

Марк Солонин



МОЗГОИМЕНЕ
ФАЛЬШИВАЯ ИСТОРИЯ
ВЕЛИКОЙ ВОЙНЫ

Abstract

The toughest and most uncompromising book by one of the most popular military historians! With a minimum of numbers and technical details, relying on common sense, clear logic and indisputable facts, the author ridicules the clumsy tricks of charlatans from history, who are trying to confuse people with deliberate and gross lies. On the pages of this book, the reader will again come across numerous Soviet and recent pseudo-historical fabrications. "General agreement between the NKVD and the Gestapo", "Stalin's secret scenario for the start of the war", "defense plan of 1941", "through transportation of Red Army units to the English Channel", "Stalin's secret negotiations with Wolf in Mtsensk" and much, much more the other - these are examples of that enchanting delirium that the author exposes. Mark Solonin is sure that the genre of "documentary fakes" that has arisen in recent years, as well as the wide and unhindered distribution of

graphomaniac writings, is very dangerous, and therefore must meet a resolute and firm rebuff from the scientific community. That is the purpose of this book.

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Mark Solonin

Mozgoimenie: False History of the Great War

Stupidity is a priceless gift from God, but this gift should not be abused.

Bismarck

From the author

When the trees were big, and I could easily fit under the table, it was customary in our country to work. Every morning, trams, hung with clusters of people, crawled away along the bridge at the intersection of Krasny Kommunarov Street with 22nd Party Congress Street (I was brought to this intersection from the maternity hospital) in the direction of huge, smoking and buzzing factories. They hummed in earnest. A low, steady and endless rumble filled the world every evening. Until the age of five, I thought that the evening is when it gets dark and buzzes. Then the test bench of the aircraft engine plant was carried out far beyond the city, and the buzzing stopped. But people still continued to work. In my vague childhood memories remained the triumphant voice of Levitan, who reported on new space flights and giant dams that blocked the mighty Siberian rivers. It was clear even

to a schoolboy of middle classes and abilities that the people who designed the rocket, calculated the flight path of the spacecraft, made an aircraft engine, the turbine of which burns, but does not burn out in a raging blue-white flame, are very smart people who learned a lot, a lot learners who know things that others don't. And any qualified turner understood that the modeller (this is not the one who walks the catwalk in white pants, but the master with golden hands who carves an exact copy of the future casting from wood) knows and knows what he, the turner, does not know. And vice versa. This is where they caught us. On the natural for every working person

respect for the knowledge and skills of another working person. On the subconscious (but very strong) idea of the "presumption of qualification" of every engineer, doctor, geologist, musician, grain grower ... The Soviet worker could not assume and believe that the Soviet "Doctor of Historical Sciences" is not at all the same Sciences, who invented the synchrophasotron. In the head of a normal person, the thought that behind the long signature: "Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor,

Head of the Department of Contemporary History," a fat official is hiding, who, firstly, knows nothing, and secondly, does not want to know anything about the latest (as well as any other) history. But he doesn't want to know anything because he wants to sleep peacefully and live beautifully, and live not on the street of Red Communards covered with soot from factory pipes, but somewhere on Frunzenskaya Embankment in Moscow. But they were not allowed to enter Frunzenskaya Embankment just like that. Only "socially close" were needed there. Only those who, with their solid appearance and awe-inspiring signature, will seal (from the word "fasten") wild nonsense, the highest prescribed for distribution in the department of agitation and propaganda of the Central Committee of the

CPSU. The Central Committee of the CPSU no longer exists. And there is no more agitation department with propaganda. And the nameplates on many streets have changed. Tsar-Emperor Nicholas the Bloody was declared almost a "holy martyr." The knight of the revolution, Felix Edmundovich, was declared a "bloody executioner." Everything is mixed up in our common house. Presumably, because of this fuss and confusion, no one guessed on the very day when the iron statue of Dzerzhinsky floated in the air above the excited crowd, to cancel with one decree all scientific degrees and titles received at the departments of the history of the CPSU, scientific communism and other "latest stories". And in vain did not guess. Oh

And now the former "cadres" without a shadow of embarrassment call themselves "Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Head of the Department of Political Science of the International Academy of Marketing, Franchising and Bubble Peeling." They still lecture students on fly-infested abstracts from thirty years ago. And at the same time they sternly wave their hooked finger, demanding "stop rewriting history." One such "frame" in all seriousness explained to me that Viktor Suvorov (with whom I had the pleasure of communicating many times both on the air and in private conversations) does not exist at all, and behind this pseudonym is a group of seasoned anti-Soviet, CIA and MI staffers -6, which was irrefutably established by "very serious institution" (eyes and finger raised: **"Well, you, young man, should understand what I mean..."**). Nevertheless, the Earth is spinning, and the process, once launched, cannot be stopped. With impunity to soar people's brains in the era

The Internet, satellite television and book publishing, dependent only on the wallet of buyers, is becoming increasingly difficult. I am calm about the students: most of them do not go to lectures, regularly buying (with their parents' money, of course) control, term papers and theses.

Professors who are socially close to any loafer are usually condescending towards such pranks of young people. Those few who need a diploma only as an appendix to knowledge have the opportunity to read serious studies of conscientious historians. It's scary to say, but for this they are no longer expelled from the institute, they are not driven to the "special psychiatric hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs", they don't "sew cases" under articles 70 and 190.1 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, they don't plant drugs ...

But what about those who are of student age and young idleness has already left, who has to "spin" from morning to evening, who has time for reading only in a subway car or in a train compartment? I can't help but advise them to get money out of their wallet and buy one of my thick military history books. Well, what working person can master these 500-600 pages in small print, with tables, graphs and maps of past battles?! From these sad thoughts, the idea was born to write a simple and cheerful book that will help the reader to get acquainted and with laughter part with the most striking examples of Russian historical "brain-having". And along the way, learn something new about our unpredictable history. However, even reading this book from any place diagonally in the subway car, do not lose sight, dear reader, of one very important, fundamentally important detail: for ridicule and public disgrace, I expose not war heroes, not veterans who returned from the front on crutches, not your grandfather and not your father, but only those parasites and rogues who for many decades turned the spread of deliberately false fabrications about the circumstances and causes of our greatest tragedy into a profitable personal trade.

Chapter

1 "Degenerative signs of degeneration"

Over the years, my computer's memory has accumulated a great many different examples of "brain-having". Each is good and handsome in his own way, each deserves public reproach. Where to begin? According to the rules of didactics, one should move "from simple to complex". That is great. We will not invent new rules and in the first chapter we will present such vigorous nonsense, which, even without being something particularly significant in essence, are remarkable in that they show us the very bottom of the "well of ignorance", from which we should get out as soon as

possible. I grant the honorary right to open a gallery to one amusing statement that delighted me with its ultimate, diamond-like transparency and simplicity, comparable only to the chemical formula of a diamond. In addition, this is one of the most recent examples known to me.

In 2007, the Yauza-EKSMO publishing house decided to gather under one cover historians of the most diverse, one might say diametrically opposed views, who were faced with the same question: what was the main reason for the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941? This is how the collection of articles "The Great Patriotic Catastrophe" appeared. A well-known historian, head of the statistics department of the Institute of Military History under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Colonel, Candidate of Historical Sciences M. E. Morozov (if at this point Miroslav Eduardovich has already become a doctor of science, then I apologize and offer him my congratulations) wrote an article for this collection "The defeat in the summer of 1941 was natural." The title, for my taste, is a little heavy, but the main idea is expressed in a soldierly way clearly and clearly.

By the way, I also believe that in the summer of 1941 the defeat was natural and inevitable. True, the coincidence of our views ends on this statement. Colonel Morozov on 93 pages

develops the idea, traditional for all Soviet historiography, that "history gave us little time" and the Soviet Union was not ready for war in material and technical terms. But I believe that the notorious "history" gave Stalin an unacceptably long time, and the 20-year corruption of the people, the ferocious destruction of all norms of morality and morality led the people and the army to a completely incompetent state. Let us return, however, to the article by M. E. Morozov. Since this article was

devoted to military aviation, it, of course, spoke about the hopelessly outdated Soviet aircraft, which cannot be compared with enemy aircraft. So, on page 299 the following is literally said: **"... the horizontal speed of the Junkers Ju-88 was one and a half times higher than the speed of the Ar-2."** Yes, of

course, a front-line bomber is not valuable for speed alone, and yet - a lag in speed of one and a half

times ... This is serious. With such technical backwardness, defeat really begins to seem natural and inevitable. Nevertheless, I would like to know the specific numbers of speeds. Don't worry, dear reader! I am not at all going to wave papers with flight test reports and "load" you with polemics about the reliability of these reports. God forbid! I promised - everything will be extremely transparent and simple. On page 249, Colonel Morozov reports that the maximum speed of the Ar-2 bomber (this aircraft was a deep modification of the most massive pre-war SB bomber) was **480 km / h**. Morozov determines the speed of the SB sample in 1939 in the same place at 450 km / h.

And on page 298 you can find out that the maximum speed bomber "Junker" Ju-88 was **450 km / h**.

This is how we write history. If you can't, but really want to, then you can. If you really want to rub in the public the thesis about the "technical backwardness" of the Soviet Air Force, then **the number 450 will be one and a half times more than the number 480**. But that's not all. An important clarification is needed: the speeds are indicated in the tables, which not every reader will still study, but the final conclusion about the overwhelming superiority of the Junkers is given in plain text!

What was it? An unfortunate oversight - or the work of a true master of brainwashing? I can not know. With this question - to the colonel.

The second in a row is the famous, which has already managed to set the teeth on the teeth of specialists, but still stunning the gullible public, ***"General Agreement on Cooperation, Mutual Assistance, Joint Activities between the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR and the Main Directorate of Security of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (Gestapo) "***. I really love this text. I use it in the very cases about which A.S. Pushkin wrote: ***"When black thoughts come to you, uncork a bottle of champagne or reread The Marriage of Figaro."*** Life is not easy these days, "black thoughts"

often come to mind, and no liver can withstand such an alcoholic load. As for the immortal comedy of Beaumarchais, it simply "rests" next to such pearls: ***"The parties will fight against the degeneration of mankind in the name of the improvement of the white race and the creation of eugenic mechanisms of racial hygiene. The types and forms of degeneration subject to sterilization and destruction were determined by the parties by additional protocol No. 1, which is an integral part of this agreement ... "*** Additional protocol No. 1 indicates ***"types of qualification of degenerative signs of degeneration"***, against which the NKVD and the Gestapo decided to fight together, namely: ***"red, oblique, lame-footed and club-handed from birth, having speech defects - lisping, burr, stuttering (congenital), witches and sorcerers, shamans and clairvoyants, humpbacked, dwarfs, persons with large birthmarks and a plurality of small ones, skin covering of different colors, different colors of eyes, etc."***

This fake, unparalleled in its stupid wretchedness, ends like this: ***"The text of the agreement is printed in Russian and German in a single copy, each of which has the same force ..."*** The mysterious Agreement was signed by ***the "Head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank L. Beria and Head of the Fourth Directorate (Gestapo) of the Main Directorate of Security***

SS Brigadeführer G. Müller of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany.

Even the exact minute at which the historic event took place is indicated: ***“Done in Moscow, November 11, 1938 at 3:40 pm.”***

Comrade

V. Karpov, the former head of the Union of Writers of the USSR, a former deputy of the Supreme Soviet and a former member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, intensively promoted this feverish nonsense in the media. Thanks to such a signature, a crudely crafted fake, not worthy of even the slightest mention, became the object of wide discussion, constant quoting, etc. However, the authorship of the text does not belong to Karpov at all. In 1999, it was published by a certain G.S. Nazarov, a figure widely known in narrow circles of ideological fighters against the dominance of Euromasons (they are also “Jew Masons”). The “document” was published in a magazine with a wonderful title for publications of this kind “Miracles and

Adventures” (1999, No. 10.) However, I do not exclude that Nazarov just rewrote the text invented by someone else. At least, I came across this “General Agreement” with reference to some kind of “Memory” No. 1/1999. In any case, only in the organisms of the fighters exhausted by narzan with ***“red, lisping and burry”*** could a fake be born with such a set of gross errors: - On November 11, 1938, G.

Müller could not have ended up in Moscow. He was in Berlin, and he had a lot of things to do that day. On the night of November 9-10, 1938, on the personal instructions of Hitler, an all-German Jewish pogrom was carried out, which went down in history under the name “Kristallnacht”. 267 synagogues, 815 shops and businesses were destroyed and burned, 20,000 Jews were arrested and thrown into concentration camps. A spontaneous explosion of “popular anger” of this magnitude had to be organized, directed and controlled, 20 thousand people had to be transported to camps. All this huge work fell on the shoulders of the leaders of the punitive organs of Germany, including Müller, whose personal participation in the events of Kristallnacht is confirmed by many

testimonies; - both the Main Directorate of Imperial Security (RSHA), and the Gestapo, which was part of it, were state

("imperial" in the terminology adopted in Nazi Germany), and not party institutions at all. There was no **"Main Security Directorate of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany"** in November 1938. By that time, the NSDAP had become a monopoly ruling party, and on the basis of its paramilitary structures, punitive bodies of the fascist state were created. In order to find out about this, it is not at all necessary to sit in the dust of libraries for months. The abbreviation RSHA (RSHA), known to everyone who watched the "movie about Stirlitz", is precisely formed from the word "Reichs", that is, "imperial". The word "Gestapo" is also an abbreviation, in which the letters "sta" stand for the word "stats", i.e. "state". The full name of this criminal organization: Geheime Staatspolizei, i.e. "Secret State Police"; e.

- all the titles and positions of the "signers" are chaotically mixed up. At the time of the preparation of the mythical "Agreement", Muller, with the rank of "SS Standartenführer", headed the 2nd department of the Main Directorate of the Security Police and the SD. The Main Directorate of Imperial Security was created on September 27, 1939, that is, almost a year after Muller's fictitious "visit" to Moscow. A year later, on December 14, 1940, Muller was awarded the title of "SS Brigadeführer", which is spelled that way, and not "BrigadeNführer". The preamble to the "General Agreement" states that Müller is acting on the basis of a power of attorney issued to him by **"SS Reichsführer Reinhard Heydrich."** The personal title "Reichsfuehrer SS" had a single person - G. Himmler. As for R. Heydrich, he really was Muller's immediate superior, however, in a more "modest", general rank of "SS Gruppenfuehrer" (later, in 1941 - "SS Obergruppenfuehrer"); - finally, such nonsense as **"a single copy, each of which is kept"** and the use of the clerical term **"printed"** instead of "composed" do not deserve a detailed discussion. For all that, the cooperation of the NKVD with the punitive organs of Nazi Germany is an indisputable fact. That's just the subject of this cooperation was not the fight against "red, oblique and multi-colored", but much more significant tasks for Hitler and Stalin.

After the Wehrmacht and the Red Army occupied Poland in September 1939, the two dictatorial regimes were faced with the task of fighting the Polish resistance movement. This struggle required the interaction of punitive structures. The legal basis for such interaction was the Secret Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Friendship and Border, signed in Moscow on September 28, 1939. Here is the full text of this Protocol: ***“Mr. Moscow September 28, 1939 The undersigned***

Plenipotentiaries

***at the conclusion
of the Soviet-German Treaty on the border and friendship
stated their agreement on the following: Both sides will not allow
any Polish agitation***

***in their territories that affects the territory of another country.
They will eradicate the germs of such agitation in their territories
and will inform each other about the appropriate measures for this.
By authorization For the German Government J. Ribbentrop For
the Government of the***

USSR V.

Molotov. The

text of the Protocol is stored in
the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the

Russian Federation (AVP RF, f. 06, on. 1, p. 8, d. 77, l. 4).

Published, in particular, in the two-volume collection of documents
“1941. Documents” (Book 2, p. 587). Within the framework of the

proclaimed "friendship" there was also "the repatriation of German subjects located on the territory of the USSR." Moreover, behind this strange formula, two diametrically opposed processes were hidden. On the one hand, the Germans arrested during the Great Terror of 1937–1938 were released from prisons and camps. on charges of espionage. On the other hand, German and Austrian anti-fascists, who found in 1933-1939. refuge in the "country of the victorious proletariat". In a word, the NKVD and the Gestapo had a lot of common affairs and concerns, but these issues were resolved in working order, without writing the spreading "General Agreements".

Chapter

2 Stirlitz Volfovich

If the idea of fighting “redheads and burrs” is still in the farthest corner of subconscious fears and human prejudices overgrown with mold and cobwebs, then the history of the Great Patriotic War still remains (and will remain for a long time) one of the most “hot” the most painful points of public consciousness. It cannot be otherwise in a country that has brought millions of human lives to the altar of this unprecedented sacrifice. Accordingly, any hoaxer (or just a graphomaniac who has fallen into insanity) who has composed another “sensational document” is guaranteed to receive his portion of Herostratus glory. Comrade V. Karpov, mentioned above, could not resist the desire to get a portion, who revealed to us the secret of Stalin's “secret separate negotiations” with the German command, allegedly taking place in February 1942 in the city of Mtsensk occupied by the Wehrmacht. With both funny and sad pride in such a situation, V. Karpov told reporters (an

interview in Komsomolskaya Pravda on October 17, 2002) that he had “the so-called number one **clearance, which gives the right to work with top secret documents.**” Further, Karpov's reports on the practical use of “permit number one” vary. In some interviews, he says that he found documents about the “negotiations in Mtsensk” in Stalin's former personal office (like lying around under the table), in others Stalin's office is also present, but this office allegedly houses a “especially secret archive”, access to which is open only to holders of the secret “clearance number one”. When asked about the location of the documents, V. Karpov replied to the columnist of the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper M. Deutsch quite simply: **“Here's another! Would you like the keys to the apartment on a silver platter?”**

Could all this be true? No, he can not. The probability of discovering top secret documents under such

circumstances is zero. Not one hundred millionth, but exclusively and only zero. I tell you why. More than 50 years have

passed since Stalin's death. But even five days should have been enough to ensure that not a single document lying ownerless on the floor in Stalin's office (cottage, apartment, car) was left. Currently, the secret documents touched by the Owner's hand can be in two and only two possible states: they are either destroyed, or credited, numbered and registered in the appropriate archives. In principle, it is impossible to find a document on separate negotiations with the Germans under the table. Theoretically, such a document can be found in the archive, but then the publisher of the document must say four magic words: "fund, inventory, file, sheet." Without these words, the historical document does not exist. It can only be a fake - more or less crudely crafted. But that's not all. The holder of "clearance number one" (as well as "clearance two" and "three") must

understand that ***"the right to work with top secret documents"*** absolutely does not imply the right to PUBLISH secret documents. This is the alphabet that everyone who has really worked with secret documents knows. This "alphabet" consists of a special closed room, a secret notebook with stitched and numbered pages, a guarded safe in which this notebook is placed every evening, a field communication, which only has the right to move the notebook that has become secret from point A to point B, and so on. If the document has not yet been declassified, then any copy of this document, any extract from it, even a simple mention of its existence, is not subject to open publication. Violation of this order is a criminal offense. Every holder of a "clearance" signed that he was warned about the responsibility for disclosure.

If the document has already been declassified, then it can be published, but only with the obligatory indication of the fund, inventory, file and sheet. This was invented by people so that anyone - and by law (I won't say that "in life") any citizen of the Russian Federation has the right to familiarize himself with any declassified document - can come to the archive, name the "fund, inventory, case, sheet" of interest to him " And

to check whether the publisher rewrote the document correctly, whether he forgot something, whether he added **“degenerative signs of degeneration” on his own.**

Having done away with this "educational program", let's move on to clarifying the only remaining question: how well was the fake describing the notorious "negotiations in Mtsensk" made? Here are these two “documents” composed by V. Karpov or those who decided to play a trick on the old man (at the time of publication, V. Karpov was already well over 80 years old): **“Proposals to the German command. 1.**

***From May 5, 1942, starting at 6 o'clock,
cease hostilities along the entire front line. To declare a truce until
August 1, 1942, by 18:00. 2. Starting from August 1, 1942 and until December
22, 1942, German***

***troops must withdraw to the lines indicated in diagram No. 1. It is
proposed to establish the border between Germany and the USSR along
the length indicated in diagram No. 1. 3. After the redeployment of armies
By the end of 1943, the armed forces of the***

***USSR will be ready to begin military operations with the German armed
forces against England and the USA.***

***4. The USSR will be ready to consider the conditions for declaring
peace between our countries and to accuse international Jewry represented
by England and the United States of instigating the war, to conduct joint
military offensive operations in the next 1943-1944 in order to reorganize
the world space (diagram No. 2). Note: In case of refusal to comply with the
above requirements in***

***paragraphs 1 and 2, the German troops will be defeated, and the
German state will cease to exist on the political map as such.***

***Warn the German command of responsibility. Supreme Commander
of the USSR I. STALIN Moscow; Kremlin February 19, 1942
No. 1/2428 February 27, 1942 To
Comrade STALIN***

REPORT

During negotiations in Mtsensk on February 20–27, 1942, with a representative of the German command and the chief of the personal staff of the Reichsführer SS, SS Gruppenführer Wolf, the German command did not find it possible to satisfy our demands. Our side

was asked to leave the borders to the end 1942 on the front line as it is, ceasing hostilities.

The government of the USSR must immediately put an end to Jewry. To do this, it would be necessary to initially resettle all Jews in the region of the far north, isolate, and then completely destroy. At the same time, the authorities will carry out the protection of the outer perimeter and a strict curfew on the territory of the group of camps. The Jews themselves will deal with the destruction (killing) and disposal of the corpses

of the Jewish population. The German command does not rule out that we can create a united front against England and the USA. After consultations with Berlin, Wolf stated that during the reorganization of the world, if the leadership of the USSR accepted the demands of the German side, Germany

might push its borders in the east in favor of the USSR. The German command, as a sign of such changes, will be ready to change

the color of the swastika on the state banner from black to red. When

discussing positions under scheme No. 2, the following differences arose: 1. Latin America. Should belong to Germany. 2. Difficult attitude to understanding "Chinese civilization". According to the German command, China should become an occupied country. 3. The Arab world should be a German protectorate in northern Africa. Thus,

as a result of the negotiations, a complete divergence of views and positions should be noted. The representative of the German command, Wolf, categorically denies the possibility of defeating the German armed forces and defeat in the war. In his opinion, the war with Russia would drag on for several more years and end with a complete victory for Germany. The main calculation is made on the fact that, in their opinion, Russia, having lost strength and resources in

to return to negotiations on a truce, but on tougher terms, after 2-3 years. First

***Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
(MERKULOV)***

Well, what can I say? It's not even fake. This is more of a prank, a stupid joke, a banter. The authors of the text (I repeat once again the assumption that someone evil and stupid slipped this scribble on Karpov, wanting to laugh at a well-deserved, but, alas, already too old man) do not even try to give their work a moderately plausible look.

"The German command, as a sign of

such changes, will be ready to change the color of the swastika on the state banner from black to red." In the third year of the world war of extermination, the color of heraldic signs was the last thing that could excite Stalin and the "German command". But in this particular case, the proposal is completely absurd, since the color of the "state banner" (in Russian it is called the "state flag") of Nazi Germany was red. A red swastika on a red flag is already outright banter.

SS Gruppenfuehrer Wolf appeared in this story for the same reason that the "General Agreement" between the NKVD and the Gestapo was "signed" to the brigadeNfuehrer Müller. The authors of the fake openly mock the reader, whose knowledge is limited to multiple viewings of the legendary "movie about Stirlitz." If the authors of the fake tried to be convincing, then they could "appoint" Heydrich, Reichenau, Bock, Model, Kluge, the hanged Jodl, Canaris or Keitel, who did not live to see the surrender of Germany, as negotiators. Of the heroes of the film "Seventeen Moments of Spring", Himmler who was poisoned or Kaltenbrunner, who was executed in 1946 by the verdict of a military court, would fit perfectly.

But Karl Wolf is completely unsuitable for the role of a participant in top-secret negotiations with the Soviet leadership. For the simplest and most obvious reason - he lived too long and died 39 years after the end of the war. K. Wolf wrote memoirs, dozens of historians and journalists talked to him. And if in his turbulent biography there was at least something reminiscent of negotiations with

Stalin's representative, then not only the holder of "clearance number one", but also any American student would know about it. During the years of the Cold War, the story of how Stalin, behind the backs of the Allies, conducted separate negotiations with the Nazis, and in those very days when American and British sailors delivering military supplies to Murmansk died in the icy waters of the North Atlantic, would become "propaganda bomb number one. But Wolf never told anyone about any "negotiations in Mtsensk". And what is the

signature **"Supreme Commander of the USSR"!** The USSR did not have a "commander-in-chief". And among the many positions of Stalin, there was no such one. Stalin was the Supreme Commander of the Red Army. And also the Chairman of the State Defense Committee, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the People's Commissar of Defense, the Chairman of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the General Secretary (sometimes in documents he simply wrote "secretary") of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks). The Supreme Commander of the Red Army wrote competently and clearly. He couldn't come up with such clumsy phrases as **"to**

establish a border in extent" or "combat offensive operations in order to organize world space." This is form. The content is even more moronic. Germany had a totalitarian regime. Hitler was the head of this regime. The command of the Wehrmacht carried out his sole orders. Questions of world reorganization, the division of Latin America, "Chinese civilization" and the "Arab world in northern Africa" could be discussed either with Hitler or with the generals who decided to overthrow Hitler. The third is simply not given. In Hitler's Germany there was no place for a legal opposition playing according to the constitutional rules.

For negotiations with Hitler (or with his proxies), one had to go not to the destroyed front-line Mtsensk, but to any of the capitals of states that maintained diplomatic relations with both Germany and the USSR (Sofia, Istanbul, Stockholm, etc.). That is how things were done. In a calm, comfortable environment. In a restaurant with good food. In the front-line city, it was only possible to conduct negotiations with the conspiring generals. But the fight against "international Jewry" (on this fad, either the compiler of the fake, or Karpov himself obviously went crazy) will never

was the number one issue for the command of the Wehrmacht. Moreover, most of this command clearly understood the danger and perniciousness for Germany of Hitler's pathological anti-Semitism. However, Hitler himself, in the course of very real negotiations with Molotov in November 1940, never raised this topic, and even more so, he did not discuss the issue of "disposal of the corpses of the Jewish population" along with the problems of a global

redivision of the world. Just as delusional is the specific content of the "offers". The chronology is as follows: from May 5 to August 1, 1942 (and exactly until 18 hours!) The "truce" lasts. Wonderful. What will happen after 6 p.m.? **"Starting from August 1, 1942 and until December 22, 1942, German troops must withdraw to the line."**

Does the "truce" continue? If so, why is its deadline indicated only "until 18:00 on August 1"? Why does it take 5 months to "retreat to the frontier"? At the end of September 1939, the disengagement of Soviet and German troops took place on the territory of defeated Poland. A joint document was drawn up, indicating the real timeframes and milestones. The withdrawal rate is 20 km per day. Twenty. With such a normal pace of the march, in 5 months the Germans had to reach the Atlantic and drown in it ...

Complete apofigure comes, however, in the "Note": "In case of refusal to fulfill the above requirements ***in paragraphs 1 and 2, the German troops will be defeated, and the German state will cease to exist on the political map as such. Warn the German command of responsibility.***

Absolutely sloppy syllable ("***existence on the political map as such***"). Completely absurd logic. If you think you have the strength to smash and destroy, then smash; tearing a vest on his chest and yelling "seven hold me" in serious negotiations at a high level is somehow not accepted.

Such a defiant tone (and even with a "warning of responsibility") is absolutely uncharacteristic of real documents of that era. Here, for example, in what terms Germany declared war on the USSR on the morning of June **22, 1941** :

compelled to immediately take military countermeasures." And point. This is the last sentence of the statement of the German government. No ***"existence on the political map"*** was ever discussed.

Was it worth spending so many letters to refute an obvious fake? Of course not - if this nonsense with depressing constancy did not surface first in one place, then in another. Quite recently, in front of millions of viewers of Channel One, a well-known Moscow theater director, waving some kind of newspaper, literally with foam on his lips, was in a hurry to inform the public about this "historical sensation". God be with him, with the director - people of this specialty, apparently, cannot live without a little "crazy". But why didn't the TV show host, the highly experienced and erudite V. Pozner, call the orderlies at the first mention of the "negotiations in Mtsensk"? On June 21–22, 2007, Komsomolskaya Pravda, with the subtitle

"Copies of documents published in V. Karpov's book The Generalissimo, became the loudest sensation in the historiography of the Great Patriotic War," published another article about the "negotiations in Mtsensk." For the sake of truth, it should be noted that the content of the article completely contradicted the subtitle, and this time "the loudest sensation" was recognized as an ordinary fake. However, the question posed in the title of the article is "Did Stalin offer an alliance to Hitler?" — remained unanswered. By default, the reader must assume that if Karpov's "documents" turned out to be graphomaniac nonsense, then there was no alliance between Stalin and Hitler. Strictly speaking, we have before us another example of "brain-having", only in this case it is of much better quality. The question of whether Stalin offered an alliance to Hitler is rhetorical. That is,

such questions, the answer to which has long been known for sure. In search of an answer, there is no need to crawl under the table in Stalin's office, while waving "clearance number one." Everything is much easier. On September 30, 1939, all the central newspapers of the USSR published the following text of the statement of the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop: ***"My stay in Moscow was again short, unfortunately too***

short. Next time I hope to stay here longer.

Nevertheless, we made good use of these two days. The following was

clarified: 1. German-Soviet friendship has now been finally established. 2. Both sides will never allow third powers to interfere in Eastern European issues.

3. Both states want peace to be restored and that England and France stop the absolutely senseless and hopeless struggle against Germany. 4. If, however, arsonists take over in these countries

war, then Germany and the USSR will know how to respond to this.

For those who were born, grew up and grew old in New Zealand, I hasten to explain that even a report about new milk yields on the Krasny Serp collective farm went through many stages of the strictest censorship before appearing on the front page of the Pravda newspaper. The text of Ribbentrop's statement, in which direct threats were made on behalf of "Germany and the USSR" against the "Anglo-French warmongers", was, of course, previously agreed with the Soviet side. Moreover, Comrade Stalin was the only person who could give permission for such a publication.

Can Ribbentrop's ominous allusions be regarded as a document about the alliance between Stalin and Hitler? Of course not. Only the very tip of the iceberg appeared on the front page of Pravda. A specific discussion of the conditions for creating an aggressive alliance of four totalitarian states began on November 12–13, 1940, during Molotov's official visit to Berlin and his negotiations with Hitler. After Molotov returned to Moscow, on November 25, 1940, the Soviet version of the conditions for creating the "Rome-Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo Axis" was personally handed by Molotov to the German Ambassador, Count Schulenburg. Hitler's answer was silence, which ended at dawn on June 22, 1941. But the document remained! And the fact that this document existed did not allow the Kremlin rulers to sleep peacefully, after the Stalinist empire, by an amazing and absurd coincidence, became a member of the "anti-Hitler coalition of democratic countries." I'm not kidding, that's what it was then called. Immediately

after the war, at the direction of Stalin, a special body was created, which was called differently in different documents: "the government commission for the Nuremberg trials",

"commission for the leadership of the Nuremberg Trials". The commission included such experienced "workers of justice" as Beria's deputies, comrades Abakumov, Kobulov and Merkulov. The head of the commission was entrusted to the chief Stalinist "jurist" Vyshinsky, who forever glorified his name with a chased formula: "the confession of the accused is the queen of evidence." The main goal of the commission was to under no circumstances allow a public discussion of the facts of Soviet-German cooperation in 1939-1941 in Nuremberg. An indelible shame on the conscience of the leaders of democratic states remains the list of issues officially agreed with Stalin that are **"inadmissible for discussion in court."** What kind of "court" is this, which in advance waives its obligation to find and examine ALL relevant facts and documents?

However, the unnatural union of democracy (albeit very imperfect) with tyranny (which has never been equal in the history of mankind) could not last long. In 1948, a package of documents found in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry seized by the Western allies was published in the collection Nazi-Soviet Relations (which can be translated as "the relationship between Nazi Germany and the USSR"), which truly became **"the loudest sensation in the historiography of the war."** For more

than forty years, Soviet historians have angrily denounced this "impudent trick of the bourgeois falsifiers." Mountains of books were written and hundreds of dissertations were defended. Then, after receiving the command "lights out", the second copies of the documents were found in the Soviet (now - Russian) archives. So, in the Archive of the President of Russia (AP RF f. 3, op. 64, file 675, l. 108) a typewritten text of the Soviet conditions for the creation of a "four-powers union" was preserved, and even with Molotov's own handwritten note:

"Transferred to Mr. **Schulenburg by me**

on November 25, 1940. And the signature: V. Molotov. Here is the text of the original document (quoted from the collection "1941. Documents", Book 1, p. 417). Of course, it is not as beautiful as the "General Agreement against Redheads," but if you carefully think about its content and possible consequences, it is much more terrible:

“The USSR basically agrees to accept the draft four-power pact on their political cooperation and mutual economic assistance, set out by Mr. Ribbentrop in his conversation with V. M. Molotov in Berlin on November 13, 1940, and consisting of 4 points, under the following conditions: 1.

If German troops will now be withdrawn from Finland (in fact, there was nothing to withdraw, since the first units of the Wehrmacht were deployed in Finland only in June 1941 - *M.S.*), ***representing the sphere of influence of the USSR according to the Soviet-German agreement 1939, and the USSR undertakes to ensure peaceful relations with Finland, as well as the economic interests of Germany in Finland (export of timber, nickel).***

2. If in the coming months the security of the USSR in the Straits is ensured by concluding a pact of mutual assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria, which, by its geographical position, is in the sphere of security of the Black Sea borders of the USSR, and the organization of a military and naval base of the USSR in the area of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on the

basis of a long-term rent. 3. If the center of gravity of the aspiration of the U.S.S.R. in the south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf.

4. If Japan gives up its concession rights for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin on terms of fair compensation. In accordance

with the above, the draft protocol to the 4-Power Treaty, presented by Mr. Ribbentrop on the delimitation of spheres of influence, should be changed in the spirit of determining the center of gravity of the aspiration of the USSR in the south of Batum and Baku in the general direction to the Persian Gulf (the Germans

proposed to direct the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean, Stalin, through the mouth of Molotov, specified that he was much more interested in oil than Indian tea and elephants with er

In the same way, the draft Protocol-Agreement between Germany, Italy, the USSR and Turkey outlined by Mr. Ribbentrop should be changed in the spirit of securing the military and naval base of the USSR near the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on the basis of a long-term lease with a guarantee of the 3 powers of the independence and territory of Turkey in if Turkey agrees to join the four powers.

This protocol should provide that in the event of Turkey's refusal to join the four powers, Germany, Italy and the USSR agree to develop and implement the necessary military and diplomatic measures, on which a special agreement should be concluded.

If the political, economic and military cooperation between Nazi Germany and the Stalinist USSR in the period 1939-1941. is a reliable fact, then on the issue of separate negotiations during the Soviet-German war, it remains only to build very shaky hypotheses. There is very little documentary material to build any substantiated version of events. Let's try to briefly summarize the crumbs of information available.

First. Neither in the archives of the defeated Third Reich, nor in the testimonies of the leaders of the Nazi regime who appeared before the court, nor in the memoirs of those who were able to survive the "first wave" of retribution (at least 480 fascists were executed by the verdicts of military tribunals), there are no information about actually held separate Soviet-German negotiations. This is a serious argument in favor of the fact that if something happened, then this "something" did not advance further than a preliminary sounding of the intentions of the parties.

Second. There is a completely reliable document: "Explanatory note by P. A. Sudoplatov to the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated August 7, 1953." (Kept in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, f. 3, op. 24, file 465, pp. 204–208). By the "reliability" of the document in this case, I mean exclusively and only the reliability of the fact of the existence of the yellowed typewritten pages themselves - but by no means the proven reliability of the content.

Even the shortest story about who P. A. Sudoplatov is will take up half of this chapter. Therefore, we confine ourselves to a simple definition: A Very Big Chekist. A man with a biography that surpasses any adventurous novel. If Sudoplatov ever used the expression "to tell the truth", then he hardly understood it in the same way as most ordinary people. Sudoplatov's "explanatory note" appeared as part of the investigation of the criminal case of L. Beria. For Sudoplatov, Lavrenty Beria was a personal enemy. True, Sudoplatov ended up in prison for many years.

sent not Beria, but Khrushchev ... Taking into account all these circumstances, let's read the first few paragraphs of the document:

"I report the following fact known to me. A few days after the perfidious attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, around June 25-27, 1941, I was summoned to the office of the then People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria. Beria told me that there was a decision of the Soviet government, according to which it was necessary to find out in an unofficial way under what conditions Germany would agree to end the war against the USSR and stop the offensive of the Nazi troops. Beria explained to me that this decision of the Soviet government was intended to create conditions that would allow the Soviet government to maneuver and buy time to gather forces. In this regard, Beria ordered me to meet with the Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR, Stamenov, who, according to the information of the NKVD of the USSR, had connections with the Germans and was well known to them (further in the published text of the Notes there are ellipsis. - M.S.). Beria ordered me to put four questions in a conversation with Stamenov. Beria listed these

questions, looking in his notebook, and they boiled down to the following:

1. Why did Germany, violating the non-aggression pact, start a war against the

USSR; 2. What would suit Germany, on what conditions Germany agrees to end the war, which is necessary to end the war;

3. Will the Germans be satisfied with the transfer of such Soviet lands to Germany as the Baltic states, Ukraine, Bessarabia, Bukovina, the

Karelian Isthmus; 4. If not, what territories does Germany additionally claim.

Beria ordered me to speak with Stamenov not on behalf of the Soviet government, but to raise these questions in the course of a conversation on the topic of the military and political situation that had arisen, and also to find out Stamenov's opinion on the merits of these four

issues. The following is a detailed account of the circumstances of the preparation and holding of the meeting, which took place in the restaurant "Aragvi" in

Moscow. After that, Sudoplatov writes:

“For some time, surveillance of Stamenov’s encrypted correspondence continued. It didn’t give any results. However, this does not exclude that Stamenov could have reported this conversation through diplomatic mail or diplomatic communications of those embassies and missions whose countries had not yet participated in the war by that time. I did not receive any further instructions related to this case or the use of Stamenov. Whether Beria personally met with Stamenov, I do not know. I was not entrusted with

the organization of such a meeting ... ” This is a sounding of a possible peace agreement. Since at that moment the Soviet Union was not yet legally an ally of England and the United States, the term "separate peace" in this case is inappropriate. Judging by the information known to this day, the matter

did not advance further than cautious sounding. **Third.** It is known for certain that in the fall of 1941, Stalin blackmailed the Western allies with the possibility of concluding a separate peace with the Germans. W. Churchill, in his multi-volume History of the Second World War , cites the text of a letter sent to him by Comrade Stalin on September 3, 1941 : monthly. - ***M. S.) The Soviet Union will either be defeated or will be weakened to the point that it will lose for a long time the ability to provide assistance to its allies by active operations on the front of the fight against Hitlerism ... "There is no other*** meaning than the threat to conclude a separate peace with Hitler, this the phrase could not have. **Fourth.** It is known for certain that the first meeting of the Big Three (Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill) took place

only in December 1943 (in Tehran). It turns out that for two and a half years (!!!) the "allies" were allies, without concluding any specific agreement on the goals of the war, the tasks of the parties and the future structure of Europe. And it's very strange. The correspondence between Stalin and Roosevelt, devoted to the preparation of the meeting of the "Big Three", was published a long time ago (back in the "years of stagnation"). There were no doubts about the authenticity of the publication either in the USA or in the USSR. So, from this correspondence it follows that throughout 1943

Stalin delayed the meeting as soon as he could. Why? Was this two and a half year-long de facto refusal to conclude a comprehensive treaty with the Allies a manifestation of Stalin's desire to "keep the door open" in case a separate deal was concluded with Hitler? Don't know. And no one knows this, but questions remain ...

Chapter

3 Snow in June, or On the Question of the "Fucking Mother"

Now, from the falsifications worked out at the most primitive, amateur level, let's move on to the episode related to the discussion around the "misinformation" made by the professionals of the secret war.

At the turn of the 80-90s, our historians-publicists, as they say, "broke through." Chattering and pushing each other with their elbows, yesterday's workers of the department of agitation and propaganda rushed to open the people's eyes and divulge the Terrible Military Secret. This "terrible secret" (I dare to assume - prepared in advance in the counter-propaganda department of a more serious office than the city committee of the CPSU) was reduced, in essence, to one thesis - to the "dogma of unpreparedness." With a sorrowful sob, they began to tell us that the great achievements of Stalin's industrialization, the tanks sparkling with brilliance, and the armada of aircraft covering the sky over Red Square are all a bluff, a mirage, an obsession. Something like Stakhanov records and abundant collective farm harvests. But in fact ... But in fact, we didn't have anything. And there was nothing to fight. Plywood planes, tanks "hopelessly outdated", DOS unfinished,

one rifle for two.

A book was even published (on the whole, very good, with a large number of declassified documents) with a very characteristic name for that time: "The Hidden Truth of War" ("Russian Book". M., 1992, compiled by P. N. Knyshevsky) . In particular, from the table given in the book **"Provision of the mechanized corps of the Red Army with ammunition as of June 15, 1941"** everyone who was interested could find out that **"152-mm shots for tank guns"** ("a projectile" is what flies out of the muzzle of a gun; all together, i.e. a projectile, a fuse, a propellant charge, is called a "shot" in artillery) the mechanized corps were provided on the whole by 10%, and the mechanized corps of the Western Special Military District - by 0%. Zero,

dear comrades, naked zero. What to fight? Stones and sticks? What is the use of such mechanized corps if they have nothing

to shoot with? Terrible thing. In order not to continue to be in the position of a victim of "brain-having", learn, dear reader, to ask TWO GOLDEN QUESTIONS:

First. Small compared to what? Second.

Interest - why? And we will succeed. With whom

was the Red Army in general and its mechanized corps in particular going to fight on June 15, 1941? With the Martians? Ah, with the Germans ... So let's compare with the Germans "the availability of 152-mm shots for tank guns." Of course, there could be no 152-mm rounds in the German tank divisions. The Wehrmacht adopted calibers of 105 mm and 150 mm. So, how many 150-mm shots for tank guns were in the Wehrmacht as of June 15, 1941? I report - zero point, horseradish tenths. A source of information? No source is needed in this case. In June 1941, the Wehrmacht was not armed with a single tank armed with a 150 mm caliber gun or "at least" 105 mm. And the Pz-IV tanks, armed with a 75-mm cannon, accounted for only 14% of the total tank fleet. And until the very end of the war, serial tanks with 6-inch caliber guns did not appear in Germany. I will say more - at the beginning of the 21st century, the Bundeswehr was armed with not a single type of tank (please do not confuse a tank with a self-propelled gun), in a rotating turret of which a gun with a caliber of more than 120 mm would be placed.

By placing a 152-mm howitzer in the rotating (that is, complex in design and creating huge layout problems) turret of the KV-2 tank, Soviet engineers solved a technical problem of exceptional complexity. They don't say "little" about such miracle tanks. Even two KV-2 tanks is more than there were tanks with a 6-inch howitzer in all the armies of the world combined. But we had not two, but much more. In total, by the end of June 1941, 213 KV-2 tanks were produced. Now about interest and ammunition. What the

compilers of the table in the collection The Hidden Truth of War had in mind is absolutely impossible to understand. They do not give any explanations for their table and mysterious percentages. Security figure for ALL mechanized corps

152-mm shots to tank guns - this is even funnier than the famous "average temperature in the hospital." In June 1941, only eight (out of 29) mechanized corps were armed with KV tanks in noticeable (more than 10 units) quantities. In the entire

Western Special Military District there was one mech corps (out of six), which was armed with 22 KV-2 tanks. But the most important thing lies elsewhere. The KV-2 tank was armed not with some unique, but almost standard (tank version differed from field artillery guns by a slightly shortened barrel) 152 mm M-10 howitzer "model 1938".

Ammunition for this artillery system was produced in huge quantities. Specifically: 2642 thousand shots were available by the beginning of the war, 925 thousand shots were delivered to the troops in the second half of 1941. The ammunition load of one KV-2 tank was 36 (thirty-six) rounds. Five rounds of ammunition for all 213 tanks is a "pathetic" 38.3 thousand shots. One and a half percent of the total stock of 152-mm howitzer rounds.

There was something to fight ... It remains to be assumed (I repeat once again that the compilers of the "terrible table" did not explain - the percentage of what they consider) that the figure of 0% in relation to the Western OVO means only the absence of special concrete-piercing and marine (this is not a typo!) armor-piercing shells for a tank 152-mm howitzer.

The fact is that the KV-2 tank was created as a "tank to break through the fortified lanes." It was supposed to be used on the offensive to destroy concrete pillboxes and armored caps. To combat the latter, it was planned to use a "sea armor-piercing grenade" (in naval artillery, this ammunition was supposed to pierce the armored deck and explode inside an enemy ship). On the morning of June 22, 1941, all this "exoticism" became absolutely unnecessary, since the troops of the Western District (as well as everyone else) had to fight on their own territory, that is, where enemy concrete pillboxes could not be, by definition. The main (if not the only) task that the super-heavy KV-2 tank could solve in defense was the fight against enemy infantry, for which the standard 152-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile was the best fit ...

Let us return, however, to the question posed in the title of this chapter. The most important element of the suddenly revealed "unpreparedness" of the Soviet Union for war was the absence of a chief. That is, there was a boss, but he was completely unsuitable for a serious matter. The hidden "truth" of the war, it turns out, is that Comrade Stalin was not gullible, but super gullible. Naive and stupid. Anyone will cheat. A pupil of the institute for noble maidens, who blushes at the sight of naked horses in the street, can be considered a "genius of villainy" in comparison with the ingenuous comrade Stalin. It turns out that Stalin lovingly looked at Ribbentrop's signature on the Non-Aggression Pact, instead of ordering the troops to be brought to a "state of full readiness" ...

Do you think, dear reader, that I am joking, mocking, grossly exaggerating? If only ... For greater importance, a "foreign consultant" was called. The Israeli professor G. Gorodetsky (who, by the way, is a born Israeli, and not a repatriate from the former USSR) fully justified the high confidence placed in him. In a book with the delightful title Fatal Self-Deception. Stalin and the German attack," Comrade Gorodetsky (I don't dare to call him "Mr.") twice proved that **"... Stalin simply refused to accept intelligence reports... Stalin did not allow the military to start implementing defense plans... Stalin remained deaf to Zhukov's requests start implementing plans for deployment ... Stalin was clearly at a loss, but desperately did not want to part with his delusion ... Stalin, apparently, drove away any thought of war, he lost the initiative and was practically paralyzed ..."**

In the preface to his work, G. Gorodetsky proudly writes: **"At the cost of incredible efforts, I have gained access to a huge number of archival sources."** Wow how! It was not otherwise than that Comrade Gorodetsky, together with the

writer V. Karpov, received the coveted "permit number one". Only with such a "permit" could one get to the information that in 1941 **"winter in Moscow dragged on for an unusually long time, and even in the second week of June it snowed."** I am not kidding. I am quoting. See page 345.

A little inferior to the "foreign consultant" and local personnel. One comrade wrote the following verbatim: **"...Expecting**

an imminent defeat in the event of a war, and for himself personally - death, Stalin probably considered resistance useless, which is why he did not try to threaten Hitler or prepare for battle in time ... Realizing the proximity of the attack, Stalin did not deploy the army, did not bring it to combat readiness, substituting it for bombs - sleeping in the barracks, with planes covered with tarpaulins ... In the first days of the war, he let go of the leadership without

taking part in any affairs at all ... War" and the worst Stalinist "satrap" Lavrenty Beria. The following foul-smelling "duck" fluttered from publication to publication:

"... I again insist on the recall and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin Dekanozov, who is still bombarding me with "disinformation" about an allegedly impending attack on the USSR ... Major General V. I. Tupikov, the military attache in Berlin, radioed the same. This stupid general claims that three Wehrmacht army groups will attack Moscow, Leningrad and Kyiv ... But I and my people, Iosif Vissarionovich, firmly remember your wise plan: in 1941 Hitler will not attack us.

This nonsense called "Memorandum of L.P. Beria dated June 21, 1941" launched into circulation by the famous writer and screenwriter O. Gorchakov. The writer Gorchakov knew some of the correct words, so he embellished his opus with the following phrase: **"On the old folder where these reports are stored, the fund, inventory, file are numbered in faded purple ink."** That's great, that's great - announce, comrade writer, the specific numbers of the "fund, inventory and deeds." But Gorchakov, of course, did not do this. Which is not accidental - the so-called "Memorandum of Beria" is a 100% fake. To date, hundreds of Soviet intelligence reports

addressed to Stalin have been published. Some of them were signed by L. Beria. They never use the appeal "Yosif Vissarionovich", the appearance of expressions like "Your wise destiny", "stupid General Tupikov" and other cheap boulevards is absolutely unthinkable there. Categorical conclusions like **"in 1941**

"Hitler won't attack us" no one ever does. The clarification about the position of General Tulikov ("military attache in Berlin") was made exclusively and only for future readers of the fake - Stalin had a phenomenal memory and already knew the names of his representatives in Berlin by heart. "Note of L. Beria" is a very rough, clumsy compilation of typical myths and gossip of the perestroika "hidden truth of the war." And what - to this day, this "duck" is full of vigor and strength. A search engine on the Internet immediately gave me 271 documents in which, in all seriousness, they talk about a note with a "wise destiny." One of the "documents" is a large article signed by General of the Army Kvashnin (at that time the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army) and the President of the Academy of Military Sciences (!!!), General of the Army Gareev ... It was on

this abundantly manured soil that he fell REAL document. The FSB of the Russian Federation declassified and with reference to the Archive of the President (AP RF, f. 3, op. 50, d. 415, l. 50–52) published **"Communication of the NKGB of the USSR to I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov No. 2279 / m"** dated June 17, 1941. A "source" working at the headquarters of the German aviation reported that **"all German military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR**

are completely over, and a strike can be expected at any time." Stalin personally inscribed the following resolution on this document (I reproduce with exact observance of the spelling of the original): **"To Mr. Merkulov. You can send your "source" from the headquarters**

of the german aviation to the fucking mother. This is not a "source", but a misinformant. I. St. Oh, what a scandal! This ill-fated resolution flew from magazine to magazine, from book to book as an example of Stalin's flagrant stupidity (or pathological naivety). Still, they report to him a fool about an impending attack, and he ... How was it with the unforgettable M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin? **"But Dunka answered with ignorance ..."**

Surprisingly, even

the fiery Stalin-lovers in this situation bashfully lowered their eyes and did not stand up for their defeated idol. I do not like Stalin, and this is

In a specific case, Comrade Stalin was wrong only in one thing: it is not worthwhile for the head of the state to stoop to the use of sub-fence expressions. In fact,

Stalin was absolutely right: the disinformation was so mockingly transparent that it was difficult to refrain from harsh words in its assessment (as well as in the assessment of the incompetence of "comrade Merkulov"). Here

is the full text of the message (which, apparently, not a single perestroika journalist bothered to read beyond the first sentence): **"A source**

working at the headquarters of the German aviation reports:

1. All

German military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR are completely completed, and a blow can be expected at any time. 2. In the

circles of the aviation headquarters, the TASS message of June 6 was perceived very ironically. Emphasize that this statement cannot matter.

3. The objects of German air raids will primarily be: the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories producing individual (electrical equipment, ball bearings, tires), as well as car repair parts to aircraft

workshops.

4. Hungary will take an active part in hostilities on the side of Germany. Part of the German aircraft, mainly fighters, is already on Hungarian airfields.

5. Important German aircraft repair shops are located: in Königsberg, Gdynia, Graudenz, Marienburg, Breslavl, Milic Aircraft Workshops in Poland, in Warsaw - Ochachi and especially important ones in Heiligenkeil.

Comrade Stalin had very good reasons not to believe that as of June 17, 1941, **"all German military measures to prepare for an armed uprising against the USSR were completely completed."** This is a serious topic, it does not need to be crumpled, and we will discuss it in detail in the next chapter. Point 4, as is known today, is clear disinformation. There were no German fighters on Hungarian airfields, moreover,

the Germans had to make considerable efforts, including a provocative staging of the bombing of Kosice and Mukachevo by Soviet aircraft (at that time these cities called Kassa and Munkács were on Hungarian territory), in order to drag Hungary into the war. In June 1941, the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy, opposed this as best he could. However, in my opinion, the most important content of the disinformation message was paragraph 3. It is the most important because paragraph 3 already deals with very specific things. And this specificity inevitably betrays the disinformers. Stalin was well aware that "car repair shops in Moscow" and a power plant in Karelia

("Svir-3") could not become objects of the first strike of the Luftwaffe. The People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov also had to have a certain minimum set of knowledge in the field of theory and practice of the use of military aviation, allowing him to understand the absurdity (in this case, deliberate deceit) of this statement. So Stalin's indignation was fully justified.

From the airfields of German bomber aviation in the territory of occupied Poland to Moscow - more than a thousand kilometers one way. The same distance separated the airfields of East Prussia from the Svir River. Theoretically, the Junker Ju-88 or Heinkel He-111 could make such a long-range raid, but only with a minimal bomb load and, most importantly, without any fighter escort. The cruising (not to be confused with the maximum) speed of these aircraft was about 350 km / h. In other words, they had to spend six long hours without fighter cover in the air over the territory of the enemy, whose air defense system had not yet been suppressed - after all, we are talking about the first strike! Of course, every Hitler falcon was obliged to give his life "for the Fuhrer and Fatherland", but what was the purpose of organizing such a collective suicide?

In reality, the first German air raid on Moscow was carried out only a month after the start of the war, on the night of July 22. By that time, the front was taking place in the Yartsevo-Yelnya region, 300 km from the center of Moscow. Theoretically, this made it possible to cover the German bombers with fighters (if not on everything, then on

most of the route), but, given the huge concentration of Soviet fighter aviation forces (by July 22, there were 29 fighter regiments in the Moscow air defense system, armed with 585 fighters - about the same as the Germans had on the entire Eastern Front), the Luftwaffe command and did not dare to conduct daylight raids. From July 22 to August 15, 18 night raids were carried out on Moscow. According to Soviet air observation posts, in total (that is, in three weeks) 1,700 sorties were recorded, but only about 70 enemy bombers were able to break through to the capital.

Hitler personally formulated the task of the upcoming air attack on Moscow on July 14 as follows: ***"To strike at the center of the Bolshevik resistance and prevent the organized evacuation of the Russian government apparatus."*** As you can see, neither ***"car repair shops"*** nor even ***"factories producing individual parts for aircraft"*** were included in the list of priority facilities. And this is no coincidence - in mid-July, Hitler and his generals were not going to break and spoil Soviet factories. They counted on the fact that they would be able to overcome the last third of the journey from Brest to Moscow at the same pace at which they had covered the first two thirds. A "blitzkrieg" was planned and carried out, a merciless rapid crushing of the enemy's army, and not at all a "war of attrition", within which only air raids on factories producing "electrical equipment, ball bearings, ***tires***" ***would make sense.***

The object of the first airstrike could be - and became in reality - by no means auto repair shops in the deep rear. There was no need to guess about it: before Stalin's eyes was the practical experience of the German "blitzkrieg" in France (they got acquainted with this experience from two sources at once, since Moscow continued to maintain normal diplomatic relations with both Berlin and Vichy) and the operational plans of the Red Air Force Command Army. And what was written in them? And here's what:

"... By successive strikes of combat aircraft on established bases and combat operations in the air, destroy enemy aircraft. Gain air supremacy and powerful strikes against the main groupings of troops, railway junctions,

bridges and spans to disrupt and delay the concentration and deployment of enemy troops ... ”

These standard phrases are present in the plans for covering all western districts without exception. Could the action plan of German aviation differ significantly from this "standard", fully confirmed by the practice of air warfare on the Western Front? He could, but only in one direction - in the direction of an even greater concentration of all (or almost all) forces and means to solve one, key task. This task was to gain air superiority, and in particular - to strike at airfields based on Soviet fighter aircraft, as one of the ways to solve the main problem. In the first days and hours of the war, the command of the Luftwaffe could not be distracted by anything else - neither by the senseless bombardment of Moscow car services, nor even by the absolutely necessary actions for aviation support of ground troops and the destruction of bridges, crossings, railway stations in the operational rear of the Red Army (in modern language, this is called "isolation of the TVD"). Stalin understood this very well. That is why the clumsy attempt to deceive him with an absurd

message that "the Svir-3 power plant will be the object of German air raids in the first place" pissed off this usually extremely reserved person. But modern Russian "historians" and journalists do not understand the situation. Why? Here we meet with a very remarkable example of how "once lied" have to lie more and more. For decades, THEY have been telling us about the "multiple numerical superiority" of German aviation, "hopelessly outdated plywood fighters" and Soviet pilots who had flown only 6 hours of "box-

by-box" training turns by the start of the war. A myriad of black crows on one side, and yellow-mouthed chicks on the other. Do you think I'm exaggerating? No, I am quoting once again, this time from the memoirs of a Soviet naval commander:

“... The mighty beams of searchlights cut the cloudless starry sky and swayed like pendulums, feeling the sky, through which, growing with every second, a monotonous rumble was spreading. Finally, a fearsome armada of low-flying

aircraft. Their endless rows of crows alternately swept along the Northern Bay ... The gloomy silhouettes of still unknown bombers either flashed in the beams of searchlights, then disappeared in the void of the sky ... "The

only word of truth in this description of the first German air raid on Sevastopol is the word "alternately". In the early morning of June 22, 1941, 4 (four) German Heinkel He-111 bombers took part in a raid on the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. The planes approached the target one at a time, with long time intervals (15–25 minutes) and dropped bottom magnetic mines by parachute. In total, 8 (eight) mines were dropped, and very inaccurately: three mines exploded on land, two fell in shallow water and automatically exploded. The entry in the War Diary and the testimonies of many participants in the events indicate that one bomber was shot down and fell into the sea, however, judging by the German data, there were no irretrievable losses during the raid on Sevastopol.

Against the background of "endless rows of crows", the assumption that the Germans could afford such an unjustified "luxury" as air raids on a power plant in Karelia on the first day of the war did not seem as absurd as it really is. But Comrade Stalin did not know the number and combat capabilities of his aviation from journalists. The Luftwaffe command also had some idea of the real strength of the enemy. Simple arithmetic inexorably testified that the situation for the Germans was practically hopeless. There were very few forces. Small in comparison with the number of enemy aircraft (ie, the Soviet Air Force), small in comparison with any theoretical standards, small in comparison with the experience of previous campaigns. In May 1940, the Germans managed to concentrate on the Western Front the largest grouping of Luftwaffe

forces in the entire period of the Second World War. The offensive of the Wehrmacht on a front with a length of 300 km in a straight line (from Arnhem to Saarbrücken) was supported from the air by an aviation group, which included 27 fighter and 40 bomber air groups, 9 groups of Ju-87 dive bombers and 9 groups of multi-purpose twin-engine Me-110.

A total of 85 groups, 3641 combat aircraft. The operational density is 12 combat aircraft per kilometer of the offensive front. On

June 22, 1941, 22 fighter and 29 bomber air groups, 8 groups of Ju-87 dive bombers and 4 groups of multi-purpose twin-engine Me-110 were concentrated on the Eastern Front (even taking into account the Luftwaffe units stationed in northern Norway and Romania). A total of 63 groups, which were armed with about 2350 combat aircraft (including faulty ones). After the previous many months of fighting in the skies over England, the Balkans and the Mediterranean Sea, the technical condition of the Luftwaffe aircraft fleet was depressing. The average percentage of combat-ready aircraft was 77%. Air groups such as II / JG-77, III / JG 27.1 / StG-2, II / KG-53, III / KG-3.1 / ZG-26 arrived on the Eastern Front with less than half of the regular number of serviceable

aircraft.

In June 1941, the minimum length of the offensive front on the first day of the war was 800 km in a straight line (from Klaipeda to Sambir). Within two weeks, the width of the front almost doubled (1,400 km in a straight line from Riga to Odessa). Even without taking into account the losses of the first days of the war, the average operational density of German aviation decreased to 2 aircraft per kilometer of the offensive front (again, including faulty ones). It only remains to add to this that, according to the pre-war ideas of Soviet military science, a front-line offensive operation required the creation of densities of 20–25 aircraft per kilometer. On average, in terms of the number of fighter pilots (taking into

account the air forces of the Black Sea and Baltic fleets), Soviet aviation had a fourfold superiority over the enemy (calculation by the number of fighter aircraft leads to even higher numbers, since in many fighter regiments of the Soviet Air Force there were 1.5 - 2 times more than pilots). On the northern and southern flanks of the huge front (i.e., in the Baltic states and Ukraine), the numerical superiority of Soviet fighter aircraft was simply overwhelming: 7 to 1 in the offensive zone of the German Army Group North and 5 to 1 in the offensive zone of Army Group South ".

In such a situation, the Luftwaffe command had the only chance left, leaving some hope of success.

The Germans were forced to resort to such a risky and costly tactic as a massive strike on airfields based on Soviet fighters. We emphasize once again that this was a forced step, fraught with huge losses, but the Germans simply had no other chances, and they put all their strength into this first blow. I do not know the exact figures, but it is believed that on June 22 the Germans carried out about 2000-2500 sorties for attacks on airfields (compare this with 1700 sorties to bombard Moscow in three weeks!).

Having done with this essentially insignificant question about the "fucking mother", let's move on to a much more important question. We will talk about the sources of information that was at the disposal of the General Staff of the Red Army on the

eve of the war. Starting from the Khrushchev era and up to the present day, the favorite plot of falsifiers of history (I think it's time to return the term they invented to the students of the CPSU / KGB) are stories about how the ubiquitous Soviet intelligence got secret documents of the German command by the pood, and stupid (or naive, or mortally frightened, or "self-deceived", according to G. Gorodetsky) Stalin did not want to listen to them. Of course, this orgy of lies has intensified in the last 10-15 years. One gets the impression that the ideological heirs of "comrade Merkulov" decided to retroactively take revenge on Stalin for the disrespect shown to them, and at the same time increase the "rating" of their somewhat faded office in August 1991. So, in 1995, the FSB published a

collection of documents under the stunning title "Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table." One of the first "secrets" with which this collection begins was the report on the press conference of the British Foreign Secretary, decorated with all the necessary secrecy stamps and inscriptions like "Eustace to Alex". With no less success, any London newspaper with the materials of this press conference and a typewritten sheet with a translation of the text could be placed on Stalin's table ... Did the compilers of the collection themselves read their book? Most likely yes, since in the preface they admit in small print that

the pompous title of the collection has nothing to do with its content:

“... information about [Germany's] military preparations did not answer the main question: what is the purpose of these preparations, whether the rulers of Germany have made a political decision to attack, when aggression should be expected, what will be the strategic and tactical goals of the enemy's military operations ...”

The right answer starts with the right question. If by

"Hitler's secrets" we mean information that the possessed "Führer" hates the Communists, is obsessed with the aggressive delusion of "the exclusiveness of the Aryan race" and hatches plans to expand the "living space" of Germany at the expense of the lands of its eastern Slavic neighbors, then such secrets could be read in any Nazi newspaper. If by "military plans" we mean rumors about a possible turn of the tip of Hitler's aggression to the East in the near future, then in the spring of 1941 newspapers wrote about this and diplomats all over the world whispered about it. But for the purposes of operational planning of future hostilities, the command of the Red Army needed not rumors, but accurate and, most importantly, documented answers to the questions: "When? Where? What forces? This task - yes, undoubtedly, more difficult than collecting gossip at diplomatic receptions - Soviet intelligence could not solve. Such a disappointing conclusion finds its exact confirmation

in declassified and published in 1992-1998. plans for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

From August 1940 to March 1941, each of the currently known versions of the Grand Plan contains the following phrase in its first lines: "The ***General Staff of the KA does not have documentary data on the operational plans of potential adversaries both in the West and in the East.***" The latest version of the strategic deployment plan currently available (dated as "not earlier than May 15") does not contain this sad phrase. There is, unfortunately, no converse there either - statements about the presence of "documentary data on the operational plans of the enemy." Moreover, available in May

variant, an assessment of the probable actions of the enemy clearly indicates the success of the disinformation measures of the Nazi

special services: ***“Most likely, the main forces of the German army, consisting of 76 infantry, 11 tank, 8 motorized, 2 cavalry and 5 air, and in total up to 100 divisions will be deployed south of Deblin for strike in the direction of Kovel - Rovno - Kiev. This blow, apparently, will be accompanied by a blow in the north from East Prussia to Vilna and Riga, as well as short, concentric blows from Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk, Baranovich.*** The assumption is deeply wrong. The main

blow “by the main forces of the German army” (which should be known to every high school student today) was delivered not in Ukraine, but in the center of the Eastern Front, along the Minsk-Smolensk line. At the same time, not “short blows” were delivered from Suwalki and Brest on Volkovysk, Baranovich, but the main blows by the forces of the two most powerful tank groups of the Wehrmacht (3rd TGr Goth and 2nd TGr Guderian), and to a much greater depth and in other directions, with the task of carrying out deep coverage and encirclement of the entire grouping of Soviet troops in Belarus. What “Hitler’s secrets” were on Stalin’s table is quite clearly evidenced by the fact that it was the 4th Army of the Western Front, located in the Brest direction (i.e., at the tip of the Wehrmacht’s main attack), that turned out to be the only one (! !!) by the army of the first echelon of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts, which did not include an artillery anti-tank brigade. The German command, of course, understood that it would not be possible to hide the concentration of a 3-

million-strong army near the western borders of the USSR, therefore, it sought to mislead Soviet intelligence and the high command of the Red Army regarding specific plans for using this group. One of the components of a carefully designed, multi-link and multi-level plan of disinformation measures was an organized “information leak” that the Wehrmacht would deliver the main blows on the extreme northern and extreme southern flanks of the Eastern Front, i.e. from East Prussia (or even from Finland) and from Romania. An element of deliberate disinformation

there was also a stream of various "dates for the beginning of the war", which was supposed to eventually disorientate the leadership of Soviet intelligence.

Here is one typical example. Marshal G.K. Zhukov (on the eve of the war - Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army) writes in his memoirs: **"... On May 6, 1941, the**

People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N.G. in Berlin, captain 1st rank Vorontsov reports: ... that, according to one German officer from Hitler's headquarters, the Germans are preparing an invasion of the USSR through Finland, the Baltic states and Romania by May 14. At the same time, powerful air raids on Moscow, Leningrad and parachute landings in border centers are planned ... "

There is not a single word of truth in this message. Before us is quite standard for the spring of 1941, the German "disinformation" - the main blow on the flanks, powerful raids on Moscow, a deliberately wrong date for the start of the invasion. But what is most remarkable is that even many years after the end of the war, Zhukov is either unable to understand that he had a German fake in front of him, or openly fools ignorant readers, arguing that "the data presented in this document were of exceptional value . **However, the conclusions of Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov did not correspond to the facts cited by him and misinformed I. V. Stalin. "I believe," N. G. Kuznetsov's note said, "that the information is false** (that's right. - **M. S.**) **and is specially directed along this channel** (quite possibly. - **M. S.**) **in order to check how will the USSR react to this...**". Another part of the disinformation campaign was the persistently spreading rumors in diplomatic, journalistic and military circles that Hitler intended to present Stalin

with some new, much more stringent requirements for the supply of raw materials and food to Germany, up to the "lease of Ukraine and the oil fields of Baku". The concentration of German troops in the east was interpreted as an instrument of psychological pressure. By spreading such rumors, the German secret services sought to instill in Stalin the idea that the war would begin not with a sudden crushing blow, but with a long period.

diplomatic tension, the presentation of an "ultimatum", etc. It is difficult to say how Stalin himself reacted to this misinformation. This is a separate topic, far beyond the scope of our book. Personally, I get the impression that rumors about the upcoming Soviet-German negotiations were spread equally by both German and Soviet intelligence. In the meantime, let us note the indisputable fact that the "sources" of Soviet intelligence in Berlin systematically delivered rumors about the upcoming "ultimatum" to Moscow.

It's time to finally name these "sources". Apart from numerous journalists, businessmen, lawyers and employees of diplomatic missions accredited in Berlin - such "sources" by definition could only be carriers of rumors, and not information about the specific operational plans of the German command - there were exactly two sources:

- "a source at the headquarters of the German aviation", he is also "Foreman", he is also Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen, an officer in the intelligence department of the Luftwaffe

- headquarters; - "a source in the German Ministry of Economy", he is also a "Corsican", he is also Arvid Harnack, an assistant to the German Ministry of

Economics. These people were not "Stirlitz" abandoned in Germany. Born Germans from very privileged circles (X. Schulze Boysen was the great-nephew of Admiral Tirpitz, married to a close relative of Prince Eulenburg; Doctor of Law A. Harnack was born in the family of a famous scientist, his wife, Doctor of Philology, an American of German origin, was the leader of the community of American women in Berlin), convinced anti-fascists and, at the same time, supporters of communist ideas (in the early 30s, Schulze-Boysen published the anti-fascist magazine "The Opponent" and, after Hitler came to power, ended up behind bars; Harnack in 1932 created the "Society for the Study of Soviet Planned economy") themselves persistently sought contact with the Soviet special services. Every second, risking their lives, they collected and transmitted to Moscow any crumbs of information that they could find. But ... But, as the wonderful French proverb says, "even the most

beautiful girl cannot give more than she has." Ober-

Lieutenant Schulze-Boysen could not pass on "Hitler's secrets" to Stalin for the simple reason that the chief lieutenant was not even allowed close to such secrets. To an even greater extent, this applies to the employee of the Ministry of Economics Harnack. Reading today the reports of the "Sergeant" and "Corsican", we note with bitterness that the courageous anti-fascists - by no means out of malice - have actually become "relays" of the skillfully crafted disinformation of the German special services. So,

on March 28, "Starshina" reported that **"the German command is preparing a pincer strike: from Romania, on the one hand, and through the Baltic states, and possibly through Finland, on the other."**

April 14 "Starshina" reports: **"The beginning of hostilities should be preceded by an ultimatum to the Soviet Union with a proposal to join the Pact of the Three."**

On May 9, in the report of the "Foreman", along with inaccurate information (**"in conversations among staff officers, the date of May 20 is often referred to as the date of the start of the war; others believe that the speech is scheduled for June"**), clear disinformation is again repeated: **"First, Germany will present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union with the demand for wider exports to Germany and the rejection**

of communist propaganda ... " May 14. **"Plans for the Soviet Union are being postponed, measures are being taken by the German authorities to keep their subsequent development in complete secrecy**

the 9th of June. "Next week the tension in the Russian question will reach its highest point, and the question of the war will be finally decided. Germany will present the USSR with a demand to provide the Germans with economic leadership in Ukraine and to use the Soviet navy against England ... "

Only on June 11 did an adequate assessment of the situation appear in the report of the "Starshina": **"The issue of an attack on the USSR has been resolved. Will Sov. The Union does not know any preliminary requirements. An unexpected blow must be reckoned with."** However, then the old disinformation version of the plan of the operation is repeated again (**"the German command will seek to create pincers by detour from the north from East Prussia and from the south**

which will gradually close in order to encircle the Red Army"). Even further

(both figuratively and literally) from the safe with "Hitler's secrets" was the head of the press service of the German embassy in Tokyo, journalist Richard Sorge (aka the Soviet intelligence officer Ramsay). Strange, but this elementary truth has not yet been understood by the broad masses of Russian historians and publicists. And even in June 2006, for example, such pearls are printed: ***"In December 1940, Hitler decided to attack the USSR, and just two weeks later Sorge sent copies of the relevant documents to Moscow."***

On December 18, 1940, Hitler approved Directive No. 21 ("Plan Barbarossa"). The directive began with these words: ***"The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia at the entrance of a short campaign even before the war against England is over."*** Must be ready. Further it was said: ***"I will give the order on the strategic deployment of the armed forces against the Soviet Union, if necessary (emphasized by me. - M.S.) eight weeks before the scheduled start of operations."*** No specific dates for the start of the war in the "Barbarossa plan" were established. The document was printed in nine copies, six of which lay in Hitler's safe until the end of the war, three were issued by the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. Secrecy requirements were usual for such kind of documents, i.e.

exceptionally strict. In the last lines of Directive No. 21, it was said: "I expect oral (emphasized by me. - ***M.S.***) reports ***from the gentlemen of the commanders-in-chief about their further intentions based on this Directive.***" Did the "gentlemen in chief" report to Hitler orally, face to face, and did they send written documents to the German ambassador in Tokyo (who had nothing to do with the development of operational plans at all)? And most importantly - why? For the convenience of Richard Sorge? Not only in December 1940, but also in the last days and weeks before the start of the war, Ramsay could not tell Moscow anything more definite than a retelling of the rumors circulating in the embassy:

May 21, 1941:

"... The new German representatives who arrived here from Berlin declare that the war between Germany and the USSR may begin at the end of May, since they received orders to return to Berlin by this time. But they also said that this year the danger may pass..."

June 1, 1941:

"... The expectation of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left on May 6 for Bangkok. In Bangkok, he will take the post of military attache ... Scholl said that the most powerful blow would be delivered by the left

flank of the German army ... " June 17, 1941: ***" ... The German courier told the military attache that he was convinced that the war against the USSR was delayed, probably until end***

of June. The military attaché does not know whether there will be a war or not..." And what did Stalin "not believe" here? The only concrete fact here is the information that a certain

German lieutenant colonel left for Bangkok on May 6 ... The fateful date for the start of the invasion (June 22) was set by Hitler and brought to the attention of the Wehrmacht High Command only on April 30, 1941. Before this date, no "sources" in principle, they could not tell Stalin this most important secret of Hitler - simply because Hitler himself did not yet know when he would start a war against the USSR. Moreover - and this is extremely important to note - on April 30, the "point of no return" was not at all passed. It is today that we know that the date of June 22 became the day of the real start of the war. In May 1941, things could still change many times over. It is believed that Hitler postponed the start date of

the invasion of France a total of 9 times ... On May 23, the German railways were switched to the "maximum military traffic" mode. This is a very important "frontier" in the overall set of measures for strategic deployment, and, as far as I know, it was precisely this point that was not revealed by Soviet intelligence. Finally, on June 10, the Wehrmacht High Command brought the following decision to the attention of the army command

"1. Day "D" of the operation "Barbarossa" is proposed to be considered June 22.

2. If this deadline is postponed, the corresponding decision will be made no later than June 18. Data on the direction of the main attack will in this case still remain secret ... "

Only on June 18 (a day after Stalin imposed an indecent resolution on the next report of the "Foreman") the decision to start the invasion of the USSR and the exact date of the start of the operation were brought to the attention of tactical level commanders (to the level of division and regiment commanders). Unfortunately, I am not aware of a single Soviet intelligence report that would record this secret, which became known on June 18 to several hundred Wehrmacht officers. At 13:00 on June 21, the German troops deployed near the western borders of the USSR received the prearranged signal "Dortmund". It meant that the offensive, as planned, would begin on June 22 and **"you can proceed to the open execution of orders."** From that moment on, many hundreds of thousands of people already knew the main military secret of Germany, but for some reason Soviet intelligence learned about this not from its own agents, but from German defectors, who, on the night of June 21-22, on their own initiative, driven by the desire to help the "motherland" proletarians of the whole world", appeared at the location of the Soviet troops.

The name of the corporal who crossed the river is known for certain. Bug in the Sokal region (Kiev district), there are reports of a private who swam across the Bug in the Volchin region (30 km northwest of Brest). Zhukov, in his memoirs, speaks of a sergeant major who, on the evening of June 21, crossed the border at the section of the Kyiv OVO. Interesting information was reported on June 22, 2006 in an interview with the RIA Novosti agency by General of the Army M. A. Gareev: **"The Germans, risking their lives, crossed the Dniester River** (emphasis mine. - **M. S.) on the offensive."** What do we want from intelligence if the President of the Academy of Military Sciences, Academician of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Military Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army for

scientific work does not know that in June 41 the border of the USSR did not come into contact with the

Dniester River at any point? In the end, Soviet intelligence learned the exact date of the attack only at dawn on June 22, 1941. Of course, to all of the above, there is one, but a crushing objection: "The time has not yet come when you can tell EVERYTHING." There is nothing to object here. Intelligence has its own laws and rules, and even if now (these lines are being written at the beginning of 2008), after the death of all agents, residents and "sources", after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, after the unification of Germany and the entry of the former Soviet Baltic States in NATO it is still impossible to name by name all the "sources" of Soviet intelligence in the military-political leadership of Nazi Germany, it is impossible to get out of the safe and publish the most informative and reliable intelligence reports - then so be it. But why, then, for unsubstantiated fabrications about "the fatal self-deception of Stalin, who believed Hitler, but did not believe his own intelligence", the time has long come and still does not end?

Well, the fate of the main characters of this story was tragic. Around Schulze-Boysen and Harnack, an underground anti-fascist organization was formed, which went down in history under the name "Red Chapel". Already after the defeat of the organization, Hitler's counterintelligence was forced to state that, thanks to the efforts of the Red Chapel, detailed information was transmitted to Moscow about the strength and weapons of the Luftwaffe, aviation production in Germany, the deployment of headquarters, production and stocks of liquid fuel. Probably the greatest achievement of the "Red Chapel" was the information about the plans of the German attack on Stalingrad in the summer of 1942.

The immediate cause of the failure was the blatant incompetence of the Moscow Center. On October 10, 1941, in one of the radiograms sent from Moscow to Berlin, the addresses of three secret apartments were named "in plain text". Of course, the transmission was carried out in cipher, but as a result of many months of work by a group of the best German mathematicians, the ciphers were "cracked".

Schulze-Boysen was arrested on August 30, Harnack on September 3, 1942. After brutal torture, they were executed in Berlin on December 22, 1942. In total, more than 80 people were arrested, 49 of them were executed, 25 people were sentenced to hard labor. October 7, 1969 X. Schulze-Boysen, A. Harnack, I. Stöbe, A. Kukhof were posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Chapter

4 "Stalin drove away any thought of war..."

The General Staff of the Red Army did not have documentary data on the operational plans of the German command. This is a fact. But this fact by no means implies the conclusion that Soviet intelligence was inactive. The feat of a scout (and not one, but many hundreds of scouts) found its concrete embodiment in a huge amount of completely reliable information. Information about what? On the concentration of German troops near the western borders of the USSR, on the transportation of weapons, ammunition and fuel, on the locations of headquarters, airfields, communication centers, warehouses and hospitals. From these disparate fragments of the "mosaic", the analytical services of the Soviet intelligence were able to build a fairly detailed picture of the Wehrmacht's deployment. And if in the winter - in the spring of 1941 the reliability of this "picture" still left much to be desired (data on the number of German troops were significantly overestimated - they were not underestimated, as it was fashionable to write in the era of documentary tales about "intelligence report No. 8", namely, overestimated), then By the beginning of the war, the actual and the number of Wehrmacht groups revealed

by Soviet intelligence almost coincided. They couldn't exactly match. And not only because even the best intelligence has a limit. The German command disguised its intentions by all available means. In particular, the main strike force of the invading troops—tank and motorized divisions—began redeployment to the areas bordering the USSR only in the very last days before the start of the offensive. So, for example, five tank

divisions of the 1st Panzer Group were loaded into echelons from June 6 to 16 and arrived at unloading stations in southern Poland (Lublin - Sandomierz - Rzeszow) only by June 14-20. Three divisions (13th, 14th and 11th) went directly into the areas of concentration and deployment literally within

the last hours before the invasion, and the other two divisions (16th and 9th divisions) on the evening of June 21 were still on the march 100-150 km from the border. Accordingly, Soviet military intelligence could not identify these divisions - simply because a week before the start of the war they were not in the border zone.

On the other hand, the constant overestimation of data on the number of German troops near the borders of the USSR, by a strange irony of fate, seemed to "compensate" for all the tricks of the enemy. As a result, on May 31, 1941, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army estimated the composition of the Wehrmacht grouping at 94 infantry, 1 cavalry, 14 tank and 13 motorized divisions (in addition, separate cavalry regiments that did not exist in reality were "discovered" in the amount of 25 pieces). In fact, these tank and motorized divisions were not yet at the border on June 1, but by the beginning of the war they appeared, and with some "surplus" (in fact, the enemy deployed 17 tank and 13 motorized divisions as part of four tank groups). It is believed that, having learned about this, Stalin should have lost sleep and appetite, pulled out his magnificent mustache and rushed about the Kremlin office like a hunted animal. But Stalin did nothing of the sort. On the night of June 22, 1941, he calmly

slept.

This is what we call "The Great Mystery of June 22". ***"Why didn't Stalin, who was informed by intelligence about the concentration of such a huge enemy army near the borders of the USSR, ..."***. Further, after this "not", there were different words. These words depended both on the current political fashion and on the level of incompetence of the writer-speaker. Usually something like: ***"did not listen to Zhukov", "did not allow the troops to be put on alert", "did not move the troops to the border" ...*** At the maximum level of incompetence reached by the Israeli comrade G. Gorodetsky, Stalin, it turns out, ***"drove any thought of war"***. The right answer starts with the right question. I was taught this at the glorious Kuibyshev

Aviation Institute - for which, taking this opportunity, I want to once again thank our teachers. I have not yet learned how to express myself in the same aphoristic way, so I will formulate my idea in a rather long phrase: unwillingness to ask the right question

often indicates an unwillingness (or fear) to hear the correct answer.

You and I, dear

reader, have nothing to be afraid of, so we will try to start with the main thing - with the most accurate questions possible. So why didn't Stalin do it? What (or whom) did he not believe? What is "combat readiness"? Where and what troops should be "moved"? And why didn't Stalin have to sleep peacefully on the night of June 21-22? Let's start with the last question.

It is the simplest, because it operates with categories known (if not from our own experience, then from the stories of friends) to each of us. On the night before the exam, he does not sleep and feverishly flips through textbooks. Who spent the entire semester lounging around and didn't go to lectures. Strange as it may seem, Soviet propaganda tried to portray Stalin, i.e., the top military-political leadership of the USSR, as such a "loser". Here we again meet with an example of how once a liar

has to lie further and more. Of course, if we proceed from the fact that the Soviet Union was engaged in "peaceful creative work", that the industry "was not transferred to a war footing in advance" (I wonder, what "rails" did this industry follow before? What did these rumbling factories produce around the clock? bicycles and sewing machines, gramophones and refrigerators for communal kitchens?), that Germany created in six years (from 1935 to 1941) a huge army armed to the teeth, if you believe that "all of Europe worked for Hitler", and the "second front" was opened only in 1944 - then yes. Then the imperturbable calmness of Stalin seems to be something absolutely incredible. But Stalin was not a loser. And already from the second half of the 30s, he "chased away any thought", if it was not connected with one or another aspect of the preparation for the Great War, for a war that resulted not in miserable patches of eastern Poland or the Karelian Isthmus, but all of Europe should have fallen into his hands. For many years he worked until late at night (more precisely, until early morning), personally solving thousands of issues related to the creation, equipment, armament,

training the largest army in the world. The result of great labors was - weighty, rough, visible.

In his army, 61 tank and 31 motorized divisions were formed. Moreover, in terms of its structure (one tank and two motorized rifle regiments), the motorized division of the Red Army corresponded to the Wehrmacht tank division, and surpassed it in terms of the regular number of tanks. So in fact, the Red Army had 92 "tank" (tank in essence, not in name) divisions.

In the strip from the western border to Leningrad and Moscow there were already (not counting the "raw" divisions of the emerging 17th and 20th mechanized corps) 40 tank and 20 motorized divisions, which were armed with 12,400 real tanks (not counting the many thousands of machine-gun tankettes), including more than 1,500 of the newest, best KV and T-34 tanks in the world with long-barreled 76-mm guns, full-fledged anti-ballistic armor and powerful diesel engines. So who, Stalin or Hitler, was supposed to stay awake and rush around the office in hysterics? Which of these two dictators should have ***"expected in the event of war an early defeat, and for himself - death"***? Intelligence

reported to Stalin that 94 Wehrmacht infantry divisions were concentrated near the western borders of the USSR (in fact, the North, Center and South army groups, not counting the reserves of the Wehrmacht High Command, had only 84 infantry divisions). This is important information, but at that time Stalin himself had 198 rifle divisions.

On June 13, Lieutenant-General N. Vatutin, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, put on Stalin's desk ... no, not another "Hitler's secret", but a certificate "On the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West." It

was planned to deploy 120 rifle divisions as part of four (North, North-Western, Western and South-Western) fronts. Another 35 rifle divisions were included in the five armies of the High Command reserve deployed in the strip from the western border to the Bryansk-Rzhev line. Total 155 rifle divisions against 94 German. And this information allegedly led Stalin

in such despair that he ***"considered resistance useless, and therefore did not try to either threaten Hitler or prepare for battle."***

Here we need to clarify one important point. The figures given above are "too high" for the catastrophic defeat of the Red Army to be attributed to the enemy's "multiple superiority in numbers". This is probably why, along with many other cheating tricks, an absurd fiction appeared - and multiplied in hundreds of publications - that the Soviet rifle division was supposedly two (or even three!) times smaller than the German infantry. This is nonsense, this was not in reality, because it could never be. The fact is

that ALL the armies of the world tried to form the main tactical unit of the ground forces (division) so that in terms of its combat potential it would not be inferior to the division of a potential enemy. Everyone tried. Not everyone succeeded, and, for example, the Polish or Finnish division of the 1939 model was inferior to the "world leaders" in a number of important parameters (primarily in artillery, cars and tractors). The division of the Red Army, for which a huge country worked from dawn to dawn, was not inferior to anyone. In April 1941, the rifle divisions of the Red Army were transferred to a new staffing table. The number of personnel was

reduced by 16% and now amounted to 14.5 thousand people against 16.5 thousand in the Wehrmacht infantry division. The somewhat larger size of the German infantry division meant only a greater development of rear and support services - in terms of firepower, the Red Army rifle division was in no way inferior to the enemy division. According to the staffing table of April 1941, the rifle division of the Red Army was supposed to have 10.4 thousand rifles, 166 heavy and 392 light machine guns - in the infantry division of the Wehrmacht, respectively, 11.5 thousand, 138 and 378. Moreover, on the eve of the war, the Red Army was re-equipped with "three-rulers" on the Tokarev self-loading rifle (SVT), which gave a noticeable advantage over the enemy in the density of small arms fire. It is important to note that there were no problems with the provision of these states - with the actually available small arms it was possible to equip not 198, but about 460-740 rifle divisions.

Traditionally powerful was the artillery armament of the rifle division of the Red Army. For comparison,

here is the number of artillery systems of comparable calibers and the so-called "weight of the total salvo" of the artillery of the Polish, French and German infantry divisions:

Страна	75 / 76-мм	100 / 105-мм	122-мм	150 / 152-мм	Вес зал-па, кг	Число стволов
СССР	34	—	32	12	1395	78
Германия	20	36	—	18	1384	74
Франция	36	—	—	24	1183	60
Польша	30	15	—	3	531	48

Others example of widespread an extremely "brain-having" was the fabrication that, as a result of a "surprise attack", the rifle divisions of the Red Army met the war with 6-8 thousand people. There is hardly another fact in the history of the beginning of the war that would be misrepresented with such force and perseverance. In fact, as early as May 21, 1940 (this is not a typo - exactly the fortieth year), by the Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee No. 16/158, it was decided to maintain in peacetime the rifle divisions of the western districts in the following numbers: 98 divisions - 12 or more thousand people each and only 3 divisions - 9 thousand each. A year later, in May-June 1941, 802,000 people were mobilized during the "large training camps" (BUS). ***"At the same time, the composition of the rifle divisions of the border districts, with a staffing strength of 14,483 people, was increased: 21 divisions - up to 14 thousand people, 72 divisions - up to 12 thousand people and 6 rifle divisions - up to 11 thousand people."*** This was publicly recognized back in 1992 by the authors of the collective work of military historians of the General Staff "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" (1992), however, to this day the famous "duck" G. K. Zhukov ("our divisions, ***even 8,000 people, almost twice as weak as the German ones***") continues to flutter from one publication to another with a cheerful quack ...

Let us now return to the events of the spring of 1941. Strictly speaking, today there is no need to guess what could and what could not frighten (to put it mildly - cause extreme concern) Comrade Stalin. There are declassified and published documents

top military-political leadership of the USSR. What do we see in them? Of course, Soviet intelligence continuously monitored the situation on the fronts of the European war. Accordingly, each of the well-known strategic planning documents began with a section devoted to assessing the possible composition of a grouping of enemy troops (opponents). The plural would be more appropriate here, since the Soviet leadership invariably included Finland, Romania, Hungary and Italy among the opponents of the USSR in the West, along with Germany (moreover, absolutely fantastic assumptions were made on the issue of the size of the armed forces of Germany's allies). We will not even discuss them and will focus on the forecasts of the estimated number of German troops alone. We present data from three documents; - September 18, 1940, "Considerations on the fundamentals of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR"; - March 11, 1941, "Updated plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR"; - May 1941, "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies."

For ease of perception, we will summarize all the information in one table and add two very important lines to this table: the "Special Message" of the General Staff Intelligence Directorate dated May 31, 1941 and the actual number of German army groups "North", "Center" and "South".

	пд	тд	мд	танки
сентябрь 1940 г.	145	17	8	10 000
март 1941 г.	165	20	15	10 000
май 1941 г.	141	19	15	—
«Спецсообщение» от 31 мая 1941 г.	94	14	13	—
фактическая численность на 22 июня	84	17	13	3266

Before we go any further, one small note. I hope you have already noticed these strange proportions: the actual number of Wehrmacht tank divisions turned out to be slightly less than expected (17 instead of 19–20), and there were three times fewer tanks in them. This is not a typo. This is unfortunately a serious mistake.

Soviet intelligence, which suggested that one Wehrmacht tank division could be armed with up to five thousand tanks ...

Karl Marx once said: "One figure allows you to understand more than entire volumes full of rhetorical nonsense." The above table gives an extremely clear answer to the question about the notorious "fatal self-deception" of Stalin, who "refused to believe intelligence reports." Everything was exactly the opposite. Stalin just believed intelligence reports. From these reports it followed that the concentration of German troops near the borders of the Soviet Union was NOT COMPLETED. Moreover, intelligence reports generally cast doubt on the fact that Hitler was concentrating troops to invade the USSR. Why? The twice-mentioned "Special Report of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff" dated May 31, 1941 gave the following assessment of the existing distribution of Wehrmacht forces:

"The general distribution of the armed forces of Germany is as follows:

- against England (on all fronts) 122-126 divisions;

- against the USSR 120-122

divisions; - reserves of

44-48 divisions. From these figures (as we now know, they were erroneous - Soviet intelligence extremely overestimated the number of the "anti-English" Wehrmacht grouping) a

completely logical conclusion was drawn: "... As for the ***front against England, the German command, having already at this time the necessary forces for the further development of actions in the Middle East and against Egypt (29 divisions, including Greece with the island of Crete, Italy and Africa), at the same time quite quickly restored its main grouping in the West, while continuing to transfer to Norway, with the prospect of carrying out the main operation against the English Isles "*** (underlined by me. - M.S.).

Considering that this topic has been the epicenter of purposeful brainwashing for many decades, I will repeat once again the main conclusion. Slowly and distinctly. At the beginning of June 1941, Stalin did not consider a German attack possible in the next few days. And this is not because he believed in Ribbentrop's signature, not because he "fell into a stupor and drove away any thought of war." Stalin's opinion was based on impeccably logical conclusions from the information

given to him by intelligence. There were LITTLE German troops near the western borders of the

USSR. Small compared to the expected size of the group enemy.

Small compared to the total strength of the German armed forces (in assessing this "total strength", Soviet intelligence made a gross mistake, overestimating it by exactly one and a half times).

Small compared to the size of the Red Army. Stalin could not believe that with such SMALL FORCES Hitler would risk attacking the mighty Soviet Union. Stalin could not believe that Hitler estimated the "invincible and legendary" Red Army lower than the army of 40 million people in France (for the invasion of which the German command allocated 136 divisions, that is, 87% of the 156 available). There was not even a shadow of "fatal self-deception" in Stalin's reasoning. Stalin was proud of his logic and reasoned in this case absolutely logically. There are simple and unshakable axioms of military affairs. ***"Focus is a good thing - cunning, ingenuity and so on. But it is impossible to live on the focus. Once he deceived - he went to the rear, the second time he deceived, and the third time you will not deceive. An army cannot win back on tricks alone, it must be a real army."*** I didn't come up with this. This is a quotation from Stalin's speech at the April (1940) Conference of the senior officers of the Red Army. For an offensive on a huge front from the Black to the Baltic Sea and to a huge depth, at least

1000 km from Brest to Moscow, one must have superiority in numbers, in firepower, in tanks and aviation. But the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe did not have a "standard" threefold superiority in military science. They did not even have a minimal numerical superiority. Moreover, the advancing (Germans) were many times inferior in numbers to the defenders. Moreover, the most unfavorable for the Germans was the ratio of the main offensive tools - tanks and aircraft. You can't attack like that, it is contrary to all common sense, and Stalin had no reason to consider his Berlin competitor a complete idiot. Sound logic, the experience of the previous two years of the war, suggested that the goal of Hitler's summer campaign would be the defeat of England, and the concentration of significant ground forces

Germany in the East has as its task to cover the strategic rear of Germany from possible "surprises" of Stalin. And if

Soviet intelligence had put the "Plan Barbarossa" on Stalin's desk, he would have written words on this report that I simply do not dare to utter. Here is the first phrase of this "plan", read it carefully, try to think over these words: ***"The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia in the course of a short campaign even before the war against England is over."*** And further: ***"The ultimate goal of the operation is to create a protective barrier against Asiatic Russia along the common Volga-Arkhangelsk line."***

To what "mother" was Stalin supposed to send the authors of such a report? Defeat Soviet Russia "in the course of a short-term campaign"? Even then, Hitler failed to defeat France during a short campaign. The "Armistice Agreement" signed on June 24, 1940 in Compiègne (stubbornly called "surrender" in Russian literature) left behind France all the signs (government, territory of a sovereign state, diplomatic force and navy), left behind France all its colonies and overseas possessions. And this, mind you, despite the fact that from the border with Germany to Paris - only 200 km. And from the western border of the USSR to the "common line Volga - Arkhangelsk" - 2000 km. How long does it take to simply walk (and the Wehrmacht consisted mainly of horse-drawn infantry and artillery) these two thousand kilometers? Even for a "triumphant march" over such a distance (with short stops at the ceremony of presenting bread and salt and flowers from the jubilant population) it would take three to four months. And what if you still have to fight?

And what is the idea of getting involved in a war with the Soviet giant ***"even before the war against England is over!"*** Where is the logic here, where is the slightest trace of common sense? Hitler has already tried to make war with England. 86 air groups, 3067 aircraft (that is, the grouping is larger than the one that was concentrated on June 22 near the Soviet borders) began on August 13, 1940 a grandiose air battle, which went down in history under the name "Battle of Britain". The command of the Royal Air Force could oppose the German air armada with 49 fighter squadrons, which were armed with 704

aircraft. With this initial ratio of numbers, the Germans lost. Already by mid-September 1940, huge losses forced the German command to abandon massive daylight raids. The landings on the British Isles had to be postponed "indefinitely". By the end of 1940, the overall ratio of aircraft losses was 1 to 2 in favor of the British. And now, having such experience, Hitler decided to defeat the "fast" Soviet Air Force with SMALLER forces, which outnumbered the British in the number of fighters by 6 times? Well, it's the same as, having suffered a defeat in a fight with a boxer of the second youth category, go to fight with a world champion in

heavy weight...

Stalin reasoned absolutely logically - and was mistaken in everything. But, as Lenin himself said on another occasion and about another person (Leo Trotsky), "this can hardly be blamed on him personally." It was hard not to make a mistake. Stalin could not foresee, foresee, believe that his huge army, equipped with the best weapons in the world, was just an armed crowd of future deserters and prisoners of war. He did not think that thousands of tanks and planes, tens of thousands of guns, millions of rifles would be abandoned on the roadsides by panicked crowds of former Red Army soldiers. But let's not judge Comrade Stalin too harshly for this mistake. After all, you, dear reader, even today, even "hindsight", even after everything that has been declassified and published in recent years, which was told by the few eyewitnesses of events who survived to the era of freedom of speech and press, do not want to believe and recognize this real FACT. Is it any wonder that Stalin could not make such a stunning prediction? For the sake of truth, it should also be noted that it took Stalin only seven days to understand the main reason for the unheard-of defeat. Perhaps he understood the meaning of what was happening so quickly and correctly because his "universities" were not the department of scientific communism of a Soviet university, but

underground work in a subversive organization that had already destroyed the Russian army once during the world war. Comrade Stalin knew exactly how empires collapse and armies of millions disappear. Yes, the truth revealed at that moment turned out to be prohibitively difficult even

for this "man of steel". On the night of June 28-29, Stalin went to his dacha, where he spent two days in a state of complete prostration (June 29 and 30), not answering phone calls and not meeting with anyone. But until these two terrible days, Stalin worked hard.

This is where we move on to the next question: "What did Stalin do and what didn't he do in June 1941?" Viktor Suvorov answered this question in a vivid and emotional form, with the inevitable publicistic overlaps in this case, in his books "Icebreaker", "Day-M", "The Last Republic", which became a world bestseller. A very detailed, dry and pedantic picture of the strategic deployment of the Red Army for the invasion of Europe was described by the candidate (now a doctor) of historical sciences (there are no rules without exception, and I am especially pleased to draw your attention to such rare doctors) M. I. Meltyukhov in the monograph "Stalin's missed chance. Interesting and meaningful works on this subject were written by P. Bobylev, V. Danilov, J. Hoffman, V. Nevezhin... Yes, and I somehow described these events on 510 pages in the book "June 23 - "M Day". If you are interested, you can read all of the above. I do not want to retell my own book in a hasty patter. I will

note only one interesting document, which I had the pleasure of holding in my hands. On June 4, 1941, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, it was decided **"to approve the creation of one rifle division in the Red Army, staffed by personnel of Polish nationality and knowing the Polish language."** Deadline - July 1, 1941 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 35, l. 13) What would it be for? Why did Stalin need a Polish-speaking division by July 1, 1941? Is the Russian land so impoverished with heroes that Poles were urgently needed to defend the inviolable borders of the USSR? A similar incident took place on November 11, 1939. Then, 20 days before the planned start of the "liberation" of Finland, it was decided to form the 106th Infantry Division, whose personnel was recruited exclusively from people who spoke Finnish or Karelian... It's funny, but to argue and prove the obvious (i.e., visible to the naked eye, if this eye looks at the map of the movements and deployment of Soviet troops) offensive orientation

the strategic deployment of the Red Army had only after the release of the Suvorov "Icebreaker". Prior to this, Soviet historians quite calmly stated that ***"the plan for strategic deployment and the construction of operational groupings of troops reflected offensive goals to a greater extent ... the offensive nature of the planned strategic actions influenced the location of positions and troops ... the transfer of troops was planned with the expectation of completing the concentration in areas planned by operational plans, from June 1 to July 10 ... "***

"The transfer of troops was planned with the expectation of completing the concentration in the areas outlined by the operational plans from June 1 to July 10, 1941." Already for this phrase alone, the authors of the collective monograph "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" (from which the words quoted above were taken) should have been awarded the medal "For Courage" then, in 1992. Briefly and clearly they answered the sacramental question about the reasons for the notorious "u

The command of the Red Army acted according to its own OFFENSIVE plans, implemented its own deployment schedule, in the preparation of which the German invasion was not expected. Yes, by the morning of June 22, 1941, the formation of operational groups was not completed. But the strategic deployment really began, it went on with ever-increasing pace and scope. The deadline for its completion was not tied to June 22, but to another date. By one of the days of July 1941, it is not yet possible to accurately establish which, given the source base at the disposal of historians.

For those who find the words "strategic redeployment" involuntarily yawning, I'm ready to retell the summary of this chapter even more simply. At six

o'clock in the evening on December 31 of any year, there is a blatant "unpreparedness" in any family. Cutlets jump and sizzle in the pan, the smoke of a burnt pie pours out of the oven, the mistress of the house in a crumpled dressing gown is feverishly stirring the Olivier salad in a bowl. Does this mean that no one in the house is preparing for the New Year? Yes, nothing like that, quite the contrary - they are very actively preparing. But not ready yet. By 12 o'clock, to the pre-scheduled

the moment the champagne is opened, everything will be in full openwork: the Olivier salad will be redeployed from the basin to the crystal salad bowl, cutlets and garnish will join at one point, and the best friend of the hostess of the house, in an evening dress with two bold cutouts, will flirt nicely with her husband. Everything will go exactly as planned - unless uninvited guests burst into the house at seven in the evening ...

Chapter

5 Global End

I think you've read Chonkin. If not yet, I highly recommend it. There is such a funny episode there: the captain of the NKVD, comrade Milyaga, by a strange coincidence of incredible circumstances, was captured by the Red Army. Due to a shell shock (he was hit on the head with a rifle butt), Milyaga did not immediately understand where he had landed, and therefore began to testify in broken Russian that he was an employee of the Russian Gestapo and shoot and kill a lot of communist and Komsomolzen (the last statement was pure true). Noble fury boiled up like a wave, and the Soviet soldiers decided to finish off the vile fascist fosterling. When Milyaga finally realized that the power in the village had not yet changed, he began to change his testimony, began to explain that he was not a trembling creature, but an employee of an institution that had the right to ... And everything would be fine if Captain Milyaga had not yelled foolishly: "Long live Comrade Hitler!" These words were the last in the life of the glorious Chekist ...

Why am I? And here's what. In August 1991 great events took place in our country. And then it seemed to many that the government had changed. For this, or for some other reason, but at the very beginning of 1992, the Military Historical Journal (and this, for your information, is the official press organ of the Ministry of Defense, and not some kind of emigrant sheet of "literary Vlasovites") published those the most, repeatedly mentioned "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" dated May 1941. The stunned audience read, in particular, the following considerations:

"... I consider it necessary in no case to give the German command the initiative to act, to forestall the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at a time when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of military branches. The first

strategic goal of the actions of the Red Army troops was to defeat the main forces of the German army deployed

south of Demblin, and by the 30th day of the operation, the Ostrolenka front, r. Narew, Lovich, Lodz, Kreutzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc (cities in Poland and the Czech Republic at a distance of 300-350 km west of the border of the USSR. - ***M.S.). The next strategic goal is to have an offensive from the Katowice region in the northern or northwestern direction to defeat the large forces of the Center and the Northern wing of the German front and seize the territory of the former Poland and East Prussia ... "The considerations are absolutely sound - why should we give the "initiative of action" to the enemy ?*** Why else were 61 tank

and 31 motorized divisions created, if not for major offensive operations? But for a person who has spent several months in zero gravity, the Earth's gravity, which is normal for all living things, becomes unbearable torment, and pale, losing consciousness cosmonauts are carried out of the descent vehicle in their arms ... So it is for Soviet / Russian readers, from kindergarten brought up on fairy tales about "good Grandfather Ilyich" and "the invariably peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union", the normal truth that wolves do not eat cabbage turned out to be a severe nervous shock.

While the public was horrified, surprised, admired, time passed and finally reached the point that it became clear to everyone that the government had not changed (and where is it, dear, from us, and we from it?) And it's time to shout again: "Long live comrade Stalin! By the way, I don't understand at all why it was impossible to shout "Long live Comrade Stalin" while waving the May (1941) "Considerations"? I don't understand. What is wrong with the fact that Comrade Stalin, it turns out, was plotting to stab "Comrade Hitler" in the back of the head with an ax? What is shameful in this? Yes, our generals from the Institute of Military History had to carry Viktor Suvorov in their arms because he depicted their mustachioed idol as a predatory beast (which Stalin really was), and not a confused, frightened institute girl ... But something didn't grow together where something, and the command "circle" did not sound. And this means that all those guilty of publishing documents discrediting the invariably peaceful policy of the USSR must "respond for the bazaar."

And so they began to respond.

First of all, the veterans of the Soviet propaganda "science" explained to everyone who was still able to listen to them that the May "Considerations" was just a rough draft, a kind of "chess study", compiled (on 15 sheets, with four appendices and seven cards) by General Vasilevsky out of boredom, in his free time from his main job as deputy chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. The hypothesis, of course, is bold, but absolutely inconsistent with the opinion about the purpose of the document by its compilers themselves, who write in the last lines: "... **I ask: 1. Approve the presented plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the plan for the planned military operations in case of war with Germany. 2. To timely allow the consistent conduct of covert mobilization and covert concentration, in the first place - of all the armies of the reserve of the High Command and aviation ...** "

That is, according to the military (specifically, exactly four people were related to the document: Vasilevsky - the text was written by his hand, the first deputy chief of the General Staff Vatutin - the text was supposedly corrected by his hand, the chief of the General Staff Zhukov and People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko), they presented to Stalin at approval of **the "plan of planned military operations"**, and not at all a student's essay. Then the "attack from the rear" began.

Indeed, there is no resolution of Stalin on the original document. Agree, this already opens a kind of "window of opportunity" in order to get rid of such inconvenient "Considerations". A piano was immediately found in the bushes. That is, the prominent Soviet military historian HA Svetlishin suddenly remembered that back in 1965, G.K. Zhukov told him about the May "Considerations" and about Stalin's reaction to them. For 27 years, Svetlishin was silent like a fish, did not publish these memoirs of Zhukov anywhere, did not write them down in his secret notebook, did not hand it over, as expected, to the secret funds of TsAMO ... But in the right

moment I remembered everything.

It turns out that Zhukov (in the retelling of Comrade Svetlishin) gave a top secret document of special importance (with an inscription in

upper right corner: "Only in person. The only copy") not to the person to whom this document was personally addressed, but to Stalin's secretary Poskrebyshev. He gave up and left. For

those who do not understand, I explain - this is a tribunal. Least. As a maximum - "tower". A regular military man could not give a document of special importance to an outsider. Only a Soviet military historian could have thought of this before. At that time, the Instruction approved by People's Commissar Timoshenko on the procedure for compiling and storing documents of particular importance was in force in the Red Army. This is a 15 page brochure. In particular, such documents had to be written personally by hand **"on a hard substrate that does not leave an impression from the pen"**, all drafts and blotting paper were to be destroyed according to the act, the document was to be stored in a sealed safe located in a room with a sealed iron door and steel bars on the windows. The instruction expressly forbade transferring documents of particular importance even to seniors in rank and position - only personally into the hands of the person to whom the specific document was addressed. But this

is not yet the end of the comedy. Further, Svetlishin (on behalf of the late Zhukov) tells that the next day Poskrebyshev, on behalf of and on behalf of the Host, scolded the Chief of the General Staff, and Zhukov heard this reprimand and order "from now on not to write such" notes for the prosecutor "" directly **in** Stalin's waiting room (possibly in the presence of third parties). The funny thing about this whole story is that Svetlishin did not even think about the existence of the declassified and published in 1990 "Journal of Visits" to Stalin's office. From this document, it appears that Zhukov and Timoshenko had no problem handing over the document to Stalin personally. Based on the "Journal of Visits" one can even guess (not confirm, but it is quite reasonable to assume) when this happened. On May 10, 12 and 14, Timoshenko and Zhukov were in Stalin's office, and the meetings

lasted 1.5–2 hours. At these meetings, the military could receive instructions on the basis of which they worked on the "plan of planned military operations." The May "Considerations" contain information from the intelligence report of May 15, which is why they are dated "not earlier than May 15." May 19 Stalin and Molotov

(at that time - Stalin's deputy as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and in fact the "second person" in the country) received Timoshenko and Zhukov. After 15 minutes, another of the developers of the plan, Vatutin, entered the office. The meeting lasted an hour and a half, all four left Stalin's office at the same time.

On May 24, a many-hour meeting was held in Stalin's office, the participants of which, in addition to Stalin himself, were Molotov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, Vatutin, the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force Zhigarev, the commanders of the troops of five western military districts, members of the Military Councils (i.e. commissars) and air force commanders of five districts. There was no other equally representative meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army in Stalin's office - neither a few months before May 24, nor after that day until the start of the war. With a very high degree of certainty, it can be assumed that at this obviously extraordinary meeting, the war plan approved by Stalin was brought to the attention of the command of the western districts (future fronts).

Another, indirect, but very, in my opinion, very convincing confirmation that at the meeting on May 24, 1941, the plan for a future war - and a war by no means defensive - was finally worked out and brought to the attention of the executors, is the absolute veil of secrecy that is shrouded the secret of this meeting. In the Soviet era, not a single mention of at least the fact of its holding - not to mention the transcript of the discussion - never appeared either in the so-called scientific or memoir literature. To this day, nothing is documented either about the agenda or about the decisions taken. Which is very strange, given the huge amount of "anti-Suvorov" literature published over the past 10 years. What is there just not here: "the myth of the icebreaker", "the icebreaker of lies", "sharp from history", "anti-Suvorov", "how Suvorov invented history", "Viktor Suvorov's lies" ... A certain rogue who took the pseudonym "V. Surov", released a libel called "Icebreaker-2". Although, it would seem, what could be simpler - publish the materials of the meeting on May 24, 1941, and everyone will finally be convinced of Stalin's invariably peace-loving policy ...

Recent doubts that the May "Considerations" are one of many documents of the practical development of the plan

invasions of Europe, and not at all a theoretical exercise, disappeared after other similar documents were published in the first half of the 90s. At the moment, historians have at their disposal four options for the general plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army (August, September, October 1940 and March 1941) and materials on the operational plans of the two most important fronts ("Memorandum by decision of the Military Council of the Southwestern **Front according to the deployment plan for 1940**", December 1940 and **"Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the commander of the Western OBO troops on the development of a plan for the operational deployment of the district troops"**, April 1941). Documents that actually reveal the operational plans of the Soviet command should also include the materials of the January (1941) operational-strategic games held by the highest command staff of the Red Army. We are led to this **conclusion** not only by simple everyday logic, but also by Marshal A.M. **moments of the operational plan were tested in a strategic military game with the participation of the highest command staff of the armed forces**. And what do we see? All currently known operational plans are actually one and the same document, only slightly changing from one version to another. There is not only a semantic, but also a clear textual coincidence of all variants of the Big Plan. All plans, without exception, are a plan for a large-scale offensive

operation carried out outside the state borders of the USSR. Combat operations on their own territory were not even considered as one of the scenarios for a staff game. The entire toponymy of the theater of alleged military operations is the names of Polish, Romanian, Slovak and East Prussian cities and rivers.

Those were the plans. Let's look at the facts now. One has only to mark on a geographical map the disposition of the troops of the western districts, which was created in the course of covert operational deployment, **and the "offensive nature of the planned strategic actions"** becomes quite obvious .

Thanks to the prudently drawn in September 1939 (and personally signed by Stalin in two places) ***“the line of demarcation of the state interests of the USSR and Germany on the territory of the former Polish state”***, the new border had two deep (150–170 km) protrusions, facing the “point” at West. Belostok ledge in Western Belarus and Lvov ledge in Western Ukraine. Two protrusions are inevitably accompanied by four “hollows”. From north to south, these “depressions” at the bases of the ledges were located in the areas of the cities of Grodno, Brest, Vladimir-Volynsky, Chernivtsi. If the Red Army were going to stand up on the

defensive, then the very minimum covering forces should have remained on the “points of the ledges”, and the main defensive groupings would have been lined up at the bases, in the “hollows”. Such a formation makes it possible to avoid the encirclement of friendly troops on the territory of the ledges, to reduce the total length of the defense front (the length of the base of the triangle is always shorter than the sum of the other two sides), and to create the highest operational density in the most probable directions of the enemy’s offensive, i.e., near the “hollows”. In June 1941, everything was done exactly the opposite.

The main striking force of the Red Army was the mechanized (tank) corps. The extreme haste and difference in timing of the beginning of their formation led to the fact that they were very unevenly equipped with military equipment. Most of the tank corps of “new types” (T-34, KV) did not exist at all, some mechanized corps had only 100-200 (in the Red Army they said “only” two hundred tanks) BT-2 / BT-5 tanks 1932–1934, with an almost exhausted motor resource. Against this background, the “five heroes”, five mechanized corps, are very clearly distinguished, armed with from 700 to 1000 tanks, including more than 100 of the latest T-34 and KV tanks, hundreds of tractors (tractors), several thousand cars and motorcycles. These are (listing from north to south) 3rd MK, 6th MK, 15th MK, 4th MK and 8th MK. Even among these, the best of the best, the 6th and 4th mechanized corps are noticeable. They were armed with, respectively, 452 and 414 of the latest tanks - more than in all the other mechanized corps of the Red Army combined!

Where were these "heroes"? The 4th MK was deployed in the Lvov area - at the tip of the Lvov ledge. Next to it, a little to the south, the 8th MK was stationed, east of Lvov was the 15th MK. Not yet firing a single shot, a strike force consisting of three mechanized corps hung over the flank and rear of the German troops, sandwiched between the Vistula and the Bug. Two days before the start of the war, all three divisions of the 4th MK began to move west, to the very border. On the morning of June 22, the 8th MK also advanced to the border river San. But perhaps the most revealing was the choice of the location of the 6th MK, which was hidden among dense forests and bottomless swamps near Bialystok. The corps could leave Bialystok on its own only in one direction - along the highway to Warsaw, to which it was then (after the war, Stalin had to return the Bialystok province to Poland) only 80 km from the border. No

less remarkable was the location of the 3rd MK. This corps was subordinated to the 11th Army deployed in the south of Lithuania, at the junction of the Northwestern and Western fronts. The border line in the area of this junction looked like a long and narrow "tongue", which, from the Polish city of Suwalki, went deep into Soviet territory in the region of Grodno. The very outline of the border near Grodno inspired great fears (even greater fears should have been caused by 4 tank and 3 motorized Wehrmacht divisions deployed on this "patch"). Nevertheless, the 3rd MK turned out to be much north of Grodno, even north of Kaunas, separated from the "Suwalki bridgehead" by the full-flowing Neman. A strange decision to repel a very likely enemy strike from Suwalki to Grodno, but very understandable and rational for an attack on Tilsit and further to the Baltic coast of East Prussia. In a similar way (the main forces - on the "edge of the ledge"

facing the enemy, much weaker ones - at the bases) separate regiments of heavy artillery were distributed. The 3rd Army, which covered the Grodno direction, had only two separate artillery regiments (152nd and 444th), and the 10th Army (the tip of the Bialystok ledge) had seven (130th, 156th, 262 th, 315th, 311th, 124th, 375th).

Do you think, dear reader, that after the declassification of such documents and facts, THEY sprinkled ashes on their heads, humbly confessed their many years of impudent “brainwashing” and went to the monastery? Right

now ... In 1996, the same "Military Historical Journal" published a series of articles in five issues under the general heading "The End of the Global Lie." The funny thing is that one of the two authors of the publication was the same Yu. A. Gorkov, who in early 1992 published the May "Considerations". The Jesuit logic of the publishers is understandable: “we didn’t drag you by the tongue, we made this mess ourselves – now you can clear it up yourself.” Only by such a tough statement of the problem can I explain the resolute shamelessness shown by the authors of "The End ...", who tried to sell the public a goat under the name and at the price of a cow. However, given that the general public knows even less about matters of military strategic planning than about animal husbandry, the “global lie” has created a certain sensation. Still would! Defensive plans were presented through (well, almost through), and almost all hostilities are planned on their territory, and the toponymy is already ours ...

I will not intrigue you for a long time, especially from scratch. The main content of The End of Global Lies was the publication of five (according to the number of Western military districts) documents. These documents were the Cover Plans for the Mobilization, Concentration and Deployment of District Troops. Taking advantage of the fact that far from all readers (although, between us, VIZh readers should be expected to have some competence) understand the meaning of specific military terms, the authors of the “global lie” tried to give out a cover operation plan, i.e. a purely private plan, limited in time and tasks of the operation, for the "war plan" they happily found, which plan turned out to be purely defensive. Here, in fact, is the whole end. A purely technologically scam was built on the continuous substitution of concepts: the cover plan for mobilization, concentration and deployment turns into a “border cover plan” (which is already a gross inaccuracy), then into a “border defense plan”, then simply into a “defense plan” . Q.E.D.

Strictly speaking, even the most distant reader from military affairs could independently come up with an unpretentious thought: if the entire operational plan is limited to one cover of mobilization and deployment, then why is this extremely expensive deployment being carried out? Is it just to create unnecessary problems with his cover? But, given that the Soviet person was thoroughly weaned from thinking independently, and advertising has already taught the Russian person not to think, but to “manage the dream”, it makes sense to understand in more detail the content of the term mobilization, “operation to cover deployment concentration”. Translated into normal human language, And

concentration and deployment" means the following: - units

and formations intended for participation in the war must be replenished with people (reservists who in peacetime are engaged in creative work and are waiting in the wings), auxiliary equipment (the mobilization scheme of the Red Army involved the withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of vehicles from the national economy and tens of thousands of tractors), ammunition, fuel, food and medicine from mobilization stocks.

- mobilized units (people, equipment, ammunition, etc.) must be moved to the places established by the deployment plan; for some units this means a 50 km march on foot, for others a 5,000 km rail transport. - the troops arriving at the theater of future military

operations must be placed in a certain way: the tank regiment should be hidden in the dense forest, the regiment of heavy artillery should be brought to a firing position, the anti-tank division should be disguised near the intersection of highways, the paratroopers should be brought to the loading airfield, the infantry should be planted in pre-dug trenches and trenches and. etc.

Only after all this (mobilization, concentration, deployment) is done, the most important boss can pick up the most important telephone receiver and croak into it: “Begin!” At the very stage of concentration and deployment, the troops are extremely defenseless. In fact, the process of concentration, both in form and content, is similar to the well-known, probably, to every move from one apartment to another. A couple of weeks after the move, life will enter into

its own track and, as everyone hopes, will be better than it was in the same place. But it will be later. In the very short moment of moving, even such a simple matter as finding a thread, a needle and a button of the right size turns into an insoluble problem. The same situation is created during the redeployment of troops. A tank division (370 tanks, 11,000 personnel), deployed in battle formation, is a formidable force. The same division, loaded into wagons stuffed with plywood for camouflage, becomes helpless, like a baby. Worse, it turns into a convenient target for the enemy. Accordingly, in order for the short period of gathering reservists, moving and operational deployment of troops not to become their last, it is necessary to carry out a whole range of special measures, which in military language is called the "mobilization and deployment cover operation". This operation is, by definition, defensive and short-lived. The object of

cover is not the country, not the border line, "not the peaceful labor of the Soviet people", but the process - a very short process of mobilization, concentration and deployment. Units and formations solving the task of covering are required to hold back the enemy offensive for several days, prevent large enemy motorized units from breaking through into the operational depth, and cover from the air areas for unloading troops, railway stations and stages. That's all. No less, but no more. At the stage of cover, you can retreat from the line of border pillars. This is not the main thing. The army, mobilized and deployed in battle formations, will return all the pillars to their place in a few days. The most effective and at the same time the cheapest way to solve the task of covering is to choose an enemy so weak that he simply does not dare to fire

the first shot and thereby disrupt the planned course of deployment of your troops. It's possible. This is exactly what happened with the wars waged by the USSR in 1939-1940. Neither Poland, whose army crumbled in September 1939 under the blows of the Wehrmacht, nor 3.5 million Finland even tried to prevent the deployment of the Red Army troops on their borders. Initially, according to this scenario, the Kremlin rulers were going to start a war against Germany. Development

cover plans did not begin in September 1939 - after the emergence of a common line of contact between German and Soviet troops, and not in the late autumn of 1940 - when work was already in full swing to develop plans for the strategic deployment of the Red Army to invade Europe, but only in May 1941. This is not a typo - in May 41st.

It's funny, but Russian "historians" are now sticking out this circumstance with particular zeal, apparently not realizing that the absence of cover plans - in the presence of invasion plans with an offensive depth of 300 km at the stage of solving the "first strategic task" - demonstrates not a special peacefulness, but only the transcendent arrogance of the top military-political leadership of the country. If there was at least some sense in such amazing planning, then it most likely consisted in the hope that the war against Germany could be started according to the most "lightweight option", namely: the main forces of the Wehrmacht would leave for the Middle East or (which would be even more reliable and better) will land in the British Isles. In this scenario, the 20-30 German infantry divisions left in Poland will either not risk interfering with the strategic deployment of the Red Army at all, or will be easily destroyed at the first attempt to cross the border. Other, much more disturbing expectations arose only in the spring of 1941. Thus, in the April (1941) Directive for the development of a plan for the operational deployment of the armies of the Western OVO, the phrase about "the possibility of the enemy going on the offensive before the end of **our concentration**" **appears**. The development of full-fledged cover plans began only in May 1941 of the year

(before that, actions to cover the deployment were briefly mentioned in the general list of tasks provided for by operational plans). Probably, it was in May 1941 that Stalin began to realize that Hitler's invasion of the British Isles could be postponed to an indefinite future, and the Red Army would have to deal with the main and most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe. Accordingly, the attitude towards the complexity and significance of the cover operation has also changed. In the period from May 5 to 14, 1941, the relevant directives of the People's Commissar of Defense were sent to the districts, and by June 6–19, plans to cover five western

districts were received from the respective district headquarters for approval by the General Staff of the Red Army. It

is noteworthy that along with the standard phrase **“stubborn defense of the fortifications along the state border line to firmly cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the district troops”**, all cover plans assumed an air strike on the adjacent territory: **“... Successive**

strikes by military aviation against established bases and combat operations in the air destroy enemy aircraft... By powerful, systematic strikes against the main groupings of troops, railway junctions and bridges, disrupt and delay the concentration and deployment of enemy troops...” Is it necessary to prove that "delaying the

concentration and deployment of enemy troops" is possible only in the case of the first, and not at all "reciprocal" strike? Is it necessary to specifically explain that in the first hours of the war a strike against the established airfields based on enemy aircraft is possible only if the locations of these airfields and the routes of approach to them are reconnoitered in advance. And such painstaking preparatory work was carried out in reality. So, for example, in the appendices to the cover plan for the Western OVO, **“the bomber crew of an aircraft squad to strike enemy airfields”** occupied three sheets of text. Moreover, the plans to cover the Kiev and Leningrad districts even assumed the possibility of an invasion of ground troops into

enemy territory already at the stage of performing cover tasks: **“Under favorable conditions, all defenders and reserves of the armies and the district should be ready, at the direction of the High Command, to deliver swift strikes to defeat enemy groupings , transferring hostilities to its territory and capturing advantageous lines.** The peacefulness discovered by the authors of the "global lie" was very, very toothy ...

Chapter 6

Surprise works

stunning...”

So, by mid-June 1941, cover plans were in place. Each of them ended with the standard phrase: ***“The cover plan is put into effect upon receipt of an encrypted telegram signed by the People’s Commissar of Defense, a member of the Main Military Council and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army with the following content: “Proceed to implement the cover plan of 1941.”*** The commanders of armies, corps and divisions had no right not only to put into operation, but also to familiarize themselves with the contents of the “red package” without the sanction of the high command. ***“Folders and packages with cover documents are opened by written or telegraphic order: in the armies - by the Military Council of the District, in formations - by the Military Council of the Army.”*** Thus, the ability of the Red Army to organize (just shoot from a cannon in the direction of the enemy is possible without any plans) repelling a preemptive strike by the Germans largely depended on whether the headquarters of the districts received a telegram with four short words: “Proceed to implement the cover plan”. But right up to the very morning of June 22, 1941, these words were never heard.

This is the first thing that Stalin did not do (in this case, it would be more correct to write this word with a small letter and in quotation marks, meaning by the collective “Stalin” a group of six people: Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, Beria, Malenkov - the latter as secretary The Central Committee served as a member of the Main Military Council).

Immediately after the introduction of the cover plan, open mobilization should begin (covert mobilization in the form of the so-called “big training camps” was already in full swing, within its framework 802 thousand people were called up in May-June). Formally, legally, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the announcement of mobilization was to be signed by the “All-Union

grandfather" Kalinin, but it is clear that such issues could not be resolved without Stalin's direct instructions. This was also not done, and general mobilization in the USSR was announced only from June 23 - which is an absolutely incredible, but at the same time an obvious and irrefutable fact. All countries participating in the World War began mobilization a month, a week, a few days BEFORE the start of hostilities. And only the country that was preparing for the Great War with all the frenzied persistence of the totalitarian regime managed to be late with the start of mobilization for a whole day!

Why? Why didn't Stalin give the command to put the cover plans into action? Why was it late with the announcement of general mobilization?

Don't these questions contradict the conclusion made earlier ("at the beginning of June 1941, Stalin did not consider a German attack possible in the next few days")? Not at all. Firstly, because many days passed from the beginning of June to June 22 and many important events took place, in particular, German tank and motorized divisions began to arrive in the offensive areas near the western borders of the USSR, and on June 21 the Germans began to openly remove wire fences at the border. Secondly, and this is the most important thing - "the stock does not pull the pocket." The flood of disturbing reports that came to Moscow through intelligence and diplomatic channels, perhaps, did not yet give grounds for unambiguous conclusions about Hitler's intentions. But why not make sure? What prevented the early, even premature implementation of the cover plan?

According to the cover plans, the troops of the border districts occupied defense lines located at a distance of tens, in rare cases, hundreds of kilometers from the places of permanent quartering. As a rule, the advance was planned to be made on foot, sometimes by cars, and only for very few units and formations by rail. The costs of coal and gasoline, stew and food concentrates required for this work are simply negligible in the total military spending of the Soviet Union. Will the personnel have to spend several days or even weeks not in a relatively comfortable military camp, but in the trenches in the middle of an open field? Well, this reason is even funnier. The hardships of military service

are expressly provided for in the Charter, besides, any soldier - from a private to a general - will agree that it is better to sit alive in a trench flooded with summer rain than to lie torn to shreds among the ruins of a military town destroyed by the very first enemy bombing raid.

The question of what was hindered by the advance implementation of the cover plan was (and always will be) absolutely insoluble within the framework of the deliberately false fabrications of Soviet historical "science" about the naive and gullible comrade Stalin, about the peaceful creative work of the Soviet people, about the multiple numerical superiority of the Wehrmacht and Richard Sorge, whose reports were not believed. In the light of knowledge about the real intentions, real plans and real actions of the top military-political leadership of the USSR, everything becomes extremely clear.

The cover operation is nothing but the beginning of a war. It's a genie that can't be put back in the bottle. And not only because the Soviet cover plans for the summer of 1941 involved massive air strikes on the adjacent territory. The complex of measures of the cover operation itself (and even more so - the open mobilization covered by this operation) is so voluminous and noticeable that it is in principle impossible to hide it from enemy reconnaissance. This would not have been a big problem if Stalin had planned to wage a defensive war. And let the enemy see, let him know: the borders of the Soviet Union are locked! ***"Let the enemy who hid in ambush remember / We are on the alert, we are watching the enemy."*** Beautiful song. Yes, only her next line (***"Foreign land, we do not want an inch"***) by the summer of 1941 was already categorically outdated. It is precisely the absence of an order to put a cover plan into effect, combined with the indisputable fact of the existence of the largest strategic regrouping of troops, that once again confirms the conclusion that hundreds of military echelons went to the West in June 1941 by no means to defend "indestructible lines".

Stalin planned and prepared to start another, not at all defensive war. This circumstance, stubbornly denied by official Soviet (now Russian) historiography, completely changes the whole situation. The premature introduction of the cover plan interfered with the main thing - it prevented

SUDDEN crushing blow to the German troops. ***“Suddenness has a stunning effect,”*** read paragraph 16 of the Field Manual of the Red Army. Concluding his report at the December (1940) Meeting of the highest command staff, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov repeated this word like a spell:

“... Victory will be ensured by the side that is more skillful in managing and creating conditions for surprise in the use of these forces and means. The surprise of the modern operation is one of the decisive factors of victory. Attaching the utmost importance to surprise, all methods of camouflage and deception of the enemy must be widely introduced into the Red Army. Camouflage and deception must run like a red thread in the training and education of troops, commanders and staffs. The Red Army in future battles must show a high class of operational and tactical suddenness...”

Stalin had been preparing his “blitzkrieg” for so long, so persistently, so carefully, he had put in so many efforts (which are bearing fruit to this day) for “camouflage and deception” that he really did not want to break the brilliant plan of the operation, which was supposed to begin with a devastating sudden blow to the enemy. He really “driven away every thought” - no, not the thought of war (he didn’t think about anything else), but that the Germans at the very last moment would be able to get ahead of him in deploying the army. The same idea can be expressed even shorter and simpler: Stalin was afraid to frighten off Hitler. This desire "not to frighten off" led to the fact that the strategic deployment was carried out ***"while maintaining the mode of operation of the railways in peacetime."*** For this valuable recognition of the authors of the monograph "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" should have been awarded a second medal "For Courage". For the multi-million armies of the first half of the 20th century, railways, trains and steam locomotives became the most important "type of weaponry", which largely determined the outcome of the main battles of the two world wars. Accordingly, both Germany and the USSR had plans to transfer railway traffic to the “maximum military traffic” mode. The meaning of the term and the process is quite clear: all trains, cargo and passengers stand and wait until the echelons with troops, equipment and ammunition proceed in the direction they need. In addition, unbooked

mobilization coal reserves, increased armed protection of railway stations and stages, etc. The regime of military transportation in the European part of the USSR was introduced (September 12, 1939) even at the stage of the strategic deployment of the Red Army before the war with the dilapidated invasion of the Wehrmacht by Poland. However, in the 41st, until June 22, nothing detailed was done!

Disguise and deceit reached the point that on June 21, 1941, the head of the Political Propaganda Department of the Baltic District, Comrade Ryabchiy, ordered ***“not to give written directives to the political propaganda departments of the corps and divisions; to set the tasks of political work orally through their representatives...”***.

Of course, Soviet norms of secrecy have always differed from universal ones, but not to such an extent that even the “tasks of political propaganda” could not be entrusted to paper! It remains to be assumed that by June 21, 1941, these “tasks” went far beyond the readiness declared on all the posters to “respond with a triple blow to the attack of the aggressor” and “reliably protect the peaceful labor of the Soviet people” ... “The

transfer of troops was planned with the expectation of completing the ***concentration in the areas outlined by operational plans, from June 1 to July 10, 1941***. No one knows the exact date of the planned start of the offensive of the Red Army. Moreover, it is quite possible that Stalin himself did not know this date on the evening of June 21. But in any case, the offensive could begin only after the completion of the concentration and deployment of troops, that is, not earlier than July 5-10. Putting into action the cover plan on June 15–20 meant throwing all the efforts and tricks to ensure maximum covert deployment to the cat, meant giving the enemy two or three weeks to prepare to repel the strike. This is a lot, two or three weeks - according to Soviet standards, a full-fledged defense zone could be equipped with the forces of a combined arms army (with the involvement of the local population and horse-drawn vehicles) in 10-15 days. Yes, Stalin

had another option - to bring the start date of the operation closer, move it from mid-July to the end of June, and put the cover plan into effect on June 22–23 (I assume that this was the decision that was made; this hypothesis is set out in detail in the book "June 23 - M-Day"). But this decision meant

that only part of the forces will be able to launch an offensive, breaking carefully worked out schedules of transportation, mobilization of personnel and transport on the go. Too bad, also fraught with failure and heavy

losses. Before you begin to shake your head contritely ("and how could Stalin have gotten into such a mess ... why didn't he listen to intelligence reports ..."), one should look at the situation through the eyes of the participants in the meetings in Stalin's office. By the way, there were many meetings. From the "Journal of Visits" it can be seen that Zhukov and Timoshenko were in Stalin's office seven times: 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 18, 21 June. On June 9, the military spent a total of 6.5 hours in Stalin's office. On June 18, "collective Stalin" in almost full force (Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Timoshenko, Zhukov) deliberated for four hours ...

Today we know for sure that the Germans attacked on June 22. Stalin only knew exactly his own plans, and these were plans for a large-scale offensive operation, which was to begin no earlier than the second decade of July. The stream of more and more alarming messages coming from both intelligence and the command of the western military districts made us frantically choose the "lesser of two evils":

- or to deprive their own troops of the opportunity to meet in an organized way a probable preemptive strike by the enemy;
- or put into action a cover plan ahead of schedule and thus guaranteed to deprive your troops of the opportunity to deliver a surprise attack on the enemy. The task was extremely

difficult. The lost surprise cannot be regained, while a possible tactical loss from the failure of the first day of defensive battles did not seem to be something catastrophic. It is you, dear reader, who firmly "knows" that the fortified areas on the old border were disarmed (or even blown up), and "they did not manage to build anything" on the new border. But the collective "Stalin" was well aware of the state of the strip of fortified areas, one of which was called the "Stalin Line", and the other - the "Molotov Line", and the topographic map of the western regions of their country.

The war takes place not on a smooth chessboard, but on real terrain, with its ravines, potholes, lakes, mountains and swamps. And if no "offensive" or "defensive"

there are no tanks and planes, then the terrain, on the contrary, can help either the defending or the attacking side. This was not invented by me, and the terms "tank-inaccessible terrain", "tank-dangerous direction" have long and firmly taken their place in military literature. These concepts were especially significant for the Wehrmacht of the 1941 model, in which motorized infantry regiments of tank and motorized divisions moved not on tracked armored personnel carriers (as was shown in the Soviet "movie about the war"), but on ordinary, "civilian" trucks, captured buses and grain vans; and German tanks, on their narrow tracks, got stuck after a good rain on the terrain that in Russia is called the "dirt road." Turning to the map, we will see that the German army group "North"

immediately after crossing the border "stumbled" into the full-flowing Neman River, and in its lower (i.e., the widest) course. Further, having crossed many small rivers and streams, the German divisions, about 250 km from the border, went to the banks of the mighty navigable river Zapadnaya Dvina (Daugava), and again in its lower reaches. After another 150–200 km, on the way to Leningrad, German troops were supposed to force the Velikaya River, to the north of which the road to Leningrad was tightly blocked by the system of Lake Peipus and Pskov. And this is the best route provided by nature. The troops of Army Groups "Center" and "South" were waiting for much more serious obstacles. The terrain in the offensive zone of the Army Group "Center" (southern Lithuania and

western Belarus) is absolutely "anti-tank". From the north, the "Bialystok ledge" is covered by a strip of impenetrable swamps in the floodplain of the forest river Biebrzha, in the south, the border was drawn along the bank of the navigable river Western Bug in its lower reaches. A few roads among the centuries-old forests and dead swamps of western Belarus are a kind of mountain gorges - the stuck (or padded) head car of the column can neither be bypassed nor bypassed. East of Minsk, the offensive zone of Army Group Center from north to south is crossed by two full-flowing rivers, which Napoleon had the misfortune to meet at one time: the Berezina and the Dnieper.

Today we can judge what it means to attack such terrain by the chronology of the most brilliant (both in concept and implementation) strategic offensive operation of the Red Army - Operation Bagration. The offensive began on June 23, 1944, approximately from the turn of the river. Dnieper. On July 3, Minsk was liberated, after 13 days - Grodno, after another 25 days - Bialystok and Brest. The city of Lomza (at the very tip of the former Bialystok ledge) was occupied only on September 13th. It only remains to add that the Red Army launched Operation Bagration with a threefold superiority in the number of divisions, a fourfold superiority in the number of tanks, and absolute air

supremacy. In June 1941, Army Group South could only launch an invasion of Ukraine through a relatively narrow (150–200 km) “corridor” between the cities of Kovel and Lvov. From the north, this corridor is bounded by an absolutely impassable strip of Polesie swamps (they say there were villages in which not a single German soldier was seen during the entire war), from the south - by the Carpathian Mountains. It was in this zone that all the tank and motorized divisions of Army Group South advanced. On this way, they had to force the Western Bug, and then the southern tributaries of the Pripyat (Turya, Stokhod, Styr, Goryn, Sluch) following one after another at almost equal intervals of 50–60 km. These small rivers have wide, reliably swampy banks. Soviet military experts characterize them as ***"water barriers of operational-tactical significance."***

South of the Carpathians, in Moldavia and in the steppes of southern Ukraine, the terrain, it would seem, is much more favorable for the advancing troops - there are neither forests nor swamps. But three navigable rivers flow parallel to the border - the Prut, the Dniester, the Southern Bug - in their lower reaches. Finally, the mighty Dnieper inevitably arose on the path of the German and Romanian troops, the forcing of which in its lower reaches is an operation that is already quite comparable in complexity and riskiness to an amphibious landing. As a matter of fact, only to the east of the Dnieper did the German motorized formations finally reach the terrain, allowing for a wide operational maneuver. Yes, only from the border to the Dnieper more than 400 km. The obstacles created by nature itself were supplemented and repeatedly intensified by obstacles

man-made. At a depth of 200-300 km from the border (beyond the line of the "old" border of 1939), the fortified areas of the "Stalin Line" were located in a continuous strip from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea:

- Kingiseppsky; -
- Pskov; —
- Ostrovsky; -
- Sebezhsky; -
- Polotsk; —
- Minsk; -
- Slutsky; -
- Mozyrsky; -
- Korostensky; -
- Novograd-Volynsky; -
- Shepetovsky; -
- Kyiv; -
- Izyaslavsky; -
- Starokonstantinovsky; -
- Ostropolsky; -
- Letichevsky; —
- Kamenetz-Podolsky; -
- Mogilev-Yampolsky; -
- Rybnitsky; -
- Tiraspol. The

number of pillboxes in one UR was different and ranged from 206 to 455, which provided a density of two to three pillboxes per 1 km of the front. Part of the fortified areas were built on the banks of full-flowing rivers (Western Dvina, Southern Bug, Dniester), which created an additional barrier for the advancing enemy. In terms of the number and composition of weapons, the quality of reinforced concrete, and the equipment with special equipment, any of these pillboxes was at least as good as the most massive structures of the notorious "Mannerheim Line". Contrary to the legend that has been replicated for

many decades, no one blew up the bunkers of the "Stalin line" before the war and did not cover them with earth. Some pillboxes are intact to this day. In principle, it was impossible to transport weapons from the "Stalin Line" to the "Molotov Line": if the bunkers on the "old" border were 9/10 machine-gun, then on the new

At the border, about half of the bunkers were supposed to be armed with the latest semi-automatic artillery systems with excellent periscope optics, and it was precisely these that were lacking. In the summer of 1940, along the new western border of the Soviet Union, the construction of 15 fortified areas of the Molotov Line began (Telypyai, Shaulyai, Kaunas, Alytus, Grodno, Osovetsky, Zambrovsky, Brest, Kovelsky, Vladimir-Volynsky, Rava Russian, Strumilovsky, Peremyshl, Verkhne-Prutsky and Nizhne-Prutsky). The grandiose program involved the construction of 5807 bunkers (there were "only" 3279 on the "Stalin Line").

By June 22, 1941, this "construction of the century" was still very, very far from completion. G.K. Zhukov, in his infamous "Memoirs and Reflections", claims that ***"by the beginning of the war, about 2,500 reinforced concrete structures were built,"*** but here he may have been mistaken, and in the opposite direction from the desired one: most modern sources indicate significantly lower numbers. So, in the URs of Western Belarus, from 332 to 505 bunkers were built, in Western Ukraine - about 375. An incomparably larger number of bunkers were still under construction.

For example, 128 bunkers were built in Brest UR, and 380 more were to be handed over by builders by August 1, 1941. Thus, in those days and hours when the last pre-war meetings were going on in Stalin's office, their participants knew that on average one kilometer of the front of the Brest fortified area there are already three concrete boxes dug into the ground, the walls of which can withstand a direct hit by a heavy field howitzer shell. One - fully built, and two more of the same boxes, partially unfinished. But this is on average. In fact, the Brest UR was located in one of the world's largest marshy areas. On such terrain, bunkers were built not in a "chain", but in separate defense nodes, blocking a few road directions. So, in the area of the town of Semyatyche, near the Sedlec-Belovezh road, there were 20 pillboxes, which were occupied by the 17th machine-gun artillery battalion.

Stalin had a phenomenal memory, but even the most forgetful commander of the Red Army could not forget by June 1941 how the Red Army broke through the Mannerheim Line. This theme

constantly appeared in the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko, at meetings of the highest command staff. It was explained to everyone that the Red Army had performed a miracle, which military history knows no equal. The chronology of the "miracle" was as follows: it took 7-10 days to overcome 30-40 km of the "foreground" and reach the main line of fortifications, then two weeks of fruitless and bloody attempts to break through. After that, the whole of January and early February 1940 were spent in serious

preparation for the assault; On February 11, the offensive began, which in the first days of March ended with the final breakthrough of the three lanes of the Finnish fortified area and the exit

of the Red Army to Vyborg. Any comparison is lame. Of course, in February 1940, the natural and climatic conditions for conducting an offensive operation were terrible. On the other hand, against 166 bunkers of the "Mannerheim Line" in February, there were concentrated (not counting 350 thousand infantry), 767 guns and howitzers of 152 mm caliber, 96 howitzers of 203 mm caliber and 28 super-heavy 280-mm mortars, throwing a projectile weighing 286 kg. The number of tanks on the Karelian Isthmus exceeded 3,000. Even if we subtract 492 T-37/T38 light tankettes from this number, it turns out that on average more than 10 tanks attacked one machine-gun bunker of the Mannerheim Line. Soviet aviation in the course of 19.5 thousand sorties dropped a total of 10.5 kilotons of bombs on the pillboxes of the Mannerheim Line; artillery brought down

on the Finnish fortifications up to 230 thousand shells per day. It was these figures, these facts and these rates of breakthrough of the fortified area that were present before the eyes of the collective "Stalin". The simplest logic and the Felix adding machine indicated that the Germans, with their frail forces, would not be able to create even one-fifth of the concentration of manpower and firepower that was created on the Karelian Isthmus in February 1940, which means that on the way from the border to the Dnieper, a months-long "bloody meat grinder" inevitably awaits them. With such an assessment of the situation, the question of whether a four-word order ("start implementing the cover plan") would arrive in the western districts a day earlier or two days later could not have the fateful significance that later Soviet historians and propagandists attached to it. Stalin did not expect a catastrophe, and within the framework of that mil

millimeters of armor, there was no reason to expect a catastrophe.

Chapter

7 Major Maneuvers

Stalin was wrong. A catastrophe unparalleled in its scale and the consequences of a military disaster took place.

The task assigned to the Wehrmacht according to the Barbarossa plan (***“the main forces of the Russian ground forces located in Western Russia must be destroyed in bold operations by deep, rapid advancement of tank wedges ...”***) was actually completed by mid-July 1941. The troops of the Baltic and Western military districts (more than 70 divisions) were defeated, thrown back 350–450 km east of the border, dispersed through the forests or taken prisoner. A little later, the same thing happened with the new 60 divisions introduced into the Northwestern and Western fronts from June 22 to mid-July. The enemy occupied Lithuania, Latvia, almost all of Belarus, Western Ukraine and Moldova. The Germans crossed the Neman along three unexploded bridges near Alytus and Merkina, and crossed the full-flowing Western Dvina on the morning of June

26 along two unexploded bridges near Daugavpils (300 km west of the border). On July 4, the Germans occupied the city of Ostrov almost without a fight, capturing two unexploded bridges across the river. Great. On July 9, Pskov was occupied. The Germans practically did not notice the fortifications of the Pskov, Ostrov and Sebezh fortified areas. At the same pace, practically ignoring the gray concrete boxes of bunkers, the Germans passed through the line of the Brest and Grodno fortifications. Only on the northern flank of the Minsk fortified area fierce battles flared up, and the enemy's offensive was delayed by 2–3 days. On June 28, exactly one week after the start of the war, Minsk was occupied (350 km west of Brest or Bialystok). On the same day, June 28, the Germans crossed the river. Berezina near Bobruisk by the forces of the vanguard of the 3rd Panzer Division, consisting of two tank platoons and one motorized infantry company. On the same day, June 28, 1941, the military commandant of the city of Borisov

wrote in his report:

"... Directly against the river. Berezina there are no large parts of the enemy. Separate tank detachments operate along the main highways with protection from them in the form of separate patrols (usually tankettes) by force from a squad to a platoon (i.e., from 10 to 50 people. - M.S.). <...> The garrison, which I have to defend the line of the river. Berezina and Borisov, has a knocked together combat unit only as part of an armored school (up to 1400 people). The rest of the composition is a collection of "rabble" from rear alarmists, demoralized by the situation noted above, with a significant percentage of German intelligence and counterintelligence agents (spies, saboteurs, etc.) who have stuck to them. All this makes the garrison of the city of Borisov incompetent ... The absence

of the 3rd department and the tribunal, before I personally organized them, significantly weakens the combat capability of the already ineffective units of the garrison. In addition (emphasized by me. - M. S.) there are no tanks and anti-tank guns ... "

On July 10-11, the Dnieper was crossed in a 200-kilometer strip from Orsha to Rogachev. On July 16, the 29th motorized infantry division of the Wehrmacht occupied Smolensk (700 km east of the border). Two-thirds of the distance from Brest to Moscow was covered in less than a month.

By July 6-9 (these dates in Soviet historiography are traditionally considered the temporary border of the so-called "border battle"), the troops of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts lost 11.7 thousand tanks, 19 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1 million small arms. The recorded losses of the personnel of these three fronts amounted to 749 thousand people. The Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front lost 64 thousand people by July 6. Thus, the loss of personnel of the advancing - and very successfully, 30-50 km per day of the advancing - the Wehrmacht and the defending Red Army correlated approximately as 1 to 12. By the end of July, the number of prisoners of war recorded by the German command amounted to 814 thousand people. By the end of July 1941, the irretrievable losses of Wehrmacht tank divisions amounted to 503 tanks. To this figure should be added the loss of 21 "assault guns". You can add on the loss of 92 Pz-I tankettes. Even in this case, the ratio of irretrievable losses of the sides' tanks is 1 to 19.

This is a "miracle" that does not fit into any canons of military science. According to sound logic - and throughout the practice of wars and armed conflicts - the losses of the attacker should be greater than the losses of the defender. The ratio of losses of 1 to 12 is possible only in the case when the white colonialists, who sailed to Africa with cannons and guns, attack the natives defending

spears and hoes...

In the years of mature stagnation, such a sad anecdote appeared. A man stands in the middle of Red Square in Moscow and scatters sheets of clean paper. Well, his - of course - under white hands and to the police.

- What are you

doing? I distribute leaflets.

What flyers? Nothing is written on them! - And what,

someone else does not understand?

Those who saw the monstrous debacle of the summer of 1941 with their own eyes did not need long explanations of its real reasons. They understood everything. As if on command (and perhaps indeed on command), an unspoken "conspiracy of silence" has developed, under the terms of which even in secret reports and reports it was not necessary to talk about the main thing that commanders and subordinates at all levels of the military ladder knew without any reports. . Here, for example, is an interesting document (TsAMO, f. 221, op. 5554, d. 4, pp. 34–39). On July 9, 1941, Major General Tikhonov writes a report addressed to the Commissioner of the Headquarters of the Civil Code, Colonel-General Gorodovikov, entitled "**Conclusions on observations of operations in the Pskov and Ostrov-Pskov directions.**" Judging by the name, General Tikhonov was sent to the troops with the task of unbiasedly understanding the reasons for the defeat and reporting his findings to the high command. With what does he begin his "Conclusions"? With the following, to put it mildly, strange phrase: "**Without going into the root causes** (emphasized by me. - *M.S.*) **of the withdrawal of the troops of the North-Western Front, it is necessary to state the presence of the following shortcomings in the troops today ...** "

However, even refusing to discuss the "root causes", General Tikhonov stated that:

“... In defense, commanders and soldiers are unstable ... I have seen many cases when the withdrawal began without an order from the commander, without pressure from the infantry, under pressure only from tanks or artillery fire or mortar fire ... Artillery shows instability, prematurely retreats from firing positions, does not use all its power of their own fire... Anti-tank guns in the defense are also unstable, leaving their positions prematurely, as a result of which the enemy's tanks are in command on the battlefield... Infantry is the weakest point of the troops. The offensive spirit is low... Part of the commanding staff, especially in the link up to the battalion commander, does not show due courage in battle, there are cases of leaving the battlefield without the order of the chief by singles and even subunits. Moreover, even in the ranks of the highest command personnel, confusion and discouragement are manifested in some ... The rear, starting with the regimental

one, is poorly managed, wandering and are the primary sources of panic rumors and flows ... ”A military historian, Colonel L.N. came to very remarkable conclusions .

Lopukhovsky. In the collection "The Great Patriotic Catastrophe-3" (M.: Yauza, 2008), his article "In the first days of the war" was published. The work is devoted to the history of the defeat of the 120th howitzer regiment of the RGK (4th Army, Western Front). The author's interest in the history of this particular unit is understandable - the regiment was commanded by his father, Colonel N. I. Lopukhovsky (died in early October 41 in the "Vyazma boiler").

“... Only sometimes you can find a detailed report on the reasons for leaving weapons and military equipment on the territory captured by the enemy. The impression is that some of these reports were simply withdrawn from the respective files, transferred to special storage (this idea is suggested to researchers by numerous cases of changing the numbering of pages in the files down) ... It is strange that the report of the commander of the 120th GAP does not say anything about the reasons for leaving 12 B-4 howitzers at the points of deployment. "Left" - and that's all ... ”

In order for you to understand how “strange” this is, you will have to give a few numbers. The 203-mm B-4 howitzer on a tracked carriage is a steel monster weighing (in the stowed position) 19 tons,

capable of throwing a 100-kg projectile at a distance of 18 km. The selling price of the B-4 howitzer in 1939 was set at (depending on configuration) 510-585 thousand rubles. This is the price of a light tank. Or 90 cars M-1 ("emka"). It is not supposed to leave such powerful and expensive artillery systems "just like that" ... Strictly

speaking, if there was a great desire, it was possible to find out the "reasons for leaving" almost every tank, every heavy howitzer, every aircraft abandoned at the airfield. Weapons "just like that" are not handed out. Specific persons were personally responsible for the safety of each piece of weapons. Even a simple three-line rifle had its own individual number and was issued to the fighter against signature. After the war ended not in Moscow, but in Berlin at the cost of the blood of millions, Stalin could arrange a big "debriefing". It was possible to take tens of thousands of captured Wehrmacht documents and scrupulously compare each report of "enemy losses" with the losses recorded in the documents of the enemy himself. It was possible to find out specifically what actually stood behind the reports of "many times superior enemy forces", about the notorious "German airborne assault forces", about German tanks that appeared in thousands in the most inappropriate places ... Many things could be checked, but Comrade Stalin showed in this deed great wisdom.

Stalin did not check and find out anything. And why? To establish the "root causes" of the military catastrophe of 1941? Stalin perfectly understood these "root causes" already in the first days of the war. To punish the guilty? The main culprits were himself and the criminal gang of his accomplices. As for the "switchmen", they have already been roughly punished. On August 16, 1941, the famous order No. 270 "On cases of cowardice and surrender and measures to suppress such actions" was issued. For greater persuasiveness, Stalin ordered his accomplices: Budyonny, Voroshilov, Zhukov, Molotov, Timoshenko and Shaposhnikov to sign this document, which hardly has an analogue in the military history of civilized countries. The operative part of Order No. 270 read: ***"I order: Commanders and political workers who, during the battle, tear off their insignia and desert to the rear or surrender to the enemy,***

to consider malicious deserters, whose families are subject to arrest as families of deserters who violated the oath and betrayed their homeland. To oblige all higher commanders and commissars to shoot such deserters from the command staff on the spot ...

To oblige each serviceman, regardless of his official position, to demand from a superior commander, if part of him is surrounded, to fight to the last opportunity in order to break through to his own, and if such a commander or part of the Red Army men, instead of organizing a rebuff to the enemy, prefer to surrender, destroy them by all means, both ground and air, and to deprive the families of Red Army soldiers who surrendered of state benefits and assistance ... ” Very important for

understanding Comrade Stalin's way of thinking is the fact that in order No. 270 he did not even consider it necessary to mention such lofty motives , as "defending the conquests of October", "saving mankind from fascist barbarism", did not remember either Dmitry Donskoy or Alexander Nevsky. Simply and bluntly, the soldiers of the Red Army were reminded that their families were hostages of their behavior at the front. It is probably difficult for a modern reader to understand the specific meaning of the phrase “to deprive state benefits and assistance”, but those who listened to Order No. buy about 4 kg of bread or two bars of soap. By choice. Stalin's order did not remain an empty phrase. In total, during the years of the war, 158 thousand people were shot by the verdicts of military tribunals (the report of the Rehabilitation

Commission indicated the “exact” figure - 157,593, but I doubt that such an accurate account was possible in the bloody whirlwind of war). Ten divisions were completely shot by their own. So Comrade Stalin did not forget to punish the "switchmen". It is hardly worth recalling the well-known fact that the Soviet Union refused to cooperate with the International Red Cross, which made it impossible to provide assistance with food and medicine to the Red Army soldiers in German captivity.

And after the great Victory, Stalin did not squander resources to feed, clothe and put on new clothes, to provide normal housing and a cheap Volkswagen to each of the survivors of the world-wide slaughter of the winners organized by him. He acted much smarter. He showed great generosity and made one, but truly royal gift for everyone: Stalin gave his subjects a TALE. A fairy tale about a beautiful young country, in which, among the endless forests, fields and rivers, one could breathe so freely and happily. But one day, on a sunny summer morning, the accursed fascist horde treacherously and suddenly attacked a peaceful country. The noble fury of peaceful people boiled up like a wave and fell upon the invaders. The defenders of the wonderful country had no tanks, no planes, simple rifles, and even that was not enough, but on the other hand there was mass heroism unprecedented in history and unprecedented unity of the party and people. And the black hordes fled in fear, and the whole world greeted the victorious army with flowers and trophy accordions in admiration.

Adults listened to this fairy tale and forgot everything they saw with their own eyes, and when the bloodthirsty and vile storyteller died (or was promptly poisoned by his comrades in the Politburo), millions of enchanted adult children sobbed and fought in hysterics. And then, in a calm atmosphere, on plentiful nomenklatura grubs, mountains of books were composed that ***“the source of the high moral qualities of Soviet soldiers were: strength, great advantages of the socialist social and state system, friendship of the peoples of the USSR, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, the undivided leadership of the Communist party in all aspects of the life of the country.*** I hope you understand - I'm not joking, I'm quoting. I will also quote what S. Gedroits wrote in the Leningrad magazine Zvezda at the end of 2007: ***“... For more than half a century, thousands and thousands of special people in special institutes, academies, departments, publishing houses produced and reproduced special Military Lies. Documents - which are destroyed, which are forged, which are classified, and most importantly - the brains are processed in such a way as to stir***

they were impossible. In the mausoleum, built from cyclopean blocks of lies, the Great Patriotic War lay deader than Lenin ... "

Of course, it is impossible to consider all cheating tricks within the framework of one chapter, I will not be able to name even one hundredth of the names, because the methods described below were used by almost all Soviet "historians", their name is legion. Without daring to formulate a complete and exhaustive classification of the methods of "special military lies", I will begin this brief review with the following

four methods: -

"maneuver along the front"; - "maneuver in depth"; - "mind game" (replacing the discussion of facts with a dispute about "opportunities"); — the use of tear gas and stun grenades

Military operations unfold in time and space. This unsophisticated philosophy opens up truly limitless possibilities for falsifications to a skilled little man. Now I will clearly show you how, using maneuver along the front and maneuver in depth, you can present to the gullible reader ANY ratio of the number of troops of the opposing sides. Let's start with the simplest, purely theoretical example.

A certain division went on the defensive. According to the pre-war Field Regulations (PU-39, clause 375), ***"a rifle division can successfully defend a strip 8-12 km wide along the front, a rifle regiment - a sector along the front 3-5 km, a battalion - an area along the front 1.5-2 km "***. Let us assume that exactly as required by the Charter, the division of the defenders is located on the ground. The enemy has the task of breaking through the defense with the strength of one division. In fact, there is a complete numerical equality of the forces of the parties (division against division). However, the advancing division will not go on the attack, stretching out in a "chain" for 10 km. To do this, the commander of the attackers does not need to be the greatest military genius of all time - it is enough to firmly grasp the Charter. What does it say? ***"The division can attack on average at the front up to 3 km. The strike group of a division is formed as part of at least two rifle regiments. It is reinforced by the tanks attached to the division and supported by the bulk of the divisional and attached artillery"*** (PU-39, p. 260).

Even if the attackers do not have any attached tanks and artillery, the strike of two regiments, supported by the fire of ***the "main mass of divisional artillery"***, will fall on the defense sector occupied (at best for the defenders) by only one regiment. Thus, the attackers have a two-fold superiority in the number of personnel and a huge superiority in artillery. What does "huge" mean? Let's count. In the regiment of the defenders (hereinafter we take the staffing of the rifle division of the Red Army from April 1941) there are only 6 guns of 76.2 mm caliber. And the advancing, in addition to the 12 guns of two rifle regiments, also have "the bulk of divisional artillery, i.e. 32 122-mm howitzers and 12 152-mm howitzers (16 divisional guns of 76.2 mm caliber, I would, on the spot attacking division commander, left in reserve - in case of repelling a possible counterattack). In terms of the number of barrels, the attackers have a 9-fold superiority; according to the total "weight of a single salvo" (there is such a characteristic in military affairs), a 32-fold superiority is created. And this, mind you, with the initial equality of forces of the parties! Now let's move from the tactical level (regiment, division) to the operational level (army, front).

Let's take a very specific example this time. Most of the Red Army forces were deployed in the southwestern theater of operations (in the strip from Pripyat to the Black Sea). As a result of this, despite the general arithmetic superiority of the Soviet side in the number of troops, in the northwestern theater of operations (from the Baltic to the swamps of Polesie) in the first days of the war there was an approximate equality of forces (74 Wehrmacht divisions in the army groups "North" and "Center" , 71 divisions of the Red Army as part of the Baltic and Western military districts). However, the German command, of course, did not line up its troops in a long,

equal chain, but resolutely massed its forces and means in the directions of the main attack. In particular, the 9th Wehrmacht Army consisting of three (8th, 20th, 42nd) infantry corps advanced on the Bialystok ledge from the north-west. Three divisions of the 42nd corps, stretching out in a "long thread" along the border on a front 110 km long, had the task of diverting attention and shackling part of the Red Army forces. The main blow at the very base of the Belostok ledge was delivered by five divisions of the 8th and 20th corps.

In fact, in the defense zone of one (56th) rifle division of the Red Army, a concentrated attack was delivered by the forces of four German divisions. Multiple numerical superiority is already evident. But this is still far from the limit of concentration. To the north of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht, the 3rd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht struck at the junction of the Western and Northwestern fronts. At the stage of breaking through the border fortifications, the 3rd TGr was quickly subordinated to two more infantry corps (5th and 6th). On the first day of the war, only in the first echelon of the offensive, against the 128th rifle division of the Red Army, three tank divisions (20th, 7th, 12th, a total of 714 tanks), two infantry and one motorized Wehrmacht division attacked. Overwhelming numerical superiority - again, with the general equality of forces of the parties on TV

D. And this "maneuver along the front" does not end there. The 3rd TGr in the first days of the war advanced in a strip 40–50 km wide. But this does not mean at all that the tanks were moving east, stretching out in a chain from Vilnius to Voronovo. Nothing like that - each of the four tank divisions of the group had its own "offensive zone", but even within this zone, the shock groups of tanks and motorized infantry advanced in relatively narrow sections of the breakthrough.

According to the pre-war views of Soviet military experts, a tank formation directly on the battlefield should have been built in 3 echelons with intervals between tanks of 20–30 meters. With this construction, the German tank division (about 200 tanks) struck on a front 2 km wide. This (see above) is the defense area of the rifle battalion. Tank division against rifle battalion! Tenfold superiority in numbers, absolute superiority in firepower. According to the staffing table, there are only two anti-tank guns in the rifle battalion - how can they fend off the blow of two hundred tanks? Here it is, the "multiple numerical superiority" of the enemy, who, as Marshal Zhukov writes, "delivered devastating cutting blows on the very first day of the war." However, you know all this very well even without me. On my own, fortunately, almost bloodless experience. A tiny

mosquito weighing less than one gram with a crushing dissecting blow pierces thick human skin. On the microscopic area of the tip

mosquito sting creates a pressure that nothing living can resist. Does this mean that in a fight between a man and a mosquito, a man is doomed? No. A person has in stock two ways to escape from a mosquito attack. The first is to create a pre-prepared strip of fortifications (a thick canvas jacket, a mosquito net, an ointment that repels mosquitoes). The second is to inflict a crushing counterattack on the flank and rear of the enemy, that is, to slam the mosquito with a slight movement of the hand. The defending army also has a third option - to oppose the concentration of forces advancing in a narrow section of the breakthrough with an adequate concentration of forces of the defenders (a person - unless it is an Indian yogi - cannot, by an effort of will, thicken his skin so that it becomes impenetrable for a mosquito sting) . Miracles don't happen. With the initial equality of the forces of the

parties, it is impossible to create a "multiple numerical superiority" in one sector without exposing all the others! The breakthrough of the 3rd Panzer Group from Suwalki to Vilnius and further to Minsk became possible not at all because the Germans found a "magic wand" that allows them to turn a fly into an elephant. It's just that the most powerful 6th mechanized corps of the Red Army could not (more precisely, did not even try) to break through the thin "thread" of the battle order of the 42nd Wehrmacht Infantry Corps and strike at the flank and rear of the 3rd Panzer Group. Repeating all those arithmetic exercises that were demonstrated above, we come to the conclusion that the 6th mechanized corps (1100 tanks, more than 28 thousand personnel) had to bring down its "crushing cutting blow" on one Wehrmacht infantry regiment and simply "smear it on the wall. Like a mosquito...

The principle of concentration of forces in the direction of the main attack was, is and will be the basis of the foundations of military art, but this is a very dangerous, "double-edged" method. And it is not by chance that this phrase exists in the Russian language: "military art". Enormous art, that is, experience, knowledge, speed and flexibility in decision-making, is needed in order to concentrate efforts on one sector of the front and not receive a crushing counterattack on another. If this were not so, then all the attackers would always only advance. Little blood and on a foreign land.

Returning from bloody military science to relatively safe military-historical propaganda, we note that in Soviet times, "maneuver along the front" was carried out, as it were, in "two echelons." At the first, in thick books that claim to be some kind of scientific conscientiousness, the phrases about the "multiple numerical superiority of the Wehrmacht" were nevertheless accompanied by a bashful clause - "in the breakthrough area", "in the direction of the main blow". Not everyone noticed these reservations, but wise professors covered up their ... reputation in this way. At the level of lectures in the "red corner" all these unnecessary, distracting from the main clarification were discarded and the workers were told directly and without prejudice about the "four to five times superiority of the enemy." It should be noted that these figures were simply taken from the ceiling, more precisely, from the district committee manual, which was copied from the city committee, and so on up to the agitation and propaganda department of the Central Committee. It was there that they decided - what to be the "numerical superiority" of the Wehrmacht. I think that a conscientious calculation of the balance of forces in those very narrow sections (in fact, road directions) on which the German tank columns were advancing would give figures of the order of 10-15 to 1.

The method of "maneuver along the front" is good for everyone, only one is bad - it is designed for a person completely illiterate in military affairs. Which, however, fully corresponded to the basic principle of communist propaganda: "a fool will not notice, a smart one will remain silent, a brave one will be imprisoned." And yet, back in the good old days, the "frontal maneuver" was supplemented by a much more solid "deep maneuver" (in this case, by "depth" I mean both space and time).

The essence of the "maneuver in depth" method is to deliberately ignore the difference between a moment and a long period of time, between a momentary photograph and filming a long process. Simply put, the number of troops and weapons of the Red Army was always indicated as of the morning of June 22, 1941, and within the geographical limits of an arbitrarily established "first echelon". And on the side of the enemy, everything that appeared there during the week, month, year is summed up

after the outbreak of hostilities. This trick opens up huge opportunities for brainwashing.

If we are talking about the "instant photograph" of June 22, 1941, then the three Wehrmacht army groups ("North", "Center" and South) should be included in the enemy force grouping, and the troops of the four Western troops should be included in the Red Army grouping. districts (Baltic, Western, Kiev, Odessa). If we talk about the "border battle" (June 22 - July 9), then on the side of the enemy the Romanian army is added, which launched an offensive in Moldova on July 2, together with the Germans, and on the side of the Red Army - some formations of the Leningrad Military District, transferred to the Ostrov region - Pskov, and some formations of the Second Strategic Echelon, which actually took part in the hostilities in late June - early July of the 41st. If we are talking about the summer of the 41st, then the Finnish army appears on the side of the enemy, which launched an offensive on July 10, the few formations of the Hungarian and Slovak armies at that time, some infantry divisions of the reserve of the Wehrmacht High Command. On the Soviet side, the entire Leningrad District, the entire Second Strategic Formation, enters the battle. And so on... Already from this brief review it is clear that a conscientious assessment of the number of troops of the Red Army and the enemy requires certain knowledge and intellectual effort. The most important thing is that it will inevitably lead to completely different conclusions than those recorded in the district committee manual. Therefore, it was decided not to be smart. This is how those figures appeared, which, I hope, are known echelon, numerous new by heart to every veteran of lectures in

the "red corner". Namely: to the number of three Wehrmacht army groups (84 infantry, 17 tank and 13 motorized, in total - 114 divisions) are added:

- 9 rear guard divisions (police formations staffed with senior military personnel); - 4 divisions of the army "Norway" (entered into hostilities in early July); - 24 infantry, 2 tank, 1 motorized divisions of the reserve of the High Command (which appeared in such numbers on the Eastern Front only at the beginning of the battle for Moscow);

- 36 Finnish, Romanian, Hungarian, Slovak divisions (truly "incomparable" with the Wehrmacht divisions in terms of weapons and the level of combat training and, with the exception of 16 Finnish divisions, suitable only for robberies in the occupied territory).

Here you have the desired "190 German divisions", which on the pages of Soviet history textbooks "at dawn on June 22" invaded the territory of the USSR. At the same time, of course, the fact was ignored that the number of the grouping of Soviet troops also increased - and it grew on an incomparably larger scale and at a faster rate than the groupings of the Wehrmacht and its allies.

On June 22, the troops of the four border districts had at least 149 "calculated" divisions (7 cavalry divisions and 12 airborne brigades were counted as 7 "calculated divisions"). This figure does not include 10 anti-tank artillery brigades and at least 16 divisions of the Second Strategic Echelon, which by June 22 were already in the territory of the western districts; divisions." Thus, even at the beginning - an extremely unsuccessful, unplanned, premature start of hostilities - the Red Army had a small numerical superiority over the enemy in the total number of divisions (superiority in aviation, in the number of tanks and tank divisions was multiple). In early July, formations of the Leningrad District entered the battle: 15 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions. By July 5–10, the redeployment to the theater of operations of the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon (16th, 19th, 20th, 21st,

22nd, 24th and 28th armies) was basically completed. In mid-July, even despite the losses of the first weeks, there were already about 235 divisions in the active army. By the end of July, the 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 43rd, 49th armies were formed. In total, during the two-month Smolensk battle, 104 divisions and 33 brigades were put into battle. In total, until December 1, 1941, the Headquarters sent 150 divisions and 44 rifle brigades to the western strategic direction, and another 140 divisions and 50 rifle brigades to the Leningrad and Kiev directions. A

after all, in addition to rifle (infantry) formations, cavalry, tank, artillery formations were also formed ... The reason

why the Red Army could increase its numbers at such a pace is extremely simple. Those units and formations that the Wehrmacht was able to concentrate near the borders of the Soviet Union, this is the maximum that 80 million Germany could achieve two years after the start of general mobilization. There was almost nothing to add to this "maximum". On the other hand, those divisions that the Red Army deployed in the western districts by June 22, 1941, represented the minimum that the 200 millionth Soviet Union was able to form under conditions of covert, secret mobilization and transfer to the West as part of the unfinished redeployment of troops. On June 23, 1941, open mobilization began,

and by July 1, 5.3 million people were drafted into the ranks of the Armed Forces (which meant a doubling of the total number of military personnel compared to June 22). Incredibly, Soviet historiography contrived to "not notice" this fact. Although, it would seem, how can one forget this? Millions of families escorted their relatives to the front, a woman's howl stood over tens of thousands of villages, "Get up, a huge country ..." thundered from all loudspeakers, newspapers were full of photographs of queues at military registration and enlistment offices ... But until the final collapse of the Soviet Union, only a number was present in all books and textbooks 2.9 million people - the number of personnel of the troops of the western districts as of June 22, 1941. Where did the 5.3 million mobilized go then? Is it for a summer walk? But even on July 1, 1941, the mobilization, of course, did not end. She was just

getting started. In total, according to the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of June 22, 1941, 10 (ten) million people were mobilized. And they weren't redundant. As the authors of the monograph "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" write, **"already in August, the remnants of all ages raised by mobilization were fully used."** Then, according to GKO resolution No. 459 of August 11, 1941, another 4 million people were called up. And about 2 million more people (at least, this is the figure that Soviet propaganda always cited) were drafted into the so-called divisions of the people's militia. Having

With such a huge "manpower resource", the Soviet command could form hundreds of new divisions, and continuously replenish the remnants of hundreds of defeated divisions with personnel - in a word, continuously compensate for the lack of quality of management by a huge superiority in the number of personnel. This method of warfare has a very specific name, but you know it without me ...

It cannot be said that "maneuvers along the front and in depth" are completely a thing of the past. No, they are still present in hundreds of publications to this day. The new methods of "brain-having" did not supplant, but rather supplemented, strengthened and deepened the old tricks of cheating. In particular, the "mind game" is still good and effective.

Once, live on Echo of Moscow, an angry listener asked me a devastating (in his opinion) question: "Here you are telling us fairy tales about the fact that the Red Army had many times more tanks than the Wehrmacht. Do you know that Germany produced iron and steel twice as much as the USSR?" I responded immediately. Honestly, as it is: "I don't know. And I don't want to know."

The question of how much iron and steel Germany produces was one of the most important questions that Soviet military intelligence was looking for an answer to on the eve of the war. Why? Because information about the volume of steel production made it possible to build some, not entirely unfounded guesses about how many tanks were produced and how many German industry could produce in the future. These guesses made it possible to make the following, most important guess: how many and what kind of tanks might be in the Wehrmacht tank divisions deployed on the borders of the USSR. In the spring of 1941, in the absence of accurate documentary data on the composition and armament of the enemy army, information about the smelting of iron was worth its weight in gold. But why today fool people with arguments about how many tanks could theoretically be made from the available cast iron, when it is known for certain how many and what (by types and modifications) tanks were actually in each of the 17 Wehrmacht tank divisions? The question of why at the beginning of

the war (underline the word "at the beginning" with a bold line) from such a large amount of steel

Germany made such a small number of tanks (the average monthly production of tanks in Germany in 1941 was 305 units, in 1944 - 1530), of course, is interesting. You can think of ten (or one hundred) perfectly logical explanations for this paradox. But all this "mind game" has nothing to do with the search for the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the first weeks of the war. But for

"brain-having" it is a passion as good, because it allows you to immediately transfer the discussion to the discussion of absolutely extraneous topics. Suitable for such a case and the famous chorus: "All of Europe worked for Hitler." What is "whole Europe"? Can it be considered "all" without England, Spain, Italy (Hitler received nothing from Mussolini but big and small troubles), Sweden, Switzerland (the last two did not give anything to Germany, but sold, and you had to pay money for these supplies)? What material resources had to be expended in order to transfer the factories producing Dutch cheese and Danish butter to the production of tanks? What actually limited the production of tanks for the needs of the Wehrmacht: lack of production capacity or lack of raw materials for the production of alloy steel (tanks, as you know, are not made of cast iron)? A lot of questions, a lot of opportunities to demonstrate one's own erudition... At the same time, the revelation of facts about the real balance of forces on the Eastern Front on June 22, 1941 is finally drowned in streams of verbiage.

In former times, this technique (replacing the discussion of specific facts with the discussion of always vague and controversial "opportunities") was not in a special move - the falsifiers were quite satisfied with other, much more crude and effective methods. Now this cheating trick is one of the most common. He was especially fond of the noisy and cheeky "anti-rezunists" (detractors of V. Suvorov for some reason consider it special chic to call him Rezun; probably, within the framework of their sense of humor, this quite typical Ukrainian surname sounds terribly funny). V. Suvorov suggested

that Stalin was preparing for an invasion of Europe, which invasion was to begin in July 1941. The elementary logic is that one can refute Suvorov's version only by offering another, coherent and internally consistent interpretation

declassified operational plans and real actions of Stalin. Alas, the mental abilities of the "anti-rezunists" are not enough even to understand the task facing them, much less to solve it. Therefore, any discussion on the "Suvorov theme" is drowned out by them with the following cry: "How could Stalin plan an invasion of Europe if (the second left support roller of the KV tank overheated, the Muhosransky district military commissariat did not prepare a site for receiving mobilized vehicles, the plan for the production of armored shutters for bunkers was completed only by 83.725%, the average level of equipping steam locomotive repair shops in the USSR with wire cutters and pliers was 27.345% inferior to the German one, the third Russian-Turkish war convincingly showed the low level of operational training of officers of the Russian army - it is unnecessary to emphasize) ... "And that's all. A few minutes later, everyone had already forgotten what they were trying to discuss - there is a fierce, with a stream of personal insults, a dispute about why the Stolypin reform failed ... Now there are also completely enchanting arguments:

"... Those who like to calculate the combat power of armies by the number of tanks for some reason ***forget that the industrial potential of Germany by 1941 was several times greater than the industrial potential of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is quite obvious*** (to whom is it obvious? - *M.S.*) ***that if the Germans built an insufficient number of tanks, it means that the corresponding production facilities were occupied with the production of other military products, which the leadership of the armed forces of the Reich considered more important. For example, armored personnel carriers, motor vehicles, motorcycles, anti-tank guns, submachine guns or field radios. There is no doubt that the German armed forces were an extremely balanced mechanism ... "***

How lovely! "There is no doubt." Why? Because it's "obvious". What is missing in this passage is a real trifle (and it is precisely from idleness that it is lacking!) - a small plate with specific numbers. The very figures that, in my opinion and the opinion of Karl Marx, "are worth whole volumes full of rhetorical nonsense."

But Mr. Goncharov (the author of the above pearl) has no time to count **"armored personnel carriers, motor vehicles, motorcycles, anti-tank guns"** that entered service with the Red Army and the Wehrmacht by June 22, 1941. There are plenty of other things to do (**"I was born in Sverdlovsk. I did not graduate from two institutes - the Sverdlovsk State Medical Institute and the Ural State Pedagogical Institute. An activist in the movement of science fiction clubs, the movement of role-playing games ..."**). Recently V.L. Goncharov actively plays a role-playing game called "I am a historian." No, he has not given a single book to the world yet, but with the strange connivance of publishers (or are they also playing a role-playing game?), He writes voluminous prefaces and afterwords to other people's books, as well as polemical articles.

The latest (of the known to me to this day) article by V. L. Goncharov is called simply gorgeous: "History or propaganda?" I read with secret anguish and I can't read enough ... Who inspired her with touching nonsense ... Sorry, I digress. The glorious surname of the Goncharovs inspired ... So, on the first four pages, Mr. Goncharov talks long and painfully about good and evil : letters. - **M. S.), without**

even trying to understand the causes of certain events ... It should be recognized that historians are divided not according to political views, but according to scientific conscientiousness ... Incompetence is not an excuse for a person who positions himself as a specialist (so in the text. - M.S.) in one area or another ... It is necessary to clearly distinguish historical science from political journalism ... "

After this rather protracted preamble, Mr. Goncharov begins to sort out "the causes of the events." With the declared "scientific conscientiousness", he decided to prove that the planes of the Soviet Air Force are hopelessly outdated "coffins". The thesis, frankly, is not new. A considerable assortment of fraudulent tricks has already been accumulated. Is it possible to say a fresh word here? Yes, yes, what a word! **"It is quite difficult to evaluate "on the fingers" the comparative qualities and "obsolescence" of certain aircraft** (still

would, especially if instead of professional engineering knowledge - two unsuccessful attempts to learn in honey and pede) ... ***In any case, it is not required to prove*** (why? because "it should be recognized"?) ***That Soviet industry was obviously weaker than the German one both in terms of technological equipment and and the skill level of the workforce. Nomes see a paradox - the production of one aircraft of the USSR spent 2-4 times less human labor than Germany. It is quite obvious that it is simply useless to compare Soviet and German aircraft "one to one" - they have a completely different technical and technological level. There are no miracles in the world, so the real combat value of the Soviet aircraft was also at least two times (and in fact - three to four times) less than that of a German aircraft of the same year of manufacture ... "***

Strongly said. No one has thought of this before Goncharov. And this is not surprising - a minimally educated person should understand that technical progress is moving towards a reduction in the cost of production of the share of living labor with an increase in the share of materialized past labor. Today, canals are being dug not by the hands of thousands of slaves, but by the bucket of a huge excavator, in which (both in the bucket and in the excavator) the labor of several generations of workers and engineers is compressed. And the production of a digital MP-3 player took several orders of magnitude less living labor than the assembly of a Dnepr tube tape recorder. This does not at all lead to the conclusion that the sound quality of a modern MP-3 player is a hundred times worse than that of a chest-like Dnepr. Rather the opposite. So the very "method" for assessing the performance characteristics of military equipment by the amount of living labor spent on its

production is extremely absurd. The very method of determining labor costs by dividing the total number of workers employed in the aviation industry by the total number of aircraft produced during the year does not hold water. Planes are very different. There was a four-engine TB-7 bomber (design weight 19,986 kg), there was a twin-engine Ju-88 bomber (design weight 7724 kg), there was a single-engine Yak-3 fighter (design weight 2123 kg). It is quite obvious (let us return to Mr. Goncharov his favorite turn of speech) that the amount of human labor spent on the production of these aircraft will differ significantly

- regardless of where and on what technological base a 2-ton or 20-ton aircraft is produced.

Finally, it is worth doubting that, in relation to the Soviet Union, the listed number of workers, employees and engineers employed at the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of the aviation industry, and the actual number of people employed in the production of aircraft, coincide. It is to this assumption that a careful study of the documents leads. We take the "Balance of Labor in the USSR as of April 1, 1945" compiled by the Central Statistical Office of the State Planning Committee of the USSR (secret, of course) (RGAE, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 1523, l. 99). What do we see? There are 36.7 million working-age people in cities (and this number includes **"working teenagers aged 12-15"**). Including 19.3 million "workers, employees and cooperative handicraftsmen." What are they doing, where are these 19 million workers and employees working? We open the monograph by N. Simonov "The Military-Industrial Complex of the USSR in 1920–1950." (M.: ROSSPEN, 1996). On pages 157-167, with specific references to the documents of the Archive of the Russian Economy, the following number of workers, employees and engineers employed in military

production in 1944 is indicated: - the
people's commissariat of the aviation
industry 733 thousand people; - People's
Commissariat of Ammunition 398 thousand people; -
People's Commissariat for Armaments 316 thousand
people; - People's Commissariat of the tank
industry 244 thousand

people; - People's Commissariat for mortar weapons 160 thousand
people; - People's Commissariat of Shipbuilding 136 thousand people.

Total: 1987 thousand people. Goncharov operates with a somewhat different figure (640,000 people employed in the aviation industry in January 1944), but the problem is not at all in this inevitable scatter of statistical data. A strange, one might say, mysterious question is what did the other 17 million workers and employees do? Is it possible that in a country that supplied "working adolescents 12–15 years old" to the machine tool, only 2 million people, i.e. 10.3% of urban workers and employees, were employed in military production? Yes, of course, there were also metallurgy, transport, coal and mining industries, petrochemistry, someone

People's Commissariats employed about 25% of all industrial workers. But in this case, 100% is 10 million. What were the other 9.3 million workers and employees doing?

I don't have an answer to these questions. There is only a firm conviction that we are dealing with "cunning figures." Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that a huge number of people actually employed in military production were removed from the list of employees of the relevant people's commissariats. For a completely understandable reason - the personnel worker of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry should be given a reservation from the draft and increased rations. For 1944, this was an unaffordable luxury ... I repeat once again - I do not have an exact answer. There is only a clear understanding that it is possible to evaluate **the "real combat value of a Soviet aircraft"** on such a shaky statistical base and on the basis of completely absurd methodological approaches only for the purposes of propaganda, which Mr. Goncharov ardently condemns. This is nothing to historical science

has no relationship.

Another, quite anecdotal example of the substitution of discussion of facts with verbiage about "potential opportunities" is found in the collection "The Great Patriotic Catastrophe-3" mentioned above. Mr. B. Kavalerchik placed in the collection a huge (148 pages) article entitled: "Which tanks were better in 1941?" Despite the fact that the title of the article, it would seem, left the author no choice but to formulate the most important tactical and technical characteristics of tanks from his point of view and then compare the tanks of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in these parameters, Mr. Kavalerchik went the other way. For some reason, he begins a conversation about tanks with ritual curses against the hated Rezun: **"... In the wake of fair criticism of the official Soviet point of view, foam also surfaced in the form of the version of V. Suvorov (Rezun), who proposed his theory, which quickly gained**

popularity among the ignorant part public. He argued that Soviet tanks, both in quantity and quality, were significantly superior to German ones ... Suvorov's (Rezun's) theory has already been convincingly criticized many times, so we will not waste time arguing with him in this work.

How nice! "We won't waste time on polemics," but kicking casually is always welcome. Yes, and it would be difficult to argue with "Suvorov's statement" about the significant quantitative superiority of the Soviet tank forces, given that on *p* . writes: **"There were 12,898 tanks in the five western military districts."** Maybe I also belong to the category of **"uninformed part of the public"**, but it seems to me that the number 12898 is greater than the number 3502. Moreover, it is "significantly" more - not by a few percent, but by almost four times.

After that, Mr. Kavalerchik undertook to criticize the quality parameters of Soviet tanks. He describes the history of the creation of the legendary "thirty-four" - a tank that marked the main trends in the development of world tank building for several decades in advance - in the following terms: "... In **August**

1937, KBHPZ received a government order to develop a new tank model. At that time for this bureau such a task was unbearable. It was a relatively small design organization that worked in the outback, far from the leading centers of Soviet tank building ... "

At this point, the book fell from my weakened hands. What is it about? What is "depth"? Was there some other HPZ? I feverishly flip the page, read further: **"... Most of the projects they**

completed could not be brought to mass production, because KhPZ was in dire need of qualified specialists ... The constant problem of a lack of competent and experienced engineering personnel ... The reason for the errors was mainly a banal lack of knowledge and practical experience ... The Armored Directorate of the Red Army had no particular illusions about the real capabilities of the bureau of the Kharkov plant ... They simply did not have enough time to search for and develop fundamentally new designs. In addition, the lack of knowledge and experience of Kharkiv residents made this activity too risky ... "

No, everything is in place. Yes, the same Kharkiv KhPZ ... Into the existence of an "ignorant public" who does not know this anecdote,

I don't believe it, but I'm still happy to tell it again. And I ask you not to consider it as "incitement of hatred." —

Chaim, where did you sew such a chic suit? - In Paris. —

Hmm, in Paris... How far is it from Berdichev?

- Well, two thousand miles will

be ... - Just think, such a wilderness, but how well

sewn! I hasten to inform Mr. Kavalerchik that in relation to the Kharkov Locomotive Plant (KhPZ), he is also the plant named after Comintern, aka Plant No. 183, all other points of the globe were "outback". Established in 1895 and given such a sonorous, such a promising name ("named after the Comintern") in Soviet times, this plant turned Kharkov into "tank Paris". Starting in 1932, Plant No. 183 produced

tanks of the BT series, which at that time surpassed any light tanks in the world in terms of speed and armament. By the time the Second World War began, Plant No. 183 produced twice as many BT tanks as the entire German tank industry. The tank turret with a 45-mm cannon, developed by the KhPZ designers, was installed not only on the BT, but also on the most massive series of the T-26 light tank.

The production of powerful (1320 hp) diesel engines for submarines at KhPZ was mastered as early as 1916. This experience (and subsequent experience in the production of multi-fuel diesel engines for tractors) allowed KhPZ designers to make a grandiose technical breakthrough - to create a high-speed, compact and light V-2 tank diesel engine (rated power 400 hp, maximum 500 hp). There was nothing like this at that time in any country in the world (the most powerful German Maybach HL120 TRM tank engine had a rated power of 265 hp and a maximum of 300 hp). The boosted V-2k engine developed for the KV heavy tank developed a

maximum power of 600 hp. s., which allowed the 48-ton giant to move along the highway at a speed only slightly inferior to the speed of light German tanks (35 km / h). Later, the production of tank diesel engines was separated from KhPZ into a separate plant No. 75, also located in Kharkov.

The appearance of the V-2 made it possible to make a technical revolution in the entire Soviet tank building. On the basis of this engine, light tanks BT-7M and T-50, medium T-34, heavy KV were developed. At the end of the 30s, the Voroshilovets, an artillery tracked tractor with absolutely phenomenal characteristics, was developed and put into mass production at trailer, the KhPZ. Without a tactical and technical tractor developed a speed of 42 km / h on the highway and had a cruising range of 390 km, with a full load - 20 km / h and 240 km. The power and efficiency of the V-2 diesel engine allowed Voroshilovets to move a heavy howitzer from one flank of the army's defense line to the other within one light day and at one refueling. Two "Voroshilovets" even coped with the monstrous 305-mm howitzer Br-18 weighing 45.7 tons. As an evacuation tractor, Voroshilovets was able to pull a five-turreted T-35 tank.

But Mr. Kavalerchik is relentless: "A small design organization that worked in the outback ... the task of developing a new tank model was overwhelming for her." And it doesn't matter that the result was the best medium tank in the world, by the standards of the early 40s. The main thing is the writer's opinion about "the real possibilities of the bureau of the Kharkov plant." Don't argue, sick. If the doctor said: "To the morgue," it means to the morgue.

We will also begin our acquaintance with the method of using a "sound grenade" with an example taken from Mr. Kavalerchik's abundant article. As you already understood, the task of the author of the article was to "exposure the myth" about the qualitative superiority of the latest Soviet tanks (i.e. T-34 and KV). An absolutely indisputable advantage of these tanks was the use of a diesel engine. It is strange that at the beginning of the 21st century, when the use of a diesel engine became the generally accepted norm for heavy transport and military equipment, this generally has to be argued. I put a burning paper torch into a bucket of diesel fuel personally - in a construction team, many, many years before the appearance of the "Suvorov theory". I would not wish my worst enemy to repeat this "experiment" with a bucket of gasoline. And not only with a torch - it is better not to approach a bucket of gasoline with a burning cigarette. But if very

If you want to prove that white is black, then you can write the following:

“... The most catastrophic consequences are caused by the explosion of a chamber (that is, having an explosive charge. - M.S.) projectile in a tank filled with a quarter or less. In this case, an aerosol mixture of small droplets of fuel is formed, which is added to the fuel vapors already in the tank. The conditions for the occurrence of detonation are high temperature and pressure, which increases abruptly to a huge value, created by the high-explosive action of the explosive charge of the chamber projectile ... As a result of the detonation of the tank, the armor plate closest to the place of its occurrence was completely pulled out of the body along the weld and thrown to the side ... The tank itself with diesel fuel after detonation, it disappeared without a trace inside it, it simply shattered into dust ... All this is fully consistent with the process that occurs when a modern volumetric explosion ammunition is detonated, sometimes called a “vacuum bomb”. As is known, its detonation velocity reaches 1500-1800 m/s, and pressure - up to 15-20 atmospheres. It was this monstrous force that tore even the strong

power seams of the T-34 hull ... ” Scary? Still not scary!

“Monstrous power”, the tank “shattered into dust”, the armor plate was “completely torn out of the hull” ... Here you have the vaunted T-34, which does not burn in fire! Yes, he, it turns out, shattered into pieces like a pretty one. Despite all its “diesel”. Can you believe it? And how can you not believe a specialist who knows such tricky words (“detonation velocity”, “volume explosion ammunition”, “aerosol mixture”, “chamber projectile” ...).

This one, really difficult, but effective, I call a “sound grenade”. Crush with “erudition”, stun with a stream of unfamiliar technical terms, put pressure on emotions ... And the client is ready. He (the client) will either not notice or not fully understand the meaning of the phrase that follows the paragraph quoted above, namely: ***“It must be added here that the high-explosive action of 37-, 47- and 50-mm German armor-piercing shells was too weak to generate detonation of the T-34's fuel tank.***

And then what are we talking about here? What does an article titled "Which Tanks Were Better in 1941?" all this "horror" about fuel cans flying into dust? In 1941, the Wehrmacht was armed with 37-mm anti-tank guns, 37- and 50-mm tank guns, 47-mm Czech anti-tank guns mounted on a light tank chassis; infantry divisions began to receive the latest 50-mm anti-tank guns. The last two systems, under particularly favorable conditions (short distance, hitting the lower part of the hull side), could penetrate the armor of the T-34, but, as Mr. Kavalerchik himself explained to us, even if the armor was pierced, THESE shells could not detonate the fuel tank. Why then the whole story about the **"catastrophic consequences of the explosion of a chamber shell in the tank"**? And why in an article called "Which tanks were better in 1941?" there is no clear and distinct statement of the fact that the fuel tanks of any German tank were covered at best with 30 mm side armor, which any Soviet tank, cannon armored car, any Soviet anti-tank (or divisional 76 mm) gun pierced at all distances of an aimed shot, and a jet of hot shell fragments and armor was guaranteed to set fire to the gasoline splashing in the tank? For all that, I am ready to agree that the "stun grenade" made by Kavalerchik works effectively and somewhere even beautifully. The same technique performed by the recognized leader of the domestic "anti-rezunists" AB Isaev looks incredibly boring:

"The first battle group of the 14th Panzer Division (Kampfgruppe Stempel) consisted of the 108th Motorized Infantry Regiment (without the 2nd Battalion), the headquarters of the 4th Artillery Regiment of the 14th Panzer Division with the 3rd Battalion of the 4th Artillery Regiment (without 1 th battery), 1st battery of the 4th artillery regiment, 1st battery of the 607th mortar division (attached hull, 210-mm mortars), 1st battery of the 60th artillery regiment (attached hull, 100 -mm guns), the 1st company of the 4th anti-tank battalion of the 14th tank division, the 36th tank regiment (without the 1st reinforced company) with the 2nd company of the 13th motorized engineer battalion, parts of the motorized communications battalion, 2nd Platoon, 4th Engineer Company. The second battle group (Kampfgruppe)

103rd motorized infantry regiment, 1st reinforced company of the 36th tank regiment, 2nd division of the 4th artillery regiment, 4th anti-tank division without one company and two platoons, 1st platoon of the 4th engineer company. Third Battle Group (Kampfgruppe Damerau)
It consisted of..."

Did you understand everything? No? Then read it two or three more times. Try to rewrite - it helps memorization. And do not be capricious - say thank you that I took pity on you and quoted only half (!!!) of the "grenade" ...

This little masterpiece of pretentious idle talk ("From Dubno to Rostov", Moscow: ACT, 2004, p. 158) was required by Mr. Isaev in order to hypnotize the reader with all this flickering of numbers of companies, batteries and divisions, to impose on him the idea of "Innumerable enemy force" approaching the black cloud on the positions of the Soviet troops. The list is really impressive.

Miracles, however, do not happen. The 14th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, on its way from the border Vladimir-Volynsky to Lutsk, met (it would be more correct to say - it should have met) four divisions of the Red Army (19th TD, 135th SD, 215th and 131st MD) and the 1st anti-tank brigade. This is not counting the 87th rifle division and 41th division located directly at the border, as well as three defense centers of the Vladimir-Volynsky UR (about which Isaev dismissively dropped: "**40 rarely located pillboxes**"). On June 26, two more rifle divisions of the Red Army (200th Rifle Division and 193rd Rifle Division) approached Lutsk, occupied by the Germans. And if a complete list of all units of one German division takes 2 pages of text, then the same list, detailed to the level of platoons and companies, would have to take 16 pages for eight Soviet divisions. Of course, Mr. Isaev prudently does not cite it ...

Tear gas (aka "Yaroslavna's cry") was and remains the most important, basic method of falsifying the history of the beginning of the war. What is his strength? In truth. The essence of this technique is to tell the truth, only the truth about the shortcomings (shortages, imperfections, difficulties, problems) that the Red Army faced in the summer of 1941. There is only one Red Army. About exactly what

the enemy had the same (if not bigger and worse) problems, you can not say. And that's all. Operates flawlessly.

“...Location. In the offensive zone of the corps - 5 serious water barriers: r. Radostavka, r. Ostrówka, r. Zhechka, p. Loshuvka and r. Sokolowka. All rivers have swampy banks and are hard-to-reach frontiers for tank operations. The entire terrain in the offensive zone is wooded and swampy, the commanding heights are on the side of the enemy. Conclusion: the terrain is not conducive to

the offensive ... " How can one disagree with such a conclusion? After reading this, not everyone will even guess to ask the question: "And on what terrain did the enemy advance at a pace of 30–50 km per day?" How did the divisions of the 1st Tank Group of the Wehrmacht operating in Western Ukraine manage to overcome these mighty forest streams (Radostavka, Ostruvka, Zhechka, Loshuvka and Sokoluvka), and at the same time the Western Bug, Styr, Goryn, Sluch and , finally, full-flowing Dnieper? Where did the "command heights" appear in the swampy forest and why did they end up in the hands of the enemy, who appeared in this forest just a few days (or even hours) before the events described in the report of the commander of the 15th mechanized corps quoted above? There is not

and has not been a single book in which Soviet historians, with a sorrowful sob, did not inform readers about the lack of combat experience, the lack of command and technical personnel, the terrible rush to create tank divisions and mechanized corps of the Red Army. You will be sure to be told that 76.453% of the commanders of mechanized formations were in their positions for less than one year, and some commanders of tank divisions (oh, horror!) Commanded cavalry units before that.

By default, it is assumed that the Germans had everything in the best possible way. Well, about the "two-year experience accumulated by the Wehrmacht of modern warfare" is said in any book. The hypnotic effect of the endless repetition of the mantra about the "two years of experience" turned out to be so great that even now many still cannot count on their fingers: four weeks of war in Poland + five weeks of war on the Western Front + two weeks in the Balkans (and all this is taken from

a large margin, and if real, then $3 + 4 + 1$). Is it really two years in total? There were problems

with staffing the army with personal (primarily command) staff in the Soviet Union. Who would argue. In the summer of 1939, the Red Army included 100 rifle and 18 cavalry divisions, 36 tank brigades. Two years later, on the eve of the war, 198 rifle, 13 cavalry, 61 tank and 31 motorized divisions had already been formed. A total of 303 divisions. A more than twofold increase in the number of connections (and a significant increase in the level of their motorization!) created serious staffing problems. To solve them in the Soviet Union, universal military service was introduced in advance, thanks to which a multimillion-strong contingent of reservists who had completed three years of military service accumulated in the country. Yes, all this is not easy and expensive, but these problems cannot be compared closely with the problems of the Wehrmacht.

Germany, demilitarized under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, approached 1935 with 10 infantry divisions. Tanks in field exercises were marked with cardboard mock-ups. In the summer of 1939, the Wehrmacht already had 51 divisions (including 5 tank and 4 motorized), by the spring of 1940, 156 divisions had been formed in the Wehrmacht, by June 1941 - 208. The dizzying growth in numbers forced to put "under arms" completely untrained conscripts. The Germans would be happy to form their tank and motorized divisions on the basis of regular cavalry divisions (the operational principles of the combat use of mobile units were very similar), but only in the old Reichswehr there were no such number of cavalry units and officers in sight. Wehrmacht tank divisions were formed on the basis of infantry formations; no more than 50% of the command staff was staffed with regular officers. However, for the Wehrmacht, even 50% was a high figure, given that in the infantry divisions formed in the second half of 1940 and later, regular officers made up no more than 35% of the command staff. Germany started the war with 5 tank divisions, by the spring of 1940 their number had grown to 10, at the end of 1940 another 10 tank divisions were formed. How many "years" commanded these divisions of their

commanders? What kind of "combat experience" could the tank divisions formed after the end of the campaign on the Western Front have? Of the 17 tank divisions deployed in June of the 41st near the borders of the USSR, only three divisions had a kind of "two-year experience of the war" (i.e., participation in the Polish and French campaigns) (1st TD, 3rd TD, 4th TD). Seven tank divisions (12th TD, 13th TD, 16th TD, 17th TD, 18th TD, 19th TD, 20th TD) did not even have the experience of a two-week war in the Balkans, and 22 June was their first day of fighting as a tank formation. Why, against this background, should the combat experience acquired by Soviet tankmen at Khalkhin Gol and in Finland (i.e., in a war with an enemy who showed fanatical stubbornness in battle) be assessed as an insignificant trifle?

The most pernicious (and the most common) modification of "tear gas" I would call the "percentage method". To this day, not a single publication of the historians of the scientific school of Gareev-Isaev can do without using it. Due to the special significance of this method of "brain-having", we will devote the entire next chapter to it.

Chapter

8

The essence of the percentage method of "brain-having" is most simply illustrated by a clear example from the field of the "housing issue" known to every Soviet person.

Suppose that a certain citizen V. Pupkin with a family of three lives in a comfortable four-room apartment with an area of 80 square meters. m. How can you assess the living conditions of Comrade Pupkin? The answer is simple and clear. We must compare. With what to compare? With the way others live. The result of the comparison is obvious: Vasya Pupkin settled down quite well, many of his compatriots still live in "Khrushchev" with a kitchenette of 6 meters for five people. And now imagine that we are faced with the task of proving that Pupkin suffers and suffers in completely unbearable living conditions. Can it be done? Easily. To do this, you just need to give

Vasya additional real estate. Namely: a house in the village (70 sq. m.) with stove heating and "amenities" in the yard, a large barn next to this house (50 sq. m.), a hayloft (60 sq. m.), a pigsty (40 sq. m.) , cellar for potatoes (30 sq. m). It would seem that Comrade Pupkin did not become poorer, and his life did not turn into a nightmare because, in addition to a beautiful city apartment, he got a barn, a hayloft, and a cellar with a pigsty. But it only seems - until deafening howls are heard: "Only 24% of the premises belonging to the Pupkin family meet modern sanitary standards, 55% of the premises have neither heating nor lighting ... How can one live and work in such inhuman conditions ? This is how our military history is written.

Four tank groups were formed in the Wehrmacht to attack the Soviet Union. The weakest, the 4th Panzer Group (Army Group North), was armed with 602 tanks. The largest, the 2nd Panzer Group (Army Group Center), had 994 tanks. In total, as part of four tank groups on June 22, 1941

there were 3266 tanks (if you call the tankettes Pz-I and Pz-II a "tank"), that is, an average of 817 tanks in each group.

The Red Army had six mechanized corps armed with 800 or more tanks (1 MK, 4 MK, 5 MK, 6 MK, 7 MK, 8 MK). Two more fully combat-ready mechanized corps should be added to this list: 3 MK (672 tanks, including 128 KV and T-34) and 15 MK (749 tanks, including 136 KV and T-34). In total - eight powerful mechanized formations, almost completely staffed with personnel and artillery, tanks superior in technical characteristics to the enemy, which received from two to four thousand vehicles, two hundred to three hundred tracked tractors each, even before the start of open mobilization. Has the Red Army really become weaker because, in addition to these eight "armored rams," it was already in the first days of the war able to bring into battle another 12 mechanized corps, which were in varying degrees of combat readiness and staffing? Was the understaffed 13th mechanized corps (282 light tanks, 18,000 personnel) standing next to it somehow prevented the most powerful 6th mechanized corps from fighting? With whom did you have to fight - with interest or with the enemy? The questions are, of course, stupid. Foolish, one might say. But why don't you, dear comrades,

throw another scribble into the bin, in which the "average temperature in the hospital" is displayed for the hundred thousandth time, that is, by adding and dividing the weapons of all 30 mechanized corps (including those that have just begun to form in the Central Asian and Oryol districts), begin to lament heart-rendingly: **"the mechanized corps of the Red Army were provided with trucks for ...%, mobile repair shops for ...%, tankers for ...%, car tires for ..."** Why do you shake your head sadly, reading that **"new types of tanks were only 7.8% of the total tank fleet."** Only 7.8 percent. Terrible, blatant unpreparedness for war. Traditional Soviet historiography argued that with such percentages, the USSR could not be ready for war until the summer of 1942 - and until that moment it

had to delay, delay and delay with all its might ... But this is an outdated point of view. Two comrades (A. Anatolyev and S. Nikolaev) published in two issues

"Independent Military Review" a huge article called "Natural Defeat." After listing all possible percentages, they come to a stunning conclusion: ***the Red Army could become truly combat-ready only by the end of the 1940s.*** I could become. In the mid-1940s, more precisely, in May 1945, Berlin, apparently, was taken by some kind of incapable army. But the authors are inexorable, more precisely, inexorable arithmetic irrefutably proves that only "by the end of the 1940s" it was possible to equip the army with "new types of tanks" at 100%. And in the publication claiming to be respectable, there was no editor who would explain to the comrades that new types of tanks (as well as new cell phone models, fashionable sandals, the best surgeons, fresh jokes) can never and nowhere make up 100% of the total fleet, and Only a defeated army can "complete rearmament".

The "completion of rearmament" has a specific, exact date - May 8, 1945. On this day, the rearmament of the Wehrmacht was finally and irrevocably completed. The Red Army, fortunately for us, could not reach such a peak. As of May 9, 1945, the tanks of the "new types" (T-34 and KV), which Anatolyev and Nikolaev had so diligently multiplied and divided, had become hopelessly obsolete and were everywhere removed from service with combat units. The main "workhorse" of the tank forces of the Red Army was the T-34-85 with new weapons (a powerful 85-mm cannon), a new three-man turret, and new fire control devices. But even this tank no longer had the right to be called the "newest", since in January 1945 mass production of the fundamentally new T-44 tank began. Contrary to expectations, the T-44 tank was not a very successful machine, and in April 1945, two prototypes of a new tank were made, which a year later was put into service under the name T-54. By May 9, no more than two hundred T-44 tanks were produced (about 0.8% of the total number of the tank fleet), the T-54 prototype was just beginning to be tested, so in May of the 45th there was an absolute "unpreparedness for war" ...

The "percentage method" also works well in the case when the notorious "readiness" is calculated as a percentage of some indicator, arbitrarily chosen and saying little. For example. All Soviet books with a sorrowful sob reported

gullible reader that on the eve of the war "only 8% of Soviet fighter aircraft had cannon armament." It works. On an intuitive level, everyone "understands" that a cannon is a hoo, not like a miserable machine gunner ... To complete the picture, "cannon percentages" should have been given for the aircraft of other countries - opponents of Nazi Germany, but Soviet historians traditionally kept silent about this. Let's fix this annoying omission.

Hitler's first serious, strategic defeat was the failure of plans for the invasion of the British Isles in the autumn of 1940. Germany suffered this defeat not on land, not on water, but in the air - during the months-long "Battle of Britain" fighters of the Royal Air Force retained air supremacy over English Channel and inflicted huge losses on German aviation. So, how many English fighters had cannon weapons at that time? 80 percent? 18? 8? The correct answer is: zero point, horseradish tenths. The air battle in the sky over London was won by British pilots on Hurricanes and Spitfires. Both the one and the other fighter were armed exclusively and only with machine guns. Let's go further. In the last months of World War II, the Allied bomber armadas were covered by American-made long-range fighters. What percentage of these aircraft had the notorious "cannon armament"? I don't know the exact figure, but it doesn't make sense to waste time searching. The vast majority of fighter squadrons by the age of 44–45 had already been re-equipped with Mustangs and Thunderbolts. Both of them were equipped only with machine guns. Not a single gun on board. American cannon-armed fighters ("Lightning", "Kittyhawk") had passed into the category of obsolete by that time, and in the sky over Western Europe they either did not exist at all, or they were used in very modest quantities as light attack aircraft ("Kittyhawk") or scouts ("Lightning"). The briefest explanation of this, strange at first glance, the transition from "obsolete cannon" to "the latest machine-gun" fighters took me 13 pages of text in the book "On

peacefully sleeping airfields". In an ultra-brief summary, it remains only to say that guns are different, and the plane of the Second World War era was equipped with a completely different multi-ton gun on which children crawl

in the park of culture and recreation. Of course, there is a difference in the damaging effect of a 20-mm projectile and a 13-mm bullet, but it is not as great as it might seem at first glance. In addition, the design of the aircraft and everything that is screwed or attached to it is carried out in strict restrictions on dimensions and weight. Accordingly, the question is posed something like this: what is better - to arm a fighter with two cannons with a supply of shells for 10 seconds of firing or six machine guns with a supply of cartridges for 50 seconds of firing? The answer to this question is very complicated, more precisely, there is no single answer in principle. In any case, there is not the slightest reason to classify the 1941 model fighter as "hopelessly outdated" for the sole reason that it did not have cannon armament.

On July 22, 1941, exactly one month after the start of the war, a meeting of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR began (it ended at midnight on the same day). The commander of the Western Front, D. G. Pavlov, the chief of staff of the front, V. E. Klimovskikh, the chief of communications of the front, A. T. Grigoriev, and the commander of the 4th Army of the Western Front, A. A. Korobkov, spent the last hours of their lives in the dock. Among the many questions asked to the former head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, Hero of the Defense of Madrid, Hero of the Soviet Union,

General of the Army Pavlov, was the following: "... During the preliminary investigation, you gave the following **testimony**: ***"In order to deceive the party and the government, it is certain that the General Staff overestimated the wartime order plan for tanks, cars and tractors by a factor of 10. The General Staff justified this overestimation by the presence of capacities, while in fact the capacities that industry could provide were much lower. With this plan, Meretskov intended to confuse all calculations for the supply of tanks, tractors and cars to the army for wartime <...>. "Do you confirm these***

statements?" Before reading the answer, one very important circumstance should be noted: the answer was given not in a torture cellar, but at a

meeting, during which Pavlov retracted some of the testimony knocked out of him by the "investigators". **Defendant**

Pavlov: Basically, yes.

There was such a plan. Such nonsense was written in it (emphasized by me. - **M.S.**). ***Based on this, I came to the conclusion that the wartime order plan was drawn up with the aim of deceiving the Party and the government ... "***

General of the Army K. A. Meretskov (Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army from August 1940 to January 1941), of course, was most directly involved in the development of the Mobilization Plan of 1941 (MP-41), but still signed the document he, but Timoshenko and Zhukov. Pavlov was shot. Meretskov was arrested at the end of June 1941, but then miraculously released in August to conditional "freedom". The materials of the "Pavlov case" were declassified and published only in 1992. By that time, none of the above persons were alive anymore. Tymoshenko did not write memoirs. In Meretskov's memoirs, not a word is said about the MP-41. G.K. Zhukov turned out to be more talkative:

"...Recalling how and what we, the military, demanded from industry in the very last peaceful months, I see that sometimes we did not fully take into account all the real economic opportunities of the country. Although from our own, so to speak, departmental point of view, we were right." I'm not sure that a

modern reader will be able to understand without an interpreter what exactly Comrade Zhukov said. The words "departmental", "departmental approach to business" were common euphemisms (substitute words) for the Soviet phrase "departmental approach" replaced another, much less euphonious "newspeak". expression: "cover your own ass". Incorporating into the mobilization plan exorbitant, unjustified and obviously unfeasible requirements for the material and technical support of the army, the leaders of the military department prepared in advance for themselves a "good reason" in case of a future defeat. It is unlikely that they also thought about the convenience for future Soviet historians, nevertheless, the gift turned out to be magnificent. For the percentages, the same percentages that, like fly tracks, cover the writings of Soviet historians,

calculated just in relation to the figures of the MP-41 mobilization plan. The very one that the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court tried to present as "sabotage", but the accused general of the army was ready to agree only that "nonsense" was written in the plan. Let's try to figure out the numbers and

percentages of MP-41 on a few specific examples. One of the (and still remain) favorite tractor-tractors. Artillery tractors were falsifiers of examples of the "flagrant unpreparedness" of the Red Army for war. More precisely, their small number. The small number is always expressed as a percentage of who knows what - either from the mobplan, or from the staffing table. In any case, the percentages are always modest: 30, 40, 50%. That's why, explain the associate professors with the candidates, everything turned out so crookedly. It was not possible to deliver the guns to the battle formations of the troops, or even drag them to the rear during the retreat. That is why the loss of artillery pieces in the first weeks of the war is simply stunning.

We will not argue, we will take a calculator in our hands and simply recalculate the number of tractors (tractors) and the number of objects for towing. By the

beginning of June 1941, there were 12.8 thousand units of artillery systems of the most massive, divisional level (howitzers of 122 mm and 152 mm caliber, guns of 107 mm caliber) in the Red Army ("three-inch" and mortars were transported by cars or horse-drawn vehicles, and we will not take them into account in this case). To this list, one can also add 7.2 thousand heavy anti-aircraft guns of 76 mm and 85 mm caliber (although most of these artillery systems were in the air defense system of large stationary objects, and it was absolutely not required to carry them around the battlefield). In total, the maximum number of objects for towing is exactly 20 thousand units. As of June 15, 1941 (here and below the figures are given according to the report of the head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army), the troops already had 33.7 thousand tractors (and this is not counting the special artillery tractors S-2, Komintern, Voroshilovets, intended for towing heavy guns of corps artillery regiments and artillery regiments of the RGK). There seemed to be no reason for

there is no catastrophe - there are one and a half times more tractors than guns. However, in the MP-41 there is a figure of 55.2 thousand. And therefore, it is possible without a twinge of conscience to say that the guns were abandoned due to the "widespread lack of mechanized traction." For the sake of truth, the "historians" should also be reminded that in the course of open mobilization, by July 1, 1941, another 31.5 thousand tractors were transferred from the national economy to the Red Army, so for this category the mobplan was completed.

"They don't think so," any specialist will say, and he will be absolutely right. Artillery units were the main, but not the only "consumer" of tractors and tractors. Tracked tractors were needed for the evacuation of wrecked tanks from the battlefield, and for mobile repair shops, and for individual engineer-bridge battalions ... Therefore, we will calculate differently, we will calculate correctly, i.e., based on staffing standards and the planned number of units and connections.

According to the staffing table of April 1941, the anti-tank division of an ordinary rifle division for 18 anti-tank guns was supposed to have 21 Komsomolets armored tracked tractors (we note in brackets that the Wehrmacht infantry did not even dream of such a luxury). Thus, for the full staffing of all rifle divisions (and all motorized ones, which were supposed to be 27 Komsomol members according to the state), 4596 tractors of this type were required. As of June 15, 1941, there were already 6,672 Komsomol members in the Red Army. Quite good. But in the MP-41 there is the number 7802. A blatant "unpreparedness" is evident.

Each of the 179 rifle (not counting the mountain rifle) divisions was supposed to have 78 tractors (excluding Komsomol members). Moreover, the states themselves were incredibly generous. So, in a howitzer regiment of an ordinary - not to be confused with a motorized - rifle division, there are 72 tractors for 36 howitzers according to the staffing table. In total, **13,962** tractors are needed for the entire infantry. For the full staffing of all 30 mechanized corps (which, by the way, was not planned by June 41 according to the mobplan), **9330** tractors and specialized tractors were required (excluding Komsomol members). Another prime recipient of mechanized traction equipment is the anti-tank artillery brigades of the RGK. By July 1, 1941 it was planned

to deploy 10 such brigades, each with 120 powerful (76-, 85- and 107-mm) guns, for the transportation of which 165 tractors were supposed to be transported around the state. Accordingly, all PTABRs need another **1650** units of mechanized thrust. Corps artillery regiments and artillery regiments of the RGK had different numbers and organization. Taking (with a clear overestimation) the average number of 36 guns and taking into account the same, unthinkable for any army in the world, double redundancy, we get a figure of about 12,100 tractors needed **to** fully equip all (94 corps and 74 regiments of the RGK) individual artillery regiments .

In total, for all combat units and formations of the entire Red Army (including the Ural, Siberian and Central Asian military districts located thousands of kilometers from the western border), according to the "super-generous" staffing standards, about 37 thousand tractors were **required** . In fact, by June 15, 1941, the troops already had **36.3 thousand** tractors and tractors (not counting 6.7 thousand Komsomol members). The compilers of MP-41 demanded 83,045. It was with the percentage of such an absolutely unbridled "need" that Soviet and then post-Soviet historians regaled us for more than half a century. But the Wehrmacht in their writings was always "ready for

war." One hundred percent. Without opening a single reference book, you can safely say: on June 22, 1941, the German tank divisions were fully equipped with heavy and medium tanks with anti-cannon armor. And the Wehrmacht was provided with armored vehicles armed with a full-fledged 45-mm tank gun in exact, absolute accordance with the staffing and mobilization plan.

And divisional guns that pierce the frontal armor of the heaviest enemy tanks. And multiple launch rocket launchers... Zero in stock, zero according to the plan, the percentage of staffing is 100. This is the famous German accuracy and pedantry. In the tank divisions of the Red Army at the beginning of the war there were already more than 1,500 KV and T-34 tanks. Thanks to the wisely compiled MP-41, this can be defined with a clear conscience with the words "a miserable 9% of the regular strength." In the Wehrmacht, divisional howitzers are dragged by six horses. Our historians call it "a fully mobilized army, for which the industry of all Europe worked." Yes, Halder did not guess and

Jodl draw up a mobilization plan "in a smart way", it did not occur to them to include non-existent equipment in the staff of their troops, to demand from Hitler 4 tractors for one gun ... That's why their Soviet historians are different than "beaten Hitler's generals", and are not called.

Another favorite topic of the historical "brainstorm" is radio communications. There was no communication in the Red Army. Like sex in the USSR. Everyone knows this. Strictly speaking, the "dogma of no connection" goes beyond the "percentage method", since in most cases the forgers do not even bother to indicate any specific numbers. For what? The reader knows without any figures that at dawn on June 22, 1941, German saboteurs cut all the telephone wires, and they did not even dream of radio stations in the Red Army. And only in a few, the most solid books, information appears that ***"the troops of the Western OBO were provided with regimental radio stations - by 41%, battalion - by 58%, company - by 70% ..."***. And really, how can one fight in such conditions? In the early 40s of the last century, the provision of ROTNY RADIO STATIONS was only 70%. It's... it's like a cellar without a Jacuzzi or a hayloft without a dishwasher! There were really big problems with communications in the Red Army. In the first hours, days and weeks of the war, the

exchange of information between headquarters at all levels was almost completely paralyzed. This is a fact. This fact has a simple, understandable, but absolutely unacceptable explanation for Soviet (as well as for modern imperial) historical mythology, namely: the subjects of the information network were absent or did not want to communicate. Simply put, the division commander, who abandoned his troops and fled to the rear, could not, and did not want to, report on the course of his "combat operations" to the army commander who had fled a day earlier and 100 km further. Even the presence of satellite phones would not change anything in this situation. In the same way that having a cell phone does not help parents find their overgrown teenager who went to a friend's birthday and

does not want to return home on time. In such a case, either the "battery runs out" or the "wrong key" is accidentally pressed ... Of

course, such a simple truth did not suit the Soviet "historians", so they, with dexterity that seasoned card sharpers would envy, replaced the real fact of the lack of communication between command instances false fabrication about the "absence" in the Red Army of TECHNICAL MEANS of communication. For greater effect, they also imposed on the frivolous public the thesis that the supposedly absent radio communication is supposedly the only technical means of communication. Surprisingly, the public swallowed even this hook without bait. For some reason, no one remembered that Napoleon, Suvorov and Kutuzov commanded huge armies not only without radio communications, but even without a simple wired telephone. For some reason, everyone forgot that a signal fire, signal flare, motorcycle, car, light-engine can be considered an excellent means of communication.

airplane...

The statutory defense zone (in the offensive it is much narrower) of a rifle division is 10–12 km. If, for simplicity, we assume that the headquarters of the division is in the center of the battle formation, then the messenger can reach any flank in half an hour. On foot. On a motorcycle during this time it is possible to overcome (even over very rough terrain) 30–40 km, i.e., to reach the headquarters of the corps. In the vast majority of cases, orders and reports from the division commander are issued at a much slower pace than twice an hour, so a high speed of information transfer is not required. Who should run and what should they ride? According to the staffing table of April 1941, in a separate communications battalion of a rifle division, there are:

- 278 people; - 6
- riding horses; - 3
- motorcycles; - 3
- armored vehicles; — 1
- car and 11 trucks. This is the staffing table.

What happened in reality? We will not count horses, but as of June 15, 1941, there were 16,918 motorcycles in the Red Army. As you can see, there are special problems with the provision of each communications battalion in each of the 179 rifle

there were no divisions with three motorcycles. And with the armored cars everything was in perfect order. Only BA-20 light armored vehicles, the best suited for driving with a particularly important document under enemy fire, before the war, there were 1899 units. An average of 6 for each of the 303 rifle, motorized and tank divisions of the Red Army. According to the staffing table, the mechanized corps included its own corps air squadron, equipped with U-2 and R-5 aircraft in the amount of 15 (fifteen) units. Unique in its simplicity, reliability and low cost, the U-2 (Po-2) corncock, as you know, took off and landed in any forest clearing and, for all its "slow speed", still moved in space two to three times faster than a motorcycle.

Of course, in some cases, information must be transmitted in "real time", without even a minute delay. For example, communication between the firing position of an artillery battery, observation and command posts of an artillery regiment must operate continuously - messengers with packages are out of place here. Therefore, the main means of communication in the armies of the 20th century was the telephone with wires. There were many of both in the Red Army. Namely: 343,241 km of telephone and 28,147 km of telegraph cable. This amount could wrap the Earth around the equator 9 times. There were 252,376 telephone sets of all types. On average - more than 800 pieces per division. A simple and cheap wire, among other things, provides incomparably better than a radio channel, secrecy and noise immunity of communication. Wired communication is very difficult (technical means of the 40s is almost impossible) to "hammer" with interference, and in order to eavesdrop on negotiations or use wired communication to transmit false information, you need to send a reconnaissance and sabotage group behind the front line - which is difficult, expensive and risky. Finally, for this, as part of the division (i.e., at the front no more than 10–15 km), 278 signalmen are on duty to monitor the state of wired communication channels, promptly eliminate breaks, lay backup lines, thus ensuring uninterrupted telephone communication.

With all this, the future was in radio communications, and the Red Army began to create this "future" on the most stunning scale. According to the staffing table of an ordinary rifle

a division that was not rushing into the operational depth of a tank or motorized, but an ordinary infantry division, which at best should advance at a rate of 10 km per day, was supposed to have 153 radio stations. One hundred fifty three. In other words, even a "miserable, insignificant" 10% of staffing means in absolute terms 15 radio stations per division!

Rations are different. Some are on an armored train, others are on a car, others are in horse packs and shoulder packs. In April 1941, the rifle division of the Red Army (for which the notorious "whole of Europe" had not yet begun to work) was supposed to be equipped as follows. Three powerful radio stations on the chassis of a car as part of a separate communications battalion - they provide communications for the commander and division headquarters. Three automobile radio stations as part of a separate reconnaissance battalion, four as part of an artillery (howitzer) regiment and the division artillery headquarters. A total of ten relatively powerful radio stations; in their capacity on the eve of the war, 5-AK was used mainly. This radio had a range of 25 km for telephone communications and 50 km for telegraph communications, thus blocking the battle formations of the division and its neighbors with a margin. As of January 1, 1941, there were 5909 5-AK radio stations in the Armed Forces of the USSR - an average of 20 for each division. In addition to

powerful radio stations, which required a car to be transported, there were portable radios (RB, RBC, RBS, RBM), with a power of 1–3 W and a range of 10–15 km. As of January 1, 1941, there were 35,617 such radio stations. Over 100 radio stations per division. According to the staffing table, a howitzer regiment of a rifle division for 36 howitzers was supposed to have 37 radio stations. One walkie-talkie for each gun is already an obvious "extremism", since howitzers do not shoot one by one. The minimum "molecule" of artillery units and subunits was a battery (usually four guns). It was the battery commander who was supposed to receive information from the command and observation posts for firing. There were nine batteries in the howitzer regiment, so even the "pathetic" 24% of the regular requirement means in fact that the commander of the artillery regiment had radio communications with each battery commander.

A rifle regiment was supposed to have 18 radio stations, including 15 battalion ones. Complaints that ***“the troops of the Western OBO were provided with battalion radio stations by 58%”*** mean that in each battalion (and this is 778 people and about 2 km of defense line) there were actually 8 walkie-talkies! The motorized division in the state received 115 walkie-talkies (this number, of course, did not include tank radio stations), i.e., in total, even less than in the rifle division. But at the same time, the number of powerful 5-AK radio stations on the car chassis was much larger - 36 units per division! Of course, having planned

(and to a large extent ensured) the absolutely phenomenal level of radio communication at the division level for the early 40s of the last century, the Red Army command did not forget about the operational level formations (corps, army). To ensure communication in this control echelon, radio stations 11-AK, RSB, RAF were developed. The RSB radio station was installed on the chassis of a car, had a radiated power of up to 50 W and provided a telephone communication range of 300 km, that is, in fact, in the army or even the front line of action. The RAF is a much more powerful (400–500 W) set of equipment, which was transported on two ZIS-5 trucks. As of January 1, 1941, the Armed Forces of the USSR already had 1,613 RSB and RAF units, that is, an average of 18 units for each (rifle or mechanized) corps. For some reason, the note on the MP-41 mobilization plan does not contain data on the presence of the predecessor of the RAF - a powerful (500 W) radio station 11-AK, although there were a lot of these complexes in the troops. So, in the Kiev OVO as of May 10, 1941, there were 6 RAF, 97 RSB and 126 radio stations 11-AK. The PAT complex could be considered a true miracle of technology in 1941. Huge power (1.2 kW) made it possible to

provide telephone communication at a distance of 600 km, and telegraph - up to 2000 km. The transmitter circuit provided the ability to work on 381 fixed communication channels with automatic frequency control. Three ZIS-5 vehicles were used to transport all the equipment of the RAT along with an autonomous power supply system, the combat crew of the station was 17 people. January 1, 1941 such

there were already 40 complexes. In particular, before the war, the troops of the Kyiv OVO had 5 RAT complexes. This, of course, is very, very small. Why? Because according to the MP-41 mobilization plan, the Red Army was supposed to have 117 (one hundred and seventeen) RAT complexes. I wonder how many fronts and on what continents the MP-41 developers were going to deploy? In fact, the Red Army reached Berlin, never having more than fifty RATs in service at the same time ...

In total, not counting portable radio stations of the battalion and company level, not counting tank radio stations, there were 7566 radio stations of all types in the Red Army. And this is on January 1, 1941. However, on January 1, life did not stop, and the factories continued their "peaceful creative work." The production plan of the 41st year provided for the release of 33 RAT, 940 RSB and RAF, 1000 5-AK. I don't think anyone is capable of learning all these numbers by heart, but develop a useful habit of throwing in the trash any article/book that begins the story of the events of June 22, 1941 with lamentations about "German saboteurs who cut all the wires", I highly recommend.

Chapter

9 Mystery! Secret!! Scenario!!!

Let us return, however, to the “simple and cheerful” story promised in the preface about the most striking examples of the latest historical “brain-having”. Not everything in this disastrous business is as complicated as it might seem to the reader who has overcome the heap of figures in the previous chapters. Some writers write about the Great Mystery of June 41st easily and simply. So, in 2005, a book was published under the title: “Stalin. The secret "scenario" of the beginning of the war "(M., Olma Press). True, the authors of the book, retired spouses Y. Verkhovsky and V. Tyrmos, said in an interview that they themselves wanted to give the book a different title: "Amateurs against historians." Who would argue - such frankness and courage in self-esteem does credit to the authors. The fact that the principle of freedom of the press as a natural cost implies, alas, such a situation when graphomaniac amateurs are allowed to fool the public - this is bad, but inevitable. But the fact that a frankly weak book turned out to be (again, according to the statements of its authors) is included in a certain “list of recommended literature”, which the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation sends out to governors and other high-ranking government officials - this is very strange and very interesting. This amazing circumstance alone makes The Secret Scenario an obligatory item on our program.

First of all, let's listen to how the authors themselves on page 224 formulate the content and meaning of the "secret scenario for the outbreak of war" deciphered by them. With exact observance of the style and spelling of the original, I will quote a rather large fragment:

“... And today (we are talking about March 20, 1941 - M.S.) Stalin has already made a decision. The war with Germany, when it starts, it will not start according to the scenario imposed by Hitler, but according to his own, Stalinist, "Script" ... This "Script" will also take into account the fact that last week, March 11, 1941, the greatest historical event took place - the United States of America joined the fight against Hitler! American last week

Congress approved the "Lend-Lease Bill", according to which states subjected to Hitler's aggression will be able to receive military and economic assistance. And Russia will also have a chance to receive this help, but only if it is not the attacking side, but itself is attacked. Russia has a chance to get lend-lease if it becomes a VICTIMS of HITLER AGGRESSION! Only if it wages a just liberation war against the aggressor! From this day on, Hitler's DISINFORMATION will be opposed by a

much more cunning and insidious Stalinist bluff, designed to mislead the whole world - enemies and friends - and the Possessed Fuhrer, and the wisest Winston Churchill, and the smartest Franklin Roosevelt ... From this day until the very "surprise attack" Stalin will pretend that he "does not believe" any intelligence reports... From this day on, intelligence reports will include resolutions "Into the list of dubious and disinformation messages." Or even worse: "You can send your source to the fucking mother." Genuine passion moved the hand of the retired spouses. The entire text is strewn with exclamation

marks, sometimes there are three of them after one word. The book is divided into many chapters with the following titles: ***"3 hours 15 minutes left before the "surprise attack" ... 2 hours 45 minutes left before the "surprise attack" ... 15 minutes left before the "surprise attack" ... 5 minutes ... "***

I know what you want to say: "Nonsense, of course, but as one of the possible hypotheses - why not ..." No, my friends, this is not a hypothesis. Not every set of words has the right to be called a hypothesis. Since signs of a qualitative difference between a bold scientific hypothesis and graphomaniac nonsense are a key element in the theory and practice of combating "brain-having", let me dwell on this issue in a little more detail. At seven

o'clock in the morning on June 30, 1908, a terrifying explosion occurred over the deserted wild taiga in the basin of the Podkamennaya Tunguska River. About 80 million trees were felled within a radius of 40–50 km. This is a fact. Comets and meteors fly in outer space. At least, this is the opinion of most scientists (a minority believes that nothing but illusions,

generated by our consciousness does not exist in the world). The assumption that the forest was felled by a meteor or comet that exploded in the Earth's atmosphere is a scientific hypothesis. In the disaster area, the taiga is heavily swamped. Swamps emit flammable "marsh gas". The assumption that the "Tunguska catastrophe" was caused by the explosion of a huge cloud of gas-air mixture, set on fire by fragments of a meteorite that flew into the atmosphere, is a scientific hypothesis. And so on... The assumption that mammoths graze in Moscow's Izmailovsky

Park, attracted there by an abundance of huge tasty cacti, is not a scientific hypothesis. Why? Because there are no live mammoths in Moscow, there are no thickets of wild-growing cacti in Izmailovsky Park, and no herbivore can bite, chew and swallow a prickly cactus. A person who puts forward such a "hypothesis" must either provide super strong evidence of his case (for example, a video of mammoths eating cacti in the background of Moscow streets, confirmed by witnesses and experts), or be prepared to meet with a caring psychiatrist. There should be no third option in a well-ordered society.

Now we return to the "secret scenario" of Verkhovsky and Tyrmos. The Lend-

Lease Act (Bill) had the official name of the US Defense Assistance Act. It did not say anything about "aggression", "victim of aggression", Hitler's aggression", etc. The law gave the President of the United States the right to independently - without the sanction of Congress - to decide on the transfer of weapons, ammunition, other military equipment to countries, support which is important for US defense. For US defense. The law did not provide for any charitable purposes, any chivalrous "care for widows and orphans". The very phrase "lend-lease" refers to a very specific financial side of the issue - weapons were transferred on the basis of a "loan-lease", which, in simple terms, meant: "Use it, and if anything remains by the end of the war, you will return it ..."

For many years before and for many years after the adoption of the Lend-Lease Act, the United States pursued an active foreign policy, in particular,

supplied American-made weapons to warring countries. For example, even before the adoption of the "Lend-Lease Law", the United States supplied combat aircraft for the Air Forces of China, France, England, Finland (the latter, by the way, was at that time recognized by the League of Nations as a victim of aggression, but not Hitler's, but Stalin's).). If we talk about France and England, then it was they who fired the notorious "first shot": on September 4, 1939, British aircraft bombed the German naval base in Wilhelmshaven; On September 9, 1939, the French army, with the forces of 9 divisions, crossed the Franco-German border and launched an attack on Saarbrücken. Of course, when deciding on the political and military support of England and France in their war against Nazi Germany, the President and the US Congress were guided not by legal chicanery on the topic "who fired first", but by an assessment of the real goals of the war and the real political interests of America.

By the way, there was nothing particularly "fateful" in the adoption of the "Lend-Lease Law". The law only untied the hands of President Roosevelt, who could now make decisions without regard to the "isolationists", whose positions in Congress were quite strong. The adoption of this law marked a serious strengthening of Roosevelt's personal power as opposed to the legislature. It did not cause any fundamental changes in US foreign policy, and even more so, it did not in itself become "the greatest historical event in the fight against Hitler." As for England and its Prime Minister W. Churchill, the effect of American laws did not apply to them at all.

The readiness (or unwillingness) of the President of America to help the Soviet Union in the war against Hitler was determined (both formally legally and practically) by no means by tribune cries about "a just liberation war against the aggressor." In order to become a recipient of Lend-Lease supplies, Stalin had to become not a **"VICTIM OF HITLER AGGRESSION"** (*capital* letters, unfortunately, do not turn petty stupidity into a sensational "hypothesis"), but an ally of America, whose combat effectiveness is important for US defense.

Like it or not, the United States and Great Britain were the great democratic powers in the middle of the 20th century. The foreign policy of the legally elected authorities of these countries was determined by ideals and interests. On July 4, 1941, in his radio address to the nation, President Roosevelt said:

“... We know that we will not be able to maintain freedom in our own land, if our neighbors around us lose their freedom ... I solemnly declare to the American people that the United States will never seek to survive as a happy and fertile oasis of freedom surrounded by a cruel desert dictatorships. And when we repeat the great oath to our country and our flag, then it should be our deep conviction, backed up by our work, our will and, if necessary, even our lives. I

fully admit, moreover, I am fully convinced of this, that ordinary Americans in conversations on the street or in the

factory floor did not express themselves in such a “high calm”. But if these words of Roosevelt were not in tune with the thoughts and feelings of the majority of Americans, then Roosevelt would not have been elected to the post of President of the United States three times and 295 thousand Americans would not have given their lives on the fronts of World War II.

From the point of view of the ideals of freedom and democracy, both Hitler and Stalin were equally hated by the peoples and governments of England and the USA. No one has had any illusions about the "new world", which is allegedly being built behind the barbed wire of the Gulag, for a long time. Although not fully, but the information about the most severe repressions, the horrors of dispossession and famine, mass executions and torture went beyond the "Iron Curtain" and caused anger and disgust in the West.

As for the specific acts of Stalinist aggression (the invasion of Poland in September 1939, the attack on Finland in December 1939, the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the summer of 1940), they caused not only a wave of indignation in society, but also very real actions of the governments of England and the USA. In particular, after the bombing of residential areas of Finnish cities, President Roosevelt extended the requirements of a “moral embargo” (a voluntary forced ban on the supply of aviation equipment and

technologies to aggressor countries) on the USSR; not without the participation of England and the USA, the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations in disgrace; in London and Washington, not only political refugees from the countries occupied by Stalin found refuge, but also their "governments in exile", etc. After

all that happened in 1939-1940, after the partition of defeated Poland, defiantly and brazenly drawn up by the "Treaty of Friendship" between the two dictators, there is no chance to appear before "the wisest Churchill and the smartest F. **Roosevelt Stalin** no longer had as an innocent victim. No "games" with the first shot on the border (which was officially called "the border of mutual state interests of Germany and the USSR on the territory of the former Polish state") could deceive not only the "wisest and smartest", but also any normal person. "A plague on both your houses" - that's all that any US citizen or subject of His Majesty the King could say about the fight for the redistribution of robber booty between Stalin and Hitler, in whatever form this fight might start. Churchill was not an ordinary person, and on the evening of June 22, 1941, he found it necessary to say the following in his radio address:

"... The Nazi regime has the worst features of communism. At it has no foundations and principles, except for greed and the desire for racial dominance. In its cruelty and violent aggressiveness, it surpasses all forms of human depravity. In the past 25 years, no one has been a more consistent opponent of communism than I have been. I won't take back a single word I said about him..." At this point, ideals ended and interests began. With interests, everything was even

simpler, clearer and more unambiguous. Without even trying to compete in the accuracy and brightness of expressions with the Nobel Prize winner in literature W. Churchill, I will quote a few more phrases from his speech: ***"... Now I must announce the decision of His Majesty's government, because we must speak out immediately, without a single day of delay . I have to make a statement, but can you doubt what our policy will be?"***

We have only one single unchanging goal. We are determined to destroy Hitler and all traces of the Nazi regime -

without a trace. Nothing can turn us away from this. Nothing. We will never negotiate, we will never enter into negotiations with Hitler or with any of his gang. We will fight him on land, we will fight him at sea, we will fight him in the air until, with God's help, we have delivered the earth from his very shadow and freed the nations from his yoke.

Any person or state that fights against Nazism will receive our help. Any person or state that goes with Hitler are our enemies ... It follows that we will provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help that

we can...

Hitler wants to destroy the Russian state because, if successful, he hopes to withdraw the main forces of his army and air force from the East and throw them on our island, which, as he knows, he must conquer, or he will have to suffer punishment for his crimes. His invasion of Russia is only a prelude to an attempted invasion of the British Isles ... Therefore, the danger that threatens Russia is a danger that threatens us and the United States, just as the cause of every Russian who fights for his hearth and home is the cause of free people and free peoples in all corners of the globe..."

Yes, there are a lot of emotions here, but cold calculation led to the same conclusions. In the spring of 1941, England teetered on the edge of an abyss. Between August 1940 and May 1941, 84,000 buildings were destroyed by German bombardments in London alone. The last (although no one could have known it then) massive raid on the British capital took place on May 10, 1941. Churchill describes it in his memoirs as follows:

"... More than two thousand fires broke out in the city, and we could not extinguish them, since about 150 water mains were destroyed by the bombing. 5 docks and more than 70 critical facilities were damaged, half of which were factories. All the major railway stations, with the exception of one, were put out of action for several weeks, and through tracks were fully opened to traffic only in early June. More than 3,000 people were killed and wounded..."

In Manchester, the worst raids took place on 23 and 24 December 1940. In two days (more precisely, in two nights), 2,500 people died and 100,000 were left homeless. On the night of November 14, 1940, 449 Luftwaffe bombers destroyed the city of Coventry to the ground. Huge damage was caused to Birmingham, Liverpool, Sheffield, Bristol, Southampton ... In total, about one million buildings were destroyed throughout the country. The total number of casualties was 43,000 killed and 51,000 seriously wounded.

The main threat to the very existence of England lurked not in the air, but under water. England is an island. For nine centuries this circumstance was a precious gift of fate, for it protected the inhabitants of the island from the invasion of hordes of foreign invaders. In the 20th century, this industrial country, the "workshop of the world," could not provide its factories with raw materials, its people with food, transport fuel without the continuous transportation of a huge amount of cargo by sea. German submarines mercilessly sank British transport ships, and no one then could say with certainty how long the shipyards of England could compete with the fighter activity of German submariners. ***"England lost this war. With the despair of a drowning woman, she clutches at every straw that in her eyes can serve as an anchor of salvation ... After the destruction of France - after the liquidation of all their Western European positions in general - the British warmongers direct their eyes all the time to where they tried to start the war: at the Soviet Union."*** These are lines from a letter that Hitler sent on June 21, 1941 to his main accomplice Mussolini. This letter (unlike the speeches of Roosevelt and Churchill cited above) was by no means intended for propaganda purposes; Hitler really hoped that he would be able to "put the squeeze on England" in the very near future.

Was it possible, under such conditions, to doubt what the "decision of His Majesty's Government" would be? Could this decision depend on who fired the first shot on the first day of the Soviet-German war? Did Churchill have another course of action? Could he not have done everything in his power to ensure that this war, saving England, once started, lasted as long as possible and weakened both dictatorships as much as possible? Could

hard and cruel political logic, based on the most fundamental, vital interests of the British Empire, to change from such nonsense as the chatter of newspapers about the "aggressor", the "war of liberation" and so on? And could the great cynic Stalin fail to understand this simple arithmetic?

The position of America, remote from European tyrants by vast expanses of ocean, at first glance did not cause much alarm. Roosevelt could analyze the situation calmly and balancedly, **"not grasping at every straw."** But he also had practically no other options for action, except for those that were implemented in reality.

The right answer starts with the right question. The correct question in this situation is: "Which was the greater threat to America - the Soviet Union, occupied by Germany, or Germany, occupied by the Soviet Union?" In my opinion, the answer is quite obvious. "Germany occupied by the Soviet Union", we have seen. It was called the GDR, it posed a threat only to itself and, in the end, unable to withstand this threat, surrendered to the mercy of the victorious West. In parentheses, we note that the very high level of development of the Stalinist military economy achieved by 1941 was based on mass purchases (thefts) of Western equipment, technology, licenses in the 30s. Without this suicidal myopia of Western political leaders, the Red Army would have approached the brink of world war like the Khmer Rouge with rifles and hoes. Fortunately for all mankind, no one had to see the Soviet Union occupied by Hitler. It is terrible to think

about what would happen if the colossal raw material, industrial and human resources of the USSR (and this, if anyone forgot, not only Russia, but also Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan) were combined with organizational, managerial, scientific and technical resources of Nazi Germany. Even without all these additional resources, even at war with the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the USA, even suffocating from a lack of raw materials and under a hail of Allied air bombs, Germany by the end of 1944 had:

- medium-range ballistic missiles delivered for mass production;

- jet fighters and turbojet engines in serial production;

- anti-ship guided missiles in serial production;

- airborne radars in serial production; -

at different stages of experimental testing were anti-aircraft missiles, thermal homing heads, two-stage a ballistic missile capable of reaching New York, several samples of medium and long-range jet bombers, and finally, a serious scientific and industrial reserve ("heavy water", high-speed centrifuges), which made it possible to begin work on the creation of nuclear weapons. It is

worth noting the fact that, while developing and launching into serial production the wonders of technology that were many years ahead of their time, the Germans did not forget about the continuous modernization of the most massive

weapons systems. The first serial Messerschmitt Me-109 left the factory in 1937 with a Jumo-210D engine with a take-off power of 680 hp. With. On the "Messer" series K in the fall of 1944 was the engine "Da DB-605AS with a water-methanol mixture injection device, developing a power of 2030 hp. With. For 7 years (from 1937 to 1944), the power of the engine of the most massive Luftwaffe fighter increased exactly three

times! And what happened with us? All Yakovlev's fighters - from the first experimental I-26 to the most advanced Yak-3 - won the entire war with the M-105 engine. Only in 1944 did the power of the M-105 PF-2 reach 1240 hp. With. (against the original 1050 hp) - and this turned out to be the limit of the achievements of domestic engine building. With the same M-105 engine, the Pe-2, the most massive Soviet bomber, also fought through the entire war. All attempts to "bring to mind" the M-106 and M-107 ended in failure ...

The obvious and indisputable fact is that the "efficiency" of the criminal and savage Nazi regime was much higher than the efficiency factor. criminal and savage Stalinist

mode. And if Hitler's hopes for a quick defeat of the Red Army were destined to come true, then in the vast expanses from the Atlantic to Kamchatka such a monstrous monster would arise that could devour America without even choking. The most intelligent Roosevelt could not fail to see this threat. And he saw her and therefore helped Stalin until the last day of his life.

Let us return, however, to our mammoths and cacti. Verkhovsky's version - Tyrmos contradicts all logic, but maybe they were able to find some direct, irrefutable evidence of their innocence? After all, some fundamental principles of quantum mechanics (such as "particle-wave duality", "uncertainty principle") are absolutely incompatible with simple, ordinary logic, which, however, does not prevent lasers from working. Let's ask another correct question: "And what could serve as direct and irrefutable

proof that Stalin secretly from everyone, secretly from the top command staff of the Red Army, without leaving a single written document, hatched some secret plans?" Do you already feel, dear reader, what power lies in the right question? He immediately leads us to the correct answer: a séance. The only thing and only by calling the spirit of the deceased Joseph Dzhugashvili, we will be able to find out what and what he was thinking in June 41st. Did the authors of the "secret scenario" have a séance? I hope no. What then did they fill the 600 pages of their book with?

"I don't like living with the widow Douglas," said the young tramp Huck Finn to his friend Tom Sawyer. ***"In her house, everything is cooked separately, and even they are forced to eat with a knife and fork. No taste, no pleasure. Whether it's a matter of leftovers in a trash can, when you mix them properly, and they are soaked in juice ... "*** (I quote from memory and apologize in advance for possible inaccuracies in front of the spirit of Mark Twain). Although one of the two authors of the "secret script" is a woman, this book was prepared not according to the "rules of the Widow Douglas", but according to the recipe of Huck Finn. The very presentation and justification of the author's version takes no more than one percent of the volume of the text; no, I emphasize - no direct evidence, documents, etc. in support of this version is

to assume - with the help of the right and left buttons of the computer "mouse") intelligence reports, fragments of memories, quotations from documents, lengthy reflections - and all this does not have the slightest causal connection with the thesis that the authors seemed to be going to prove. I emphasize once again that there could be no connection, since conspiracy theories (i.e., explaining the grandiose historical events by a secret conspiracy, about which no one except the discoverer knows anything) versions are unprovable by definition.

But, perhaps, the book is useful if only because it contains a lot of documentary materials under one cover that are not very well known to the general reader? That's what I thought for the first half hour. And then, in horror, he dropped the plump essay on the floor. There are no references to sources in the text, of course. It seems that the authors themselves do not really understand the difference between the materials of "journalistic investigations" in the style of V. Karpov and a document that has an exact archival reference. It's good for me, I have read almost all the real documents that for some reason got into the "secret scenario" many times, I recognize them - and that is why I can notice when outright bullshit suddenly appears

among the documents. But what about that same "mass reader"? For him, reading Verkhovsky's graphomaniac opus Tyrmos is tantamount to walking on thin ice: the snow sparkles in the sun, and one cannot understand where there is a strong support under the snow, and where there is a polynya

slightly covered with a thin film of ice. The most regrettable thing is that, with all the attempts at sensationalism, the book recreates painfully familiar myths of Soviet historiography with depressing completeness: intelligence reported accurately, Hitler's secrets immediately fly to Stalin's table, Stalin himself does not even think about any aggression, the Soviet Union enters into the war not in September 1939, but in June 1941, the war in the West at that moment either had already ended, or had not even begun, Stalin "is afraid to give a reason" - and only then does some innovation finally appear. The classic Soviet version was that "Stalin was afraid to give Hitler an excuse to invade." According to the authors of the "secret scenario", Stalin was afraid to give Roosevelt a reason not to give Lend-Lease to Stalin. And was it worth it...

At that moment the phone rang. Believe it or not, you can call it a cheap literary device, but at this moment, late on Monday evening, January 28, 2008, the phone on my desk rang. Not to say that I really like calls at twelve o'clock in the morning, but I picked up the phone. ***“Turn on the Ekho Moskvyy immediately,”*** the receiver shouted, ***“there is one pretzel so-and-so kind of annealing ...”*** I remembered that on Mondays the Echo hosts the “Price of Victory” program (which I once visited), and he pressed a button on the radio ... Yes, he froze - with his hand outstretched and his hair standing on end ... “The pretzel was annealed”, and how it was annealed ... “How” was no less expressive than “what”: inconsistent, confused speech, misunderstanding of questions and lack of any

logic in answers...

Ten minutes later, I got tired of it. I already understood the essence of the next “sensational discovery”, and it was time to return to the ninth chapter, when suddenly a phrase about a “documentary film” that had already been filmed (!!!) according to the script of the “discoverer” sounded from the speakers. This is what I didn't understand. Publishing a book is no easy task. For money, the printing house will print anything, and after spending a miserable two or three thousand “bucks”, you can start giving all your friends and former classmates a book with your name on the hard cover. But the film is a completely different matter. No, I'm not talking about “documentation”, there are no problems with this - our viewer is not spoiled, he can be sold a T-80 for a Pz-I. The problem is money, which is three orders of magnitude more needed to produce a film. “Who gave them to him?” I thought as I turned off the radio and surfed the Internet. And when I found out who was funding the spread of this nonsense, I realized that the next chapter should appear in our book.

Chapter

10 Briefs, underpants and FAKK

It turns out that what I took for the nonsense of a senile, according to the vice-president of the Collegium of Military Experts (???), Candidate of Political Sciences, Major General A. Vladimirov, ***“is distinguished not only by its completely new and unusual working hypothesis, but also by the scale almost exhaustive information and scrupulous documentation of the work...”***. It

turns out that ***“this bright and unusual hypothesis made it possible to win the competition for the creation of the film “The Secret of June 22”, held by the Federal Agency for Cinematography and Culture on the topic “The Beginning of the Great Patriotic War in the Light of New Historical Research.”*** That is, the “bright and unusual hypothesis” has already been recognized by the FAKK (presumably within the framework of an open, public competition, during which the word “rollback” was used only as a technical term for designing artillery systems) as the most outstanding achievement of “new historical research”. So outstanding that it had to urgently spend money from the federal budget to popularize it. And here is the opinion of the book's publisher,

General Director of the Vremya publishing house, Mr. B. N. Pasternak: ***“... This is a sensational, in our opinion, book. Alexander Osokin is an amateur historian, but amateurs have such breakthroughs that are worth a lot. He was perplexed for many years and continued to work, trying to find answers to his questions, over the secret of the first day of the war ... I've got to the bottom, in my opinion, he created this new version of the beginning of the war, answered a lot of questions. I have already talked with several historians (oh, I wish I knew the names! - M.S.), they shrug their shoulders and say: “The devil knows, maybe he is really right?” “That is, he relies on some documents that unearthed?”*** the naive correspondent asks ***naively***.

"Yes, of course," Mr. Pasternak replies without batting an eyelid. - Here, half of the book is documents and such a wonderful, I would say, photographic investigation. He takes all the photographs of those years and carefully studies them - who are these people, who is on the right, who is on the left. There is a whole book of photographs. I think it's a sensation..."

What questions, what "secrets of the first day of the war" could be resolved by looking at: **"who is on the right, who is on the left"**? To this question the annotation to the book

answers: **"The mystery of the first day of the Great Patriotic War has not yet been solved. Why Stalin so blindly believed Hitler and ignored the flood of warnings about the imminent start of the war.**

(How do you like this question, dear reader?) **Why were there no shells and fuel in the Soviet border units? Why did the country learn about the war only after eight hours of continuous bombing? Why were the fighters of several units of the Red Army on the eve of the war given underpants instead of the underpants prescribed to the personnel?**

There are many versions, but none of those published so far gives clear answers to hundreds of such questions. Alexander Osokin put forward another version, at first glance, incredible, overturning all past ideas. But this improbability is only apparent. It is worth reading the documents, appreciating the wit of the hypothesis and the painstaking analysis - and the version acquires the character of an insight that will no longer be ignored either today or in the future.

The insight, which I will not be able to (at least) forget, is set forth in the book by A. Osokin "The Great Secret of the Great Patriotic War" (M.: "Vremya", 2007) **"Osokin Alexander Nikolaevich, born in 1939, graduated from Ryazan Radio Engineering Institute, works in the radio industry.**

Corresponding member of the Academy of Electrotechnical Sciences of the Russian Federation ("I don't know what it is; I know the International Academy of Informatization - this is the former Mosgorspravka"; electrical sciences are probably secret knowledge about why there are no washing machines or irons, no hair dryers, no Russian-made sockets) **director of the Department of Information Strategies** (yes, this is not a cleaning subdepartment for you!)

Corporation "Fazotron-NIIR". Author of many magazine and newspaper publications on the history of Russian aviation and aviation radar. The sensational version is that the Red Army (including,

mind you, the troops of the Kiev and Odessa districts) was concentrating near the western borders of the USSR in order, in accordance with the most secret agreement between Hitler and Stalin, to get into wagons and go to the shores of the English Channel. For what? Elementary, Watson, for the invasion of England. As a courtesy in return, Stalin allowed German troops to pass through the territory of the Soviet Union to Iran and further to the Middle East. Why did those have to go - here, and ours - there? ***"In Germany, there was a clear understanding that the Anglo-Saxons were siblings, and it was easier for them that the Slavs fought with the Anglo-Saxons than they themselves."*** Here, however, the first discrepancy immediately appears: in Iran, the Germans had to fight either with the Anglo-Saxons, or with the Persians, who are the real, primordial Aryans ... The reasons for the catastrophic defeat of the Red Army in the summer

1941 A. Osokin explains this:

- due to the cunning intrigues of Churchill, the plan of the Soviet German military cooperation burst;
- the Germans jumped out (already on the territory of the USSR) from trains with machine guns and "rolled up sleeves" (the latter circumstance, Mr. Osokin emphasized in his speech on "Echo"); - The Red Army found itself without ammunition, because, according to a secret agreement between Stalin and Hitler, it was ordered to go to the English Channel without cartridges and shells; - the fortified areas on the old (this is not a typo - on the old) border were disarmed in accordance with the same secret agreement (how they interfered with the trip to the English Channel - A. Osokin does not explain). Most

interesting connected co ***"scrupulously documentation of the work"***, which - in the complete absence of references to sources - the general, the candidate and the vice president of military experts contrived to discover. Mr. Osokin honestly warns that there are no documents and cannot be, since the secret deal between Hitler and Stalin was kept secret from everyone (even Beria - and he

didn't know anything about her). Accordingly, all available documents not only do not contain any mention of plans for "reciprocal transit back and forth", but are also "deliberately falsified" in order to disguise the existence of these plans. There are no traces of an insidious plan in all previously published memoirs of Soviet and German generals and there cannot be - after all, they themselves are nothing

did not know...

In short, we have before us a chemically pure sample of conspiracy theory, moreover, conspiracy theory, already brought to the level of an obvious clinic. In a society of normal people, such texts can only be present in a case history that is strictly closed from prying eyes. There is little funny here, according to official statistics, 3.8 million people in Russia suffer from mental disorders that require constant monitoring in psychoneurological dispensaries; About 14 million people (10% of the population) need regular mental health care, according to WHO estimates, this figure should be doubled. Over the past 10 years, the number of citizens recognized as disabled due to mental illness has increased by 50%. What do you think - is it easy to live in the "era of change"? It's just that those unfortunate sick people who in the "era of stagnation" had to limit themselves to letters to the trade union committee and the district executive committee with a request "to put a neighbor who irradiates me every evening" have now received incomparably greater opportunities for implementing their information strategies ...

So I thought, wandering through the snowdrifts (because of the unprecedented snowfalls, it was impossible to drive through) to the doors of the bookstore. But after I took A. Osokin's book (published, by the way, on chic snow-white paper) in my hands and ran my eyes through a few pages, my opinion began to change rapidly. No, this **"amateur historian"** is not at all simple! If the book of Verkhovsky's fiery pensioners - Tyrmos is all strewn with exclamation marks and arshin-sized capital letters, then the enchanting nonsense of the "Great Secret" is carefully fenced with protective structures from "possibly", "not excluded", "probably", "there are reports", "it can be assumed", "a number of authors believe" ... That is, if Verkhovsky - Tyrmos (and a legion of enthusiasts like them) are in a hurry to share their "discovery" with the public, in

the authenticity of which they sacredly believe, then the forger Osokin clearly implements the "information strategies" of psychological warfare. The main rule in this dirty business has long been known: "Do not lie!" It is absolutely impossible not to deceive anyone. The sucker must deceive himself. Of

course, you remember how in the early 90s an avalanche of consumer electronics with the inscriptions Panasonic, Sany, JWC splashed onto the market ... asking him to return the money, he was greeted with a stern reprimand: "What are you making noise? Who deceived you? Did we deceive you? We didn't sell Panasonic to you, it was you, the dunce, who decided that you bought Panasonic from us ... "A. Osokin's book is built exactly like this:

"... It is quite possible that Hess did not fly anywhere, and British intelligence stole him in order to quarrel between Stalin and Hitler and disrupt the joint landing ... It cannot be ruled out that Hess flew to England with a draft treaty on joint military operations against the USSR and, perhaps, convincing British, spoke about the consent of the USSR to carry out, together with Germany, a landing in England. Recently a report flashed that one of the nine copies of the Barbarossa was in Hess's safe; it is possible that he had a complete plan of military operations of the Third Reich ... It is quite possible that, realizing the danger of such a development of events for England, Churchill deceived the Germans, signed this treaty and

sent it to Hitler ... "What is written here ? Here is the exact translation of this paragraph into Russian: "And hell knows, whether it was, or it wasn't, perhaps it could have been." Churchill's heirs will not be able to call Mr. Osokin to account for slander in any court, but in combination with excellent paper, hardcover, solid size and weight, a foreword by an expert in political science, the graphomaniac opus in the eyes of an impressionable reader "acquires the character of insight. " And we have 3.8 million people who are overly impressionable (the circulation of the book is 3 thousand copies - not enough for everyone, they will have to

sign up in the queue in the morning ...). Strategically, A. Osokin's book worked out correctly - an absolutely unproven "hypothesis" was sold at the price

the necessary amount of vile allusions to the British and Churchill, "because of whom it all happened," is hammered into the reader's subconscious. For January 2008, a very timely book!

But... ***"I have a friend in mind / I don't know what subject he would be / He was an expert, even though he is strict in words / But the devil is to judge the light: / Try to judge the boots."***

Everything would be fine if Mr. Osokin did not even try to talk about specific things that have numbers, dates, names.

This is where the quiet horror begins.

Both in the book and in an interview on the radio (there - already twice in 40 minutes) A. Osokin claims that ***"Churchill in the book about the Second World War, for which he won the Nobel Prize in Literature, the word" Hess "never not mentioned."*** Who do you have to be to lie like that? In Churchill's "World War II" the name of Hitler's deputy in charge of the Nazi Party, the Reich Minister "without portfolio" Hess is not only present, but is present in the title of an entire chapter! The description of Hess's flight to England (strictly speaking - to Scotland) takes seven pages (Part 3, pp. 28-35), the ill-fated name "Hess" occurs there 29 times! How many times the name "Hess" is mentioned in the entire multi-volume book - I will not say. Let the director of the Department of Information Strategies count it himself. For some reason, Mr. Osokin undertook

to talk about the balance of forces between Germany and the USSR in tanks. What relation can this have to ***the "bright and unusual hypothesis"*** about the oncoming transportation of troops is not clear. As a result, Osokin had to operate not with wild fabrications, but with numbers. And what came

of it? ***"The Germans had 990 medium tanks (more than 20 tons), and the Red Army had 1373, including 892 of the latest T-34s and 481 T-40s."***

The T-40 is not a medium or even a light tank, it is a light amphibious tankette weighing 5.5 tons (and about 160 of them were produced by the beginning of the war). Typo? T-50, T-60, T-70 can be close in spelling. The last two are light tanks, the production of which did not begin until a few months after the start of the war. The T-50 tank was put into service in April 1941, by the beginning of the war several dozen vehicles had been produced, by the end

1941 - only 50 pieces. But this is not a medium, but a light tank with a combat weight of 13.8 tons. What does "481 medium tank T-40" mean - guess who can.

A. Osokin loves amphibious tanks. In his opinion, they are very good for landing operations across the English Channel. The author of the "sensational insight" does not yet know that the T-37 / T-38 light reconnaissance tankettes were "floating" only in the sense that they could cross the forest river on the move, without wasting time looking for a ford or bridge. And even then, not all, but only with gentle banks (it is very difficult for a caterpillar amphibian to get out of the water to the shore - the adhesion of the tracks to the bottom is weakened by the Archimedean "buoyancy force", and there is not enough propeller thrust to climb ashore). The English Channel, although the British call it a "channel", is a sea strait 35–150 km wide. Forcing the English Channel is a naval landing operation, and not a crossing of a river, even the widest in the world. Only in a "documentary film" based on the visions of A. Osokin, can a terrible scene be appropriate in which a flotilla of tiny "steel turtles" swims and sinks among the raging sea waves ... And what would they do on the English coast? The light (3.3 t) vehicle was armed with a machine gun, and any anti-tank gun pierced its thin armor through both sides.

But Osokin is not afraid of bold hypotheses and therefore writes: ***"... In any case, Hitler did not have enough landing craft for landing, there were no amphibious tanks, there were few airborne troops. Stalin had all this in huge quantities: cargo ships; amphibious tanks - in the USSR from 1931 to 1939, 7309 tankettes and amphibious tanks of the T-27, T-37A and T-38 types were produced. By the beginning of World War II, the Red Army had 5836 such vehicles in service (that's right - if you add 2376 T-27 tankettes to the floating T-37 / T-38, which were never floating). Therefore, most likely, it was after the conclusion during the Berlin negotiations in November 1940 of a secret agreement on the participation of the USSR in the landing on the British Isles that tank and mechanized formations with amphibious tanks began to arrive in the border areas of the USSR ... "***

And it's still modest. A. Osokin forgot to mention the most numerous formations **"having amphibious tanks"** - rifle divisions. Amphibious tanks in the Red Army were in service with the reconnaissance battalions of rifle and motorized divisions (one company of amphibious tanks, consisting of 17 vehicles per division). Accordingly, practically any division of the Red Army can be included in the category of "units with amphibious tanks"! To sail on amphibious tanks, continuing the "logic" of Osokin, most likely, they were going to Japan. The fact is that it was in the formations of the Far Eastern Front (that's right, the "front", it was also called in peacetime) that there were unusually many amphibious tanks. So, in the 34th and 69th rifle divisions of the Far Eastern Fleet there were 44 T-37 tanks, in the 37th division - 38 T-37 tanks ... Let's not be too strict, however. Mr. Osokin has the right not to be a specialist in tanks, because we have **"the author of many magazine and newspaper publications on**

the history of Russian aviation." Were there any confirmations of **the "bright and unusual hypothesis" in the sky?** Of course yes. A. Osokin writes: **"... A few facts confirming this conjecture: our newest MiG-3 fighters had a ceiling "of 7 km, but not German, but English bombers flew at such an altitude."** In an article published on June 21, 2007 in the newspaper Vremya Novostey and announcing the publication of the book (the newspaper and the publishing house are part of the same Publishing House), A. Osokin developed this theme. Raised, so to speak, the altitude of the "instant":

"...Another noteworthy fact: in 1940–1941, on the orders of Stalin, mass production of the latest MiG-3 fighter, designed for the most effective combat at an altitude of 7–9 kilometers, was launched in the USSR, but not German, but English bombers. By the beginning of the war, 1400 MiG-3s were manufactured, and only 400 and 300 Yak-1 and LaGG-3 fighters, which specialized in the destruction of bombers, respectively.

on

German

Terrible thing. For British bombers - one fighter, for German - others. Like in the best houses in Philadelphia: lobster tongs, spatula for caviar, a special fork for oysters, a trident fork for fish ... And most importantly - where is the connection between cause and effect? Let us suppose that in order to **"destroy**

German bombers " Yak-1 and LaGG-3 fit better than the MiG-3. Let's believe it for a second. And that, in the second half of 1941, after Germany became an enemy, and England an ally, the production of MiGs ceased? Yes, nothing of the sort. 2211 MiG-3s, 2141 LaGG-3s, 877 Yak-1s were produced. Plan of the first quarter of 1942: 1570 LaGG-3, 1200 MiG-3, 785 Yak-1. As you can see, the "anti-English MiG-3s" continue to drive in huge numbers, and the most successful of this "trinity" and, in the end, which became the most massive Soviet fighter, the Yakovlev aircraft firmly occupies the last

place.

The solution is extremely simple. The production of aircraft was determined by the capabilities of manufacturers, while the distribution of orders between factories was determined by the fiercest competition between "firms" and their nomenclature patrons. The main "prize" in this fight was the largest and oldest in Russia, the Moscow aircraft plant No. 1 (now the Progress plant in Samara, which has produced and still produces all the launch vehicles of manned spacecraft). This plant went to the brother of a member of the Politburo, comrade Mikoyan. It was the incomparable production capacity of plant No. 1 that made the MiG-3 the most massive fighter of the Soviet Air Force on the eve of the war. After a long ordeal in furniture factories (this is almost no joke), the Lavochkin fighter was given to the second largest Gorky aircraft plant No. 21. As a result, a huge increase in the number of aircraft produced; at the beginning of 1942, this extremely unsuccessful fighter ("Lacquered Guaranteed Coffin," as it was called at the front) becomes the leader in production. But the young, although close to the Boss himself, Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Yakovlev, at first got only the newborn Saratov Aviation Plant No. 292 ... In December 1941, terrible for the country, Stalin sent to

Kuibyshev famous telegram:

"... Our Red Army needs IL-2 aircraft now like air, like bread ... I ask you not to get the government out of patience, I demand that more IIs be released. I warn you for the last time."

A few lines, written in the frenzy of the battle for Moscow, drew a line under the program of the MiG-3 fighter. Three huge plants: Moscow No. 1, Voronezh No. 18, Moscow aircraft engine No. 24, evacuated to Kuibyshev, turned into a giant production complex for the production of Il-2. The production of the MiG-3 at plant No. 1 was immediately curtailed and was not resumed anywhere else, since the engine plant No. 24 also curtailed the production of AM-35/37 high-altitude engines and produced AM-38 for attack aircraft throughout the war (in total 35,668 "silts" were produced during the war, which is an absolute world record for the production of a

combat aircraft of the same type). Everything that I have just said could have been read 20-30 years ago in any magazine like "Young Model Designer" (except perhaps without mentioning "court intrigues"). It was not worth inventing "specialized anti-English and anti-German" fighters. But I, as a longtime reader of the aforementioned magazine, would like to note the most striking detail of the aviation discovery (and

professional knowledge) of Mr. Osokin. 7000, 9000, 8000, 7700, 5500, 5200, 8200 meters. This is the height of the "static ceiling" (the maximum height of continuous horizontal flight) of the most massive medium and long-range bombers of the beginning of World War II (high-speed and short-range bombers are not of interest to us in this case, since not every long-range bomber could fly from England to the nearest point of the USSR). In this list (Ne-111, DB-Zf, Ju-88, Italian SM 79, French LeO-45), two "small figures" are striking - 5500 and 5200 meters. This is the ceiling of two British bombers: the main (and the only one by the beginning of the war) twin-engine Wellington and the first of a series of heavy English four-engine Stirling bombers. Yes, that's how it happened - it was the ENGLISH bombers that were the lowest among all their contemporaries! This, by the way, has quite rational explanations, but I won't take you with me into these technical jungles.

I'm interested in something else. 9500.11 000.10 000, 9900.10 000.10 120.10 350.10 500 meters. This is the height of the "static ceiling" of the most massive fighters of the beginning of World W

406, English Hurricane and Spitfire, German Me-109). The MiG-3 was indeed the highest-altitude (and also the fastest) fighter of its time. But to intercept any enemy bomber, the "ceiling" of any fighter was enough. Anyone. The problems were not in the technical characteristics, but in the tactics of use (continuous duty of fighters in the air is extremely expensive, detecting a high-altitude target without radar is almost impossible, taking off on alarm leads to the fact that the fighter does not have time to gain the altitude necessary for interception). So, no matter how much you look at the "ceiling" of the MiG-3 and Yak-1 fighters, you cannot discern an anti-English orientation on it, and even more so - only from his own ceiling, Mr. Osokin could take the plan for a joint Stalinist-Hitlerian invasion of England, and even appointed exactly for June 1941.

Mr. Osokin draws some of his mega-conclusions on the basis of such mega-stupid things that you simply don't know what to do: laugh or cry.

"I found in Halder's diary, this is the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, and so on July 3 he wrote the following thing: at the top - "12th day of the war with Russia", and below it is written - "thus on the 14th day of the Eastern campaign ... ". I raise my eyes, look again: "12th day" and "on the 14th day of the Eastern campaign." You understand? The Eastern campaign and the war with Russia according to Halder are two different things. What happened during these two days? So these two days there were trains in both directions ... "

Let's not cry. Let's lower our eyes to the book "The Military Diary" by F. Halder and read (if you still don't remember by heart this fragment quoted hundreds of times):

"... In general, now we can already say that the task of defeating the main forces of the Russian land army in front of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper has been completed . I consider correct the statement of one captured corps commander that to the east of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper we can meet resistance only from individuals who, considering their numbers, cannot seriously prevent the advance of the German troops. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days (emphasis mine. - M.S.). Of course, it has not yet

finished. The vast extent of the territory and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, using all means, will fetter our forces for many more weeks ... ” Where is here “ ***on the 14th day of the***

Eastern campaign ”? What are “***roundtrip trains***”? On July 3, Halder was in a good mood (after a couple of weeks it deteriorated sharply). Of course, he did not set any exact dates for the end of the war (“campaign”), but recorded in his diary his personal assessment of the situation: “The main thing is already behind us, the main enemy forces have been defeated, although it will take more time and effort to finish off.” To look for in this context the secret meaning of the mention of “14 days” on the 12th day of the war is simply stupid. With no less success, Halder could express the same idea, saying that the war was won in 10 days, in two weeks, in 20 days ... I refuse. I consider even the

slightest hint that one can break into Poland and Slovakia in the same underpants as insulting and indecent. Such hints are incompatible with the centuries-old traditions of friendship between the Slavic peoples, with Russian folk tales (Ivan Tsarevich didn’t even woo a frog in underpants), with Pushkin’s creative heritage (“There is no queen in the world more beautiful than a Polish girl. ***Vesela is like a kitten by the stove. And how the rose is blush, but white as sour cream. The eyes glow like two candles...***”).

Speaking seriously, for the invasion (i.e., for the amphibious landing operation across the English Channel), Hitler lacked three things: air supremacy, at least local (in the landing area) command of the sea, amphibious crossing facilities. That's all. It is only necessary to clarify some quantitative parameters. On June 6, 1944, on the first day of the Allied landings in Normandy, 4,126 landing barges and 864 transport ships crossed the English Channel. The landing flotilla was covered by 1200 warships. On June 6, Allied aviation carried out 14,000 sorties. Two floating ports were towed to the captured bridgeheads, and a main gasoline pipeline was laid along the bottom of the English Channel. These are the “little things” that Hitler lacked to defeat

Britain. He had everything else. Land Army of Germany

possessed an overwhelming superiority over the British in the number of divisions, and in the number of tanks, and in the level of combat training. If 156 divisions of the Wehrmacht (and several tens of thousands of wagons with ammunition in addition!) Could magically move to the British Isles, then the British would have to die - they could not win. But even the first task in a

row, the task of gaining air supremacy over the English Channel, the Germans could not solve. They were even further away from being able to solve the other two. Not one, not a hundred divisions of the Red Army on the French coast of the English Channel brought Hitler one iota closer to the desired goal. He could gather there for the company and his bosom friend Mussolini with his army, and Croatian, Slovak, Hungarian fascists ... All this pack could only bark frantically across the English Channel - like a chain dog that breaks, splashes foam, but can not break the chain. That is why the very central idea of A. Osokin's "Great Secret" is mega-stupidity: Hitler did not need Soviet infantry in Normandy, he had nothing to transport his infantry on.

A message flashed through that it was impossible to exclude the possibility that, probably, Mr. Osokin himself (according to a number of authors) felt that he would not succeed in proving the truth of his "epiphany" by vague conjectures alone. Apparently, therefore, a DOCUMENT appears on page 414 in his book. According to Osokin, this "document" is **"the first powerful documentary confirmation of the correctness"** of his version. Agree, it sounds proud. The chapter itself is called: "The correctness of the new hypothesis is confirmed by the Generalissimo. Have you already understood everything? No? I give the first and last clue: **"In 2002, the Moscow publishing house Veche published V. Karpov's book The Generalissimo, in which he cited a number of documents by I.V. Stalin that had never been published before ..."** Yes, yes, yes . It is they who come, the "negotiations in Mtsensk", the very ones during which the Germans agreed to "change the color of the swastika from black to red." Bread and "Rama" are made for each other. Birds of a feather flock together. Two mega-historians, V. Karpov and

A. Osokin, could not help but meet... In conclusion, all that remains for me is to fulfill a pleasant duty and congratulate the FAKK on the successful comp

topic ***“The Beginning of the Great Patriotic War in the light of new historical research”***, to congratulate the Fazotron NIIR corporation on the fact that the Department of its information strategies is in good hands. Well, dear viewers, I wish you a pleasant viewing of the "documentary" film. Get comfortable. Free popcorn - only to members of the Collegium of Military Experts General Vladimirov.

Chapter

11 Tank Destroyers

Don't forget to take your child to the park. Here in Samara it is called "Children's Park. Gagarin". As befits a children's park, it is decorated with a tank, an armored personnel carrier and three guns. See how many kids (and their parents) surrounded the tank, and how many surrounded the cannon. In the same proportions (and for the same reason!) the attention of writers, readers, journalists, screenwriters, historians was distributed. The tank is prettier. Even forever frozen on a pedestal, it staggers the imagination with its all-destroying power. And if you still start a 500-horsepower diesel engine, but how to "rev up" properly ...

World War II is often referred to as the "tank war". This is a metaphor not to be taken too seriously. The merciless "god of war" was (and remained until the end of the 40s) artillery. It was the tornado of artillery fire that put out of action half of all the dead and wounded, it was artillery fire on enemy machine-gun points - and not obscene abuse and brandishing a pistol - that a real, competent commander raised his soldiers to attack. It was the artillery and mortars hidden in closed firing positions that quickly and ruthlessly destroyed the enemy who had risen to attack. But who is interested in reading and writing about mortars today? A pipe is a pipe. In any popular book, the story about the operation (strength and losses of the parties) uses two or three numbers: the number of divisions, men, tanks. Unless in a thick monograph they will name the number and calibers of the artillery systems involved, but even there, most likely, they will pass over in silence the most important figure - the amount of ammunition used. But it is precisely the "boring" tons, ammunition loads, echelons of shells delivered by the beginning of the offensive that give a concrete answer to the question of what the victory in this operation was paid for: soldiers' blood or iron, TNT and gunpowder ...

Tankers, I ask you not to be offended. By the end of World War II, the tank troops that had radically changed their technical appearance

could probably claim a role quite comparable to artillery in importance. Just do not forget that the tank of the 45th year did not even look like the tank of the 39th year. What can we say about the most important, that is, changes invisible to the eye! The tank of the end of the war is armor that is invulnerable to small and medium caliber artillery, a 75-88 mm cannon that unleashes a full-weight high-explosive fragmentation projectile on enemy infantry, wide tracks, an engine of such power that not every naval ship has. In the autumn of 1939, completely different tanks entered the world war - bulletproof armor, which was pierced by any product called an "anti-tank gun" (for example, the French 25-mm "Marianne" weighing only 310 kg), narrow tracks guaranteed to get stuck in the wet after rain arable land, an engine whose power is good if it exceeds 100 hp. s., finally, weapons, almost useless for fighting infantry, sheltered in the simplest field fortifications. ***"They were poorly maneuverable and vulnerable to artillery fire, they ran on gasoline and, therefore, were highly***

flammable, had insufficiently strong armor." Marshal G.K. Zhukov writes this in his famous "Memoirs and Reflections". In this case, his words should be unconditionally believed - the marshal did not see the tanks in the children's park. Moreover, it was G.K. Zhukov who organized and brilliantly carried out the operation to defeat the Japanese troops at Khalkhin Gol. The tank brigades of the Red Army then played a decisive role in encircling and defeating the enemy. In the military history of the turn of the 30s and 40s, one cannot find a more striking example of the successful use of tank formations. Yes, the German tank divisions in Poland and France dispersed incomparably large crowds of enemies, but the thing is that our tankers at Khalkhin Gol got a completely different enemy: he could not be "dispersed", he had to be destroyed. Zhukov knew what the victory at Khalkhin Gol had cost, so his very harsh assessment of the technical parameters of light Soviet tanks is worth believing. With one, but very important clarification - the German ones were even worse. Yes, Germany had centuries-old traditions of conscientious work, a huge army of skilled workers,

a great engineering school... That's why Germany eventually caught up and, to be honest, overtook the Soviet Union in many branches of military technology, including tank building. But catching up is always difficult, and it can never be done instantly.

At the time when the German Reichswehr conducted field exercises with cardboard models of tanks (under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the size of the German army was limited to ten divisions without medium and large caliber artillery, without tanks and aircraft), the Red Army was already armed with 3460 real tanks. If, however, light machine-gun tankettes are added to the number of real (i.e., having cannon or flamethrower weapons) tanks, then the Soviet tank fleet will amount to 7574 vehicles. There were so few of them on January 1, 1934. Three years later, by January 1, 1937, the "peaceful creative work of the Soviet people" increased the number of tanks and wedges of the Red Army to 17,280 units. The production of the

first German combat training tanks began only after Hitler came to power and Germany's refusal (at first de facto, and in March 1935 - formally) from fulfilling the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. The light tankette Pz-I was developed and put into service. Armament - two machine guns of a conventional rifle caliber, engine power - 60 hp. s., bulletproof armor 6-15 mm thick, weight - 5.4 tons. ***"No one, of course, thought,"*** writes G. Guderian, the main ideologist and creator of the German tank forces, in his memoirs, ***"that we would have to go into battle with these small training tanks ..."*** Here Guderian was mistaken. The first meeting of future opponents took place on the battlefields of the Spanish Civil War.

Germany supplied Pz-I wedges to the Francoists; Fascist Italy sent the best it had: a 3.5-ton Fiat-Ansaldo CV-3 tank armed with a machine gun on a turret in a fixed (!) turret. The Soviet Union supplied the Republicans with 10-ton T-26 tanks and 13-ton BT-5 tanks, both types of tanks were armed with a 45-mm cannon. The armor-piercing projectile of the Soviet tank gun pierced the armor of the enemy's light tankettes at a distance of 1 km (it could have been from a greater distance, but it is almost impossible to hit the tank from such a distance). Future head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, future general

army and commander of the Western Front D. Pavlov (one of the first Soviet tankmen who arrived in Madrid in 1936) expressed his assessment of the experience of fighting in Spain as follows: "The experience of the war in Spain ***taught the Germans and showed them what tanks are needed, for light German tanks in the fight against the republican*** (i.e., Soviet. - *M.S.*) ***cannon tanks were not included in any comparison and were shot mercilessly ...*** "

The war in Spain really "taught the Germans", and they began to feverishly force the production of new models of full-fledged battle tanks: the Pz-III, armed with a 37-mm cannon, and the Pz-IV with a short-barreled (the Germans called it "butt") 75-mm cannon. However, it doesn't work well quickly. "***In view of the fact,***" Guderian writes, "***that the production of the main types of tanks was delayed for a longer time than we expected, General Lutz decided to build another intermediate type of tank, armed with a 20-mm automatic cannon and one machine gun.***" The 20-mm "gun" in its ballistic characteristics was somewhat inferior to the parameters of the Soviet anti-tank 14.5-mm Degtyarev gun. So the most accurate name for the new German "tank" Pz-II would be "self-propelled anti-tank rifle with a machine gun." To perform the main tasks of the tank - the destruction of fire weapons, fortifications and enemy manpower - a projectile weighing 120–145 g, carrying (in different versions) from 4 to 20 g of explosive, was negligibly weak. Before the war in the USSR, guns of this caliber were installed only on fighter aircraft, but by no means on armored vehicles ... By the beginning of the war with Poland (which turned into a European and then a world

war), the Wehrmacht received 1445 Pz I and 1223 Pz-II, 98 Pz-III and 211 Pz-IV. Moreover, the occupation of Czechoslovakia made it possible to transfer 280 captured light Czech tanks Pz-35 (t) / Pz-38 (t), armed with a 37-mm cannon, to German tank divisions. If you call a spade a spade, Germany entered the war armed with 378 light and 211 medium (Pz-IV) tanks. Rounded - six hundred pieces.

January 1, 1939 (9 months before the start of the World War) in the Red Army there were 11,765 light tanks armed with a 45-mm cannon or flamethrower (T-26, BT-5, BT-7) and about 560 tanks,

armed with a 76-mm cannon (BT-7A, multi-turreted T-28 and T-35). Rounded - 12 thousand. 20 times more than the Germans. After analyzing this information, Soviet historians came to the only possible (for them) conclusion: **"... The position of**

the Soviet government could be likened to the position of a person who is being overwhelmed by the sea tide higher and higher: now the water has reached his knees, now it has reached his waist, up to chest, then to the neck ... Another moment - and the water will hide the head, if a person does not make some quick, decisive jump that will carry him to a rock inaccessible to surf ...
"Water

(or other liquid)" hid the head "of Soviet historians
propagandists, and for almost half a century they were talking about the fact that Stalin and Molotov were trembling in horror at the thought that these six hundred German tanks, having passed all of Poland (and it was then twice as wide as it is now!), Will rush through the autumn thaw, straight through the swamps of Belarus, to Smolensk and Moscow. And that only a desperate desire to "jump" from this inexorable danger forced them to sign the Treaty with the insidious Ribbentrop ...

Let's get back to reality. The above figures show the distance behind which the German tank industry had to overcome in order to catch up with the USSR. Something has been accomplished in two years. The composition of the Wehrmacht's tank fleet changed radically - machine-gun tankettes were replaced by full-fledged light and medium tanks. The armament of the Pz-III was strengthened by replacing the 37-mm cannon with a 50-mm one (i.e., the newest German "troika" in terms of armament caught up and even somewhat surpassed the "hopelessly outdated" - according to Soviet historians - Soviet T-26 and BT). As a result of all efforts, 17 tank divisions deployed in June 1941 near the borders of the USSR were armed with
were:

- 439 Pz-IV tanks with a 75-mm gun; -
- 707 Pz-III tanks with a 50-mm gun; -
- 1039 tanks with a 37-mm gun (Czech and Pz-III of the early series).

Total - 2185 tanks. Only half of this number (439 + 707) with very, very big reservations could be called "tanks with anti-cannon armor" (reinforced to 50-60

mm frontal plate of the hull withstood a 45-mm projectile from Soviet tank and anti-tank guns, but the turret, high side and stern of even these, the best German tanks, had only bulletproof armor). To complete the picture, it is necessary to take into account about 250 more "assault guns" (Pz-III chassis, on which a 75-mm short-barreled "cigarette butt" was installed in a fixed armored cabin) and 8 divisions of "tank destroyers" (Czech 47-mm anti-tank gun on the chassis wedges Pz-I), which adds another 216 combat vehicles to the German armored weapons. In general, even three thousand tanks and self-propelled guns are not recruited. Another 1081 "tanks" of the invading army were light wedges Pz-I or Pz-II. Is it a lot - three thousand tanks (of which half are light,

with bulletproof armor and a small-caliber 37-mm gun) on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea? Terribly much, - without wasting an extra minute on reflection, - Soviet historians answered in chorus. It was precisely the "multiple numerical superiority of the enemy in tanks and aircraft" that always acted as the main explanation for all failures. "A steel avalanche of tanks with spidery swastikas on the sides... German tank wedges broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops... a breakthrough of a large enemy tank grouping made it inevitable... German tank divisions closed the encirclement around... pulling up fresh tank units, the enemy went on the offensive..." – and just like that we wrote the history of the 41st year. This is how a "documentary film about the war" was filmed, in which 50-ton Soviet tanks of the 60s, "made up" with plywood and cardboard under the German "Tiger" of the 44th model, eerily tossed a tower with a gun barrel, half the size telegraph pole...

German tank formations, and invariably and excellently "fresh", appeared in the most unexpected places. Even where there were none at all. Thus, the troops of the Southern Front retreated beyond the Prut, Dniester, Southern Bug and Dnieper, pursued by the German (and, what is quite strange, the Romanian!) infantry. The vast expanses of southern Ukraine with a unique industrial and raw materials region (Krivoy Rog, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, the largest manganese mines in Nikopol in Europe) were occupied by the Germans without any tanks. Then

also without a single tank battalion, the German infantry broke through the fortifications of Perekop and captured the Crimea. So it was in reality, but the "avalanche of German tanks" continued to spill over the pages of memoirs, and sometimes even claiming to be "historical" literature. At times it seemed that Soviet historians decided to outdo the Sovinformburo itself, which on October 4, 1941 reported that ***"in more than three months of the war, the Germans lost more than 21,000 tanks ... These are the facts."***

The mousetrap into which Soviet historical "science" drove itself with such zeal, slammed shut at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. After half a century of praising the indestructible power of tanks and their decisive role in the battles of 1941, data on the composition and armament of the armored forces of the Red Army on the eve of the start of the war were declassified and made public. 61 tank and 31 motorized divisions (a motorized division of the Red Army in its structure - one tank and two motorized rifle regiments - and the regular number of tanks, at least, was not inferior to a Wehrmacht tank division). So, in fact, the Red Army had 92 "tank" divisions. 23,268 tanks (including 3,607 T-37/T-38/T-40 amphibious machine-gun tankettes). If we count extremely strictly (excluding all machine-gun tanks and obsolete BT-2), then 17,806 real tanks are recruited. The BA-10 armored car (a three-axle off-road vehicle covered with bulletproof armor and armed with a standard light tank turret with a 45-mm cannon) was quite comparable to a light tank in terms of armament and armor. There were 3361 of these undeservedly forgotten armored vehicles.

Directly in the western districts there were - and entered into hostilities already in the first two weeks of the war - 40 tank and 20 motorized divisions, armed with 12,379 tanks. About two thousand tankettes (mainly amphibious T-37/T-38/T-40 machine guns) were in service with the reconnaissance battalions of the rifle and cavalry divisions of the Red Army. "We are lazy and incurious," said the greatest Russian poet

about his compatriots. But even the laziest person, when confronted with such figures and facts,

the question inevitably arose: "How is this possible?" If 17 German tank divisions armed with 3,000 tanks is an all-destroying irresistible force, then why didn't 60 armored formations of the Red Army with 12,000 tanks leave a noticeable mark on the battle maps of the summer of 1941? Why the only visible "trace" were only the mountains of armored vehicles, which filled up all the roads of Lithuania, Belarus and Western Ukraine? Why didn't the Soviet "tank wedges" break through, surround, close and destroy anything?

In early September 1941, the Germans crossed the full-flowing Dnieper in the Kremenchug region on the move, with virtually no serious fighting, built 1.5-kilometer pontoon bridges, along which three tank divisions of the 1st Panzer Group moved to the eastern bank. Three tank divisions of the 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Desna and Seim rivers along pontoon crossings and an unexploded bridge near Makoshino (to this day books are published in which this disgrace is explained by the fact that "the bridge was captured by a large detachment of German paratroopers"). On the evening of September 14, in the area of Lokhvitsa (170 km east of Kyiv), the advanced units of the 1st and 2nd tank groups closed the encirclement ring of the giant "Kyiv pocket". A huge grouping of Soviet troops (21st, 5th, 37th, 26th, part of the forces of the 38th Army, more than 40 divisions in total) was defeated within one week. The Wehrmacht High Command then announced the capture of 665 thousand prisoners, 3718 guns and 884 tanks. Soviet sources admit that about 400 thousand

people were taken prisoner. A lot has been written about the catastrophe near Kiev both in Soviet and post-Soviet times. All the writers unanimously quoted the last phrase from the operational report sent to Moscow on the night of September 13-14 by the Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front: ***"The beginning of a catastrophe that you understand is a matter of a couple of days."*** Heated discussions were (and are still going on) on the question of who is to blame for the fact that the "understandable catastrophe" could not be prevented? Stalin, who, for political reasons, did not allow the surrender of Kyiv until the last minute? Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov, who did not adequately and timely assess the inevitable consequences of a breakthrough by German tank divisions into the deep rear of the Southwestern Front?

Responsibility for yourself and your power to withdraw the troops of the front from the emerging "cauldron"? Everyone who discussed this question puzzled over when (September 12? September 14? or maybe September 10 already?) Should have left everything and run to the east. Unfortunately, I personally did not come across a single text in which the combat-ready tanks with which the German tank divisions "closed the encirclement" were summed up in a column.

Let's fix this annoying oversight. In the first ten days of September (i.e., about a week before the tank wedges met at Lokhvitsa), three tank divisions of the 1st TGr (9th, 13th, 16th TD) had 185 serviceable tanks. In three tank divisions of the 2nd TGr (3rd, 4th, 17th TD) there were 140 serviceable tanks. Particularly impressive is the composition of the tank fleet of the "constantly fresh" 3rd Panzer Division, in which, after the previous many months of fighting on the route from Brest to Mogilev and from Mogilev to Desna, 5 Pz-IV, 6 Pz-III, 30 Pz-II remained. A total of 41 serviceable tanks (and this is if we count the Pz-II tank with its 20-mm "gun"). The

appearance of such a "steel avalanche" in the rear of the half-million grouping of the Southwestern Front is considered by us to be the cause of the "understandable" catastrophe - although it would be appropriate to ask the question: who surrounded whom? Six badly battered divisions with 325 tanks on a front of encirclement with a total length of 250 km (in a straight line from Kremenchug to Konotop, the actual front line was even longer) - is this a "steel wedge" or a thin thread? And if six tank divisions, in which less than one third of the original number of tanks remained (and, presumably, there were not a lot of people), are able to surround four combined arms armies, then why are 20 Soviet mechanized corps (60 tank and mechanized divisions) over the entire summer and throughout the autumn of 1941 they did not encircle and defeat at least one German infantry division?

It was impossible to simply ignore these and similar questions, so Soviet historians and their modern followers waged a long, exhausting and merciless struggle against Soviet tanks. Not on the battlefield, of course, but on the pages of his junk writings. Some, most

outstanding examples of "brain-having" associated with this struggle will be considered in this chapter. First

of all, the number of tanks in the Red Army was "reduced" by more than ten times! How? Very simple. Extremely simple. All tanks were divided into "tanks of new types" (T-34 and KV) and "hopelessly outdated" (ALL the rest, without the slightest exception, fell into this category). Further, the work of falsifiers was built in the traditional (see Chapter 7) "two echelons". The first one, in thick solid books, said: "By the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 1,500 tanks of new types, as well as a significant number of hopelessly outdated light tanks." At the "second echelon", at the level of lectures in the "red corner" and newspaper articles, the clarification about "a significant number of hopelessly outdated" was discarded as unnecessary (and why count these hopeless ones?), And only one and a half thousand remained in the Red Army tanks. Professional "thimblers" at the sight of such a trick nervously smoke in the corner ...

Of course, one cannot but agree that the combat potential of a 48-ton heavy KV tank and, for example, a 10-ton light T-26 is very different. And it is no coincidence that all normal historians in any reference table always highlight new tanks (T-34 and KV) in a separate line. In principle, such a view of the history of the war also has the right to exist, in which, in the description of the events of the 41st year, everything that is worse than the Soviet "tanks of new types" is taken out of the scope of consideration and is considered as if non-existent. Why not? I am the first to agree that a combat vehicle that does not have anti-shell armor and at least a "normal" three-inch (76.2 mm) gun cannot be called a "tank". A wide variety of classification systems are possible and appropriate - but under one, quite obvious, condition. The requirements and approaches must be the SAME for the opposing sides. Accordingly, Soviet historians had to write directly and honestly that the Red Army had one and a half thousand tanks, while the German army had no tanks at all. No one. There are estimates all numbers of "tank" regiments,

divisions and groups, but no tanks. And such a conclusion would be absolutely adequate to the one invented by the Soviet

“historians” of the classification system, because not a single tank comparable in terms of tactical and technical characteristics with the T-34, and even more so with the monstrous KV monster, was in service with the Wehrmacht in the summer of 41.

In an extremely concise presentation, the fundamental, qualitative superiority of the new Soviet tanks over any German tanks boiled down to the following:

- the long-barreled 76-mm KV and T-34 cannon could penetrate the frontal (especially side and stern) armor of any German tanks at a distance of 600-800 m for aimed fire; - the tank guns of any German tanks could not

penetrate the armor of the KV tank, but the best German 50-mm KwK-38 tank gun could hit the T-34 only when firing into the side at small (100-300 meters) distances; - only the Pz-IV tank (439 units, 15% of the total tank fleet) had

weapons equivalent to new Soviet tanks to fight against enemy infantry (75-mm cannon); - even the best modifications of the Pz-III tank were armed with a 50-mm cannon, the weight of a fragmentation projectile of

which was three times less than that of the 76-mm cannons of Soviet tanks (1.96 kg versus 6.3 kg);

- even the heaviest modifications of German tanks (Pz-III series H and J, Pz-IV series E and F) did not have full-fledged anti-ballistic armor: Soviet divisional 76.2-mm guns (F-22 and USV) pierced the frontal armor of these tanks at a distance of 600-800 meters, and the 45-mm anti-tank gun pierced the armor of the turret and hull sides;

- the most massive 37-mm anti-tank gun in the Wehrmacht could not penetrate the armor of the T-34 and KV even from a distance of 100 meters; the latest 50-mm anti-tank gun (which began to enter service with the Wehrmacht infantry in the amount of two pieces per infantry regiment!) Could not penetrate the KV armor, and the T-34 could only hit the side of the hull or when firing from extremely short distances in the forehead;

- thanks to wide tracks and unique in terms of power and efficiency, the T-34 diesel engine outperformed any

German tank in terms of power reserve, cross-country ability and off-road speed;

- thanks to the use of a diesel engine, the T-34 and KV were superior in fire safety to any German tank, since without exception, all German tanks ran on flammable gasoline. Superiority in three key parameters - firepower, security, mobility -

allows us to say with all certainty that the T-34 and KV were tanks of a completely different quality level than the best Wehrmacht tanks as of the summer of 1941. For the most attentive readers, I am ready to make one important clarification. Armor penetration is a probabilistic category. In the vast

majority of cases, the 37-mm German anti-tank gun did not penetrate the armor of the T-34. "Thirty-fours" came out of the battle with dozens of marks from hits, but without a single hole. It was after the meeting with the T-34 that the German soldiers gave their 37-mm Pak-36 the nickname "door knocker" (the meaning of this black soldier's humor was that a projectile could knock on the armor, but "go inside" - no). No less eloquent are the specific figures for the loss of "beaters". So, by November 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht lost 2479 Pak-36s on the Eastern Front, which is 1.42 times higher than the losses of all artillery systems of the divisional and corps levels combined. And at the same time, T-34 tanks with holes from 37-mm shells arrived at the tank repair bases. It really was. Why? No one knows the

exact answer for each case. There are a lot of possible reasons. For example: the hole was weakened by a previous hit from another projectile; factory defects during heat treatment and/or welding of hull armor plates; this tank had already burned once, which led to the "vacation" (decrease in mechanical strength) of the armor; finally, the 37-mm cannon fired at the tank literally "point-blank", from several meters, and the projectile hit a particularly vulnerable area of the hull side in the area of the track support rollers. And the very concept of "breaking through the armor" is not as clear as it seems at first glance. What is considered a breakthrough? A through hole on the back of the armor plate with a diameter of 1 mm? Or a hole through which the entire armor-piercing "blank" passed?

Or a hole in the armor the size of a soccer ball? According to the standards adopted in Germany, armor penetration was considered the ability of a gun to "transfer" 70% of the mass of an armor-piercing projectile through the armor in 50% of cases. Soviet standards were tougher: 70% penetration with the transfer of more than 90% of the projectile mass through the barrier ...

After the rhetoric about "1.5 thousand KV and T-34s, as well as a certain number of hopeless ones" began to be perceived as an old and stupid joke, the falsifiers decided to come from the other flank. "The hopelessly outdated T-26 and BT should not be taken into account and taken into account as tanks, not because they are worse than the latest T-34 and KV, but because they are much worse than enemy light tanks."

Why are they worse? Armament? Soviet light tanks were armed with at least a 45 mm cannon. At a minimum, modifications with a short-barreled 76-mm cannon were produced in a small series. Enemy light tanks (Czech Pz-35/Pz-38, Pz-III of the early D, E, F series) are armed with a 37 mm cannon.

The number 37 is clearly less than the number 45. Unfortunately, many people forget that the volume of the body depends on the third power of linear dimensions, therefore, while maintaining the geometric similarity, a 45 mm projectile will be 1.8 times larger than a 37 mm projectile in volume and weight. This is a theoretical scheme (in reality, shells have different geometry and design). In practice, a 45 mm fragmentation shell from a Soviet tank gun weighed 2.13 kg, while a fragmentation shell from a German 37 mm gun weighed only 0.69 kg. Moreover, Soviet historians invariably called even the German Pz-II, armed with a 20-mm cannon (projectile weight - 148 grams), a "tank". Mobility, patency, power

reserve? According to these indicators, all the tanks of the late 30s, as they say, "cost each other." Narrow tracks, a very modest (150-200 km) power reserve, rather conditional off-road patency. Against this gray background, only the Soviet wheeled-tracked BT tanks stood out brightly. Thanks to the installation of a powerful 400-horsepower aircraft engine, BT, even on a caterpillar track, developed a speed of 52 km / h on a highway and 35 km / h on a dirt road (Czech Pz-38, respectively, 42 and 15, German "troika" - 40 and 20). On the wheel, BT overtook trucks on the highway ...

Who seeks - he finds. It turns out that Soviet light tanks were "hopelessly inferior" to enemy tanks in terms of armor protection. Yes, this seems to be true - if you measure the "armor protection" in millimeters.

German tanks, even the lightest Pz-IIs, have armor 30 mm thick, while the Soviet T-26 has only 15–10 mm. The BT-7 is slightly better - from 22 to 13 mm. The number 30 is twice the number 15. And three times the number 10. Does this mean that German tanks were more protected from enemy fire? The answer to this question is extremely simple. It is necessary and sufficient to remember what kind of fire the German tanks were waiting for on the Eastern Front.

The rifle division of the Red Army was armed with 54 anti-tank 45-mm guns. Moreover, these guns were present not only in the staffing table, but also in reality - by the beginning of the war, there were 14,900 "forty-five" in the army (an average of 65 for each rifle and motorized division). All BA-10/BA-11 light tanks and armored vehicles were armed with the same gun. At a distance of 100 meters, the "forty-five" pierced 52 mm of armor, at a distance of 500 meters - 43 mm, at a distance of 1000 meters - 35 mm. That's the whole answer. By the standards and requirements of the Eastern Front, all German light tanks, as well as medium tanks Pz-III and Pz-IV of early modifications, actually had only bulletproof armor. The 30 mm armor of German tanks is a mistake. The most costly and almost uncorrectable mistake in the choice of design parameters. The only difference between the Soviet and German vehicles was that the bulletproof armor of the "hopelessly outdated" Soviet light tanks T-26 and BT was "reasonable, corresponding to the criterion of rational, sufficiency" (to protect against small arms fire, armor German tanks, mm was quite enough). The of 10-15 on the other hand, were overloaded with 30-mm armor, which was excessive for protection against rifle and machine gun fire, and absolutely insufficient for protection against 45-mm shells of Soviet tank and anti-tank guns.

Strictly speaking, all this discussion about millimeters, calibers and horsepower is a thing of the past. Today, it is not customary to remember about the "hopeless obsolescence" of Soviet light tanks. It became a sign of bad taste. New time - new songs. "Yes,

there were a lot of tanks, yes, they were generally not inferior in terms of performance characteristics to enemy tanks - but they were broken! All. Well, almost everything."

Unfortunately, I'm not kidding. Not only at the level of the wall newspaper of the garment factory, but also in publications claiming to be scientifically fundamental, nonsense is being circulated to this day that by the beginning of the war, "three-quarters of old-type tanks needed repair." It is sad, but even the compilers of such an authoritative statistical study as "Secrecy Removed", did not hesitate to inform readers on page 345 that out of 14.2 thousand Soviet tanks located in the western military districts on June 22, 1941, "there were fully combat- **ready 3.8 thousand units.**

Real data on the technical condition of tanks have been known since at least November 1993 (since the well-known publication by N. Zolotov and S. Isaev in No. 11 of the Military Historical Journal), but this did not affect the graphomaniac activity of falsifiers. Three quarters of faulty tanks continue to crawl through the pages of the most modern books and articles. N. Zolotov and S. Isaev also showed the truly elegant way in which the

years of brainwashing.

Based on the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 15 of January 10, 1940, the Red Army provided for the division of armored vehicles into the following five

categories: 1st. New, unused and in good condition use for its intended purpose. 2nd. Used, in good working order and in good condition. use for its intended purpose. 3rd. Requiring repair in the district workshops (medium repair). 4th. Requiring repair in central workshops and factories (overhaul). 5th. Worthless (tanks of this category were deregistered and

summary statements were not included).

I hope the reader has already guessed how the Soviet "historians" fooled him - they included only the 1st category, that is, completely new tanks, into the category of "combat-ready", i.e., completely new tanks, and the entire 2nd category was classified as "in need of repair" . To make it completely clear - imagine a "traffic cop" who agrees to extradite

inspection coupon exclusively and only for owners of new vehicles that have not been in operation for a day ...

We have already mentioned several times above the June (1941) report of the head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Fedorenko "On the state of providing armored vehicles and property of the Red Army" (TsAMO, f. 38, op. 11373, d. 67, pp. 97–116; published in 2007 in the collection Tank Breakthrough. Soviet Tanks in Battles 1937–1945). From this document it follows that 9.3% of the tanks required a medium repair, 9.9% - a major one.

Accordingly, 80.8% of all tanks in service with the Red Army were quite suitable "for use for their intended purpose." This figure refers to the entire army, including training centers in the Siberian or Central Asian military districts. In the western military districts, the percentage of those fit was somewhat higher. Judging by the latest pre-war "Statement of the availability and technical condition of combat vehicles as of June 1, 1941" (TsAMO, f. 38, op. 11353, d. 924, pp. 135–138, d. 909, pp. 2–18), out of 12,782 tanks, 10,540 tanks were assigned to the 1st and 2nd categories . 82.5% of the entire fleet. 82, not 25. Do you think that

after such an embarrassment, the falsifiers calmed down and, shamefacedly lowering their eyes to the bottom, stepped aside? No matter how! The fight against the tanks of the Red Army does not weaken for a minute. Another "terrible truth of the war" is that there were a lot of tanks and they were serviceable - but only until 4 am on June 22, 1941. A few days after this fateful date, all the tanks broke down, and therefore they had to be left in the territory occupied by the enemy . There is progress. This "truth" is already very close to the truth. The tanks were indeed lost in the very first days of the war. Let us repeat once again that, according to the official data of Russian military historians, by July 6-9, the troops of three fronts (North-Western, Western and South-Western) irretrievably lost 11.7 thousand tanks. Comparing this fantastic figure with the above-mentioned initial strength of the tank fleet of the troops of the western military districts, we come to the conclusion that practically all serviceable and combat-ready - as of June 1 - tanks were lost.

Secondly, they were lost NOT IN BATTLE. This is evidenced by thousands of surviving photographs in which German soldiers pose against the backdrop of Soviet tanks, on which it is impossible to detect external traces of any damage, and eyewitnesses who saw with their own eyes endless rows of abandoned tanks and armored vehicles, and documents of mechanized corps that have survived to this day. of the Red Army, and even simple logic, which suggests that the ratio of the losses of the sides' tanks as 1 to 19 could not be the result of a battle. More precisely, the result of the "great tank battle" should have been precisely the ratio of losses of 1 to 19 - but only in favor of the Red Army ... It probably makes sense to give

at least one specific example of where and how the tanks of the Red Army disappeared. As an example, let's take the short history of the defeat of the 8th Panzer Division (4th Mechanized Corps, Western Ukraine). The 8th Panzer was an "old" personnel division, almost fully equipped. In terms of the number of new tanks (50 KV and 140 T-34s, a total of 190 units), the 8th TD alone surpassed the four mechanized corps of the Leningrad and Baltic districts combined. In addition, the division was armed with 68 three-turreted T-28 medium tanks (a short-barreled 76-mm cannon in the main turret and two machine-gun turrets), 31 BT-7s and 36 T-26s. A total of 325 tanks. By the morning of June 28 (at that moment the division entered the

famous tank battle near Dubna), only one consolidated tank regiment remained from the entire division, armed with 65 tanks. Soon they disappeared too. But documents remained, including a report from the division commander indicating the reasons for the loss of tanks. An outstanding feature of this report is the direct and explicit use of the term "abandoned" (for this reason, 107 tanks were lost). For convenience of perception, we will summarize all the data in one table:

	КВ	Т-34	Т-28	БТ-7 и Т-26	Всего
Исходное кол-во на 22.06.1941 г.	50	140	68	67	325
Подбито	13	54	10	8	85
Брошены, пропали без вести, прочее	25	49	27	28	129
Отправлены на за- вод, отработали мо- точасы	8	32	—	8	48
Завязли в болотах	2	2	—	2	6
Арифметический остаток	2	3	31	21	57

So, the main component of tank losses in one of the best divisions of the Red Army was: "abandoned", "disappeared", "stuck in swamps", mysterious "other". The balance of 57 tanks exists, alas, arithmetically, but not practically. So, judging by the reports of the Armored Directorate of the South-Western Front from July 15-17, the 8th TD has only 32 tanks, and among them there are not 31, not even one T-28. Against the background of such "order in tank units", the reliability of information about combat losses is highly doubtful: 13 KV and 54 T-34s, practically invulnerable to 37-mm German anti-tank guns, were allegedly hit, but at the same time tanks with bulletproof armor and gasoline engines (T-28, BT and T-26) were hit almost four times less! Both the commanders of tank divisions, who at the end of July 1941

wrote reports on military operations, and those who accepted these reports, equally understood that nothing could be verified. Tanks remained in the territory occupied by the enemy. The question of when the Red Army would return to Western Ukraine - and whether it would return there at all - was at that moment open. The endless series of "burnt clutches" and "jamming of engine pistons" in these reports is no more reliable than the number of allegedly destroyed enemy military equipment indicated in them. Today, the tanks abandoned in June 1941 do not even exist. Those that did not get to be melted down in German open-hearth furnaces were melted down a long time ago in the Urals and in Zaporozhye. No Technical Inspection Certificates carried out by independent experts (and even better - by the Special Department and

Military Prosecutor's Office), no one has ever seen. Most likely, they were not.

The difficult question of the reason for such a devastating "death of tanks" is solved by modern Russian historians very simply. If the tanks were lost before the battle (without a battle), then they were broken. The argumentation is built in strict accordance with the saying "bast and bast - start over." Technical

the unreliability of Soviet tanks is proved by the fact that they broke down.

The fact that they broke in one week is due to their unreliability. Unreliability is confirmed by the fact that the tanks broke down ...

There is no doubt - the hypothesis that the gigantic losses of tanks during the first two or three weeks of the war are due to their low technical reliability has a right to exist. But with only one very important clarification: a very strange (if not absurd) HYPOTHESIS should not claim to be the ultimate truth. More plausible, in my personal opinion, is the hypothesis that the tanks and armored vehicles went missing for the same reason that 6.3 million small arms were lost. At least one thing can be said for sure: neither before the summer of 1941, nor after it, there was such a massive "death" of Soviet tanks. The first episode of the combat use of BT tanks was the war in Spain. On the basis of 50 BT-5 tanks, a tank regiment of the republican army was formed, which in

October 1937 entered the combat area of the bunk. Ebro, having made a march of 630 km in two and a half days. Six hundred and thirty kilometers through a very rugged, in some places mountainous terrain. The most difficult test of the running capabilities of BT tanks was Khalkhin Gol. At the end of May 1939, two tank brigades (6th and 11th) made an unprecedented 800-kilometer march across the hot Mongolian steppe (the air temperature in those days reached 40 degrees). Here is how the Hero of the Soviet Union K. N. Abramov, the commander of the tank battalion of the 11th brigade, describes the events of those days: ***"... For our brigade, the combat alarm sounded on May 28th. We were given an hour and a half to prepare for the alarm. The battalion was ready to move in 55 minutes ... The column***

moved along a barely noticeable steppe road trodden by camel caravans.

In some places the road disappeared - it was covered with sand. To overcome sandy and swampy areas, tanks had to be transferred from wheeled to caterpillar. Well-trained crews performed this work in 30 minutes ... "

By the end of the day on May 31, the brigade in full force reached the designated area. The 6th tank brigade spent a little more time (6 days) on the 800-km march. Six years after the battles at Khalkhin Gol, in August 1945, BT-7 tanks as part of the 6th Guards Tank Army took part in the so-called "Manchurian strategic operation." The old Bateshki (the most recent of which were issued five years ago) then covered 820 km through the Greater Khingan mountain range with an average march rate of 180 km per day. Of the total number of 1019 tanks of all types, only 78 (seventy-eight) units were lost during the operation - this is a phenomenally high level of reliability. As of September 30, 1945, after the most difficult forced march, after fighting with separate groups of Japanese troops, more than 80% of the tanks of the Far Eastern Front were in good order. Including: 77% of the total number of BT tanks, 87% of the T-26 tanks hopelessly outdated by that time, 94% of the T-34 tanks. The history of the T-34 tank, as it is written about in all books, began with the fact that in March 1940 the first two experimental tanks traveled 3000 km on their own along the route Kharkov - Moscow - Minsk - Kiev - Kharkov. We passed in the spring thaw, along country roads (moving along the main highways and even using bridges in the daytime was forbidden for reasons of secrecy). Yes, such a march was not easy for technology, many failures were revealed. In the end, the turnaround time for serial tanks was not set at 3,000 km (namely, such a figure, fantastic for heavy tracked vehicles, was provided for by the terms of reference), but "only" at 1,000 km. In the cold of January 1943, during the offensive Operation Don, Soviet tank brigades marched more than 300 km across the snow-covered

Zadonsk steppe and defeated the large forces of the German Army Group A, which broke through in the summer of 1942 to the oil-bearing regions of Mozdok and Grozny. In the summer of 1944, during Operation Bagration (the defeat of the German Army Group Center in Belarus), the 5th Guards. TA, advancing off-road, among forests and swamps, passed

900–1300 km at an advance rate of up to 60 km per day. In May 1945, the tanks of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies traveled 400 km from Berlin to Prague. Through mountainous wooded areas, in five days, and at the same time - without significant technical losses. The legendary "thirty-four" went through the entire war, in many armies of the world it stood in service until the mid-50s. Captured Soviet tanks and Komsomolets light tracked tractors served in the Finnish army right up to 1961! They worked properly in the Finnish snows and swamps without factory spare parts, without operating instructions ... The long-term struggle

of historians with Soviet tanks was bloodless. This pleases, but not so much as to recognize it as completely harmless. Unfortunately, it had very concrete, tangible economic consequences. Two generations of Soviet generals were brought up and trained in military academies on the myth that the catastrophe of 1941 happened due to the technical backwardness of the Red Army, in particular due to the fact that the tanks were "hopelessly outdated" and "technically unreliable". The Soviet generals did not want a repeat of the catastrophe and for half a century put pressure on the party elite, demanding to finally and irrevocably "re-equip" the Soviet army, so much so that friends were afraid. Hundreds of scientific research and design organizations, dozens of huge factories spent countless intellectual and material resources on arming a huge armored horde. In the midst of this great labor battle, the Warsaw Pact "suddenly" collapsed, and then the Soviet Union itself disappeared into oblivion, leaving a practically incapable army as a legacy to Russia. And 30 thousand of the best tanks in the world.

Chapter

12 The right to dishonor

Historians, writers, journalists, philosophers - everyone who tried to understand the meaning of the catastrophe that occurred in the first half of the 20th century, has already revealed many differences between Stalin and Hitler, between the terrorist regimes of Hitler's Nazism and Stalin's Bolshevism. It is noted that Hitler killed mostly strangers, and Stalin - mostly his subjects. It is noted that the scale of mass repressions in pre-war Germany and the USSR is simply incomparable (Stalin exterminated an order of magnitude more people). It is noted that Hitler's Nazis killed people according to the "national principle", guided by the delusional and criminal idea of the superiority of the "Aryan race", while the Stalinist Bolsheviks killed people as representatives of the "reactionary classes", guided by the false and criminal theory of the supremacy of "revolutionary expediency over formal

legitimacy."

It is noted that the Stalinist approach to business opened up incomparably greater opportunities for organizing mass terror, since in the absence of any legal order, any number of arbitrarily chosen victims could be attributed to the category of "representatives of the reactionary classes". Let's not forget, however, that Stalin closely watched the actions of his Berlin rival and

took everything "valuable" into his arsenal. In particular, Stalin - many habitually forget about this - did not at all refuse to carry out "ethnic cleansing", from mass repressions on a purely national principle. This is not only about the fate of the so-called repressed peoples (Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks), whom Stalin condemned to extrajudicial mass deportation to the godforsaken places of Siberia and Kazakhstan as a punishment for real or imagined cooperation of these national groups with the Nazi occupiers.

In parentheses, we note that Soviet Jews were also in line for reprisals (only the death of the dictator in March 1953 saved them from the fate of other "repressed peoples"), accusing them of collaborating with the Nazis would be difficult even for Stalinist propaganda. No, the ethnic cleansing and "national operations" of the NKVD began in the USSR long before June 22, 1941. Probably (a full study of this topic is far

beyond the scope of our conversation), the first victims were the Finns and their kindred peoples (Karels, Veps, Ingrian). In the early 1920s, a strange semi-state formation was created in Karelia called the Karelian Labor Commune; On July 25, 1923, it was transformed into the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, however, the former team of "Red Finns" (leaders of the socialist revolution suppressed by Mannerheim in Finland who emigrated to Soviet Russia) remained in the leadership of the autonomy. It was the Finnish (and not Karelian!) language that was given the status of the state language in the autonomy, education was transferred to it in Karelian schools, newspapers and books were published in Finnish. In October 1925, the "Separate Karelian Jaeger Battalion" was formed, on the basis of which the "Separate Karelian Jaeger Brigade" was later deployed. The name "jaeger" was completely unique for the Red Army, clearly borrowed from the vocabulary of the Finnish army; just as unique was the fact that the command staff of the brigade was purposefully selected from Finnish political emigrants.

It can be assumed that in the 1920s Moscow had a "reserve Finland" at the ready, to which it would be possible to attach the real Finland after the victory of the Bolshevik-style revolution in it. In the early 1930s, when the last illusions on this score were dispelled, a great massacre began under the name "liquidation of Finnish bourgeois nationalism." By October 1935, in the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, **"1350 all kinds of spies" had been confiscated.** By the end of the year, 4,688 people were arrested in Karelia alone (excluding Leningrad and the region). Finnish nationality. In full force, the leadership of the autonomy and the commanders of the Jaeger brigade were arrested and almost without exception shot. About the Finnish language in Karelia they were afraid to remember, public

a statement on the topic that Karelians and Finns are still in some kind of relationship has become tantamount to suicide. Many thousands of Karelians, Finns, Ingrians were deported from the Leningrad region to a forced "special settlement". According to modern historians, at least 15,000–20,000 Finns died during the years of terror in the USSR. If the Finns were the first in chronological order, then the sad "leadership" in the number of

repressed undoubtedly belonged to the Poles. Stalin, Voroshilov and the company experienced especially warm feelings towards "pansky Poland" (the Soviet press did not call this country in a different way). The resounding slap in the face, which the newborn Polish army gave them in 1920 on the outskirts of Warsaw, and the shame of the flight of the Red Army hundreds of kilometers east of the Vistula, could not be forgotten. Both in the secret resolutions of the Central Committee and in newspaper propaganda, the notorious "Polish agents" are invariably present as the primary source of all evil. So, one of the key in the organization of the Holodomor of 1933, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 22, 1933 (with the requirement "to prohibit by all possible means the mass movement of the peasantry of Ukraine **and the North Caucasus to the cities**") began with the following words: **"The Central Committee and the Government have evidence that the mass exodus of peasants is organized by the enemies of the Soviet government, counter-revolutionaries and Polish**

agents..."

The Poles were always to blame for everything. The Polish Communist Party was declared a den of spies and saboteurs who penetrated the Comintern in order to corrupt it from within. The fact that the leadership of

the PKP, located in Moscow, was completely destroyed in 1937–1938 was quite in line with the general Comintern tradition, but the fact of the official dissolution (!!!) of the "wrecking" Polish Communist Party was a completely extraordinary phenomenon. The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was declared a "social fascist" servant of the dictator Pilsudski, helping him to suppress the labor movement in Poland and sending spies into Soviet Russia. Finally, in 1937, the NKVD discovered in the USSR a nest of espionage and sabotage organizations called the Polish Organization of the Troops (POV). Scary to say but POV

was created back in 1914 (!!!), on the initiative and under the personal leadership of Pilsudski in order to organize sabotage in the rear of the Russian army during the First World War. In other words, the mythical POV was declared not even an anti-Soviet, but an anti-Russian organization, which was accused of what the "old Bolshevik-Leninists" themselves considered their great merit - the decomposition of the Russian army during the "imperialist war". Ordinary citizens of Poland, who fled for various reasons from Poland to the Soviet Union in the early 1920s, automatically passed into the category of spies sent to the USSR. The same attitude was towards the Poles living in the USSR, who had relatives in Poland ... In the end, the cup of patience of the leadership

of the CPSU (b) / NKVD overflowed, and in the summer of 1937 the infamous "Polish operation" began. In the order of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yezhov No. 00485, a long list of Poles subject to arrest (*"... **political emigrants and political exchanges from Poland ... former members of the PPS and other Polish political parties ... all prisoners of war of the Polish army remaining in the USSR ...**"*) ended with a completely dimensionless *"**the most active local category of anti-Soviet and nationalist element of the regions.**"* The decision to arrest and enroll the arrested person in one of two "categories" (the first - execution, the second - imprisonment for a term of 5 to 10 years) was taken not even by a "troika", but by a "two" consisting of the head of the regional or republican NKVD and the corresponding prosecutor. Then the lists of the doomed were approved at the "deuce" in Moscow, that is, after consideration in the central apparatus of the NKVD, they were sent for signature to Yezhov and Vyshinsky. In total, 143,810 people were arrested under Order No. 00485. In a number of cases, the lists were compiled according to the telephone book, from which "Polish-sounding" surnames were written out. As a result, 139,835 people were convicted, including 111,091 sentenced to death. One hundred and eleven thousand executed. One hundred eleven thousand. Every sixth Pole living in the USSR. The "Polish operation" of 1937 was the

culmination, but by no means the end of the repressions. For Poland and the Poles, everything was just beginning. On the night of August 23-24, 1939 in Moscow, the minister

Foreign Affairs of Germany, Ribbentrop and the head of the government of the USSR Molotov (Comrade Stalin himself, as one of the ordinary deputies of the Supreme Soviet, could not sign interstate agreements) signed the Secret Additional Protocol on "the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests ***in Eastern Europe.***" In it, in particular, the following was said: ***"...2. In the event of a territorial***

and political rearrangement of the regions that are part of the Polish State, the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR will approximately run along the line of the rivers Nareva, Vistula and San.

The question of whether the preservation of an independent Polish State is desirable in mutual interests, and what the boundaries of this state will be, can only be finally clarified in the course of further political development. In any case, both Governments will resolve this issue in the manner of friendly mutual consent ... " On September 1,

1939, the German army from three sides (from the west from Germany, from the north from East Prussia, from the south from occupied Czechoslovakia) invaded Poland. On September 17, the Soviet Union unilaterally tore up the Non-Aggression Treaty concluded on July 25, 1932 between the USSR and Poland, and huge forces (21 rifle and 13 cavalry divisions, 16 tank and 2 motorized brigades, a total of 618 thousand people and 4733 tanks) struck in the back of the Polish army, the remnants of which by that time were still fighting against the German Wehrmacht. Within a week, the last pockets of organized Polish resistance were crushed. On September 28, 1939, Ribbentrop again visited Moscow, where the Treaty of Friendship and Borders was signed between Nazi Germany and the USSR. One of the three secret protocols to the Treaty recorded a change in the dividing line of "spheres of interest" agreed on August 23 (a strip of territory between the Vistula and the Bug, 100–120 km wide, was transferred from Stalin's to Hitler's "share", but Lithuania was excluded from the "sphere of interests" Germany and passed on to Stalin). The question of "the desirability of preserving an independent Polish state" was decided quite openly, with demonstrative impudence and cynicism.

On the front page of the Pravda newspaper, there was the text of the Treaty of Friendship and Borders, which began with the following words: “ ***The government of the USSR and the German government, after the collapse of the former Polish state, consider it solely as their task to restore peace and order in this territory ...*** ”

On October 31, 1939, speaking from the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet, Comrade Molotov declared: “***It turned out that a short blow to Poland from the side of the German army first, and then the Red Army, was enough to leave nothing of this ugly offspring of the Treaty of Versailles.***” Could not hide his triumph and People's Commissar Voroshilov. In a holiday order dated November 7, 1939, it was said: “***At the first serious military clash, the Polish state shattered like an old and rotten cart. For some 15 days of the war with Germany, pan-Poland as a state ceased to exist ...*** ” After such vivid and leaving no room for doubt speeches, not only in newspapers and speeches, but even in top secret, by no means intended for the public documents of the Red Army command, Poland was called exclusively and only "former Poland" or (in the Hitlerian manner) "governor-general".

However, in one moment Molotov was not quite right. From the "former Poland" something remains. In particular, soldiers and officers of the Polish army remained in the territory of the USSR in prisoner of war camps. According to the orders of the Red Army command (undoubtedly sanctioned at the highest level), all servicemen of the Polish army were considered “prisoners” of the undeclared war, regardless of whether they resisted the Red Army and whether they carried weapons. As a result, mobilized but not yet armed reservists ended up in the camps (and there were especially many of them in the rear eastern regions of Poland), and retired officers, and even disabled people from past wars without arms and legs (this is not an exaggeration!). After the liquidation of the “former Polish state”, the legal status of these people became completely inexplicable. They could no longer be considered “prisoners of war” (The Hague Convention “On the Laws and Customs of War on Land” of October 18, 1907 provided for the mutual and complete release of prisoners after the end of hostilities

actions), and it was impossible to send them to the Gulag for ten years, subject to at least the minimum norms of "socialist legality" - foreign citizens placed in camps had not yet had time to commit any crimes on the territory of the USSR.

A complex political and legal conflict was resolved extremely simply. In accordance with the well-known (authorship of the aphorism is often attributed to Stalin himself) rule: "There is a person - there is a problem ..." Ordinary soldiers and non-commissioned officers, natives of Eastern Poland, annexed by Stalin and renamed "Western Belarus" and "Western Ukraine", were released according to houses. About 43 thousand natives of western and central Poland were handed over to Germany. Officers of the Polish army (of which no more than 40% were military personnel, and the rest were teachers, doctors, engineers called up for mobilization), police officers, border guards, gendarmes, military and government officials with a total of 15 thousand people were transferred to the NKVD for "operational-chekist work. The work went on for almost five months. During this time, the "prisoners" were sorted out: about 6 thousand policemen and officials were concentrated in the Ostashkov camp (Kalinin, now Tver region), officers were distributed in approximately equal numbers in Starobelsky (near Kharkov) and Kozelsky camp (the latter was created on the territory famous in Russian Orthodoxy Optina Hermitage). On October 27, 1939, L. Beria approved the plan of "undercover and operational measures", according to which a "counter-revolutionary element" was identified among the "prisoners", information was collected about the armed forces of "former Poland", and agents were recruited. By February 1940, everything that could be done had already been done, and from the point of view of the NKVD leadership, the "captured" Poles had finally turned into unnecessary, spent slag.

In early March, Beria filed a memorandum addressed to Stalin, in which he proposed to shoot 14,700 Polish officers and police prisoners of war, since **"all of *them are inveterate, incorrigible enemies of the Soviet regime ... filled with hatred for the Soviet system ... they are trying to continue counter-revolutionary work, conduct anti-Soviet agitation ... each of them is just waiting for release in order to be able to actively***

join in the struggle against the Soviet power ... " Beria's proposal was fully understood and turned into a policy document, formalized by a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The same Decree of the Politburo ordered to shoot ***"11,000 members of various counter-revolutionary, espionage and sabotage organizations, former landowners, manufacturers, former Polish officers, officials and defectors who are in prisons in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus in the amount of 11,000 people."*** The nationality of the doomed was not explicitly indicated, but the figure itself (11,000 people) clearly coincides with the fragment of Beria's memorandum, where it was said that 18,632 prisoners are kept in prisons in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, of which 10,685 are Poles. The first to be shot (in the basement of the Smolensk Regional Directorate of the NKVD) were the clergy kept

in the camps. Then, during April - early May 1940, "captives" in groups of 100-250 people were taken by rail from the camps to the place of execution. Prisoners of the Ostashkov camp were shot in the inner prison of the NKVD in Kalinin (Tver) and buried near the village of Mednoye, prisoners of the Starobelsk camp were shot in the inner prison of the Kharkov regional department of the NKVD and buried in the area of the village of Pyatikhatki, prisoners of the Kozelsk camp were shot and buried in the forest in the Kozy Gory area (a few kilometers from the Smolensk-Orsha highway). One should not think that the "unloading of prisoner of war camps" diverted all the attention of the NKVD bodies and they slowed down the pace of "deep socio-political transformations" in the annexed territories for at least one minute. Nothing like that, the work was in full

swing day and night. The famous Chekist P. Sudoplatov writes without a shadow of embarrassment

in his memoirs:

"... In Lviv, the atmosphere was strikingly different from the state of affairs in the Soviet part of Ukraine. In Lviv, the Western capitalist way of life flourished, wholesale and retail trade was in the hands of private traders, who were soon to be liquidated ... "

The first mass deportation of the Polish population (simultaneously in "Western Belarus" and "Western Ukraine") was carried out on February 10, 1940. In severe frost (in Belarus in those days the thermometer dropped to -37 degrees), people were given two hours to pack, however due to lack of transport, loading into freight wagons dragged on for four days. Several thousand children and the elderly died of hypothermia at loading stations and along the way. The next, the most massive (26,000 families) extrajudicial expulsion of people who were even too lazy to be charged with committing a crime, was carried out on April 13, 1940. But it was not the last either. Sometimes, presumably, in the form of black humor, natives of Poland, who never knew Trotsky in a dream, were taken away from their homes on the basis of the Order of the NKVD - USSR dated July 30, 1937 as "members of the families of Trotskyists and saboteurs." Judging by the certificate compiled by the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR V. V. Chernyshov, as of August 1, 1941, the number of special settlers (mainly Poles by nationality) was 381 thousand people. But this is in August 41st. Until this August, I still had to live. According to L. Beria himself, at least 10 thousand deportees died on the way from hunger, cold and disease. Deportation to a "special

settlement" could be considered the mildest form of punishment to which those "lucky ones" were subjected, whom the NKVD authorities recognized as just a "class-alien element." Apparent or potential enemies of the Soviet regime were awaited by arrest, prison or execution. From September 1939 to February 1941, 92,500 people were arrested by the NKVD/NKGB in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. Among them: 41 thousand Poles, 23 thousand Jews, 21 thousand Ukrainians, 7.5 thousand Belarusians. As we can see, there was no obvious discrimination on the basis of nationality, everyone was imprisoned, but still the Poles, who, according to Molotov, made up only 12% of the population of the annexed territories (according to Polish demographers - 43%), are in the first place. In the spring of 1941, as part of the preparations for the theater of the upcoming war, the scope of repression increased significantly. By June 1941, the total number of those arrested in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus had grown to 107 thousand people. With the outbreak of hostilities, the NKVD / NKGB

began a hasty evacuation of prisons in the western regions, during which 10,259 arrested persons (both convicted and on trial) were killed (not always in the form of humane execution). The figure was obtained by summing up the reports of the Prison Department of the NKVD of the USSR and probably does not cover all cases of mass murder of prisoners (besides the prison department, there was also the department of the NKVD escort troops, there was a separate from the NKVD People's Commissariat of the NKGB, and all these "bodies" also knew how and loved to shoot). At least, in the OUN documents, there is a figure of

80,000 prisoners killed in Ukraine alone. "To whom is memory, to whom glory, to whom black water - no signs, no trace." Our imperfect world is so arranged that they make films and compose songs about the death of "burnt by the sun" generals, and the destruction of tens of thousands of ordinary workers from a tragedy turns into boring statistics. Who today will remember the tens of thousands of Poles who were shot in 1937 using the phone book? Who is interested in the fate of the Polish peasants, who were thrown out with their children in the February cold of 1940? The suffering of these people, the grief of their loved ones disappeared without a trace in the immense human tragedy of the Second World War. And only one of the episodes listed above - not the very first, not the largest, not even the most cruel in terms of the method used to deprive people of life - turned into a long-term international problem, into a bleeding ulcer that poisons Polish-Russian relations to this day. Katyn. A simple geographical name - an area and a forest near the village of Kozy Gory in the Smolensk region - has become a password for trouble, and now it sounds somehow ominous, reminiscent of the common Slavic word "kat": tormentor, executioner ...

This story, in its briefest retelling, is as follows. In February 1943, the German occupation authorities discovered a mass grave of Polish officers in the Katyn forest. Having run through all instances, the information reached the "Ministry of Truth", the chief propagandist of Nazi Germany, Dr. Goebbels. In Soviet wartime cartoons, Goebbels was depicted as an ugly

small monkey sitting on Hitler's shoulder. IN

Recently, the former monkey has been elevated to the rank of an outstanding and unsurpassed master of political PR. In my opinion, the truth lies exactly in the middle. Goebbels knew and loved his dirty work, but thanks to the "gifts" that Stalin generously gave him, the work of the Reich's chief propagandist was not too hard. The first and main "gift" was the standard of living in which Stalin drove the Soviet workers and collective farmers. Goebbels accepted the gift, organized trips of workers' delegations to the occupied territory of the USSR, arranged countless photo exhibitions, meetings with soldiers of the Eastern Front, and so on under the general title "Bolshevik 'paradise' through the eyes of German workers." When, on June 30, 1941, units of the Wehrmacht entered Lviv, over which hung the horrifying stench of 2.5 thousand decomposing corpses of prisoners killed in prisons, Goebbels "worked out" this situation in

full. Foreign journalists were brought to Lvov, a commission of the International Red Cross was invited; letters from German soldiers with stories about what they saw in Lvov prisons were published in Germany in a separate collection, in a huge circulation, with the obligatory indication of the exact address (and even telephone number, if any) of the recipient of the letter (the parents of the soldier, his fiancée, comrades in work, etc.). I don't know and I don't dare to guess whether anyone checked these addresses and phone numbers, but such a move had an irresistible effect on the public. In a word, by 1943, Goebbels already had rich experience in organizing propaganda performances on the topic: "The atrocities of the Bolshevik monsters." Katyn, that is, the fact of the mass execution of Polish officers, made it possible to draw the Polish government-in-exile (it was in London at that time) into the orbit of a grandiose international provocation and thus split the ranks of the really emerging anti-Hitler

coalitions.

On April 13, 1943, German radio stations broadcast a message that the graves of Polish officers "killed by the GPU" had been found in the vicinity of Smolensk. On April 14, the Polish Red Cross was asked to provide a commission of experts to participate in the exhumation of the grave. Not to mention the fact that a categorical rejection of the "proposal" of the occupying authorities would be tantamount to

suicide, Red Cross employees had no moral right to refuse to perform their direct duties of identifying the dead and informing relatives. It was decided to send a group of specialists to Katyn, which was called the "Technical Commission of the Polish Red Cross". Despite the enormous pressure from the German authorities, the Polish specialists did not become, as far as it was possible, accomplices in the propaganda operation of Goebbels, namely: they refused to indicate the date of death in all issued certificates (namely, the date of the 40th year could become that decisive the argument that the Germans needed) and did not sign any documents identifying the perpetrators of the death of Polish officers.

The "Technical Commission" took part in the exhumation of 7 group burials (the eighth grave was only partially opened, because on June 7, 1943, work was suspended due to the onset of the summer heat). 4243 corpses were discovered and recovered, most of which (2730) were identified from personal documents, certificates (including those about vaccinations made in the Kozelsky camp), letters, diaries, and medallions. Judging by the area and depth of the eighth grave, the Commission suggested that it could contain the remains of no more than two to three hundred people. Comparing these figures today with the number of prisoners in the Kozelsky camp (as of December 29, 1939, there were 4,543 people in it), one can state the high accuracy and scrupulousness of the work of the "Technical Commission". All documents and personal belongings found on the corpses were handed over to the Germans at their request (however, the Poles managed to take two copies of the detailed protocols and part of the material evidence with them, and some of the diaries and notes of the executed were also preserved). As already mentioned, the "Technical Commission" refused to sign the political statements of the Germans, but compiled a detailed report on the work done, which was handed over to the leadership of the Polish Red Cross in Warsaw. The document survived and was published in 1989. Here are a few quotes that are important for understanding further events:

"... The Germans examined the entire territory very carefully - it was important for them that the number of 12,000 announced by propaganda did not differ too much from the true one, so we can assume

that no more graves will be discovered... The cause of death was a shot aimed at the base of the skull... From the documents found on the corpses it follows that the murder took place in the period from late March to early May 1940..."

Concluding the theme of the work of the "Technical Commission", we note that until 1989, that is, until the time of the collapse of the communist regime in Poland, only one person survived, I. Bartoszewski (participant in the Warsaw Uprising from its first to its last day). Two members of the Commission died in the ranks of the Polish Resistance, many after the end of the war were forced to emigrate from Poland. Yes, and Bartoszewski himself was arrested exactly three days after the Soviet troops entered Krakow ...

Let us now return to the events of April 1943. The first reaction of the Soviet radio was a statement that the Germans had found an archaeological site (!!!), the skeletons in which they are trying to pass off as the burial place of the executed Polish officers. Judging by the entries in Goebbels' diary, he was completely delighted with such a manifestation of the idiocy of Stalin's propaganda, which was clearly unexpected even for him. Finally, in Moscow, they came to their senses from the first shock, and in the official report of the Soviet Information Bureau it was said that the Polish prisoners of war were allegedly at the time of the start of the war on road construction work west of Smolensk, fell into the hands of the Germans in the summer of 1941 and were shot by the Germans. This version, with minor clarifications, became absolutely mandatory in the USSR for any mention of the Katyn case for half a century.

On April 17, 1943, the Polish government in exile asked the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to send a delegation to Smolensk to exhume corpses from burials. In response to this appeal, the ICRC agreed to take part in the case, but only on the condition that all interested parties, including the USSR, turn to it. Of course, the Stalinist leadership did not want to participate in the investigation into the circumstances of the execution in Katyn, nor to see an authoritative commission of the ICRC at the site of the exhumation. It went the other way: on April 25, 1943, in the most unbridled terms, accusing the Polish government of complicity in "vile fascist slander" (and this despite the fact that not a single joint with the Germans

The Sikorsky government did not make a statement on the Katyn case, and his appeal to the ICRC fully complied with all the norms and traditions of international relations), Moscow announced the termination of diplomatic relations with Poland. At this point, the

attentive reader should interrupt me - what kind of "diplomatic relations" could the Soviet Union have with "former Poland"? The question is absolutely appropriate and very meaningful, since the answer to it allows us to understand a lot in Stalin's reaction to the Katyn case.

Between September 1939 and April 1943 there was also the summer of 1941. This terrible summer changed the entire political landscape of Europe, it brought about radical changes in Soviet-Polish relations as well. On the evening of June 22, Churchill announced that Great Britain would support the Soviet Union in the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. On June 23, Sikorski, the head of the Polish government in exile, issued a statement in which he called on the Soviet government to restore relations and cooperate in the fight against a common enemy. Comrade Stalin was silent like a fish in the first days of the war, but then, when the real, i.e. catastrophic, nature of the developing events became quite clear to him, he began ... no, not to ask - to demand (!!!) from the Western countries all-round assistance. Yes, Churchill and Roosevelt were doomed to support Stalin, but in the summer of 1941 they could still condition their support on certain minimum conditions. Poland was one of those conditions.

England entered the Second World War fulfilling its treaty obligations to protect the sovereignty of Poland (at least, that was the official wording). Polish pilots defended the skies of London (the fourth most effective squadron of the Royal Air Force Fighter Command was the "Polish" 303rd), Polish sailors, along with the British, led transport caravans through the deadly waters of the Atlantic, Polish soldiers fought alongside the British in North Africa. In such a situation, Churchill could not ignore the thoughts and feelings of his fellow citizens to such an extent as to openly help the state (USSR), whose leaders declared the country with a thousand-year history "the ugly brainchild of the Treaty of Versailles" (and at the same time annexed 52% of the territory of pre-war Poland). Under pressure

of his newfound allies, Stalin was forced to recognize the "former Poland" as existing again and enter into negotiations with the Sikorsky government. On July 30,

1941 (please underline this date with three bold lines) the Soviet-Polish intergovernmental agreement was signed. Its first paragraph read: ***"The government of the USSR recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 regarding territorial changes in Poland as invalid."***

The agreement provided for the formation of a Polish army on Soviet territory, which would be considered ***"an integral part of the Armed Forces of the sovereign Polish Republic, to whose allegiance its servicemen would swear."*** A special protocol to the Agreement provided that ***"the Soviet government grants amnesty to all Polish citizens currently imprisoned on Soviet territory as prisoners of war, or on other sufficient grounds."*** On the basis of this Protocol, on August 12, the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces was issued on the amnesty of Polish citizens, including ***"all prisoners of war and interned servicemen of the Polish army."*** Of course, neither the reports of the Soviet Information Bureau, nor the post-war Soviet history textbooks confused the minds of the Soviet people with the information that on July 30, 1941, Stalin agreed to

recognize his "liberation campaign" as "lost", as a result of which the eastern half of Poland turned into the so-called "Western Ukraine" and "Western Belarus". However, by April 1943, the "minute of weakness" by virtue of which in the summer of 1941 Stalin agreed to recognize his territorial acquisitions in Poland as illegal was already in the past, and Moscow was looking for a way to untie its hands and free itself from any obligations to the Polish government. In such a situation, the main one who benefited from the propaganda hype unleashed by Goebbels around the burials in Katyn turned out to be, oddly enough, Stalin, who finally received the long-awaited reason to break off relations with the "bourgeois government" of Poland.

September 26, 1943 Smolensk was liberated from the Germans. The phrase "golden autumn" does not go well with talking about the exhumation of mass graves, but, according to experts, this

the time of the year is the most optimal for such a terrible occupation (it's not hot anymore, there are no insects anymore, it's not very cold yet, the autumn wind and rains disperse the cadaverous stench). However, October, November, December 1943 passed, but no one in the Soviet Union explicitly remembered the Katyn burial. January 1944 arrived. The grandiose offensive of the Red Army in the Right-Bank Ukraine (Dnieper-Carpathian strategic operation) at the cost of a sea of blood of Soviet soldiers (270 thousand killed, 893 thousand wounded according to official military statistics) brought Stalin closer to the borders of pre-war Poland. And this meant that the moment was approaching when Stalin had to finally and irrevocably declare to the Anglo-American allies that the Soviet Union did not know and did not want to know either the "London" government of Poland, or the geographical map of Europe of the sample of September 1, 1939. And something like this it turned out that it was in the frosty January of the 44th that the "Special Commission for the

Establishment and Investigation of the Circumstances of the Execution of Polish Officers of War by the Nazi Invaders" headed by Academician HH Burdenko arrived in the Katyn Forest. The task assigned to the commission (whose work was directly controlled by as many as two deputy people's commissars of internal affairs - S. Kruglov and V. Merkulov) was unambiguously determined by its name. The commission arrived at the scene of the crime with a ready conclusion about the guilt of one of the two possible criminals. It only remained to find some material evidence of "the shooting of Polish officers of war by the Nazi invaders." With the support of two of Beria's deputies behind him, with the ability to find and force any "witnesses" to give the necessary evidence, the Burdenko Commission could have blinded a more or less tolerable falsification. But

I could not.

Neither experts from neutral countries, nor criminologists from the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, nor even representatives of pro-Soviet Polish organizations, from which the new, "correct" government of Poland was formed in Moscow at that time, were involved in the work of the "Special Commission". Within one week (from January 16 to January 23),

925 corpses were exhumed in the January frost (although then this number in the report

Commission increased to 1380). On this "ground" it was concluded that 11,000 Polish officers were shot in Katyn (multiple overestimation of the number of victims was necessary in order to explain the fact of the disappearance of the prisoners of the Ostashkovsky and Starobelsky camps). In the absence of any independent witnesses, nine documents were even "discovered" on the corpses (postal items, receipts with dates later than May 1940). After that, the "Special Commission" considered its work completed and invited foreign correspondents to the place of exhumation.

The first thing that caught the eye of journalists was warm clothing (overcoats, scarves, gloves, warm underwear) on the corpses of people allegedly captured by the Germans in hot July 1941 (references to unprecedented heat are found in literally all memoirs of both Soviet and German participants in the July battles). To the natural (and easily predictable!) question of why the captured Poles did not flee after their NKVD escorts fled without a trace, Academician Potemkin did not find anything smarter than to answer: "They both worked and remained to work by inertia ". The question of who "by inertia" continued to feed 11 thousand men, allegedly engaged in road construction work in the middle of the battlefield of the Smolensk battle, remained unanswered. There were many unanswered questions - but it was January 1944, the Red Army was smashing the hated fascists, countless traces of the monstrous atrocities of the Nazi invaders had already been discovered on the liberated territory of the USSR. And then not a single journalist turned his tongue or pen in order to question the conclusions of the Burdenko commission sewn with "white threads" ... Comrade Stalin should have stopped there, but two years later, in the dazzle of his triumphal glory as

the Greatest Commander, he for some reason, I decided to raise the issue of the execution in Katyn at the Nuremberg trials. The arguments of the prosecution were based on "documents" and conclusions of the Burdenko commission. It was a big mistake. Even the Nuremberg trials, in which one of the parties to the conflict arrogated to itself the rights of a judge, prosecutor and investigator at the same time, even this strange Tribunal, which, in violation of all written and unwritten norms of justice,

compiled a list of topics, questions, documents, facts that should not be discussed, even this "trial of the victors" was still very different from the Soviet "people's court" of the 1937 model. And what the journalists closed their eyes to in January 1944, experienced German lawyers could not help but notice in the spring of 1946.

First of all, it turned out that the number of victims of the shooting indicated in the Indictment unexpectedly and without any justification changed from 925 to 11 thousand people. The defense drew the attention of the Tribunal to these strange manipulations, demanded and succeeded in calling the witnesses of the parties. A big commotion began in Moscow. On March 21, the Vyshinsky Commission was assembled for an extraordinary meeting, which, as early as September 1945, was entrusted with directing the course of the Nuremberg Trials. The largest figures of the Soviet punitive departments were involved in the preparation of "witnesses" and accusatory materials: Abakumov, Vyshinsky, Merkulov. Five days after the meeting of the Commission, the prosecutor of the Special Criminal Court in Krakow, R. Martini, who had been instructed to prepare Polish witnesses and testimonies for Nuremberg back in December 1945, was killed in his

apartment. The next death occurred in Nuremberg itself. The young prosecutor N. D. Zorya, an assistant to the chief Soviet prosecutor, after getting acquainted with the materials of the "Katyn case", turned to his superiors with a request to urgently second him to Moscow to report to Vyshinsky. Prosecutor Zorya had previously shown himself to be an immoderately honest lawyer, capable of non-standard actions (in 1939 he was demoted to the rank of private after he revealed facts of falsification of cases during a prosecutor's check). N. D. Zorya did not reach Moscow, because he was refused his report and the next day, May 23, 1946, he was found dead. The official cause of death is an accident while cleaning personal weapons.

The issue of Katyn was considered by the Nuremberg Tribunal on July 1–3, 1946. During the interrogation of witnesses and experts, it was established that F. Ahrens, whom the Soviet side tried to present as the commander of the German unit that shot Polish officers, commanded the 537th communications regiment and together with his subordinates appeared in the Katyn area much later than the estimated time of the crime. None

no arguments were presented to support the version that a unit of German signalmen was engaged in mass executions. The "witness for the prosecution", trained in the NKVD, Bazilevsky (deputy burgomaster of Smolensk during the German occupation), hardly read his testimony from a piece of paper. From his answers to the questions of the defense, it turned out that he was not at the place of execution and could not name a single witness to the execution. The Bulgarian doctor Professor Markov (a member of the international commission of experts that worked in Katyn at the end of April 1943), despite the fact that in "liberated" Bulgaria he had already been put on trial for his participation in the "despicable fascist provocation", in the face of The Nuremberg Tribunal once again reiterated its conclusion that the features and speed of cadaveric decay in a mass grave have not been studied by science to such an extent that would allow establishing the time of death of the victims with the accuracy required in this case. Answering questions from the defense, Markov confirmed that the corpses were wearing warm clothes...

In the end, the Soviet prosecutor Rudenko had to make efforts to stop the discussion of the "Katyn issue". T. Stupnikova, who participated in the work of the tribunal in the modest role of a simultaneous interpreter, in her memoirs

writes:

"... For me it was really a "rainy day". Listening to and translating the testimonies of witnesses was incredibly difficult for me, and not because of the complexity of the translation, but because of an overwhelming sense of shame for my only long-suffering Fatherland, which, not without reason, could be suspected of committing the gravest crime ... It was, no doubt, hard for all Soviet . And the judges, who suddenly lost their self-confident petrification, and the accusers, who were destined to be convinced by the example of Katyn that the Nuremberg Tribunal was not a court in the USSR ... "

The Nuremberg Tribunal, in its verdict, did not charge the Germans with the execution of Polish prisoners of war in Katyn. This decision was not challenged by the Soviet prosecution; a protest (unlike in many other situations) was not made. Which, however, did not prevent the Great Soviet Encyclopedia in the article "Katyn execution" without a twinge of conscience (if only the use of this word is generally appropriate here)

inform readers that ***“according to the calculation of forensic experts, the total number of corpses reached 11 thousand”, and “The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg found the main war criminals guilty of pursuing a policy of extermination of the Polish people and, in particular, of shooting Polish prisoners of war in Katyn forest.”*** This

is where the story of the crime in Katyn ends, and another, no less dramatic, story of half a century of lies begins, a hard and unequal struggle at first to restore the truth. It is possible and necessary to describe how, with the beginning of Gorbachev's perestroika, the new leadership of the CPSU desperately maneuvered, trying to reveal a particle of the truth, while maintaining the inviolability of the executioners, how the awl uncontrollably burst out of the bag, what ridiculous and indecent tricks the defenders of the old propaganda myths tried to resort to ... But the volume of this chapter is not unlimited, so let's move on immediately to the final act of the historical drama, to the Conclusion of the Commission of Experts of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation on criminal case No. 159 signed on August 2, 1993. criminal attempts to hide the

truth about his true culprits: ***“... The documents allegedly used by the HH Burdenko commission, as well as the results of post-mortem studies, have never been***

described, published or presented ... The unsent postcard of Captain S. Kuchinsky with the date June 20, 1941 is an obvious fake. Stanislav Kuchinsky was not kept in the Kozelsky camp, and left the Starobelsky camp in December 1939 ... <...> The statement made about the detention of prisoners of war in three special purpose camps No. 1-ON, No. 2-ON and No. 3-ON, as well as the testimony of the witness "Major Vetoshnikov", allegedly the head of one of the camps. As follows from the certificates of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, such camps did not exist in 1940 and subsequent years. The so-called major Vetoshnikov did not serve in the state security system and is a fictional figure...

The dating of the burials in the summer-autumn of 1941 did not receive substantiated confirmation. Even before the discovery of the body of NKVD documents, convincing evidence of the date (spring 1940) was contained in numerous documents found on corpses (newspapers, diaries, etc.) with the last designation March-May 1940. This is confirmed by two surviving copies of protocols describing material evidence stored in Krakow...

A note by L.P. Beria to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks to I.V. Stalin contained a draft resolution of the Politburo, which was automatically turned into a resolution dated March 5, 1940, entered into the protocol as "Question of the NKVD of the USSR" under number 144. On the note there were handwritten (confirmed by graphological examination) visas of Stalin, Voroshilov, Molotov and Mikoyan and the note "vol. Kalinin is in favor, Comrade Kaganovich is in favor." The authenticity of the note and the resolution of the Politburo dated March 5, 1940 was confirmed by handwriting a

According to a note signed by the chairman of the KGB A. N. Shelepin dated March 3, 1959, a total of 21,857 people of "persons of the former bourgeois Poland" were shot, including in the Katyn forest (prisoners of war from the Kozelsky camp) - 4421 people, from the Starobelsky camp - 3820 people, from the Ostashkov camp - 6311 people. 7,305 people were shot in "camps and prisons in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus." Interrogated as a witness, A. N. Shelepin confirmed the authenticity of the note and the facts set forth in it. P.

K. Soprunenko, interrogated as a witness using video recording, confirmed that he was personally acquainted with the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b) on the execution of Polish prisoners of war. Putting this decision into practice, he supervised the entire transfer of Polish prisoners of war to the disposal of the NKVD of the Kharkov, Smolensk and Kalinin regions. The executed were buried on the territory of the summer cottages of the NKVD of the indicated regions. Similar testimony was given by the former head of the UNKVD for the Kalinin region D.S. Tokarev ... Witness M.V.

a large number of Polish prisoners of war who were shot at night, and then taken out to be buried in the area of dachas of the UNKVD ... Similar testimony about the executions of Polish prisoners of war in the spring of 1940 was given by witnesses P. P. Titkov, I. Nozdrev, P. F. Klimov, P. P. Dvornichenko and others.

The exhumations carried out in 1991 on the territories of the dacha settlements of the KGB in the Kalinin (now Tver) region (Mednoye), the Kharkov region (the village of Pyatikhatki) and the Smolensk region (Katyn forest) confirm that there are mass graves of Polish prisoners of war who were shot in the back of the head ... A direct natural connection has been established between the lists of instructions for sending prisoners of war to the UNKVD of the Smolensk region and the order in which the corpses lay in the Katyn graves in the spring of 1943. The coincidence of both lists indicates the reliability of the identification list of 1943 (compiled by the Technical Commission of the Polish Red Cross . - M. S.), which can be considered as an evidentiary

document ... The material of the criminal case irrefutably proves the unlawful fact of killing by shooting in April - May 1940 14,522 Polish prisoners of war from the Kozelsky, Starobelsky and Ostashkovsky camps of the NKVD, as well as 7305 Poles - prisoners from prisons and camps in Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine by the NKVD officers by order of the Politburo of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b) ... ”

So, the truth triumphed. On April 13, 1990, President of the USSR M. Gorbachev handed over to President of Poland V. Jaruzelsky two folders with lists of prisoners taken from Kozelsk and Ostashkov, as well as a list of prisoners of Starobilsk. On the same day, the TASS news agency reported that the NKVD was responsible for the crime. On October 14, 1992, the chief archivist of Russia R. Pikhoya, on behalf of the President of Russia B. Yeltsin, handed over to the President of Poland in Warsaw copies of the documents of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with the decision to execute Polish prisoners of war. At the place of execution (in the Katyn forest and in Medny) memorial complexes were built, the opening of wh

multi-volume collections of documents describing in detail all aspects of the "Katyn case". The truth has prevailed. But not for long.

The triumph of truth could not be long and lasting, for it was some kind of strange, half-witted truth. There is a crime of monstrous cruelty and scale, but there is not even the most minimal punishment for the perpetrators. Of course, this applies not only to the "Katyn case", which is only a small fraction of the atrocities of the Stalinist regime.

Interrogated "as witnesses", the executioners and guards quietly went home (most of the NKVD/NKGB criminals who survived until the early 90s were not interrogated at all, even as witnesses). These criminals have violated all the commandments - divine and human. Killed, tortured, raped. The number of their victims is incalculable. Only in 1937-1938. 680 thousand people were shot, and even during the "investigation" in prisons and camps, 115 thousand people died in those two years. And did state terror begin in 1937 against its own people? And the monstrously cruel suppression of peasant uprisings in 1919-1921, and dispossession, famine, the icy hell of the Gulag, ethnic cleansing of the 30s and 40s ... And no one - neither specific people, nor criminal organizations - had anything for it. How could the surviving executioners, their physical and much more numerous spiritual heirs, react to

the wide publication of the truth about the crimes committed? Doubly. Both possible options are known today on concrete examples.

It was explained to Hitler's executioners and their heirs that killing, torturing and raping is not good. They explained, mainly, not by bright journalistic articles in newspapers, but by deed. Only in the American zone of occupation of Germany, 13 million (!!!) Germans filled out a questionnaire of 131 questions regarding their complicity in the crimes of the Nazi regime. According to the results of this "questionnaire", the Americans prosecuted almost a million (!!!) people, of whom more than 600,000 were punished - mainly in the form of a ban on public service. However, they got off with such a mild punishment

Not everyone. In total, according to the verdicts of military tribunals, 480 fascists were executed, more than 10 thousand war criminals went to prisons and labor camps. It was on this healthy soil that two generations of Germans grew up, who raised Germany from ruins, turned it into a prosperous democratic country, and at the same time everyone repents, repents and repents, everyone is looking, looking and looking - before whom else they

could atone for their guilt. In our country, the spiritual heirs of the unpunished and unrepentant executioners behaved quite differently. At first, they were limited to muffled grumbling on the topic: "There is no need to paint with one black paint the heroic, albeit difficult, period of our history." Then they grew bolder, and now, from the pages of the so-called "patriotic" newspapers, a mocking squeal began to rush that "shit rats are lying about millions of victims," and only some 700 thousand people were shot. By 2007, they got excited to the point that they publish a collection of articles under the general title "We have nothing to repent for!". That's it. Know "ours"! Let us return, however, to the Katyn, or rather, to

the new, "anti-Katyn" theme. The "anti-Katyn" campaign began, of course, not with a direct denial of too obvious facts recognized by the presidents of the USSR and Russia, but with an evil hiss in the style of "your husband is a drunkard." Any mention of Katyn began to be accompanied by a story about "tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers who died in Polish captivity in 1920-1921." The numbers were constantly growing: 20,000.40,000.60,000... Finally, on April 26, 2000, an article by

political observer Ksenia Fokina appeared in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, known for its independence, under the title "80 years of the Soviet-Polish war." That's right - not "80 years since the beginning", but "80 years of war". It turns out that ***"a large-scale offensive by Polish troops led to the capture of 130,000 (according to the most conservative estimates) Russian prisoners, about 80,000 of which later died in the camps of Jozef Pilsudski ... countries to the negative moments in the history of Soviet-Polish relations, including the victims of the war of 1919–1920.***

For a long time, this issue was generally forbidden to be covered in the press ... Meanwhile, Poland never forgot about the execution of officers of the Commonwealth near Katyn ... "

I don't know about you, but somehow it's even embarrassing for me to offer young lady Ksyusha to read the Statistical Collection entitled "Secrecy has been removed. Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Is it a

woman's thing? ***"God forbid that I meet at a ball or at a porch ride with a seminarian in a yellow shawl or with an academician in a cap ..."***. True, a political observer of any sex and age must understand that no crime in the past can justify the next crime; must know that the "old dispute of the Slavs" of Russia and Poland has, unfortunately, a centuries-old bloody history, which can neither be understood nor completed, engaging in speculative reasoning about "who started it first." But we will not engage in moralizing, but simply take off the shelf "Secrecy has been removed" (I repeat once again - prepared by official military historians of the General Staff of the Russian Federation) and see what it says about the losses of the Red Army in the Soviet-Polish war of 1920. Table 8 (pp. 28-29) "Losses of personnel of the fronts for 1920." Missing, captured: 53,805

people on the Western Front and 41,075 people on the Southwestern Front. So, not "130 thousand according to the most conservative estimates", but 95 thousand according to the most maximum estimates (not every "missing person" was captured by the enemy - there are still deserters and dead and wounded unaccounted for in the headquarters reports). How did the fate of these prisoners "in the camps of Pilsudski"? We open page 34, we read: ***"According to the information of the Mobupravlenie of the Headquarters of the Red Army, as of November 21, 1921, 75,699 people were returned from Poland. prisoners of war and from Germany - 40,986 people. internees, and in total - 116,685 soldiers of the Red Army.*** So that there is no doubt that the return of interned Red

Army soldiers from Germany is directly related to the Soviet-Polish war, the following is an explanation: ***"Part of the troops of the Western Front turned out to be interned ... In August 1920, when retreating from the Vistula region, they could not break through to the east and were forced to retreat to the territory***

***East Prussia, interned."* where were the German authorities**

So, the number

of Red Army soldiers who returned safely to their homeland turned out to be greater than the number of missing and captured? Of course, miracles do not happen. It's just that in the real conditions of the civil war, complete chaos reigned in the accounting of personnel. And the personnel were not too amenable to accounting and control. Two paragraphs above, on the same page 34, the following clarification is given: ***"On the Western Front, older servicemen, because of their unwillingness to fight, voluntarily surrendered. On the Southwestern Front, in a number of formations, "natives of the Don and Kuban, all without exception, voluntarily went over to the side of the enemy."*** After these words - a link to the archival funds of the RGVA. What accurate accounting of the number of troops can be discussed in an army that goes over to the side of the enemy in droves? With all this, the captured Red Army soldiers "in Pilsudski's camps" perished, perished by many thousands. Studies by Polish historians allow us to estimate the total number of deaths in the camps at 8-12 thousand people. And this, I must tell you, is not enough. And "little" not only in comparison with the fantastic work of Ksyusha Fokina. Small compared to the original number of prisoners and the state in which they were taken prisoner.

A long time ago, when no one had heard of the word "Katyn", N. Ostrovsky wrote an autobiographical book. "How steel was tempered" is called. And there is such a line there (for some reason it stuck in my memory back in my school years): ***"Typhus was more terrible than Polish machine guns mowed down the ranks of the army."*** And when the "Secrecy stamp removed" was in my hands, I decided to check how the writer's phrase corresponds to reality. We return to table 8 on page 28. Western Front: 6,989 people were killed, 33,171 fell ill. South-Western Front: 10,653 were killed, 23,234 fell ill. who was out of action due to illness. According to the Main Military Sanitary Directorate of the Red Army, in 1920, 1,299,859 servicemen fell ill with typhus and relapsing fever. 13% of those who contracted typhoid died. Died in medical institutions, not in "death camps"; died not because they wanted to be tortured, but

because in conditions of devastation, hunger and lack of medicines, they are not were able to save.

If about 80-90% of the Red Army soldiers who found themselves in Polish captivity in the summer of 1920 still survived, then this indicates precisely that the Polish camps were not extermination camps. For the most ardent "patriots" I hasten to read aloud p. 390, line 16 from the top: ***"After the war, 1939 thousand people returned to their homeland from the Soviet Union, and 451 thousand German soldiers and officers died in captivity."*** I hope, gentlemen, you will not argue that the Soviet camps for German prisoners of war were "death camps in which the mass and deliberate destruction of defenseless people took place"? As for the death of almost half a million German prisoners, this tragedy has a fairly clear explanation. Not only is a POW camp not a sanatorium; people who enter this camp do not enter it from a sanatorium. At best, the prisoner is hungry, exhausted, tormented by fear and despair. Often he is also sick or injured. That is why all 100% of the prisoners in the camps do not survive. Neither the Polish Army in 1920, nor the Red Army in 1943-1945. could not (and did not intend to) take a glass of milk and a skein of bandage from her wounded and give them to captured enemy soldiers. Such is the terrible truth of the war, on which it is time to stop speculating. Attempts to equate the inevitable in the anarchy of the Civil War cases of ill-treatment and unauthorized reprisals against prisoners (which cases took place in 1920 on both sides of the front!) And the cold-blooded destruction of 14.5 thousand Polish officers carried out in peacetime, according to decision of the supreme body of lawless party power, were only the first step towards the complete denial of the responsibility of the leadership of the CPSU (b) / NKVD for the tragedy in Katyn. Since the first step was judged to be nothing more than a laudable "pluralism of opinion", the following steps inevitably followed. On April 15, 2006, an article appears in the newspaper. Author - V. Cherepakhin, publicist. In this article, everything was excellent - both the content and the title: "Katyn drama in the" theater of the absurd ". theater of the absurd. More precisely and better SUCH can not be called:

“... Now in Poland, the theme of “Moscow’s guilt” in the Katyn tragedy, which allegedly played out (hereinafter, it is emphasized by me. - M.S.) in the autumn of 1940, when, according to some historians and researchers, the Soviet NKVD about 12,000 Polish officers captured by the Red Army in September 1939 were shot... The demands of the Polish side are fueled by the categorical and emotional recognition in 1990 by Mikhail Gorbachev, and a little later by Boris Yeltsin, of his country's guilt in the Katyn drama. However, as noted by the fundamental researchers of this issue, in particular Yuri Mukhin, this gesture was made on the wave of perestroika euphoria without sufficient grounds.

Many European historians are convinced that the peremptory and one-sided interpretation of this page of the war by the Poles has no solid justification ... The commission that arrived after the expulsion of the Nazis, headed by academician HH Burdenko, established ... Strong evidence of the guilt of the Nazis in organizing and carrying out the mass execution of the Poles was presented by the Soviet prosecution to the

International Nuremberg ... " Oh, well done! "What, dear, do we have a millennium in the yard?" God be with him, with the millennium - what courage is shown to the world by the publicist Cherepakhin! It is necessary to call the position enshrined in the decisions of the presidents of the two countries a "peremptory and one-sided interpretation"! Such uncompromising determination embraces our "patriotic" public in one single case - when it is already completely sure of its complete impunity. By the way, what kind of newspaper decided to publish an article in which the guilt of the exposed criminal, recognized at the highest state level, is called "the opinion of some historians"? The newspaper is called beautifully: "Red Star". Yes, yes, the same one, the main press organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Not just an official, but a super-official newspaper, the press organ of the department, which is entrusted with the "red" and all other buttons, after pressing which the next newspaper on Earth will be printed by millions in two years. The newspaper of the Ministry of Defense, unlike some homegrown "Mukhosransk-Daily", has no right to hide behind bashful reservations, such as "the opinion of the editors may not coincide with

opinion of the authors ... ". So she's not hiding! Immediately after Cherepakhin's article comes the comment "Editor's note". It is worth quoting from the first and almost to the last word: **"The**

Chief Military Prosecutor's Office of Russia refused to recognize the Poles who were shot 65 years ago in Katyn as victims of political repression ... The military prosecutor's office explains its decision by the fact that there is no evidence that the Poles who died in Katyn were convicted under the Soviet Criminal Code and therefore cannot be recognized as victims of political repression. Obviously, this is where it is worth putting an end to this story: lawyers, as you know, are guided not by emotions, but by law. After all, all of us, both in Russia and in Poland, spoke for a very long time about the need to create a state of law and the rule of law. So let's follow those rules, for the observance of which we fought so much ... " No,

we can't put an end to this. By all logic, there should be a comma here. Such a cynical mockery of the memory of the victims of lawlessness has practical meaning only as the penultimate step towards the complete denial of the fact that **"the Poles who died in Katyn"** did not die by themselves, but were shot by order of the leadership of the CPSU (b) / NKVD. And it's not that the editorial board of Krasnaya Zvezda fought long and painfully for the creation of a rule of law and the rule of law - the very argument that those who were tortured without any Criminal Code cannot be considered victims of political repression contradicts both the most minimum concepts of conscience and decency, and the Law. It would be good to know this law for those who, it turns out, "fought so much ...". Adopted on October 18, 1991, the Law "On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions" directly refers to the category of victims those who were subjected to repressions **"by decision of extrajudicial bodies: collegiums, commissions, special meetings, "twos", "triples" and other similar bodies"**. Polish prisoners of war were doomed to death (the word "sentenced" would be inappropriate here, since there was no trial with the Criminal Code) precisely and only for political reasons ("they are all **inveterate, incorrigible enemies of the Soviet regime**"), therefore their right

to be considered victims of political repression is based on both the letter and the meaning of the Rehabilitation Law.

While the memorials in Katyn, Medny and Starobelsk have not yet been demolished by a bulldozer, and the portraits of the “fundamental researcher” Mukhin have not yet compulsorily decorated school classrooms, it remains for us to take advantage of the respite and get to know the “researcher” and his creations closer. Who is this powerful old man?

Yuri Ignatievich Mukhin is not at all old yet (he was born on March 22, 1949), and the power of his writer's prolificness cannot but amaze. Within three years (from 2004 to 2006 inclusive) 17 books written (or signed?) by him with a total volume of 5822 pages were published. I apologize in advance if I could not find and fix all the creations of Yu. I. Mukhin. Here are the titles of some of his books: “Secrets of Jewish Racists”, “Why Was Stalin Killed?”, “Antiapollo. USA Lunar Scam”, “Jews about Racism”, “Corrupt Genetic Girl”, “Stalin's Assassins”... As you can see, the range of the writer's scientific interests is extremely wide – from the depths of the Cosmos to the gloomy abyss of the worldwide Jewish Masonic conspiracy. I have not read any of the above, and a rare reader will be able to bring these books to the middle of the Dnieper. In this case, I am interested in two books by Mr. Mukhin, published in 1995 and 2003, respectively. The first was called relatively modestly: “Katyn detective.” The name of the second already fully corresponded to the “wind of change” raging over Russia “rising from its knees” at the beginning of the 21st century: “Anti-Russian meanness. Investigation of the falsification of the Katyn case. In 2005, “meanness” was re-released in the second edition. It is these books that the publicist Cherepakhin, together with the editors of Krasnaya Zvezda, presents to the public as “basic research”, after which one can write and talk about “Moscow's guilt” only in

quotation marks.

Yuri Ignatievich writes very emotionally - far before him “some historians” who, in the wake of “perestroika euphoria”, babbled something about the crimes of the NKVD. Mukhin's scientific arguments pour in one after another: **“Scumbags from the Academy of Sciences”, “Junkies of the Press”, “stupid scum”, “spotted cretin”, “pig squeals**

freaks of the Polish gentry”, “the Katyn affair was started today precisely so that Poland would again become a greedy European prostitute with the stupid hope that if she sets herself up for someone, something will break off for her ...” And this is still modest . Irrefutable evidence that the testimony of the former head of the Kalinin NKVD Tokarev should not be taken into account is the following passage from Mr. Mukhin: “ ***At the end of his life, 89-year-old Major General of the KGB D.S. and Kryuchkov ...*** ” After this, is it any wonder that not only the editors of the Red Star, but also much wider circles of the so-called patriotic public enthusiastically praise the "fundamental research on the Katyn question "performed by Comrade Mukhin?

I hasten to clarify right away that the “anti-Katyn” books of Yu. Mukhin has a lot of evidence that Moscow's "guilt" in the massacre of Polish officers has not been proven in any way. He even numbered them: “proof No. 5”, “proof No. 15”, “episode No. 9”, “episode No. 109” ... There are so many of them, they are so convincing (“The government of the USSR in 1939 with the liquidation of Poland as a ***state did not agree and, therefore, the Soviet Union had no reason to liquidate the officers of the army of this state ... The Politburo had no state power, it had power only over the communists ... The execution somewhere in the forest or in prison of large groups of unknown people would have caused such rumors and people's dissatisfaction with the authorities, that not only the NKVD and the prosecutor of the region, but also the party elite would immediately lose their heads ... Never, even in difficult times, in the USSR, the legal form of holding a trial of people was not violated. There was no need for this. In the presence of emergency situations in the USSR “troikas” in the regions and republics could, in an absolutely legal manner, secretly shoot anyone and in any quantity ...***”) that a continuous stream of these mocking nonsense has an absolutely magical effect on other readers. This is how the monotonous beats of the tambourine and the incoherent cries of the shaman put the primitive savages into a trance.

If you try to reduce the cries of Yu. I. Mukhin into a certain system, you get something like the following. All documents found in the archives are forged. The experts who recognized these documents as authentic were bribed. Politicians who believe in these "fakes" are idiots and enemies of Russia at the same time. The slandered defendant (the leadership of the CPSU (b) / NKVD) never committed such crimes, therefore even suspicions of his guilt are vile "anti-Russian meanness." Poland and the Poles are sheer evil (a third of the book is devoted to this topic in "meanness!"), but the humanism of Stalin and Co. was so great that even with such "wrecking" Poland they treated too gently (at the end of the book, Mukhin writes: ***"It would not be for the Germans to do this! It would not be out of place for the captured Polish officers to be shot by the executioners of the NKVD on Stalin's orders from good old revolvers."***)

The most surprising (and very shameful) thing in this whole story is that "fundamental research", built on such methodological foundations (and written in such an eloquent style!), became the subject of public discussion. The reader, far from all this disgrace, will probably be quite surprised when he finds on Internet forums a megaton of words devoted to the discussion of Mukhin's "discovery", and calls to award the "patriot researcher" with the Order of the Hero of Russia. It's funny and at the same time sad to watch how the initially sane people, who find themselves in this atmosphere of delirium, begin to mutter in confusion: "M-m-maybe there is something e-e-e-e in this ch-ch-ch-is it?"

No, my friends, there is nothing in this, except for immense impudence and masterful (this I am ready to admit) use of the long-known methods of "psychological warfare". It works. Tested on many clients. For example, try to prove to me that Gagarin was in space. Go? I can repeat the rules of the game once again: all documents were forged, all witnesses were bribed, there was nothing before and nothing after (neither launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nor flights of international crews to the ISS). Well, and how will you prove to me that the "flight of Gagarin" was in reality? TASS message? Funny. Newsreel? Well, what can be seen in this newsreel? There is a large rocket, "soaring" with liquid oxygen boiling in tanks; the artist, disguised as Gagarin, is climbing somewhere ... What are you

will you prove that he later did not get out from where he climbed, and the rocket started without a person?

How can you prove that the rocket did not explode when entering orbit? Who and how could see this orbital flight, if it was reported only after the alleged "landing"? A? Look into the eyes, s-s-bitch! How can you prove it ... And this affects the weak brains of domestic "educators", and they begin, trembling and confused in words, to prove that Stalin signed sometimes from left to bottom to right, and sometimes from left to top to right ...

My friends, remember the main thing - no one is obliged to look Mukhin in the eye and prove to him his "non-camel". There are state archives that have accepted documents for storage. There are forensic experts who conducted a handwriting examination. Dot. The opinion of the metallurgical engineer Yu. I. Mukhin (who did not spend a single day in the archive and did not hold in his hands the originals of the documents he rejected) about what Stalin's real signature should look like is of no interest to anyone. Forgery of documents stored in the state archive is a criminal offense.

No less serious crime is the falsification of the results of the examination of documents. The burden of proving the guilt of the suspect lies with the accuser. If Mr. Mukhin and the "Katino-patriots" who joined him have suspicions, they can put a hat around, raise money (fortunately, Russia is now swelling with petrodollars) and invite other, qualified and authoritative experts. Preferably from countries that are not connected with the centuries-old Polish-Russian showdowns - from Brazil, Switzerland, Norway ... And now, if the results of the re-examination show grounds for initiating a criminal case, go to court. You can also write a book. But first - an independent professional expertise, and protest howls (if you really can't do without them) -

Then.

Having written almost a thousand pages, Yu. I. Mukhin "proved" that the evidence of Stalin's guilt in the murder of captured Polish officers was untenable. Mukhin's opponents obediently followed him into a hopeless dead end of endless verbiage about where and how business numbers should be, at what angle to the text

Voroshilov signed, whether in original documents the name Kobulov could be written through the letter "a" and so on. Of course, we will go the other way. We will go in a

completely different way. We will not even discuss the evidence of Stalin's guilt. We will try - with one hundredth of the captiousness that Mr. Mukhin shows - to find some evidence of Hitler's guilt. Yes, Hitler was the greatest villain, guilty of horrendous crimes. This is a hundred times true, but even this truth is not grounds for imputing to him the death of people from an earthquake that happened 200 years before his birth. No matter how fanatic Hitler was, his guilt in the murder of Polish officers captured by the Red Army needs to be proven. What does this have to do with the "Katyn detective"? The most direct. This "detective" is special. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that the list of possible perpetrators of the crime consists of exactly two names.

Or Stalin, or Hitler (of course, under these names we only personify, for simplicity of presentation, two totalitarian terrorist regimes). The third suspect can only be aliens, but Mukhin has not yet written anything about this, therefore, the topic of Martians is not yet topical. The arrested Polish officers were in heavily guarded NKVD camps. In 1940, on the territory of the Soviet Union, there were no illegal armed formations of such strength that could beat off prisoners, take them from three different camps to Katyn and secretly shoot them there. Another armed force appeared on the territory of the USSR only on June 22, 1941. Only there and only when, where and when the German troops appeared, the execution of Polish prisoners of war could theoretically be carried out not by Stalin, but by Hitler. Everything in the "Katyn detective" is simple. Extremely simple. So simple that it becomes strange - what were so many words spent on?

Copper. This word immediately closes the whole discussion. There were no Germans in the village of Mednoye. Not one day, not one hour. There were no Germans in Medny, and the mass grave of the executed Poles -

There is.

Hitler could have killed (and actually killed) hundreds of thousands of Poles. Hitler could change into the uniform of the Polish police killed people from other countries and peoples (if you remember - the world war began with corpses dressed in Polish military uniforms at the radio station in Gleiwitz). Hitler could have committed a great many other crimes, but he could not bury the corpses of those executed in Medny. In relation to the execution of those who are buried in Medny, the villain Hitler has an iron, undeniable, impenetrable ALIBI. If it was not Hitler who killed the Polish policemen held in the Ostashkov camp, then Stalin killed them. There is no third. The burial was

discovered exactly in the place that the former head of the Kalinin NKVD, who personally supervised the execution of the prisoners of the Ostashkov camp, D.S. Tokarev, named in his testimony. This, in particular, means that ***“at the end of his life, the 89-year-old Major General of the KGB”*** did something completely different from what Mr. Mukhin, who has lost his last shame, writes about. On the threshold of the meeting with the Supreme Judge, General Tokarev did not take on another sin, the sin of perjury, and gave quite truthful testimony about the circumstances of the crime he had committed.

The exhumation of the burial in Medny began (with the participation of Polish experts and the Polish ambassador to the USSR) on August 15, 1991. By a strange twist of fate, just a week before the dissolution of the CPSU. But then no one knew about it yet, but on August 19, on the first day of the GKChP coup, ***“officials of the KGB of the USSR in the Tver region had a certain negative impact and pressure on the joint Soviet-Polish investigative and expert group to immediately stop the exhumation work that had begun and departure of a military unit from the territory”*** (I quote from a memorandum filed on September 3, 1991 by the leadership of the GVP addressed to Gorbachev). On August 19, the Tver “chekists” became so bold that they announced that they did not guarantee ***“ensuring the security of the stay of the Polish prosecution and expert group in the city of Tver and n. Mednoe village.”*** However, Yanaev, Kryuchkov and Co., as you know, were not up to par, the putsch failed, and work in Medny continued. During several years of painstaking work, it was possible to discover and identify the remains of 2,000 executed Polish policemen. That it was not possible to find everyone is not surprising, considering

the past six decades since the execution and the construction of dachas. Yes, yes. At the end of the 1940s, on the site of mass executions near Medny, 12 country cottages were built for the leadership of the Kalinin MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as a "special hotel" for the MGB. Songs and dances took place on the bones of the executed. In the literal sense of the word. And nothing but a morning hangover happened to any of the Chekists. Nails would be made from these "people" ...

In the Kharkov region, including in the area of the village of Pyatikhatki (now this place is called the "6th quarter of the forest-park zone of Kharkov"), there were German troops. In other words, a suspected criminal (Hitler) was spotted at the mass grave of Polish officers from the Starobilsk camp. However, in order to commit this crime, the suspect had to meet with the victim. Could the captured Polish officers, imprisoned in the Starobelsk camp, meet with German troops near Kharkov?

Paradoxically, the suspected Stalin and his defender Mukhin unanimously assert that such a meeting could not have happened. According to Stalin-Mukhin's version (voiced, in particular, at the Nuremberg trials), in the spring of 1940, captured Polish officers were suddenly deprived of the right to correspond with their relatives, secretly taken out of the Starobelsky (as well as Ostashkovsky and Kozelsky) camps and sent to road construction work near Smolensk. In such a situation, the prisoners of the Starobilsk camp could not meet with the Germans in Kharkov. However, during the first exhumation (July 25 - August 9, 1991) in the 6th quarter of the forest park zone of Kharkov, the remains of 167 executed Polish officers were found, fragments of Polish military uniforms, personal belongings and documents of the victims were found. These sad findings cannot yet serve as final proof of the guilt of the suspected Stalin - the Germans could theoretically carry out the execution in Kharkov - but the fact that the suspect blatantly lied, and even tried to mislead the International Tribunal in Nuremberg, becomes completely obvious.

Mukhin gets out of this predicament, guided by the saving rule: "silence is golden." For hundreds of pages, he rants about clerical

differences between the "investigative file" and the "accounting file", with a learned look of a connoisseur examines the slope of the signatures, but about the disappearance without a trace (there are no letters from prisoners since the spring of 1940, they are not in the Katyn graves, they are not alive either) 4 thousand prisoners The "fundamental researcher" mentioned officers from the Starobelsk camp only twice. In his first book in 1995, Mukhin dropped the phrase that during the exhumation **"the remains of buried criminals who died in the camps of German prisoners of war and died of wounds in the hospitals of Soviet soldiers were found in the cemeteries of Kharkov."** Not a word about Polish officers. And since when did an abandoned (moreover, deliberately disguised) pit in the forest begin to be called a "cemetery", where "the dead from wounds in the hospitals of Soviet soldiers" are buried? In the "meanness" published in 2003, Mukhin went further. In full accordance with the title of the book, he admits with a mocking laugh that near Kharkov **"several dozens of shot skulls were dug up ..."**.

Denying the fact of the mass burial of Polish officers near Kharkov, Stalin and Mukhin deprived themselves of the opportunity to shift the blame for this crime on Hitler. But this is by no means a random mistake. They would hardly have succeeded in proving Hitler's guilt in this crime. Why? To answer this question, please look at the date that I asked you to underline with three bold lines above. On July 30, 1941, the Soviet-Polish Protocol was signed, according to which "all Polish citizens now imprisoned on Soviet territory" were to be released. On August 12, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on amnesty for Polish citizens was issued. And when the Germans occupied Kharkov? 24 October 1941 24 October Almost three months after the signing of the Soviet-Polish Protocol and a month after the Kyiv catastrophe (the encirclement and defeat of half a million Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Dnieper near Kiev). But that's not all. One of the mobilization points was located in the Starobilsk camp, in which the Soviet-

Polish conscription commissions worked (as was stipulated by the intergovernmental agreement) in the formation of the Polish army on the territory of the USSR. From all this it follows that Stalin had to

either fulfill his obligations and release the Polish officers from the Starobilsk camp, or - if he really needed these officers for some special secret business - take them out of Starobilsk to the remote Siberian taiga. Stalin was a famous deceiver, but he was never an idiot. It can be assumed that Stalin deceived the Polish government and did not release the Polish officers, but how could they then be left in the frontline zone, and even next to the recruiting center of the Polish army? There was plenty of time for the evacuation of prisoners - even after the defeat of the Southwestern Front near Kiev, the Germans walked from the Dnieper to Kharkov for a whole month.

Can we believe in such a development of events? It's hard to believe this, but let's assume for a second that it was in this fantastic way that 4,000 Polish officers ended up in the hands of the Germans. Where, in this case, are the documents of the official investigation? Where is the verdict of the military tribunal in the case of the commanders of the NKVD escort troops, through whose fault especially important (and for some special need Stalin needed) "criminals" ended up in the hands of the enemy? Finally, what are the Germans doing, given such a stunning opportunity to drive a wedge into the emerging anti-Hitler coalition? Instead of presenting to the whole world the fact of Stalin's two-faced game, they secretly (???) shoot Polish officers and never remember this again. They do not remember even at a time when an international scandal around the burial in Katyn is being promoted. Yes, the suspected Hitler in relation to the murder of captured

Polish officers from the Starobilsk camp does not have such an absolute alibi as he has in relation to the crime in Medny. But the totality of known facts allows us to say with a probability of 99.999% that Hitler had nothing to do with the mass execution near Kharkov. Moreover, he never even knew about this event. And this means that the killer is Stalin. The undeniable guilt of Stalin in the murder of the Polish prisoners of the Ostashkovsky and Starobelsky camps allows

us to draw a number of legally significant conclusions. First, Moscow's guilt in the murder of Polish officers - even assuming that the execution at Katyn was the work of Hitler - has already been proven. Killing 10 thousand

of unarmed people no less than the murder of 14.5 thousand can be recognized as a crime to which ***“there is every reason to apply clause “b” of Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, which classifies violations of the laws or customs of war as war crimes, in particular - killing or torturing prisoners of war”*** (I quote the Conclusion of the Commission of Experts of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation).

Secondly, the authenticity of the documents found in the archives (Beria's letter, the decision of the Politburo) is confirmed, and it is confirmed not by examining signatures and paper fibers under a microscope (after all, with the desire and money, any paper can be forged), but by the real fact of execution of precisely those decisions that are recorded in the documents of the leadership of the CPSU (b) / NKVD.

Thirdly, we are convinced that the suspected Stalin is constantly lying. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1941, the Poles overcame Stalin with questions about where the captured officers had gone. All this time, Stalin lied in their eyes, played modest amateur performances (in the presence of the Polish ambassador, he called somewhere on the phone and, having received an “answer” from the handset, explained that everyone had long been released and was simply hiding from being drafted into the army); once, in all seriousness, he suggested looking for “runaway Polish officers” in ... Manchuria. At the same time, Stalin knew for certain that the remains of the executed officers and policemen should not be looked for in Manchuria, but in the place of secret burial places of the NKVD in Pyatikhatki and Medny. Even if you believe for a second the version that the prisoners of the Kozelsky camp were sent to road construction work near Smolensk, where they were abandoned by guards in July 41, then Stalin could have told the representatives of the Polish government this “truth”, and not mocking stories about Manchuria. Such behavior of the suspect in any court will be regarded as circumstantial evidence of his guilt.

Fourthly, the strange, at first glance, line of conduct of the Burdenko Commission and the Soviet prosecutors at the Nuremberg Tribunal becomes clear. The Soviet side stubbornly insists that 11,000 Polish prisoners of war were shot at Katyn, but at the same time makes no effort to ensure that

to discover their remains, and stops exhumation work after the discovery of 925 bodies of those killed. In the almost two years that passed from the moment of the liberation of Smolensk to the hearing of the "Katyn case" in Nuremberg, it was possible to turn the entire Katyn forest upside down. However, the "NKVD commission" (this is how the Burdenko commission should be called in fact) does nothing of the kind, since it knows for certain that, apart from the remains of 4.5 thousand prisoners of the Kozelsky camp shot in Katyn, there are no other corpses in Polish military uniforms, with Polish orders and insignia, with letters and documents in Polish cannot be found. Therefore, in Nuremberg, Soviet prosecutors and "witnesses" simply and unpretentiously

lie. We now turn to the third event of the crime, to the execution in the Katyn forest. The suspected Hitler is accused of committing two crimes: the murder of captured Polish officers captured by the German army in the Smolensk region in July 1941, and in organizing an international provocation in April 1943. Theoretically, the suspect could have committed both of these crimes. The Stalin-Mukhin Brigade had at its disposal the military archives of defeated Germany, hundreds of thousands of captured Wehrmacht and SS officers, the status of a victorious country legally occupying part of Germany, and 60 years of time to search for evidence of Hitler's guilt. And what did she find?

However, searches in German archives and interrogation of German suspects can only be the second stage of the investigation. At first, it is necessary to find out how and under what circumstances 4.5 thousand Polish prisoners of war, allegedly placed in three "special purpose camps" with caricature-absurd fictitious names (No. 1-OH, No. 2-OH and No. 3-OH), ended up in the clutches of the Nazis? Where were the specially checked guards of these "special purpose camps", why did she shamefully abandon the contingent entrusted to her? Mr. Mukhin solves this issue with enviable ease. Tearing his shirt on his chest with a crack, he begins to scream heart-rendingly: **"Because**

the damned German 2nd Army with the 2nd Panzer Group, having launched an offensive on July 10, 200 km from Smolensk, on July 16 already took it from the south, and no one can stop it couldn't. And the no less damned German 9th Army with the 3rd Panzer Group,

at that time she took Dukhovshchina and fought for Yartsevo - a railway station east of Smolensk ... "

I am ready to immediately agree that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and all other armies of the Wehrmacht must be damned forever and ever. But for the investigation of the crime, these cries alone will not be enough. First you need to find out what the heads of the NKVD Prison Department and the NKVD Convoy Troops Department were supposed to do and what they really did in a situation where "one damned German army is on the right, the other is on the left ...". In vain, very in vain, the "Mukhin-Stalin brigade" hoped that the secret reports of the Prison Department of the NKVD on the progress and results of the "evacuation of prisons" would never be made public :

In the camp, the prisoners were taken back to the exercise yard and from all the prisoners 14 people were selected who were convicted by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 06/26/40 (these are those who were more than an hour late for work. - M. S.), ***30 people convicted under domestic articles of the Criminal Code, and 40 young people.***

Ukazniks and bytoviki in the amount of 44 people were released,

and the youngsters were placed back in their cells. After the selection of 84 of these prisoners, the head of the 2nd department of the UNKGB comrade. Goncharov, an employee of the UNKGB Dvorkin, Head. The prison department of the UNKVD comrade.

Stan, with the participation of other employees of the NKGB and the NKVD, about 2,000 prisoners who remained in the exercise yard were shot. All accounting material and personal files of prisoners were b

Tov. Klimov gave an order by phone - if it is impossible to evacuate the intended contingent of the ZKk to be sent, destroy it, and release the rest of the prisoners ... at 20.00 I started to fulfill the order of the deputy. head of the UNKVD for the destruction of the ZK for k-p. Art. (counter-revolutionary articles. - M.S.), but since the enemy occupied Art. Dubno continued to advance on the city, [to destroy] all the ZKs that were to be destroyed, there were about 60-70 people left closed in the cells. At 10:30 p.m. With

the rest of the personnel had to leave the prison and go to Rivne...

2464 people left the prisons of the Lviv region in the 1st category, 808 prisoners were released, 201 defectors and

left in prisons 1546, mainly accused of domestic crimes ... All the prisoners who died in the 1st category were buried in pits dug in the cellars of prisons, and in the mountains. Zlochev - in the garden ... As of

June 22, 1790 people were kept in the prison in Tarnopol. prisoners. Of this number, 560 people. lost in category 1. The burial was made in pits dug specially for this purpose, however, some 197 people. buried in the basement of the NKGB, very shallowly buried, the operation was carried out by the beginning. UNKGB... From 3

prisons in Stanislav, Kolomyia, Pechenezhin, 1376 people were transported by wagons. According to the 1st category, 1000 people left. According to the statement of of the prison of Stanislav comrade Gritsenko, the burial was carried out outside the prison in a pit dug for this purpose. A part of the 1st category was buried on the territory of the prison in a

As of 28/V1-s/g, 376 people were kept in the prison in Berezhany. prisoners, 174 people died in the 1st category. The burial was made at the location of the military unit (old fortress).

Of the total number of those who left in the 1st category, 20 people remained in the basement of the prison, who did not have time to be taken out, since the beginning. Maksimov, the regional department of the NKGB, categorically

refused to provide vehicles for the removal of corpses ... " The shortcomings in the work shown during the evacuation of the prison in Berezhany were reflected in several long and tedious explanatory notes:

"... Cars in the count. 2 pieces were only presented at 21:30. On June 29, 1941, and at 10 pm, Berezhany was subjected to intensive bombardment, and the authorities left the city. Beginning NKGB comrade Maksimov left his cars, left on foot, by this time 40 corpses were loaded in 2 cars in the prison, and I gave the order to take them to the prepared pit. Not reaching the pit 400 m, the cars came under heavy bombardment and a pool. shelling. A radiator was broken in one car, one guard was slightly wounded, the cars were abandoned 400 meters from the pit, it was impossible to stay in the city, we went out of the city and from there I was sent for cars with the corpses of the beginning. prisons comrade. Krasan and opera. upl. Litvin, in order to throw corpses into the pit and take 20 corpses from the basement of the prison, also take them to the same pit. Beginning prisons comrade. Krasan of my or

fulfilled, did not bring the corpses into the pit, but threw them into the river under the bridge and did not take out 20 corpses from the basement, reporting to me that this was

impossible due to the heavy bombardment ... "This is the first week of the war in the western regions of Ukraine . Yes, there is confusion, fuss, conflicting orders, mutual reproaches of the heads of the NKVD and the NKGB. But what is not even in sight is the disappearance of several thousand ZK along the k.r. st. All were counted, for the most part they were shot, the places of the murders were disguised as far as possible. Where the enemy practically did not advance in the first week (a section of the then Soviet-Hungarian border near the city of Stanislav, now Ivano-Frankivsk), a significant part of the prisoners were not "evacuated according to the 1st category", but were taken alive into the interior of the country. In the future, after the state-punitive machine came to its senses after the shock of the first days of the war, the procedure for evacuating prisons begins to fall within the framework of strict directive instructions:

"... 7. Only untried prisoners are subject to removal to the rear, in respect of which further investigation is necessary to reveal sabotage, espionage and terrorist organizations and agents of the enemy. 2.

Women with children with them, pregnant women

and minors, with the exception of saboteurs, spies, bandits, etc. especially dangerous (that is, Soviet legality, which Mukhin so praises, suggested the possibility of the existence of especially dangerous pregnant and minor "saboteurs" . - M. S.), - to release.

3. All those convicted under the Decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of June 26, as well as those convicted of domestic, official and other minor crimes ... to be used in an organized manner at work of a defensive nature at the direction of the military command, with early release at the time of evacuation of the

prison guards. 4. To all other prisoners (including deserters) apply VMN - execution ... "

And now, overcoming natural disgust, let's try to read what Mr. Mukhin writes about the circumstances of the disappearance

Polish prisoners of war:

"... the prisoners rebelled and decided to change the forced labor camp in the USSR to a prisoner of war camp with civilized

Germans ... Only a few people, Jews by nationality, left with the convoy, the rest remained to wait for "treatment in accordance with accepted international standards." So we waited..."

There it is: the prisoners of the "special purpose camps" rebelled, and the convoy shyly lowered his eyes and, apologizing for the inconvenience caused earlier, left. With songs and Jews. By the way, where are they? Where are these most important witnesses - the only ones who could confirm the existence of the mythical "No. 1-OH, No. 2-OH ...". Why at the Nuremberg Trials, a Smolensk servant of the occupiers and a professor from Bulgaria acted as "witnesses for the prosecution", and not these mysterious ***"several people, Jews by nationality"***? And why did the "Mukhin-Stalin brigade" for 60 years never find any documents in their own Soviet archives, no official correspondence on the absolutely incredible fact of leaving several thousand foreign prisoners to the enemy? A whole scandal arose over the abandonment of 20 undisguised corpses of unfortunate Ukrainian peasants who were shot in the town of Berezhany, and 4.5 thousand (or even 11 thousand - according to Mukhin - Stalin) Polish officers were left to the Germans just like that? And no one was even reprimanded for this?

Absurd in itself, the story about the "special purpose camp", leaving which was easier than escaping to the river from the pioneer camp, becomes completely senile if you "impose" it on Mukhin's version (comrade Stalin and the Burdenko commission did not think of this) about the reason for the appearance of these same "OH".

There is a fact, obvious and indisputable - since the spring of 1940, relatives of captured Polish officers stopped receiving letters from them. This fact has a simple explanation - it was at this time that the prisoners were shot. The dead don't write. Such an explanation, of course, did not suit Soviet propaganda, but it could not think of anything else, and therefore the fact of the termination of correspondence was simply passed over in silence. Mukhin tried to become a greater Stalinist than Comrade Stalin himself, and invented the following mockingly stupid story. It was too expensive to feed the captured officers for nothing (***"the Soviet Union had a burden in the form of 9,000 healthy, evil men who were of no use"***

they didn't bring, but who needed to be fed for who knows how long”), so they were sent ... no, not to their families, but to road construction work. But - the timid and shy Stalin was embarrassed to admit that Polish officers were working in Soviet captivity. He did not hesitate to break the non-aggression pact with Poland unilaterally. He did not hesitate in front of the whole world to sign an agreement with Hitler on the liquidation of the Polish state and the division of its territory (“Treaty of Friendship and Borders”), did not hesitate to call Poland “the ugly brainchild of the Treaty of Versailles” through Molotov’s lips, did not hesitate to keep “prisoners” undeclared in the camps war more than a year after the end of this war - but to report that the officers are working with a shovel and a sledgehammer - he was shy (***“to admit that the captured officers were sent to labor camps, it was impossible for the Soviet government in peacetime, and even more so during the war ”***). All this nonsense was

invented by Mukhin only in order to utter the following, even greater stupidity: ***“What should this automatically lead to? Of course, to the deprivation of their right to correspondence - they should not have told anyone about their conviction.*** The prison was invented long before writing, but since people learned to read and write, prisoners' letters have been censored. The order is known - in the camps, Polish prisoners of war handed over their letters to the administration in open envelopes so that the censor did not even have to spend an extra minute printing them out. “Of course,” it was enough to explain to the Poles once that a letter with the slightest mention of work at a construction site would immediately be thrown into the stove, and the “great secret of Stalin” invented by Mukhin would be safely preserved. In the end, for both the prisoner and his family, it was not so much the content that was important, but the very fact of receiving the letter: if he writes, then he is still alive. So, combining both delusional versions of Mukhin, we come to the conclusion that it ***was impossible for the Soviet government to allow the disclosure of the secrets of the work of prisoners “in peacetime, and even more so during the war”***, but it was during the war that 11 thousand Polish officers were freely left to the enemy as living witnesses - with shovels and a pick in their hands ...

Incredible, contrary to the actual practice of evacuating prisons, not confirmed by any document, not a single witness, the fiction that the captured Polish officers in full force were left by the NKVD escort and in the same full complement, without a single survivor, fell into the hands of the Germans, makes strictly speaking, further discussion is superfluous. That doesn't happen. There was no

"front line" in the generally accepted meaning of these words in the middle of July in the Smolensk region. There were several tank and motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht, which approached Smolensk, Yelna and Yartsevo from different sides, breaking away from their infantry by 100–200 km. On July 21, the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops began, during which five army operational groups launched strikes from the areas of Bely, Yartsevo and Roslavl in converging directions to Smolensk in order to release the troops of the 16th and 20th armies surrounded northeast of Smolensk. The fierce Smolensk battle continued until August 5 (as the commander of Army Group Center believed) or even until September 10 (as Soviet military historians write). In this chaos of strikes and counterattacks, in the theater of operations, which was a "multi-layered pie" of the defense lines of the German and Soviet troops, at least part of the Polish officers had the opportunity to either withdraw to the east, or, on the contrary, to withdraw to the west, into Belarus, where there were numerous villages and towns with a predominantly Polish population.

However, not a single (!!!) living person who was a participant or witness of the wanderings of a crowd of thousands in Polish military uniforms through the forests and roads of the Smolensk region has ever been found. No one. Nevertheless, suppose the impossible is possible and consider hypothetical options for the suspected Hitler. According to sound logic, the

suspected Hitler should have used the Polish officers who fell into his hands for his own benefit. Among several thousand people there are always those whom the threat of death, deceit or bribery can be persuaded to cooperate. This is exactly how - and nothing else - Hitler used crowds of thousands of captured Red Army soldiers. Someone was recruited into sabotage and reconnaissance units, someone was sent to work in the rear, repair and construction,

transport units of the Wehrmacht, someone was forced to sign leaflets with stories about a free and satisfying life in German captivity ... All the rest were driven to huge meadows surrounded by barbed wire, where they starved and dysentery. The treatment of prisoners was extremely cruel - but there were no mass, thousands of executions. And even more so, mass executions were not carried out in such a long and laborious way as a shot in the back of the head for each of the doomed. If you believe the "Mukhin-Stalin brigade", then the suspect Hitler acted with the Polish officers in the most non-standard way: he secretly shot and secretly buried, without making any attempt to use them for propaganda, military, intelligence purposes. Could this be? This cannot be, but once again we will believe in the impossible, which means we will

once again ask the inevitable questions: where are the witnesses? where are the documents? where are the orders? where are the names, titles and positions of executioners? Of course, there was no humanity in the Wehrmacht and the SS, but there was order. It is known that after the mass executions of the Jewish population, accurate summaries of the cartridges used and the gasoline used to transport the victims and corpses were compiled. Something, but the accuracy and discipline of the Germans do not need to be taught. And what answers to these obvious questions did the "Mukhin-Stalin brigade" find in 60 years in captured German archives, in the protocols of interrogation of captured officers of the Wehrmacht and the SS? Alas, nothing fresher and smarter than the story about Lieutenant Ahrens and the 537th "sapper regiment", which later turned into a communications regiment with the same number, exposed during the Nuremberg trials, has not been presented.

There is hardly a court that, after such a heap of absurdities and absurdities in the position of the prosecution, does not release the accused right in the courtroom. Nothing but a clear desire to confuse the investigation and a hidden intention to shield the true killer, "Prosecutor Mukhin" did not present.

As doubtful as the guilt of the suspected Hitler in the murder of Polish officers is, it is equally obvious and indisputable that it was the Germans (and not the suspected Stalin!) who raised the huge international scandal surrounding the burial in the Katyn Forest. In April 1943, the Germans were taking to the open graves in Katyn

everyone they could bring in: Red Cross experts, journalists from all over the world, Polish prisoners of war, Catholic priests, Wehrmacht soldiers ... It turns out that the suspect Hitler tried his best to convince the whole world that the murder actually happened. Such a strange behavior of the killer according to Mukhin - Stalin is explained by the fact that, having committed one crime (the murder of Polish prisoners of war), Hitler decided to commit the next crime - to slander the innocent Stalin. Immediately a private, not of fundamental importance, but still an interesting question

arises - why did the suspect Hitler take so long to carry out his dastardly plan? Why did the Germans, who, according to Mukhin-Stalin's version, themselves shot the Polish officers, raised a grandiose fuss around the burial in the Katyn Forest only in the spring of 1943, i.e. after the withdrawal of the Polish army (known as the "Anders army") from the territory of the USSR? As of March 1, 1942, the Polish army, formed in the USSR, numbered 60 thousand people, six infantry divisions; four more infantry divisions, tank and cavalry regiments, and an artillery brigade were in the formation stage. Agree that, given the hot (and often reckless) Polish character, the publication in the spring of 1942 of the fact of the mass murder of Polish officers opened absolutely amazing opportunities for Hitler ... But for some reason he missed them.

The wise Mukhin understands that this question exists, therefore he gives an answer to it, which he calls without a shadow of embarrassment "proof No. 6 of Stalin's version." I'm sorry, but it sounds like this: ***"We must understand the following. The Germans shot the Poles in autumn and winter*** (the Burdenko commission, on the basis of the testimony of "witnesses", irrefutably "set" the time of execution as August-September, but Mukhin needs "autumn-winter" to explain the presence of warm clothes on the corpses of the executed. - M. S.) , ***that is, the corpses cooled already in the frosty air, were thrown into frozen graves and covered with frozen earth. They were like in the morgue. It was impossible to dig them out in the spring of 1942, they were not yet touched by decay. There is no other explanation."***

Evaluate the persistence with which Mr. Mukhin conducts his ritual session: **"We must understand ... There is no other explanation ..."** There is another explanation. In the spring of 1942, the Germans had no idea that there was a mass grave of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest. That's all. The simplest explanation. As for "decay" ... Dear reader, in the preface I promised you "a simple and cheerful book." In this chapter, I have already had to go beyond all the limits of simplicity and gaiety. Now (and it will be even worse in the future) our conversation has come to a discussion of such circumstances of the case, which are beyond the bounds of what is acceptable in secular conversations. I have to warn you about this; if you don't like it, you can skip to the next chapter right away. In principle, you already know everything important about the so-called "Katyn issue" ... Of course, I do not pretend to be a professional pathologist. However, even from a school chemistry course, it should be clear that the rate of what is called "putrefactive decay"

depends on temperature and oxygen supply. In a powerful freezer, the meat of a slaughtered cow lies "without decay" for several months (or even years). What will happen to the meat in the summer sun? I cannot give exact figures for the required temperature and humidity, but in general it is clear that by placing the corpses of the executed in a warm (or hot) room, the Germans could get any necessary degree of "decay" by the spring of 1942, after which they could bury the half-decomposed the remains in the ground and start propaganda

campaign.

Now we are moving from fortune-telling to a discussion of what really happened. The corpses found and examined by the Polish Red Cross and the international commission of experts were dressed in warm clothes. The Danish doctor X. Transsen (a member of the Resistance movement who spent the last year of the war, from July 1944 to May 1945, in a German concentration camp) draws attention to another important detail: **"As a specialist in the field of forensic medicine, I immediately rushed in the eyes, the absence of primaris cadaverosis, that is, the initial decomposition of the corpse immediately after the murder. There were no traces of flies, worms, no insects at all among the bodies - nothing indicating that it was warm at the time of burial.** More than 3 thousand various papers were found on the corpses, but none

one letter, a fragment of a newspaper, a receipt, a certificate with a date later than April - May 1940 was not found. It was these circumstances that immediately led all the participants in the exhumation to the assumption that the execution took place in the spring of 1940, that is, more than a year before the appearance of

German troops in the Smolensk region. This is a fact. This fact becomes another proof that the villain, scoundrel and cannibal Hitler has an obvious alibi in relation to the crime committed in Katyn. The Burdenko Commission and the Soviet side of the prosecution at the Nuremberg trials either simply ignored this fact, or indiscriminately declared all the participants in the exhumation "accomplices in the vile crime of the Nazis."

Mukhin, even in this episode, is trying to become a greater Stalinist than Stalin himself. Therefore, on dozens of pages, he insistently, with repeated repetitions, with hysterical cries (***"did Goebbels' henchmen dig up the graves of the Poles before showing them to the commissions, sorted documents, or will you assure the whole world of the honesty of Hitler's scum?"***) asserts, conjures and assures: the Germans PREPARED the corpses of the Polish officers shot by them for display. According to Mukhin, two months (February - March 1943) before the arrival of the Polish and international commissions of experts, the Germans opened the graves, searched the corpses, seized all the documents with dates later than April - May 1940, then buried them again, tamped (Mr. Mr. Mukhin even gives a calculation of the time and technology for carrying out the earthworks necessary for this) and only after the

completion of the preparation they raised a cry to the whole world. Is it possible? Of course available. There is nothing contradicting the fundamental laws of conservation of matter and energy in Mukhin's version. If there is a desire and resources, anything can be done. It only remains for us to

assess as accurately as possible - what exactly was to be done?
"... Local workers descend into the pits where the dead are buried and separate the remains, and often they have to be torn apart - the layers of corpses are so flattened and compressed. The uniforms, of course, were caked, stuck together, faded. Unbuttoning the buttons is out of the question. Knives let in. To get everything that a person

pockets, pockets and even the tops of boots are cut ... ” (Yu. Matskevich).

“...Documents, in the state they were on the corpses, were thoroughly cleaned of dirt, grease and rot with wooden sticks...” (K. Skarzhinsky).

“... There was no doubt that no one shifted the corpses. The top layers fit snugly against the bottom. I will not go into explanations of the chemical processes that should have already taken place by that time, causing these layers to stick together. The picture clearly testified that the corpses had been lying here for several years ... ” (I. Bartoshevsky). “... It

was obvious that the remains had lain together in the graves for many months. The corpses lay close to each other and were so compressed that it took great effort to separate them ... All the uniforms, all the underwear and all the shoes were clearly the right size, and they fit the bodies so tightly that, in my opinion, these uniforms should be taken off, and then dress the corpses again, it would not only be difficult, but simply impossible ... The dried brain mass was located in such a way that it was clear that the body had not been moved or turned over for at least two years, and quite likely much longer ... ” (X. Transen).

It looked like what was exhumed in April 1943. Consequently, the Germans, if they were actually engaged in the “preparation” of the corpses of the Polish officers they had shot, were required to carefully separate the stuck together mess of bodies, unbutton the buttons on the decayed clothes with jeweler accuracy, remove the boots from the half-decomposed corpses, remove all the papers, clean them ***“from dirt, grease and rot”***, to select and destroy all evidence that by the beginning of the summer of 1941 the dead were still alive, to stain the documents left “for display” again in cadaveric rot, to hide them in pockets of clothes, in the tops of boots ... And it had to be done 4243 times. After that, it remained only to “dress and put on shoes” the remains and tamp the corpses in the pit, so much so that even professional forensic experts would not guess anything.

Is it possible? Maybe. It is very difficult, almost unbelievable, but if you make tremendous efforts, attract the best specialists... Miracles sometimes happen. Or they might happen. Chair,

on which you are now sitting, can fly. This physical paradox is called (if my memory serves me right) by the name of the scientist who came up with this idea, "the miracle of Jeans." Stool is made up of molecules. Molecules are constantly, but randomly, moving. There is an infinitesimal (but not zero!) probability that in one fabulous moment all the molecules will move in one direction - and the chair will fly into the air. The story that the Germans did the above-described manipulations with corpses - and no one, not a single expert noticed the forgery - belongs to the category of the "miracle of Jeans." Incredible, but in principle possible. And only now we are approaching the circumstance of the "Katyn case", which is usually written about in the very first lines of even the shortest articles on this topic: "... Judging by the bullets extracted from the

corpses of officers, as well as by the shells ***found in the sand, were made from short-barreled weapons of 7.65 mm caliber. It looks like these bullets are of German origin. Fearing that the Bolsheviks would not use this circumstance to their advantage, the German authorities were vigilant that the members of the PKK Commission did not hide a single bullet or cartridge case. It was naive to count on the effectiveness of this order: it was impossible to keep track of its implementation ...*** " (from the report of the Technical Commission of the Polish Red Cross). It was not possible to keep track, there

were too many spent cartridges with German markings. It was not difficult for specialists to determine that Polish officers in Katyn were shot with German Walter pistols. Of course, with the use of German cartridges. Before the appearance of Mukhin, the entire "Stalin's brigade" vied with each

other about this fact (and this is an undoubted, indisputable fact) as irrefutable proof that the Poles in Katyn were killed by the Germans. I am ready to admit that Mr. Mukhin is smarter than all his predecessors from the "Stalin's brigade", taken together. Mukhin understands two simple things: - by August 1941, the Wehrmacht already had more than a million units of Soviet small

arms and a completely astronomical amount of ammunition for it (in total, in the second half of 1941, 360 were lost in abandoned warehouses

million cartridges for the TT pistol, they are also cartridges for the "automatic" PPSH). With this amount of ammunition, the Germans could shoot half of Europe, not to mention 4.5 thousand Polish prisoners of war;

- the burial in Katyn was not discovered by "Stalin's brigade"; it was discovered and presented to the world by the "Goebbels brigade" with incredible noise and propaganda crackle. Therefore, it is necessary to somehow explain the paradoxical fact that the Germans brought foreign experts and journalists to the dug graves littered with German shells.

German shell casings at the place of execution are, in fact, indirect evidence of the suspected Hitler's non-involvement in the murder of Polish officers in Katyn. The logic here is very simple. If the Germans initially planned to shift the blame for their crime on Stalin, then they could use Soviet weapons and Soviet ammunition for the murder, which they had in huge quantities. If the vile plan to blame Stalin for the murder came to Goebbels' mind after the execution of the Polish officers, then the Germans should have worked a little, collected the shells from the "Walter" and poured into the pit, if not all 360 million, then at least 360 pieces of shells from the TT pistol. By the way, the TT pistol has a caliber of 7.62 mm, and the difference of three hundredths of a millimeter (7.65–7.62) in the inlets in the shot skulls (sorry for the cynicism) is almost impossible to detect during inspection.

Mukhin understands that this contradiction must somehow be explained, and presents his own, very bold and, as always, boorish explanation: ***"Hurry and disrespect for the mental abilities of the Poles and the rest of the European intelligentsia."*** That's it. Rush. Goebbels was impatient to curry favor with Hitler, to show his zeal and agility, and this is the result - first they brought a crowd of foreigners to Katyn, and then only remembered that they themselves had shot Polish officers, and the place of execution was littered with shells from the German "Walter".

Could this be? Can a professional of political provocations forget such simple things, known to every high school student who has read detective stories? Of course it can. We have already found out that even a chair can fly through the air by itself.

But only in one direction.

The Germans could show incredible, almost impossible thoroughness in the notorious "preparation" of corpses. The Germans could show (although this is even less believed) blatant negligence and forget about what weapons and ammunition they used to kill. But such a situation is absolutely impossible when German specialists with tweezers and a microscope sort half-rotten papers in a cadaverous mess - and at the same time they do not see the cartridge cases from German weapons with German markings point-blank. This cannot be, because it can never be. No chair can fly up and down at the same time. With this, I stop the endless "giveaway

game" with the mockingly deceitful version of Mukhin. No more inventing incredible miracles. Everything

was extremely simple. In the spring of 1940, the prisoners of the Kozelsky camp were shot. With a common intent (as stated in the Report of the experts of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation) with the prisoners of the Ostashkov and Starobelsk camps. Both in Katyn and Tver, German pistols "Walter" were used for execution. In the testimony of the former head of the Kalinin NKVD, Tokarev, there is both a direct confirmation of this fact and a completely logical explanation for it (during prolonged shooting, the Walther overheated less, so this particular model of weapon was used for mass executions). It is important to note that Tokarev had nothing to do with the execution in Katyn, so his testimony, even theoretically, could not be part of the deliberate falsification of the "Katyn case". The captured Polish officers were shot from the end of March to

the beginning of May 1940. That is why their correspondence with their families stopped at that time. That is why the corpses of those shot in the Katyn forest were wearing warm clothes. That is why the records in the surviving papers, letters, diaries of the executed are cut off at the spring dates of the 40th year. That is why there are no traces of the existence of "special purpose camps" near Smolensk. That is why there is not and never was a single witness of the flight of the guards of these mythical camps in July 1941. That is why no one, not a single Polish prisoner of war, who allegedly found himself free after

the flight of the guards, did not survive - they were all killed a year before the appearance of German troops in the Smolensk region.

Having committed countless crimes, Hitler is not guilty of killing Polish officers. Therefore, the killer is Stalin. The execution of defenseless "prisoners of war", most of whom did not fire a single shot at the Soviet troops, was Stalin's first crime. The second crime was lying, refusing to confess his guilt and using the "Katyn case" to split the anti-Hitler coalition. Not the Sikorsky government, but Stalin, used the situation in order to free himself from obligations under the Soviet-Polish agreement of July 30, 1941. Not Goebbels, but Stalin, by his crimes (murder and subsequent stubborn unwillingness to admit guilt) convinced the Wehrmacht soldiers, whom entire units they brought to the Katyn graves that it is better to die in a battle with the Red Army than to surrender. ***“As a result of increased bitterness during the Second World War, millions of Soviet, British, American, German soldiers were additionally killed on the fronts,”*** reads the publisher's annotation (usually the author himself writes these annotations) to Mukhin's Anti-Russian meanness. I would like to hope that with "millions" the authors of the annotation nevertheless greatly exaggerated, but if at least one German soldier, remembering the pile of corpses in the Katyn forest, shot at our fathers and grandfathers for one minute longer, then the blame for this blood lies with Stalin . And if only for this...

Having already praised Yu. I. Mukhin for his intelligence, I cannot fail to note his exceptional accuracy in choosing the title of the book. Yes, this is indeed anti-Russian meanness. Lies that have dragged on for half a century, primitive and vile attempts to hide the truth, to silence those who tried to get to the bottom of the truth in the "Katyn case", have long been a shameful stain on the reputation of our country. Today, those who, due to their lack of honor and conscience, can call themselves "patriots" want this disgrace to return to our lives again.

Large circulations of "Anti-Russian meanness" cannot but upset, but they cannot surprise. "The right to dishonor is the easiest way to captivate a Russian person," wrote one and a half

centuries ago, the great connoisseur of the human soul F. M. Dostoevsky. Distorting the thought of a classic is a sin, so I gave it in its original form. Having nothing in common either with politics or with the notorious "political correctness", I would, nevertheless, remove the epithet "Russian" from Dostoevsky's chased formula.

It is easier for a person of any kind-tribe to roll down than to climb uphill; It's easier to crawl than to fly. It's easier to look for the machinations of the damned "Euro-masons" than to learn how to throw garbage in the trash can. It is easier to believe in a comforting, albeit obvious, lie than to take responsibility for everything - good and vile - in the history of your country. And yet - try not to get carried away by the "right to dishonor." Do not let the memorized hysteria of professional provocateurs lead you into a state of even the most momentary unconsciousness.

Chapter

13 Warehouse Fire

There is nowhere to go further. We have come to the last chapter and the last topic. I wouldn't want to write about this at all, and it doesn't fit the "light and cheerful book" stated in the preface ... On the other hand, it's also impossible to simply get past the heaps of lies and hypocrisy in the most tragic issue of the history of the war. Therefore, for those who are ready for a difficult and very sad (sometimes scary) reading, I offer the thirteenth chapter. This chapter is about death, suffering, heroism and martyrdom. Chapter about the human losses of the Soviet Union in World War II.

Let's start with simple and harmless things. From one mathematical paradox, which is called "small difference of large quantities." $1000 - 999 = 1$. Any objections?

No objections. Now a little bit, just by one percent, let's increase the first number. And the second number will be slightly reduced, by only one percent. What happened?
 $1010 -$

$989 = 21$. This is what is called the "effect of a small difference of large values." A little bit there, a little bit here, but the difference has grown twenty-one times! By the way, this paradox is not quite an abstract game of the mind. Every designer knows that it must be taken into account when setting dimensions on the drawing, i.e., a groove 5 mm wide at a distance of 670 mm from the end of the part must be "measured" individually and specifically, otherwise, when setting two dimensions (670 mm and 675 mm), you can get anything, but only 5 mm not required for assembly ...

Why am I? And all to the very same, to 27 million. Which used to be 20 million. Where did these numbers come from? Why did Stalin talk about 7, Khrushchev about 20, and Gorbachev about 27 million dead?

You probably think that the state, in the person of its specially trained civil servants, went around all the yards, villages, towns, cities and megacities, checked, counted and recounted all the card files of all "passport offices" (I wonder if this phrase can be translated into some European language?) and SUMMING the data for each village to get the total SUM of losses for the whole country? To be honest, that's exactly what I thought. Even I, after so many years spent reading the writings of domestic "historians", did not expect such shamelessness and such hack-work, which were revealed in reality. It turns out that no one summed up anything. It turns out that the

sacred figure that was present in all textbooks, in all newspapers, which sounded at all rallies and ceremonial meetings ("20 million dead") and which in 1990 suddenly, without explanation, suddenly took and grew by 7 million, was obtained not by summation, but by SUBTRACTION. By subtracting two huge and completely arbitrary numbers. In full accordance with the theory of "small difference of large quantities." And now I will be silent, and you will carefully read THIS:

"The estimate of the population of the USSR on June 22, 1941 was obtained by shifting the results of the pre-war census of the country's population (January 17, 1939) to the indicated date, adjusting the numbers of births and deaths by 2.5 years from the census to the attack of Nazi Germany. The population of the USSR at the end of 1945 was calculated by moving back the age data of the All-Union Population Census of 1959 ... This figure was obtained as a result of extensive statistical studies by demographers and subsequent work (at the end of the 80s of the XX century) by the state commission to clarify human losses of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War.

So, "as a result of extensive statistical research," the central issue of the military history of the USSR was resolved easily and simply. ***"The population of the USSR at the end of 1945 was calculated by shifting back the age data of the All-Union Population Census of 1959."*** Is it necessary to prove that in this way it was possible to obtain any, predetermined, figure of losses? About what accuracy

can we talk about moving the census data back 13 years? 13 years, and what years!

Who, what demographic scientists, can know how to "move back" the census data if these 13 years were completely unique? Where and when in the history of civilized mankind did another such massacre take place? Yes, in the days of medieval atrocities, even larger-scale homicides took place (it is believed that during the Thirty Years' War every third person died in Europe, and every second in the Czech Republic), but then no one kept demographic statistics with the accuracy and detail adopted in the 20th century. How, on what statistical basis, it was possible to calculate the quantitative impact on demographic indicators (fertility, mortality, population growth) of such phenomena as the mass death of men of marriageable age (and the number of these deaths is not known, it is just to be determined by arithmetic games into "transportation"!), as a mass involvement of women of childbearing age in back-breaking physical labor, mass homelessness of children, an unusually large number of single-parent families ("fatherlessness"), gigantic, unprecedented since the time of the "great migration of peoples", migration of the population ...

Absolutely indisputable, in my opinion, the conclusion from the above is that the human losses of the USSR in World War II are not known to anyone. It may very well be that a normal study, that is, based on the summation, and not the subtraction of the "average ceiling values," was carried out immediately after the end of the war, but its results are still strictly classified.

This assumption (about the existence of real, relatively reliable demographic statistics) I did not take from the ceiling. A collection ("Soviet everyday life and mass consciousness 1939–1945", M, ROSSPEN, 2003) was published in the "Documents of Soviet History" series, in which, with reference to the previously top secret report of 1959 "The national economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic war" published extensive demographic statistics of 1943–1945. What is there just not there - marriages, divorces, birth rates, mortality, infant mortality, the ratio between the number of men and women, differentiated by six age groups ... The rural population, the urban population, in the territories that were

under occupation, those who were not under occupation... There was a record. Was. The survivors were counted. Strictly speaking, it could not be otherwise in a country in which without a residence permit (or registration in the village council) a person simply could not exist (cards for food, kindergarten, school, employment, burial - none of these actions could be produced without a registration stamp). Yes, but all published demographic data is given as a percentage. Or in such terms as "per thousand births", "per thousand marriages"... But the one who counted the percentages and coefficients could not but know the absolute figures! In the absence of reliable

information, the public was asked to believe first in the number 20, then 27 million. These figures were obtained by a mockingly absurd method of subtracting two large values obtained as a result of completely arbitrary manipulations with the data of the all-Union population census of 1939 and 1959. Such a "methodology" made it possible to obtain ANY figure in the range of 10–50 million. In fact, the only reasonable question in this situation is: "Why did Khrushchev want the number of war victims to be expressed as 20 million, while Gorbachev needed to increase this number to 27 million?" This chapter is devoted to an attempt to answer this question. I will not intrigue you for a long time and I will immediately say that, in my opinion, both of these figures are OVERAGED. The number of victims of the war is less than 20 million, and even more so - less than "Gorbachev's 27".

In the most general sense, human losses are made up of two parts: the loss of personnel of the Armed Forces and casualties among the civilian population. Relative order in accounting exists only in relation to the first component - the losses of the Red Army. We will start with her. Let's start with the traditional school "problem about the pool" - it flows into one pipe, pours out into another ... Let's try to digress from the sea of human suffering that is hidden behind the figures below, and let's do bare arithmetic. By the beginning of June 1941, 4,901,852 people were serving in the

Red Army, Air Force and Navy, in military formations of civilian departments (hereinafter, unless otherwise specified, all figures are taken from the statistical collection "Secrecy stamp removed",

compiled in 1993 by a team of military historians of the General Staff of the Russian Army, edited by Colonel General G. F. Krivosheev). As part of covert mobilization ("large training camps"), by June 22, 1941, another 767,750 people entered the troops. In all four years of the war, another 28,807,150 people were mobilized. Total: 34,476,750 people - this is the total "manpower resource" used in the Armed Forces. These figures are very accurate and reliable, as they describe the actions of the military registration and enlistment offices and other services that were in the rear and keep strict records.

As of July 1, 1945 (i.e., approximately 50 days after the end of hostilities in Europe), there were 11,793.8 thousand people on the list in the Armed Forces and military formations of other departments. 1,046,000 servicemen were treated in hospitals. I see no reason to doubt the sufficient accuracy and reliability of these figures. For 50 peaceful days, commanders of all levels could count their subordinates and draw up appropriate reports to higher headquarters. Those wounded who were destined to die have already died (military medical statistics show that the question of life or death of the wounded in the vast majority of cases is decided in the first few days after the injury). With the accuracy with which other figures will be given, it can be assumed that of the 1046 thousand wounded who were alive on July 1, 1945, no one died. As for the hostilities against Japan, which began on August 9, 1945, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in this operation amounted to 12 thousand people. This figure is less than one tenth of a percent of the losses in the war with Germany and its allies, so in the future we will not take into account the losses of the "Japanese war" at all. $34\,476.8 - 11\,793.8 - 1046 = 21\,637$. During the entire war, 21,637 thousand people left the Armed Forces of the

USSR. Decline and loss are

two different words with different meanings in the military language. During the war years, 8007.1 thousand living people left the Armed Forces. Namely:

- 3614.6 thousand were transferred to work in industry and military formations of civilian departments; -

- 3798.2 thousand demobilized due to injury or illness;

- 594.3 thousand were convicted, but at the same time they were not shot and sent to penal units. The last

category needs some explanation. There are two possible situations. First: the person did not commit any offense, and he was sent from the army to the Gulag due to "wrong nationality" (German, Finn, Romanian, Kalmyk, Chechen), wrong place of birth (native of "former Poland"), dubious social origin (son of the repressed) . Out of harm's way, they took away their weapons and sent them to logging or to Vorkuta, to cut coal "for the front, for victory." Another option: a person has done something - from the point of view of the "special department" - especially dangerous. For example, ***"he expressed terrorist intentions against the leader of the people ... he slanderously stated that in the areas liberated from the German occupiers the peasants were opposed to the restoration of collective farms ... in 1928 he voted for an anti-party Trotskyist resolution ..."*** (I hope you understand that this is not swearing, but accurate quotes from SMERSH documents). The identified enemies of the "leader of the people" were not shot on the spot and were not sent to the penal battalion "to atone for their guilt with blood", but were arrested and transferred from the army to the NKVD for investigation and subsequent conviction. The sentence could also be execution, but this death was no longer included in the list of losses of the Armed Forces (which, strictly speaking, is quite reasonable - the deceased was not a victim of the war).

And those three numbers seem pretty accurate to me. The event took place outside the combat zone, was strictly taken into account and controlled, moreover, it was controlled from at least two sides: the army surrendered - the military industry enterprise or the NKVD bodies accepted it. The wounded were demobilized by the decision of the commission, the decision was recorded, upon returning home, the disabled person presented documents to the military registration and enlistment office to receive benefits. Errors and inaccuracies are possible, but they are relatively very small.

There is another category of servicemen who left the active army, but as of July 1, 1945, they were, without a doubt, alive. These are prisoners of war who survived until the end of the war. No one knows their exact or even approximate number, but there is one quite reliable figure: the number

prisoners of war who passed through the "filtration points" and were recorded in the documents of the Office for Repatriation. I repeat once again - there were more survivors, not all former prisoners of war wanted to be on the threshold of a "filtration point", some tried to stay in the West, some tried to forge documents and return home, bypassing a meeting with the NKVD, but only 1836 were registered and personally recorded thousand people. $21637 - 8007 - 1836 = 11794$. 11,794 thousand servicemen died or left the USSR forever and

without a trace. This is the result, and a fairly reliable and accurate result of solving the problem "about the pool". This means that the total irretrievable demographic losses of the servicemen of the Armed Forces of the USSR, even theoretically, cannot be more than **11,794 thousand people**. Anything more is nothing more than an unfounded hysteria on the topic "they filled up with corpses." The names of modern hysterics are well known to specialists, and there is no need for everyone else to clutter up the memory with all sorts of rubbish. Try to remember the main thing: no one has yet canceled the law of conservation of matter, and any nonsense about "25 ..., 37 ..., 43 ... millions of killed soldiers" can be safely thrown into the trash. Further, less and less reliable figures appear, since we will now talk about the events and processes that took place under fire, directly on the front line, and even behind this line, in the territory controlled by the enemy:

- 5.23 million servicemen of the Red Army, Navy, Air Force, border and internal troops of the NKVD were killed or died at the stage of sanitary evacuation. It is this figure that was obtained by a team of historians under the leadership of Krivosheev by summing up the reports of the troops. Of course, it does not include all the deaths of Soviet soldiers in battle (mainly due to the chaos and panic of the first months of the war, when entire formations disappeared along with headquarters and all headquarters documentation); - 1.10 million

people died from wounds in hospitals (however wild it sounds, but the nightmarish figure of a million dead people is evidence of the highest qualification and selfless fulfillment of their human and military duty on the part of all

employees of Soviet military medicine - from an ordinary medical instructor to the chief surgeon; out of 22 million cases of injury, 21 million ended in saving the life of the wounded; taking into account the lack of the simplest - by today's standards - medicines and the monstrous congestion of all medical institutions, these figures look like a real miracle); - 0.40 million died from diseases, died as a result of accidents and accidents (non-

combat losses). For comparison, we note that in the Wehrmacht for 6 years of war, non-combat

losses amounted to 200 thousand people.

- 0.16 million were shot by the verdicts of military tribunals or by the decision of higher commanders; - 0.22 million died in

battle, fighting on the side of the enemy. There is no need to speak about the accuracy of this figure, nevertheless, in the book of Krivosheev (p. 392) it is precisely such a figure of losses of the "volunteer formations" of the Wehrmacht and the SS, staffed by former Soviet citizens, that is indicated.

With an estimate of the size of this category, everything is very unsteady: on the one hand, prisoners of war and deserters were the main, but by no means the only source of personnel for "volunteer formations", on the other hand, the indicated figure of 0.22 million does not include the loss of those accomplices occupiers from among the former Red Army soldiers who fought with Soviet partisans as part of "police battalions" and other punitive units and subunits. In total, the figure is 7.11 million killed and dead, whose death is beyond doubt. The most dubious and uncertain are the statistics associated with

captivity and desertion - the very nature of these shameful phenomena precludes the possibility of maintaining accurate personal records. According to Krivosheev, the missing and "unrecorded losses of the first months of the war" total 4,559,000 people. But at the same time, the overall "balance of income and expenditure" of the personnel of the Armed Forces does not

converge to a huge number of 2186 thousand people (see pp. 140-141). The authors of the collection themselves explain this, in particular, by "a significant number of unidentified deserters." In order for arithmetic (not military-historical, but only

arithmetic) the balance has converged, it must be admitted that the total number of all categories of missing persons (prisoners, deserters, those killed in the reports of the headquarters, the wounded left in the territory occupied by the enemy) is 6745 thousand people (4559 + 2186). The number is huge. As you can see, it is more than the number of those who were killed and died from wounds in hospitals. Such is the price of the catastrophic defeat of the first months of the war...

According to German historians, the total number of Soviet prisoners of war is at least 5.2 million people. I repeat once again that these are the most conservative estimates (a number of authors raise the figures to the level of 5.7–5.8 million). Only the number of those released from captivity can be considered relatively accurate: 319 thousand were released in the summer-autumn of 1941 (Ukrainians, Balts, ethnic Germans); another 504 thousand were released before May 1, 1944 (mainly in connection with enrollment in the "volunteer formations" of the Wehrmacht and the SS). For those who are still surprised, I can point

to the page (Krivosheev, p. 334). The number of dead POWs has been the subject of political speculation for many decades. At first, the reports of the Sovinformburo called unrealistically small numbers of missing Red Army soldiers, then, at the Nuremberg trials, 3.9 million prisoners were destroyed; Krivosheev's collection, underestimating the total number of prisoners, also names a surprisingly small figure of 1.3-1.7 million who died in German captivity; German military statistics speak of 0.67 million dead after February 1942, but this ignores the worst and most massive death of Soviet prisoners of war in the fall and winter of 1941. Modern German historians, analyzing the documents of the Wehrmacht and the SD, come to an estimate of 2.2-2.6 million, including about 1.5-2.0 million who died in the first military winter. Without claiming any accuracy, I propose to count as follows: subtract the number of those who returned to their homeland and were released from captivity by the enemy from the total number of those captured. Total: $5.2 - 1.84 - 0.82 = 2.54$ million.

Summing up the above number of those killed and dying from wounds (7.11 million) with the estimated number of deaths in German captivity (2.54 million), we get some figure of 9.65 million. This is the number of military personnel who, in all likelihood, will not

survived. Comparing this figure with the maximum possible number of irretrievable demographic losses of military personnel of the Armed Forces of the USSR (11.79 million), obtained by the method of solving the "problem about the pool", we find an arithmetic difference of 2.14 million. Two million people, whose fate no one knows nothing concrete. And, most likely, he will never know. Without further ado, I propose to simply divide this number in half: to classify half as those killed in battle, but not taken into account in headquarters reports, and to consider the other half as "undiscovered deserters" and prisoners who went to the West or hid their past and remained under fictitious names in territory of the USSR.

Now we just have to bring all the abundance of numbers into one table:

Убиты в бою и умерли от ран в госпиталях	7,40 млн
Погибли в плену	2,54 млн
Небоевые потери (аварии, болезни, несчастные случаи)	0,40 млн
Расстреляны или погибли, воюя на стороне противника	0,38 млн
Всего погибших военнослужащих	10,72 млн
Предположительно живы (бежали на Запад, дезертировали)	1,07 млн

An additional confirmation of the reliability of the above calculations can be considered the accounting data of notices ("burials") received by the military registration and enlistment offices for the entire time of the war. There were 12,401 thousand of them. There is nothing surprising in the fact that they turned out to be 600 thousand more than the sum of all the categories of losses listed in the table. Notifications came both to the dead and to those who, according to the documents of the headquarters, were considered missing. And this means that in total about 13.6 million notices could be issued. Taking into account the inevitable duplication (when, at the request of a relative in connection with their forced relocation, several notices about the same person were sent to different military registration and enlistment offices), there could have been even more "funerals". In other words, the final figures indicated in the table are by no means underestimated. They may even be a bit overpriced.

Most likely, the results obtained surprised you, dear reader, with their "smallness". And I understand you very well - for the last 20 years, our domestic publicists have been conducting a desperate "race on coffins", deafening themselves with hysterical cries: "they filled up with corpses ... one rifle for three ... twenty of our soldiers for one killed German ..." Less than 20 -25 million dead - and only from among the military - no one agreed. But we will not scare ourselves with a cry. The ill-fated "one rifle for three", if it has some relation to real events, then cases of such criminal disorganization could only take place in the summer and autumn of 1941. And even then, such situations arose by no means from an objective lack of weapons - the available small arms could be equipped according to the full standard wartime norms of 450-750 divisions ... In 1944-1945, the Red Army bombarded the enemy not with corpses, but with artillery shells. Soviet military science, not without reason, was proud of the fact that at the final stage of the war the Red Army put into practice such a term as "artillery offensive". Densities of 150-200 guns per 1 km of the offensive front and 50,000 shells of 122-mm caliber and above were considered the average norm to suppress the defense of one Wehrmacht infantry division (which means three shells weighing at least 22 kg each per German soldier). And this is on average. In the largest offensive operations of the end of the war, much greater densities were created. Thus, during the breakthrough of the German defense during the Vistula-Oder operation (January 1945), fantastic artillery densities of 420 guns per 1 km of the front were created in the main strike zone. At each meter of the defense of the German troops, 15 shells of medium and large caliber exploded. In the offensive zone of the 5th Shock Army, 23 kilotons of ammunition were used up in one hour - this is the power of the "Hiroshima" atomic bomb. To complete the picture of the final stage of the war, one must take into account the multiple superiority of the Red Army in tanks and absolute numerical superiority in the air. Since the autumn of 1944, it was

rare to see a German fighter in the sky over the Eastern Front, and almost never a German bomber.

(the remnants of German aviation, working out the last stocks of aviation gasoline, tried to prevent the final destruction of German industry and the transport network, carried out by continuous massive raids by American "flying fortresses"). The fact that, with such an overwhelming fire superiority, the losses of the personnel of the Red Army at times (not dozens of times, but at times) exceeded the losses of the enemy should not be surprising. This is, pardon the cynicism, "normal". The losses of the attacker should have been higher than the losses of the defender - especially if the defender shows the highest discipline, stamina and courage. Here I am forced to digress for a moment from the subject of discussion, since I could already

be convinced from my own experience that the phrase about the steadfastness and courage of German soldiers causes immediate loss of hearing and vision in some readers. As recently as March 2008, I had the honor of addressing the most respectable meeting of the St. Petersburg intelligentsia. So even in this chosen society, after the words about fortitude and courage, they immediately asked me the following question verbatim: **"You said that the Wehrmacht soldiers fought for a just cause ..."** I didn't say or write that. I generally have no idea what this or that particular Hans or Fritz fought for. Maybe for the Fuhrer and great Germany, maybe in dreams of an estate with farm laborers in conquered Russia, maybe for my best friend Kurt, who died a week ago ... I don't know, and it's none of my business. I am not a poet, I am not a writer, I am not a philosopher. As a historian, I am obliged to state a fact - the Germans fought with the greatest tenacity, not giving up a single piece of our land without a fight; for several months they fought in complete encirclement; at the slightest opportunity, they switched to a skillfully organized counteroffensive. In order to break the resistance of such an enemy and push him back 3,000 km from the Volga to the Elbe, the soldiers of the Red Army had to show no less stamina and courage. And suffer significant losses. Let's take a few concrete examples. Almost the only example of a successful strategic offensive operation of the Red Army in the initial period of the war is the counteroffensive near Moscow. For one month (from December 5 to January 7) irretrievable losses (killed and missing)

amounted to 139.6 thousand people. The Germans lost 77.82 thousand dead and missing in the battle for Moscow - but this is for the entire duration of the operation, from October 3 to January 10, that is, taking into account the losses of two months of unsuccessful attempts to reach the walls of the Kremlin. With an accuracy acceptable for this case, the German losses of December 1941 can be taken as one third of the total irretrievable losses. With this assumption, the ratio of the losses of the parties is expressed as a number of **5.35 to 1**. The losses of the advancing Red Army were five times greater than the losses of the Wehrmacht. But this is December 1941. This is an offensive on one enthusiasm, waist-deep in snow, in severe frost, almost without artillery. As G.K. Zhukov (at that time the commander of the Western Front) writes in his memoirs, ***"we had to set an ammunition consumption rate of 1-2 shots per day per gun. And this,***

mind you, during the offensive! Now let's take the statistics of losses in the second half of 1943. This is the period of large-scale offensive operations of the Red Army (the Battle of Kursk, the liberation of Smolensk and Donbass, the crossing of the Dnieper, the liberation of the left-bank Ukraine and Kyiv). The total (killed, missing, wounded) losses of the Red Army amounted to 4809.3 thousand people. The total losses of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS for the same period amount to 1413.2

thousand people. The ratio of total losses: **3.4 to 1**. It makes sense to consider separately the third quarter of 1943 (July, August, September). During this period, the Battle of Kursk falls - one of the largest battles of the Second World War. The total losses of the Red Army amounted to 2748 thousand people,

including irretrievable (killed and missing) - 694 thousand. Losses of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS troops: total - 709 thousand people, including irretrievable - 231 thousand. Total Loss Ratio: **3.8 to 1** Dead Loss Ratio: **3**

second half of 1944. The Red Army is almost continuously advancing along the entire front. Three grandiose strategic offensive operations fell on this period: "Bagration" (the defeat of the German army group "Center" in Belarus), Lvov-Sandomierz and Iasi-Kishinev. At the same time, in absolute terms, the losses of the Red Army (in comparison with the second half of 1943) are noticeably less: 3,258.8 thousand total and 690.2 thousand.

irrevocable. The Germans lost 1,300.3 thousand people, including 650.4 thousand irretrievably. In the structure of enemy losses, for the first time, a huge proportion are missing (463.3 thousand). The ratio of total losses: **2.5 to 1**. When assessing the ratio of irretrievable losses, the problem arises of determining the number of dead in the total amount of "missing" Germans. In fact, we are forced to move into the realm of divination. Considering that there was still no mass capture comparable to the situation of 1941 in the Wehrmacht, it can be very, very conditionally assumed that half of the number of "missing" German soldiers are killed. Under this assumption, the death toll ratio drops to **1.7 to 1**.

Directly during the operation "Bagration" (and this is the largest - both in terms of the number of Soviet troops and in terms of the success achieved - a strategic offensive operation), the losses of the Red Army amounted to: total - 765.8 thousand, including irretrievable - 178.5 thousand. Human. Enemy losses: 26.4 thousand killed, 263.1 thousand missing, 109.7 thousand wounded. The ratio of total losses: **1.9 to 1**. The

ratio of the number of those killed (under the same assumptions about the number dead) is **1.13 to 1**.

Of course, the accuracy of each of the above figures can be challenged. There are no two sources in which the loss figures (by periods or transactions) would not differ by 10-15%. Nevertheless, all these reservations do not significantly change the overall picture, and it is quite clear and obvious - the ratio of losses was constantly changing for the better (if there can be something "good" and even "better" in talking about the death of millions of people) for the Red Army side. And although in the irresponsible journalism of recent decades it is customary to stigmatize "talentless and bloody Stalinist generals", one cannot but admit that the ratio of losses achieved during Operation Bagration can be considered exemplary (although, of course, the best role model is not this monstrous bloodshed, but the peace and accord achieved in Europe over the past half century).

In general, from June 22, 1941 to December 31, 1944, the Wehrmacht and the SS troops irrevocably (including missing and captured) lost 2.62 million people on the Eastern Front. In particular, the army group

Center, whose officers in November 1941 examined the streets of Moscow through binoculars, irretrievably lost 844 thousand people (including 401 thousand killed and 443 thousand missing). For comparison, we note that on all fronts, from September 1, 1939 to December 31, 1944, the losses of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS amounted to 3360 thousand killed and missing (of which about 2850 thousand people by the beginning of the 50s were considered dead). In other words, the losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 78% (more than three-quarters) of the total amount of German losses - a completely eloquent answer to the question of which army

"broke the back of the fascist beast." It is difficult to say with what, with what figures of the losses of the Red Army it makes sense to compare the number of irretrievable losses of the German ground forces. Is it correct to compare them with the total irretrievable losses of the Red Army, a significant part of which are those who died in captivity, who died from the bullets of Soviet soldiers or the NKVD firing squad? In the most generalized form, it can be stated that the losses of the Red Army were three to four times higher than the losses of the enemy. It hardly makes sense to discuss the possible refinement of this figure.

Three or four times. These proportions quite realistically reflect what happened on the fields of a grandiose

battle. At the end of this topic, I have to note that the Krivosheev team nevertheless poured a fair amount of tar into the result of their unique and highly professional work. Perhaps someone made Krivosheev "an offer that cannot be refused." I don't know - but on page 390, after a detailed and quite correct (that is, generally coinciding with the results of the fundamental works of German historians) analysis of the structure and number of German losses, the following phrase suddenly appears, like a jack-in-the-box: "**Analysis of some archival materials and publications in the Soviet and foreign press shows that ...** " After that, the irretrievable losses of Germany on the Eastern Front alone grow to an incredible figure of 6,923.7 thousand people! And this is just the beginning.

Then, the equally staggering losses of Germany's allies in the amount of 1,725.8 thousand people are added to them. Hungary alone, it turns out, "managed" to lose 864 thousand people on the Eastern Front! About nine times more than Italy, and exactly

ten times more than Finland (see p. 392), although the Finns fielded 16 divisions against the USSR, which in the summer of 41 and in the summer of 44 fought many months of bloody battles, which cannot even remotely be compared with the "feat" of the Hungarian troops under Stalingrad. But this seemed not enough - in the total set of "irretrievable losses of the enemy" the Japanese, Chinese and Koreans appear in a very modest (for them) number of 723.8 thousand people. As a result of all these manipulations, it was possible to obtain the ratio of the losses of the Red Army and the enemy as 1.3 to 1.

The casket opens very simply. The war for Germany ended in complete and unconditional surrender. After that, any German soldier (for example, a guard at an ammunition depot in Germany who had not fired a single shot throughout the war) could, on formal legal grounds, be considered a prisoner of war. This legal collision opens up huge opportunities for manipulating numbers (do not forget that for two soldiers of the active army, both we and the Germans accounted for "one and a half people" in various rear and support services). It was by summing up the real combat losses of the Wehrmacht with the colossal number of "May prisoners of war" that the above figures were obtained. The same trick was performed for Hungary. But Finland did not capitulate, the 2nd Soviet-Finnish war ended with the signing of the Armistice Agreement (September 19, 1944), which is why, on page 392, the real losses of the Finnish army turned out to be 10 times less than the speculative figure of the Hungarian "losses". The appearance in the calculation of 640 thousand Japanese and Chinese captured in Manchuria (for the most part after the surrender of Japan), is nothing but "black humor", and

cannot be named...

$$20-11=9.$$

$$27-11=16.$$

Any objections? I think there is already. And it is no coincidence that everyone knows (at least heard) about the number of 20 (then - 27) million Soviet people who died during the war; and journalistic literature - but at the same time, the obvious and indisputable arithmetic difference between the number 27 and

number 11 is not mentioned almost anywhere and never. And this is understandable - even those who ordered the figure of 27 million did not have the courage to loudly and openly assume that the Germans destroyed 16 million civilians. This is too much - even for the late Soviet, as well as the current "imperial" propagandists. Therefore, the arithmetic difference between the highest established figure of 27 million and the number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army exists as a Kantian "thing in itself". They don't talk about her out loud - even when, it would seem, they don't notice her

impossible.

For example, in 2001, the same team of military historians, led by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, released a new, corrected and supplemented version of their statistical collection ("Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the Armed Forces. Statistical study", M., Olma-Press). The compilers left the figure of irretrievable demographic losses of military personnel the same, i.e. 8.7 million people. Accordingly, up to 27 they had to "get" as much as 18.3 million . Desperate efforts (which will be discussed below) managed to count 13.7 million. ***occupation accounts for more than half of all the human casualties of the Soviet Union (compare 13.7 million people and 26.6 million people).***" The authors of the collection prudently do not call for comparing the mentioned figure of 13.7 with the arithmetically necessary figure of 18.3 and discussing the huge "shortage" of 4.6 million ... Of course, the figure of civilian casualties of 13.7 million people is terrible. Fortunately, it is significantly overpriced. They recruited 13.7 million as follows. After the indisputable and unobjectionable statement of the tragic fact (***"the barbarous extermination of civilians was carried out in all the republics of the USSR that were subjected to enemy invasion"***), the final conclusion immediately comes: ***"In total, more than 7.4 million people were deliberately exterminated in the occupied territory"*** . Link to source No. 526. What is 526? This is an encyclopedic reference book "The Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945", published in 1985. I'm not talking about the fact that in the fundamental monograph of 2001 the very reference to the one released in the era of total censorship

encyclopedic reference book looks rather strange. As a reference to Jules Verne's novel in a contemporary monograph on submarine design. Another thing is more important - in 1985, the figure of 20 million dead was considered the truth about the war. How can those figures fit in with the "new truth" about 27 million? They don't match up. Therefore, the compilers of the collection, without blinking an eye, add to the number of victims of the Nazi terror, obtained from some "sociological studies", the excess of the actual mortality of the population in the occupied territory over the average peacetime values. As a result, they receive another 4.1 million. Who and how determined this "excess", even if the number of the population under occupation is known with an accuracy of no more than "plus or minus 5 million"? And if there is, it turns out, specific statistics of violent and non-violent deaths in the occupied territory, then why was there a need to play with the "advancement" of the population census results by 13 years? These questions are answered briefly and convincingly: ***"According to available data."***

Another 2.16 million dead were found by the compilers of the collection among the so-called "Ostarbeiters" - Soviet citizens who were taken to Germany for forced labor. The method for obtaining this figure is traditional: subtraction instead of summation. The number of Ostarbeiters who returned to the Soviet Union is known. Documents of the Office for Repatriation Affairs give a figure of 2,654 thousand people. There is a huge variation in the estimate of the number of people taken out for forced labor. According to German data, this is no more than 2.8–3.0 million people (moreover, this amount includes both civilians and prisoners of war placed at the disposal of German industrialists). According to the Extraordinary State Commission for Establishing and Investigating the Atrocities of the Nazi Invaders and Their Accomplices (hereinafter referred to as the ChGK), the occupiers drove 4.3 million people for forced labor. The compilers of the statistics book indicate the "exact figure" of 5,269,513 people. The number of dead is then subtracted.

At the same time, the compilers of the collection did not pay attention to the fact that the ratio of the number of dead prisoners of war (1.78 million) and the dead "Ostarbeiters" (2.16 million) that they presented contradicts any common sense. Of course, working and living conditions

forced laborers were very heavy. Especially - in comparison with the idea of "labor" that exists in the modern office clerk. So, in one of the Moscow newspapers, I recently read a story described in the most dramatic colors about two Ukrainian girls who were forcibly taken to Germany. They ended up on a farm where the owner entrusted them with the care of a whole herd of 40 cows. In terms of a Moscow journalist, this is hard labor. Alas, the well-fed does not understand the hungry. 40 cows on the farm of a strong German "fist" is at least 400 liters of milk per day. Milk river with banks of oatmeal jelly. Even if this "fist" was a soulless and vicious brute, for whom the unfortunate girls, cut off from home and relatives, were just a kind of domestic animals, then in this case, the private-proprietary inside told him that domestic animals should be fed. A Soviet prisoner of war dying of hunger could not even dream of such a "hard labor", who was shot in the summer of 1941 for trying to crawl to a puddle and drink rainwater, and they were beaten every day for no reason ...

The compilers of the "new Krivosheev" back up the surprising figures related to the number and fate of the "Ostarbeiters" with reference No. 537. This is an article in the journal Sociological Research No. 12/1991. A very remarkable note by the compilers of the statistics collection is also given to this reference: ***"In addition to those who died in forced labor in Germany, 451 of the so-called 'defectors' from the Ostarbeiters, who, with the active participation of the military authorities of England and the United States, are included in the total losses of the civilian population. and France were recruited as cheap labor to the countries of Western Europe, Latin America, the USA and Australia.*** Here it is, the

bestial grin of capitalism - they lured the simple-hearted collective farmers and used them as "cheap labor". The number of deceived "sociologists" counted again with enviable accuracy - up to 100 people. They traveled all over Australia, Canada and the USA. It is a pity that they did not provide equally accurate figures for the wages of "cheap workers" ... Returning to the "new

Krivosheev", one should note the last and

the compilers of the collection referred to the fundamental source of information about the victims of the civilian population of the USSR only once. At the very beginning of the article about human losses, a link to the ChGK documents appears. True, this source was not used at all in order to find at least minimally reliable loss figures there. It was decided by the authority of the ChGK to confirm a long-standing and, it seemed to me, long-standing fake thrown into the landfill - the notorious "Memo to a German soldier." My peers should still remember this text: "... ***Destroy pity and compassion in yourself, kill every Russian, do not stop if there is an old man or a woman, a girl or a boy in front of you. Kill, in this way you will save yourself from death, secure the future of your family and become famous forever ...*** "

Of course, no one has ever issued or seen such a "memo". Before us is a completely "normal", standard sample of wartime military propaganda. Its task does not change from century to century - to present the enemy soldier in the form of a fiend. Normal combat work: the crew of the OT-130 flamethrower tank burns the enemy with the KS fire mixture, the military propagandist "burns people's hearts" with a fiery word. At the same time, speaking only the truth is the same treason to the Motherland, as well as the deliberate substitution of fire mixture with shampoo. In war, as in war. But what does this fake do in a solid 2001 military history study?

However, 2001 is already the past. Considering the speed of changes taking place in Russia, this is a thing of the distant past. Take a book of the first category of freshness from the shelf. Published in 2007. A. Dyukov "For what the Soviet people fought", M., Yauza, EKSMO. The book is new and the author is very young. The publisher's abstract states: ***"This is a reminder book based on the documents of the Extraordinary State Commission for the Investigation of the Atrocities of the Nazi Invaders, the materials of the Nuremberg trials, numerous eyewitness accounts from both sides. The first in decades! A book that everyone should read!"*** And here is the opinion of the author himself about his essay: ***"The book that you are holding in your hands is the first domestic work in which the main aspects of***

extermination policy of the Nazis in the occupied Soviet territory.

A few pages later, A. Dyukov frankly shares his creative method with the reader. He retells a sad episode from the memoirs of K. Simonov: in the city of Chernivtsi (northern Bukovina) liberated from the Germans, a Jew who miraculously survived, screaming and crying at the same time, told Simonov about the horrors of the extermination of the Jewish population of the city; the unfortunate man could not stop in any way, ***“and kept on shouting the same thing that he shouted to me, to some people who had crowded near our car before ...”***. After retelling this, Dyukov draws the following conclusion: ***“This is how we should scream and cry when we talk about the Nazi genocide of the Soviet people.”*** I am

ready to agree with this, but with only one, fundamental and integral clarification: crying and crying is appropriate in any text (novel, short story, poem, screenplay, even a philosophical essay), except for a scientific and historical one. Where the reader begins to be excited by "shouting and crying", historical science ends. And the propaganda begins. And the noisy propaganda, masquerading as a "comprehensive consideration of the main aspects," is especially harmful. What immediately demonstrates the book of A. Dyukov. The book contains 500 pages of author's text and 76 pages of appendices. At the same time, everything that has to do with the central and very specific issue of the history of the extermination (without any quotes) policy of the Nazis in the occupied Soviet territory takes up less than half a page. Here is the "everything" in its entirety:

“To this day, it is not known how many civilians were killed in the occupied territories. Soviet historians spoke of 10 million (772), modern Russian researchers give a figure of 13.5-14 million civilians, to which should be added 2.5 million killed prisoners of war (the latter figure is clearly underestimated) (773) . There is, however, another, even more appalling assessment. According to these calculations, the occupied areas had a total population of 88 million before the war, and 55 million remained by the time of liberation (774). Even if we make an allowance for the evacuation of part of the population, for conscription into the Red Army, for those who

fortunate enough to subsequently return from the Nazi camps, the figure of civilian losses will be more than 20 million.

It is strange, but with all due respect to Comrade Stalin (A. Dyukov decorated each chapter of his book with an epigraph taken from the speeches and speeches of the Leader of the Peoples), the author forgot to quote Stalin's well-known words that "as a result of the German invasion, the Soviet Union irretrievably lost in **battles with the Germans, and also thanks to the German occupation and the deportation of Soviet people to German penal servitude, about seven million people.** Seven million along with the losses of the Armed Forces, and not **"more than 20 million civilian losses."** Let us take into account that even A. Dyukov does not believe in everything to his idol, and we will look carefully at the sources.

772 is the textbook "History of the CPSU" of 1970. 773 - this is the same "new Krivosheev", which was discussed above. But the most interesting is 774. The source of the "terrifying estimate" of the population of the occupied territories before and after the war turned out to be Signor J. Boffa ("History of the Soviet Union", translated from Italian, M., Progress, 1980). Where could an Italian in 1980 get the information that Soviet historians were not allowed to access? However, what kind of "signor" is he? It would be more correct to say "Comrade Giuseppe". Moscow correspondent for the newspaper Unita. Unique figures could be obtained by him in a single place - at the next briefing in the organization that supported the Italian Communist Party all these years.

Let us return, however, from Comrade Giuseppe's "terrible appraisals" to Comrade Dyukov. If the first question of importance (**"how many civilians were killed in the occupied territories"**) takes up half a page, then what is the entire book filled with? At first glance, by what was promised: screaming and crying. Moreover, sometimes the "reminder book" begins to degenerate into a short course for novice sadists: **"on the outskirts of a village near Bialystok, five corpses of women were stuck on five pointed stakes. The corpses were naked, with open bellies, cut off breasts and severed heads. The heads of women were lying in a pool of blood along with the corpses of murdered children ..."** Sometimes - in some kind of exercise in black humor. How do you, for example, such a passage: **"... they took long**

daggers, rolled up the sleeves of their tunics, holding weapons at the ready. Their appearance was disgusting. As if possessed, loudly whooping, with foam on their lips, with bulging eyes, they rushed through the streets of Lvov ... "; "Hooting loudly, with foam on the lips and long (hence,

heavy!) **Daggers in the teeth...**" The very first days of the war in the description of A. Dyukov look like this: **"... The infantrymen scattered around Baranovichi like locusts. They broke into houses to profit from trophies. Where the doors were open, they killed for a sidelong glance; where the houses were locked from the inside, they killed everyone. An evil fate awaited the first Soviet prisoners of war who fell into the hands of the Germans. On Pionerskaya Street, Wehrmacht soldiers tied four captured Red Army soldiers to poles, put hay**

under their feet, doused them with fuel and burned them alive (12). Number 12 is a reference to p. 169 of A. Schneer's book Captivity. Perhaps there is a typographical marriage here, and Dyukov had another page indicated in the manuscript, but in the copy of "Captivity" that I have on the shelf with the author's inscription, there are no indicated words on page 169. But this little thing is not important - something else is

noteworthy. By a strange coincidence, on page 169 you can read the following: **"Usually, from tens and hundreds to several thousand people were placed at collection points. The protection of these points consisted of only 2-10 soldiers. The small number of guards was explained by the fact that, according to NKVD intelligence officers, "there are decadent moods among the prisoners of war, and prisoners of war, having full opportunity to escape, do not leave the camps ... in the village of Krivopolye they are guarded by only 6 guards"**

How can you believe that several hundred (or even thousands) young men, guarded by a couple of guards, "having full opportunity to escape", sat and patiently waited for the moment when they were burned alive or impaled? With all this, a nightmarish incident with the burning of four prisoners in Baranovichi could well have taken place in reality. I fully admit this - for the simple reason that there were 3 million soldiers and officers in the invading army. Among so many armed men

inevitably, statistically inevitable, several thousand mentally deranged sadists had to be recruited, whose heads, under conditions of extreme stress, such as war, finally "fell off the roof". However, Comrade Dyukov "with tears and screams" is trying to induce his readers into an insane state - and all this only in order to present these cases, rare for the situation of the victorious offensive of the Wehrmacht in the first weeks of the war, by the NORM. General rule. Moreover, as a rule, allegedly direct prescribed by the orders of the German command.

Dyukov's book begins with "live pictures" of this kind: "...

Erich von Manstein was thinking about all the beautiful German land; tenderness made his throat constrict. Duty to the motherland demanded to leave it; the general and his soldiers had to go to fight in the wild eastern lands inhabited by numerous hordes of subhumans (A. Dyukov repeats with some manic persistence, almost on every page - allegedly on behalf of German soldiers and generals, talking about Russians - this word : "subhumans", "subhumans", "subhumans" ...). ***General von Manstein recalled his beautiful homeland. At that time, in the divisions of his 56th tank corps, the officers were read out the order of the command of the mandatory extermination of political workers, Jews and the Soviet intelligentsia*** (emphasized by me. - ***M.S.***). I don't know what Manstein was thinking

about on the evening of June 21, 1941, and what caused his "throat to catch." I am not into spiritualism. But now everyone can read Manstein's most famous memoirs ("Lost Victories") if they wish: ***"... A few days before the start of the***

offensive, we received the OKW order, which later became known as the "commissar order". Its essence was that it ordered the immediate execution of all captured political commissars of the Red Army - carriers of the Bolshevik ideology. From the point of view of international law, political commissars could hardly

enjoy privileges spreading on military personnel. They certainly weren't soldiers. I would hardly consider as a soldier, for example, a Gauleiter assigned to me as a political overseer ... But no matter what opinion

we did not adhere to the status of commissars from the point of view of international law, their execution after being captured in battle contradicted all ideas about soldier morality.

The execution of this order threatened not only the honor of the troops, but also their morale. I was therefore compelled to report to my superior that this order would not be carried out in my troops. I acted in this with the consent of the unit commanders, and in my corps I did just that. However, naturally, my bosses were in complete agreement with my opinion (emphasis added by me. - ***M.S.***). ***Attempts to cancel this order led to success only much later*** (the order was canceled in March 1942. - ***M.S.***), ***when it became clear that the only result of the "order on commissars" was that the commissars, in the most cruel ways, forced the troops to fight until last..."***

You can, of course, not believe what Manstein writes. But then it is completely incomprehensible - why should one believe in the visions of Dyukov? In any case, the notorious "order on commissars" ordered that it was not at all the "Soviet intelligentsia" and not even the communists as such that they were to be shot, but exclusively and only captured political workers of the Red Army, that is, armed men who, by the power of the party word, as well as TT pistols were obliged to prevent even the slightest thought of captivity among ordinary Red Army soldiers. Moreover, on June 8, 1941 (i.e., even before the start of hostilities on the Eastern Front), the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Brauchitsch issued an Addendum to the "order on commissars", according to which "a prerequisite for taking measures against each political commissar is openly ***manifested or intended actions directed against the German Armed Forces.***" And if we have already begun to read Manstein's memoirs, then it has

it makes sense to flip two more pages:

"... Already on this first day, we had to get acquainted with the methods by which the war was waged on the Soviet side. One of our reconnaissance patrols, cut off by the enemy, was later found by our troops - it was cut out and brutally mutilated. My adjutant and I traveled extensively to areas where we could still

to be part of the enemy, and we decided not to surrender alive into the hands of this enemy ... "

From Manstein, a flight of creative imagination takes Dyukov to the location of the units of the 2nd Tank Group of the Wehrmacht: "... ***In***

front of the sapper regiment lined up by the line, the commanders read out the order of the Fuhrer and the Wehrmacht high command. It was difficult to read in the rapidly gathering twilight, and the Hauptmann shone a flashlight on the paper; the uneven light gave his face a vaguely sinister expression...

The soldiers knew that at the same time the same words were being uttered all over the Eastern Front. The Fuhrer's order is read in the neighboring infantry divisions, in the tank units prepared for the strike Private Otto Tyshler peered

into the eastern bank of the Bug. On the entire vast front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, millions of similar German soldiers looked east. There, behind the boundary pillars, there was a rich, generous, fertile land. At the whim of history, this beautiful land was inhabited by stupid and dirty Russians, mixed with countless Asian savages ... these geek Slavs ... Judeo-Bolshevik non-humans ... subhuman ... Slavic-Asian hordes ... "Now carefully close Dyukov's book, put it in the trash, wash our hands, rinse throat and nose, ventilate the room. After that, we

will try to deal with those orders that were read (or never read!) to Wehrmacht soldiers in general, and to the soldiers of the Guderian Tank Group in particular. The word "figure out" (as opposed to "shouting and crying") implies a certain mental effort, so do not blame me, dear reader - the quotes will be long and ponderous. The requirements of the "Directive on the Conduct of Troops in Russia" (approved by the Wehrmacht High Command on May 19, 1941, the text is stored in the State Military Archive of Germany under the registration number BA MA, RW4 / v. 524) were to be brought to the attention of each soldier. Here is the document, from first to last word:

"The High Command of the Wehrmacht. Directive on the conduct of troops in Russia.

1. Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of the National Socialist German people. Germany is fighting against its harmful outlook and its bearers.

2. This struggle requires an unceremonious and energetic opposition to the Bolshevik instigators, partisans, saboteurs, Jews and the complete elimination of any active and passive resistance.

3. In relation to all

employees of the Red Army - including prisoners - it is necessary to exercise special caution and the sharpest vigilance, since it is necessary to reckon with the insidious methods of waging a struggle. Particularly impenetrable, unpredictable, treacherous and insensitive are the Asian soldiers of the Red Army.

4. When military units are taken prisoner, their leadership should be immediately separated from subordinates.

5. A German soldier finds himself in the Soviet Union in the face of a non-uniform population. The USSR is a state formation that combines many Slavic, Caucasian and Asian peoples, holding together on the violence of the Bolshevik rulers. Jewry is widely represented in the USSR. 6. A significant part of the Russian

population, especially the rural population impoverished due to the influence of the Bolshevik system, has an internal rejection of Bolshevism. In non-Bolshevik Russian people, national self-consciousness, associated with a deep religious feeling, will most often find joy and gratitude for liberation from Bolshevism in religious forms. Thanksgiving prayers or processions should not be stopped or interfered with in any case. 7. In conversations with the population and in

behavior with women, the greatest caution should be exercised. Many Russians understand German but do not speak it. Enemy intelligence will be especially active in [Wehrmacht] occupied territory in order to obtain information about militarily important equipment and activities. Any thoughtlessness, underestimation of the enemy and gullibility can therefore have the most severe consequences.

8. Material values of all kinds and spoils of war, especially - food and fodder, fuel and clothing - must be protected and protected. Any waste or loss harms the troops. Robbery is punished under military law with the heaviest sentences. 9. Be careful with captured food! Water can only be consumed in boiled form (typhus, cholera). Each touch to the inhabitants is fraught with medical dangers. Protecting one's own health is the duty of a soldier.

10. For Reichs banknotes and coins, as well as for German small change coins in denominations of 1 and 2 pfennig, as well as 1,2,5 and 10 Reichspfennig, a mandatory acceptance applies. It is forbidden to pay with other German money."

Where are the "subhumans", "geek Slavs", "dirty Russians" here? The mortal enemy is clearly and unequivocally defined as "Bolshevism", "its harmful worldview and its bearers." The object of the struggle is not at all "Russian subhumans" (there are no such words in the text), but "Bolshevik instigators, partisans, saboteurs". But is there an army in the world in which the soldiers would not be required to "unceremoniously and vigorously counter partisans and saboteurs"? The only national group that is unequivocally ranked among the enemies are the Jews. In relation to everyone else, it is prescribed to observe "the greatest caution", in the literal sense of the word "do not touch the inhabitants", to respect the religious customs of the population. For robberies, "the heaviest sentences" are promised. I don't know about you, but it seems to me that if the Russian army in Chechnya strictly followed such a "directive on the conduct of troops" (of course, with the replacement of the word "Bolshevism" with the word "terrorism"), then dozens of blood would be shed there times less...

It makes sense to quote one more document. Although it is not directly related to the events of the beginning of the war, the document is interesting in that it shows the evolution of the views of the Wehrmacht command on how to interact with the population of the occupied regions of the USSR. We are talking about the memo "The Ten Commandments of the German Soldier", distributed among the troops in 1943 by the command

Army Group South. Each "commandment" was also given a short explanation, but for lack of space I skip all comments:

- 1. Always maintain your authority among the local population.**
- 2. Be fair. 3. Reward the Russian if he does a good job. 4. Don't hit the Russians. 5. Avoid any statements about the Russians that make it clear that the Germans in relation to them are the superior race. 6. Respect Russian women and girls just like you respect the Germans.**
- 7. Refrain from unauthorized confiscations and illegal requisitions of food and property. 8. When talking to Russians, always distinguish between Russians and Bolsheviks.**
- 9. Be discreet when talking about religion with Russians.**
- 10. In dealing with Russians, show calmness and self-respect: this way you will achieve more than shouting and**

cursing. Of course, there is always some "gap" between orders and their practical execution. And although discipline is rightfully considered a characteristic national trait of the Germans, it would be too reckless to draw conclusions about the behavior of Wehrmacht soldiers only on the basis of "directives" and "commandments". Fortunately, we have lived to a time when both the stories of ordinary people who survived the German occupation and the previously secret reports of the military command can be published. Due to lack of time and space, we will confine ourselves to two testimonies. They refer to the events of the first weeks of the war and are especially remarkable because they were written by opponents - in the most original sense of the word "enemy". They fought almost opposite each other: the 9th Army Corps (Army Group Center) advanced in the zone from Bialystok to Minsk, and the remnants of the defeated 3rd Army of the Western Front broke through from the encirclement in the direction of Minsk - Mogilev. At the end of June 1941, the commander of the 9th AK, General

Gayer, reported
higher command:

"... Most soldiers treat the population good-naturedly, although the need to select food and horses, as well as other reasons, may contribute to some acts

cruelty.

The attitude of the population ranges from surprising indifference to usually fearful curiosity and gullibility. Due to too much destruction, there are many refugees moving with all their belongings, but no robberies of houses have been noticed. On the territory that formerly belonged to Poland (i.e., in the so-called "western Belarus." - M.S.), German soldiers were enthusiastically greeted as liberators. But even on the former Russian territory, it happens that they throw flowers and greet them in a friendly way. The confidence of the population is manifested primarily in the fact that the buried food and other property is dug up again when we arrive, since the German soldier, of course, will not take it away.

There were no acts of sabotage by the population in the corps zone. On the contrary, in cases where the frightened population dares to say anything at all, much dissatisfaction with the collective-farm system and all Bolshevik management is expressed. In general, the command of the corps regards the danger of a guerrilla war with the participation of the population as small. People in the areas we have passed through, in their way of life and statements, do not give the impression of those who can fanatically adhere to any idea at all.

And here is an excerpt from the report, which on August 1, 1941, after his exit from the encirclement, was submitted to the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army by a member of the Military Council of the 3rd Army, army commissar of the 2nd

rank N. I. Biryukov: ***"... From the first days of the war even before the fighting on the Dnieper, the Germans tried to carry out a policy in the countryside that would not embitter the peasants against the Germans. Therefore, the first period, if it can be called that, was characterized by the fact that the Germans did not commit robberies and violence in the villages. During this period, the Germans told the peasants that "they are also for socialism, but without communists and Jews." In the same period, the Germans took only eggs, milk from the peasants, sometimes they took cl***

use, did not take. They didn't climb into the peasant chests and didn't rob

the peasants ... " As you can see, the German general describes the attitude of the German army towards the population even in more critical tones ("**the need to select food and horses can contribute to some acts of cruelty**"), while the Soviet commissar claims that in the first weeks of the war, Wehrmacht soldiers took from the peasants only what they could eat and drink on the go (a mug of milk, a raw egg...). Against the background of this reality, Dyukov's delusional visions ("**where the doors were open, they killed for a sideways glance; where the houses were locked from the inside, they killed everyone**") look

completely wild. Now let's move on to the infamous order of May 13, 1941 "On the application of military jurisdiction (sometimes translated as "on a special procedure for jurisdiction") in the Barbarossa area." According to A. Dyukov, it was this order that the nameless Hauptmann read to Guderian's soldiers, and "**the uneven light of the lantern gave his face a vaguely ominous expression.**" Comrade Dyukov does not work well. Hackly. "Under Comrade Stalin, they didn't work like that ..." It was necessary to place an unknown hauptmann with a flashlight on some other sector of the Eastern Front. Since when the 2nd Tank Group is mentioned, the following fragment from Guderian's memoirs immediately comes

to mind: "**... Shortly before the start of the war in the East, an order from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces regarding the treatment of civilians and prisoners of war was received directly into the corps and divisions. This order abolished the mandatory application of military criminal laws to military personnel guilty of robberies, murders and violence against the civilian population and prisoners of war, and transferred the imposition of punishment at the discretion of immediate superiors and commanders (hereinafter, it is emphasized by me. - M.S.) . Such an order could only contribute to the disintegration of discipline. Evidently, it aroused the same feeling in the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces, since Field Marshal von Brauchitsch appended to the order instructions that this order should not be applied if it created a danger of undermining discipline.**

In my opinion and in the unanimous opinion of my corps commanders, the order created such a danger in advance, so I forbade its distribution to the division and ordered it to be sent back to Berlin. This order was never applied in my Tank Group... Looking back at the past, one can only regret with pain in the heart that both of these orders (meaning also the "order on commissars" - M.S.) were not already detained in the main command of the ground troops. Then many brave and impeccable soldiers would not have to experience the bitterness of the greatest shame that fell on the Germans ... "

The beaten Nazi general is lying and trying to whitewash his past? May be. Or maybe not. In any case, Brauchitsch's "disciplinary order", in which he emphasized that "the main task of the troops is to fight an armed enemy", and in fact transferred the question of the application of the "special jurisdiction order" to the discretion of the commanders of armies and corps, really existed. Moreover, already at the end of July 1941, the Wehrmacht high command gave the order to destroy all copies of the "special jurisdiction order" in all official instances. The order "on special jurisdiction", of course, contributed to the decomposition of discipline, and in that

part of it that prescribed reprisals against civilians (***"When circumstances do not allow you to quickly identify individual culprits, against settlements from which the Wehrmacht was treacherously or treacherously attacked, collective executions are carried out immediately on the orders of an officer in a position not lower than the battalion commander"***) was, without a doubt, criminal. And the fact that the Wehrmacht was by no means the only army in the world that responded with "collective

reprisals" to attacks by unknown persons does not in any way change this assessment: a criminal order that contradicts all norms and ideas about law. However, even this criminal order, which was soon canceled, and in a number of formations was never used, by no means freed Wehrmacht soldiers from responsibility for unauthorized reprisals against civilians, and even more so, did not call for robberies and rape:

“... The judge determines whether a disciplinary punishment is sufficient if a serviceman is held accountable or whether judicial intervention is necessary. The Judge only prosecutes actions against local residents in court martial when discipline or protection of the troops is required. We are talking, for example, about serious offenses that are based on sexual promiscuity, stem from criminal inclinations, or are a sign that the troops are threatened with savagery. Crimes are to be punished, due to which, to the detriment of one's own troops, shelter, food supplies or other trophy property are senselessly destroyed ... ”

Almost simultaneously with the "Order on Special Jurisdiction", on June 7, 1941, Bakke, State Secretary of the German Ministry of Food and Agriculture, signed Instructions for Civil Administration Workers in the East. The document is voluminous, but even some of its fragments quite clearly characterize the real content of the plans for the forced colonization and exploitation of Russia. colonization and exploitation. No less, but no more than:

“... Do not talk, but act. You will never speak Russian and convince with words. He knows how to speak better than you, because he is a born dialectician and has inherited a “tendency for philosophizing” ... You must be people of action who, without any debate, without long fruitless conversations and without philosophizing, establish and carry out the necessary measures. Then the Russian will gladly submit to you. ...Stay

away from the Russians, they are not Germans, but Slavs. Don't have any drinking parties with the Russians. Do not enter into any relations with women and girls of enterprises subordinate to you. Take care to maintain the authority of the German. Raise it with your calm, businesslike orders, firm decisions, ridicule debating and ignoramuses. ... Russian

youth for two decades was brought up in the communist spirit. She has no other upbringing. Therefore, it would be pointless to punish her for the past. We do not want to convert the Russians to the path of national socialism, we only want to make them a tool in our hands. You

must subdue the youth by pointing out to them their tasks, vigorously tackle them and mercilessly punish them if they sabotage or fail to fulfill these tasks..."

"But what about the "General Plan "Ost""? Indeed, where would we be without it... Not a single article and not a single book could do without mentioning this cannibalistic plan for the physical extermination of the Russian people. So the compilers of the "new Krivosheev" in 2001 write about ***the "master plan" Ost "- the monstrous program document of the Nazi genocide."***

The master plan "Ost" (East) never existed as a directive document. Moreover, it did not exist at all in any finished form. Under this name usually goes one of the documents (the only one found and presented at the Nuremberg trials) of the development of the POST-WAR plan !!! arrangement of the vast territory of Eastern Europe in the interests of the Third Reich. We are talking about "Remarks and proposals on the general plan "Ost", signed on April 27, 1942 by a certain E. Wetzel, head of the colonization department of the 1st main political department of the "Eastern Ministry". I cannot quote this document in its entirety for two reasons. First, it is very large in volume and boring in form. Secondly, lengthy arguments about the comparative "racial biological value" and the results of "anthropometric studies" of various Eastern European peoples are not only disgusting, but also directly fall under the articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Therefore, we will have to confine ourselves to only a few fragments of the concrete proposals of the compiler of the "Remarks and Suggestions". So: ***"... At present, it is already possible to more or less definitely establish as the eastern border of colonization (in its northern and middle parts) a line running***

from Lake Ladoga to the Valdai Upland and further to Bryansk. It can be understood from the plan that this is not a program to be implemented immediately, but that, on the contrary, the settlement of this area by the Germans should take place within about 30 years after the end of the war (hereinafter, it is emphasized by me. - M.S.) . According to the plan, 14 million

local residents. However, whether they will lose their national traits and whether they will undergo Germanization within the envisaged 30 years is more than doubtful, since, again, according to

plan under consideration, the number of German settlers is very slightly...

In addition, it seems to me that the plan does not take into account that the local population of non-German origin will multiply very rapidly over a period of 30 years ... Given all this, one must proceed from the fact that the number of residents of non-German origin in these territories will significantly exceed 51 million people. It will amount to 60-65 million people. This leads to the conclusion that the number of people who must either remain in these territories or be evicted is much higher than provided for in the plan ... It is necessary to briefly consider the question of the attitude towards the Russians, about which almost nothing is said in the general

plan.

First of all, it is necessary to provide for the division of the territory inhabited by Russians into various political regions with their own governing bodies in order to ensure in each of them a separate national development ... The Russian from the Gorky General Commissariat must be instilled with the feeling that he

something different from the Russian from the Tula general commissariat. There is no doubt that such an administrative fragmentation of Russian territory and the systematic separation of individual regions will prove to be one of the means of combating the strengthening of the Russian people ... In these regions we must consciously pursue a policy of reducing the population. By means of propaganda, especially through the press, radio, cinema, leaflets, brief pamphlets, reports, etc., we must constantly instill in the population the idea that it is harmful to have many children. It is necessary to show how much money the upbringing of children costs and what could be purchased with this money ... Along with this, the widest propaganda of contraceptives should be launched. It is necessary to establish a wide production of these funds. The distribution of these drugs and abortion should not be restricted in any way. Every effort should be made to expand the network of abortion clinics...

Apart from these measures in the field of health, there should be no obstacles to divorce. Assistance should not be given to illegitimate children. No tax privileges should be allowed for those with many children, no financial assistance should be provided to them in the form of wage increases ... For us Germans, it is important to weaken the Russian people to such an extent that they will no longer be able to prevent us from establishing German domination in Europe . We can achieve this goal in the above ways...” Yes, this is a project of the COLONIZATION program. Forced

colonization. The colonization program does not provide for any Bavarian beer with Hanoverian sausages for the natives. Gas chambers, mass executions and crematorium ovens are also NOT included in this program. The promotion of abortion and the distribution of condoms in order to reduce the Russian population

in the interests of the German colonists, as well as the fragmentation of the single Russian people into residents of pseudo-independent "bantustans", fully reveals the mercenary plans of the colonialists. Can this be called a "monstrous policy document of genocide"? The question is moot. Although if many people, religious leaders and political parties consider abortion a form of murder, then why not call the "Plan Ost" a program of genocide? The dispute about the legal validity of the use of the term "genocide" in this case is of no interest to me. It seems to me much more important to emphasize the following, absolutely indisputable fact: this memorandum written in April 1942 by a second-rate

did not and could not have an official.

And if huts were burning in the occupied territory and the blood of innocent people was flowing like a river, then this is not at all because some clerk of the "Eastern Ministry" wrote projects for "the broadest propaganda of contraceptives" **for** a period of 30 years ***"after the end of the war."***

All this is very strange. At first sight. Why invent fictitious crimes when Hitler and his henchmen committed so many real grave crimes that they

listing would not be enough for 576 pages of 576 books? Why indulge in "breaking bad", inventing some fantastic figures of the losses of the civilian population of the USSR, when even the most minimal estimates indicate that the occupiers and their accomplices exterminated millions of people. Millions. That, relatively speaking, 5 million killed children, women and the elderly is not enough? Is it necessary to "need" 15 or 25 million in order to recognize Hitler as a cannibal? Any Wehrmacht soldier, even the one who did not touch a Russian woman with a finger and treated her child to a chocolate bar (and there were such soldiers, and not in small numbers), is guilty. Guilty of having come with a weapon to a place where no one called him. Guilty of bringing SS punishers with him. This guilt was admitted by the German people themselves. Why is it necessary to strain a morbid fantasy, inventing "foam on the lips, long daggers in the teeth and bulging eyes"? ***"If the stars are lit, then someone needs it. This means that it is necessary..."*** I believe that

quite specific answers can be given to all the previous abundance of question marks. There are at least THREE REASONS why Soviet and post-Soviet propaganda passionately wanted to exaggerate the number of civilian casualties in the occupied regions of the USSR and find non-existent "plans for Hitler's genocide of the Russian people." These reasons have a very different "weight" - from almost a whim, petty redneck, to the most important link in the entire Soviet mythology. I propose to consider them in reverse order, from the tertiary to the main. The third in importance (but at the same time the first in chronology) should be recognized as the "Jewish question". Yes, he is the one. Ilf and Petrov made a big mistake. Everything turned out exactly the opposite: there are almost no Jews in

Russia, and the ill-fated "Jewish question" is still

There is.

I perfectly understand that to a normal person, and even not familiar with the "circumstances of the case", my assumption may seem very strange. I am ready to apologize in advance to a normal person for what he just thought about my normality. Indeed, from the standpoint of common sense it is difficult to understand why the Great Soviet Encyclopedia has an article "Auschwitz", but this article does not contain the word "Jew" in any case. Normal person

he will never guess what kind of strange sign was depicted on the tombstone in the city of Nevel (Pskov region). And this is the hexagonal "Star of David" over the mass grave of the tortured Jews, which the vigilant authorities "cut off" to a five-pointed state. Because "there is nothing to stick out here ...".

A normal person (unless he has seen it himself on the TV screen) will never believe that on April 19, 2001, several dozen deputies of the State Duma ("the best people in the country") refused to stand up and observe a minute of silence in memory of the victims of the genocide (April 19 1943 the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto began). However, in any case, a minute of silence did not happen, since the hall was resounding with noisy squabbles, wild cries of Zhirinovskiy and Shandybin, and the voice of the presiding officer, our incomparable L. Sliska, amplified by microphones, urged everyone to "decide on this issue on their own."

But as? How to decide on "this issue", if the need to honor the memory of millions of innocent people killed is a question? In addition to the school history textbook, most of the deputies and voters did not read anything. Not a word was said about the genocide of Jews in the school textbook (as well as in any Soviet university textbook). The most inquisitive could buy the statistical collection "Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century", published in 2001. And what could they read there? But this:

"... The war unleashed by the Nazis against the USSR was a war of extermination of entire peoples, primarily the Slavic, Russian population ... The barbaric actions of the Nazi invaders to exterminate the Soviet people, especially the Slavic peoples and, above all, the Russian people, claimed millions of human lives ... Not only the Slavic peoples were subject to destruction, but also other peoples living on the territory of the USSR. The most cruel was the attitude towards the Jews, whom the Germans exterminated in the first place, along with the

communists ... " If professional historians, candidates and doctors of science really believe that the Jews were exterminated" along with other peoples "and" on an equal basis with the communists," then they did not scholars, but ignoramuses and impostors. If they know the truth, but at the same

“the extermination of the Soviet people, especially the Slavic peoples and, first of all, the Russian people,”

then they are liars. Hitler did not hatch plans to "reduce the Jewish population for 30 years after the end of the war by distributing condoms and promoting abortion." He did not intend to "reduce" this number at all. Jews, everyone - from young to old, from infants

to gray-bearded elders, were doomed to complete, wholesale extermination. This sentence was not linked to any economic or political expediency. Neither the religion of the victim, nor her behavior, nor even the consent to cooperation was taken into account. The massacres of Jews began in the very first days (not the first weeks - days!) after the Nazi invasion of the territory of the USSR. Where the total extermination of people, for whom even the executioners did not admit any guilt, except for Jewish origin, was carried out with German organization and method, the victims could count on a quick and “easy” execution. Where local "activists" took the initiative, Jews could only dream of being shot...

By June 22, 1941, about 4 million Jews lived in the territory that was to become occupied (including 1.9 million in the territories of the Baltic states, eastern Poland, and Bessarabia annexed in 1939–1940). About 1 million Jews were able to evacuate to the East (mainly from the regions of the left-bank Ukraine and central Russia, where the Germans arrived only in the autumn of 1941). Of the 3 million Jews remaining at the

disposal of the invaders, at least 2.83 million people died. The surviving 150-200 thousand Jews (about 5% of the original number) survived not at all because the Germans showed leniency towards one of them. Just as part of complex political games, Hitler returned Bessarabia with Bukovina to Romania, and even gave the so-called "Transnistria", that is, the territory of Ukraine between the Dniester and the Southern Bug. And if at the beginning of the war the extermination of Jews by the Romanian troops and the gendarmerie was massive and extremely savage, then after the defeat at Stalingrad, the Romanian leadership stopped the massacres and even allowed delivery to Jewish

ghetto food aid from international organizations. As for the zone of German occupation, almost all the Jews who did not have time to evacuate died there. Before the war,

25,000 Jews lived in the hero-city of Brest. Only 19 people survived until liberation. Not 19 thousand, but 19 people (six of them were saved by the family of Polina Makarenko, hiding in her house). Such families of the "Righteous of the World" were found in almost every occupied city and town. To date, the Israeli memorial and research center "Yad Vashem" has established more than 18 thousand names of people who saved Jews during the years of the genocide. This greatest and unparalleled feat of self-sacrifice in history (punishers unconditionally shot all those involved for harboring Jews) in statistical terms gives an insignificant fraction of a percentage of those who survived. Moreover, several tens of thousands of Jews survived until the liberation, fighting in partisan detachments. By equating the Jews with the communists (*"the*

Germans exterminated the Jews on a par with the communists"), the historians from the General Staff showed, at best, deep ignorance. Communists in the occupied territory were required to register with the local commandant's office. That's all. If they did not interfere with the lives of the Germans, then they lived relatively calmly until the arrival of the Red Army. After that, they were again registered - this time in the NKVD. The order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 001683 of December 12, 1941, with additions of February 18, 1942, required only "provide undercover surveillance" of such twice registered communists. The Jews were driven to the anti-tank ditches not at all for the purpose of "undercover surveillance" ...

In this matter, Russian historians of 2001 merely continued the traditions of 60 years ago. In the very first days of the war, Soviet propaganda was at a loss in front of a hail of German leaflets with a short but expressive slogan: "Beat the Jewish political officer, his face asks for a brick." Nothing better than the pose of a frightened ostrich has been invented. Any mention of the genocide of the Jews began to be carefully deleted from the newspaper pages. Today, the history of "editing" the ChGK message about the atrocities of the Nazi occupiers in Kyiv is known in detail. On December 25, 1943, the text was drawn up and endorsed by the chairman of the ChGK Shvernik

official report, in which it was said about Babi Yar that "the Nazi bandits carried out mass brutal extermination of the Jewish population." Then, according to a rigidly established procedure, the text of the ChGK's message was sent for approval to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. On February 2, 1944 (after a whole month!) the text was returned to the ChGK with an amendment made by the head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, comrade G. F. Aleksandrov (future venerable scientist, academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences). "Jewish population" was deleted and replaced with "thousands of peaceful Soviet citizens". Shvernik understood the hint, and there were no more Jews in the reports of the ChGK (only in the act on Minsk - and

this city and its environs became the place of extermination of 100 thousand Jews - the existence of a ghetto was mentioned). On January 27, 1945, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front liberated the Auschwitz death camp. The fact that hundreds of thousands of Jews were killed in Auschwitz was immediately established by the army command. The political department of the front created a special commission, which by February 5 presented a detailed report, which, in particular, noted the destruction of 600 thousand Jews from Hungary in Auschwitz in the summer of 1944. However, the official report of the ChGK appeared only three months

later, on May 7, 1945. It followed from it that not Jews, but "millions of citizens of all European countries" were systematically exterminated in Auschwitz. Once a liar is forced to lie further and more. If not Jews, but "peaceful Soviet citizens" were shot in Babi Yar and hundreds of other such places, then it was necessary to come up with some kind of explanation, some kind of motivation for the committed atrocity. In the Soviet era, there was a "class approach" in use. Fascism was declared a "terrorist dictatorship of the big monopoly bourgeoisie", in accordance with this logic it was written: "Tens of thousands of Stakhanovite workers and advanced collective farmers became victims of the Nazi executioners." Since today the mention of "Stakhanovites and advanced collective farmers" will rather cause a wry smirk, the falsifiers had to switch to "national rails",

that is, to attribute to the Germans the intention to physically destroy the Russian people. In comparison with such absurdity, even the classic Soviet formu

slaves") is much closer to the truth. And if we remove the inappropriate epithet "freedom-loving" and ignore the fact that the legal status of the Soviet collective farmer was somewhere between the state slave of ancient China and the serf of the late 18th century, then everything falls into place. Yes, this is exactly what Hitler wanted - to turn Russia into a colony, and drive the Russians into the position of "white negroes." To achieve this criminal goal, they killed all those who resisted. Not everyone in a row (they were killed exclusively and only Jews), but all those who resisted.

The specific "weight" of the genocide of Jews in the total volume of repressions of the occupiers varied in time and space. In the first weeks and months of the war, the destruction of the Jewish population was practically the only component of the mass terror of the Nazis and their accomplices in the occupied territories. Almost all descriptions of shootings and executions in the summer-autumn of 1941, unless they are fictional, in reality refer to the massacres of Jews. In the future, in connection with the deployment of the partisan movement, the non-Jewish population became more and more victims of the punishers. But even in Belarus, in this "partisan republic", where the total number of civilian victims, according to the ChGK, was 1,547 thousand people, half of the dead (about 730 thousand) were Jews. In the Baltic States and Moldova, the concepts of "occupier terror" and "Jewish genocide" can practically be equated. In the east of Ukraine and in the occupied regions of Russia, the proportion of Jews in the total population was much lower, moreover, many managed to evacuate. In these areas of the occupied territory of the USSR, the non-Jewish population predominates in the total number of victims.

Having finished with the discussion of the "Jewish component", let's move on to the second, incomparably more important reason for the desperate desire to find a non-existent plan for the "genocide of the Russian people", which was and is being manifested by communist and neo-Stalinist historical propaganda. Even

the paranoid Hitler was not a clinical idiot, and he perfectly understood that rolls and sausages would not come out of the ground on their own, someone should work on the ground, but replace Russian (Ukrainian, Belarusian, Moldavian) peasants with German

colonists, if planned, then only **“within 30 years after the end of the war,”** but certainly not in the summer of 1941, in the midst of hostilities. Pragmatism and prudence are rightly considered a national trait of the Germans, and the simplest and most obvious calculation suggested that peace in the rear was the easiest and cheapest way to ensure without needlessly exacerbating relations with the local population. Even if someone in the leadership of the Wehrmacht and the German occupation administration looked at the Russians as "Slavic-Asiatic degenerates", the requirements of discipline forced him to restrain his base feelings. At least until the time when Russia is really and finally defeated. The reasons why the occupied territories

were eventually flooded with seas of blood cannot be understood without taking into account the actions of the second participant in the war, and fakes like the notorious "German soldier's memo" ("kill every Russian, don't stop if there is an old man or a woman, a girl **or boy**") were invented just to divert attention from the intentions and actions of the Soviet leadership.

If not the "Hitler plan Ost" itself, then separate written documents of its development were preserved and were presented in Nuremberg. Stalin behaved much more circumspectly - he did not trust paper with his thoughts about the fate that he had prepared for the population of the western regions of the USSR occupied by the Germans. Nevertheless, a lot of documents and eyewitness accounts have been preserved that make it possible to quite reliably reconstruct the "Stalinist Plan

West". On July 3, 1941, on the twelfth day of the war, Stalin finally addressed his subjects with a big speech. Refusing to admit even the slightest mistake, he honestly warned: **“The war with Nazi Germany cannot be considered an ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies.”** And it was the pure truth. By that time, the two totalitarian despotisms had already managed to gain the bloody experience of mass repressions, which they brought down both on their own people and on the population of the enslaved countries of Europe. There was no doubt that the former accomplices in the robbery would equally try to turn the armed clash of their armies into unprecedented cruelty.

slaughter. In the same speech of July 3, 1941, a phrase was heard that gives the first idea of what methods Comrade Stalin intends to wage this unprecedented war: "... In the event

of a ***forced withdrawal of Red Army units, do not leave the enemy a kilogram of bread or a liter of fuel. The collective farmers must steal all the livestock, hand over the grain for safekeeping to state bodies for its removal to the rear areas. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel, which cannot be exported, must be unconditionally destroyed.***" The mere direct and precise execution

of this order (and the speech of Stalin, who by that time had already appointed himself chairman of the State Defense Committee, was precisely an order that was binding on execution) meant the starvation of millions of people in the occupied territory. True, "the severity of Russian laws is mitigated by their non-execution." The order to destroy all stocks of food and fuel was not carried out in full, but huge and diverse destruction of the life support system of the population (water pipes, power plants, elevators) was carried out in many places. You can't surprise a Russian peasant with hunger. An endless series of wars, rebellions,

raids, crop failures taught people to "cook soup from an ax." But it can be cold in Russia, and the winter of 1941-1942, unfortunately, fell very early and very frosty. This circumstance was also taken into account. On November 17, 1941, Stalin personally signed the Order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 0428: ***"... I order: 1. Destroy and burn to the ground all settlements in the rear of the***

German troops at a distance of 40-60 km in depth from the front line and 20-30 km to the right and to the left of the road. To destroy settlements within the indicated radius, immediately abandon aviation, make extensive use of artillery and mortar fire, teams of scouts, skiers and trained sabotage groups equipped with Molotov cocktails, grenades and explosives ... "The list of" Egyptian executions "was not exhausted by the cold and which Stalin decided to send to the

civilian population of the occupied

districts. Even the mass burning of houses, after which the inhabitants found themselves with children in a 30-degree frost, can be considered harmless fun - in comparison with the "people's war" that the Soviet leadership fomented by all means available to it.

Already on July 1, 1941, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus issued a directive in which it called for ***“destroying enemies wherever they can be overtaken, killing them with everything that comes to hand: with an ax, scythe, crowbars, pitchforks, knives ... When destroying enemies do not be afraid to use any means - strangle, chop, burn, poison the fascist monsters ...***

”. The military authorities did not lag behind the party authorities either. On August 6, 1941, the former people's commissar for defense, Marshal Timoshenko - this time as commander of the troops of the Western Front - addressed "to all the inhabitants of the territories occupied by the enemy." The marshal, having lost his army, having lost tens of thousands of tanks, aircraft, guns, now demanded the following actions from unarmed people: ***“ ... Attack and destroy German transports and columns, burn and destroy bridges, set fire to houses and forests ... Beat the enemy, torture him to death starvation, burn it with fire, destroy it with a bullet and a grenade... Set fire to***

warehouses, destroy the fascists like rabid dogs...” Yes, I know how it should be properly called: "The earth was on fire under the feet of the occupiers." Only the earth did not burn on its own, it burned along with the inhabitants. And the slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory" is known to me. I just want to understand - to what extent does this "everything" extend? Absolutely everything? We will not stand for ANY price? And if turning your country into a scorched, deserted desert

is compatible with the concept of "victory", then whose victory is it? To achieve victory, the command of the Royal Air Force of Great Britain chose the tactics of massive night raids on German cities. Hundreds of thousands of civilians died under the ruins of houses, in the fire of fires. No sooner had the war ended than a fierce public controversy began in England on the issue of the admissibility of such inhuman treatment of women and children of the enemy. The intensity of the discussion was such that the commander of the British bomber force, General Harris, was actually forced to leave the country and retire to South Africa. Names

dead bomber pilots were refused to be included in the lists of war heroes... Why don't we even consider it possible to think about the admissibility of sacrificing OUR women and children? At the very least, the

military-operational value of guerrilla warfare, carried out with the help of a crowbar, a pitchfork, a scythe and a knife, is also doubtful. Of course, acting in this way - and paying for each slaughtered German rear with the lives of hundreds of Soviet people - it was possible to inflict some damage on the enemy's manpower. Was this the main task of the armed struggle behind enemy lines? The Wehrmacht fought on a front thousands of kilometers away from factories in Germany. And if "eggs and milk" could still be taken away from the local population, then cartridges, shells, mines, gasoline had to be transported in thousands of echelons by rail from Bavaria and Saxony to the Volga, Don and Kuban. In fact, the entire war machine of the Wehrmacht hung on a dozen "steel threads" of railways passing through the vast forests of Belarus and Bryansk. The systematic destruction of these communications could put the Germans in a difficult situation. But this is not a task that unarmed peasants with axes and pitchforks could solve ... Isn't it time to finally admit that in the eyes of Comrade Stalin, the population of the

occupied regions became waste slag, which no longer has any value: these people could not be used either as labor force, nor as a "draft contingent". Worse, these people were beyond his control, they could now have their own personal opinion and exchange it with a neighbor, they could see living foreigners and at least communicate with them with signs and gestures, they could be used by the enemy both for work and for recruitment into anti-Soviet armed formations. Dozens of years have passed since the war, and the question "Did you live in the occupied territory?" remained in the questionnaires that were filled out by millions of Soviet people, and a positive answer was considered "a stain on the biography." And even then, at the height of the war, Stalin was not at all going to stand on ceremony with this "slag", so he considered the village burned along with the inhabitants as a completely acceptable price for the murder of a couple of gaping German vacationers.

One can argue about whether there would be an army in the world whose command did not respond with cruel repressions to such calls and actions ("choke, chop, burn, poison like mad dogs"). It was not at all necessary to guess how the Wehrmacht and SS command would react. However, the Soviet leadership was not only aware that the result of the guerrilla warfare tactics they had chosen would be merciless massacres of the population - it pushed the enemy to the most brutal actions by any possible means. Wehrmacht documents, unfortunately too numerous, testify that in the very first days of

the war, already in June 1941, the advancing German troops in many places found the corpses of their soldiers, who, for a number of reasons, were captured (stragglers, wounded, crews downed planes) who were tortured with unimaginable sadistic cruelty. It seems to me absolutely incredible the assumption that the Red Army soldiers, that is, for the most part, yesterday's Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian peasants, already in the first days of the war managed to be imbued with such insane hatred. Much more realistic is the hypothesis that these crimes were committed by special NKVD teams with the aim of deliberately provoking German troops to retaliate against civilians and prisoners. The "partisan detachments" abandoned behind enemy lines also acted in the same direction, which - if we talk about the situation in 1941 - almost entirely consisted of NKVD operational officers, and not at all from teenagers and an old man with a Berdanka

who had descended from a picture of a Soviet artist. By the nature of the tasks being solved, these were actually punitive and sabotage groups, which not only provoked the Germans by their actions to retaliate against the local population, but also mercilessly cracked down on the peasants, who did not show sufficient readiness to help these "people's avengers".

Caught "between the rock and the hard place", the population began to spontaneously arm itself and create local self-defense units to protect themselves from the "partisans" and bands of armed deserters that flooded the forests. The Germans had only to take under their

control these armed groups and turn them into subordinate police forces. Stalin's instructions to turn the occupied territory into a scorched desert greatly contributed to the growth in the number of "policemen". The legendary patriarch of Soviet saboteurs, a participant in four wars, Colonel I. Starinov, in an article written in 2000, said: "It ***turned out that we ourselves pushed the local residents to the Germans ... After the slogan "drive the Germans into the cold," the Germans formed a police force of about 900 thousand . Human***". The figure itself (900 thousand) is many times overestimated, but it vividly reflects the personal impressions of the partisan war practice that "the policemen were at every turn ...".

The attitude of the population towards the "partisans from the NKVD" can be judged by the following figures, terrible in their eloquence. In Ukraine, the state security agencies left behind enemy lines and transferred 778 detachments and groups with a total number of 28,753 people there. As of August 25, 1942, there were 22 detachments, numbering 3310 people. In Belarus, out of 437 groups and detachments that were thrown behind enemy lines, 412 ceased to exist by the end of January 1942. The NKVD Directorate for the Leningrad Region sent 287 detachments with a total number of 11,733 people behind enemy lines. By the beginning of February 1942, only 60 detachments with a total strength of 1965 people had survived. All this is summed up in one short word - defeat.

By November 1942, the total number of "auxiliary police" had grown to 320 thousand people, another 48 thousand were in separate police (by type of activity - punitive) battalions. Larger formations were also created, for example, the so-called "Russian Liberation People's Army" numbering 10 thousand people, to which the Germans transferred the functions of fighting Soviet partisans in the vast territory of the Bryansk and Oryol regions. One can argue for a long time about whether it is appropriate to use the term "second civil war" in relation to the fact that in 1942-1943. took place in the occupied territory of Russia. It is not the terms that are important, what is important is that, under the harsh noise of the Bryansk forest, detachments of armed Russian people killed each other furiously, burned villages, dealt with those whom each side considered "traitor" in its own way, sparing neither the old nor the young. And about

the fact that a full-scale, monstrously brutal civil war has unfolded in Western Ukraine with the participation of the Polish Home Army, Bandera's Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Soviet partisans, Ukrainian "policemen", and there is no need to argue.

"...A shooting is already from all sides. And it's already on fire. We hid, but Galya the neighbor did not. And my uncle is gone, he went to the barn even earlier ... When everything had already calmed down, they found out that the Petrovites surrounded Staraya Rafalovka and fought the Bandera. Several Bandera people were killed, and our place, consider, was completely destroyed. And people were killed, I won't even say how many. Galya was thrown alive into the fire. We found the charred corpse of my uncle near the barn. And in the yard and

near the house there were six more burnt corpses. In our farm, only the cellar survived. In it they found Olezhka of the neighbor. He was in brand new shirt, belly ripped open with a bayonet ... "

Staraya Rafalovka is a village in the Ukrainian Polissya, near the Kovel-Sarny railway. "Petrovtsy" are partisans from the detachment of "Uncle Petya" (Colonel Anton Brinsky). Three months after the successful operation in Rafalovka, Colonel Brinsky was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union; now in Nizhny Novgorod a street and a children's library are named after him. Petersburg historian A. Gogun (from whose book the story of the massacre in Rafalovka was quoted) found several more references to this event and this Hero. So, on June 20 , **1943, the chief of staff of the partisan movement of the Rovno region**, Comrade Begma, wrote in his memorandum addressed to Malenkov and Khrushchev: ***With the development of the partisan movement in Ukraine, these groups began to***

grow rapidly at the expense of the local population ... for example, Colonel Brinsky - "Uncle Petya" - grew to 300 people, Captain Kaplun - up to 150-400 people, Major Medvedev - up to 600 people ... All the people in these groups are guarding the headquarters, preparing food, and for more than a year they have not done a single combat operation ... People are decomposing, there are many cases of unauthorized executions

innocent population, mass drinking, hooliganism, etc." In the report of the

headquarters of the UPA of the Zagrava district, the events in Staraya Rafalovka are mentioned as a completely ordinary event: **"The Bolsheviks attacked Staraya Rafalovka, which they burned down. 60 people were killed, 8 of them were regional activists. The political assistant Teterya was killed."** There was nothing out of the ordinary in this. The report of the Danube district of November 1943 noted the following episodes: **"Red gangs attacked the village of Karpilovka at night, robbed, burned and killed 183 of our peasants. The village of Dert was surrounded, robbed, and 300 pieces were taken away. livestock. November 3 again attacked with. Borovoe, burned farms that remained unburned by the Germans, and killed 20 peasants ... "** In total, during the autumn of 1943, the red partisans cracked down on the inhabitants of 29

villages of Ukrainian Polissya, the Germans burned 77 villages there over the same period ... Of course, Hitler (denoting by by this name the whole machine of fascist totalitarian despotism) is the main culprit of this tragedy. All those who died in the bloody bacchanalia of mass terror in the occupied territory of the USSR should be considered victims of fascist aggression - even if their killers spoke Russian or Ukrainian. It was Hitler's aggression that made this many years of slaughter possible, it was Hitler who gave arms into his hands, directed and kindled the fire of fratricidal war. I don't doubt it in the slightest. I just want to ask - but Comrade Stalin has nothing to do with it? Isn't he responsible for this blood? Was it not the Stalinist regime that brought the people to such insanity, in which a foreign armed enemy seemed for a moment a

Now let's move on to the most important thing. To the fire in the warehouse. A fire in a warehouse happens when a stealing supply manager needs to hide the traces of his many years of fraud. Seasoned swindlers understand that the fire should be big, "solid" and, most importantly, documented in the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the fire department. That's when under this "case" you can write off anything. Well, if the fire happened by itself, and even for a reason that does not arouse suspicion of arson - for example, from a lightning strike, then this is the most joyful day in the life of a crook ...

In 1937, a memorable year for the country, the All-Union Population Census was conducted in the USSR. However, the population did not learn anything about the results of this large-scale work. The results of the census were recognized as "wrecking", the final reports were classified, the leaders of the scientific team that conducted the census were arrested. In January 1939, a second population census was carried out, and even before summarizing its results, Comrade Stalin announced the "correct" result: 170 million people live in the country of victorious socialism.

Human.

At present, monographs and hundreds of newspaper articles have been written about the "execution census" of 1937. It is believed that the real population according to the results of the 1937 census was 162 million. Given some increase in the population in 1938 (although this year - the year of the culmination of mass repressions - was hardly particularly "fruitful" for people), the announced official results of the 1939 census are overestimated by 6-7 million people. In other words, the real number of victims of the Stalinist repressions of the 1930s (and this is not only the "great terror" of 1937, but also dispossession, the famine of the collectivization period, the cleansing of cities from the "non-labor element", ethnic cleansing) is measured in the wrong hundreds of thousands, which are confirmed by documents of party and punitive bodies, but by many millions of people.

So there was a shortage of 6-7 million in the warehouse. The war and the post-war "recovery period" did not at all weaken either the pressure of the merciless exploitation of the "labor force" or the scale of the state's repressive policy. Millions of people driven to the "special settlement" or the so-called "worker battalions", in completely inhuman conditions, continued to dig canals, build roads, cut coal and build the next "giants of the Stalinist industry." From an endless series of testimonies, we will cite only one - a letter from an unnamed **worker to** M.I. Kalinin dated June 18, 1945: **"Uncle Tom's Cabin", but for now I will limit myself to this piece of paper ... The food is cooked much worse than a**

good owner would cook for pigs. The labor force is used not only for

highway, but more even for all sorts of amenities: foreman, construction foreman and other officials ... It would be useful to say a few words here about the children who here, like their fathers, had to drag out their miserable existence. Kids here except 300 gr. black sour (which even crackles behind the ears) bread gets nothing. Sugar appears in the store every 3 months, but even then it is not completely given out for various dark reasons ... Last winter, workers not only hungry, but also literally naked were forced to work on the highway in frosts reaching 20 degrees, where some died completely, while others were left with frostbitten members of the body ... "

How many people remained forever at these "construction sites of the century" - only God knows. And what no one knows for sure is whether Stalin believed in God and whether he was preparing to give an account at the Supreme Court. But it is known for certain that Stalin did not plan to appear before an earthly court, he did not expect an "audit commission", and he did not intend to report to the "rabble of thin-necked leaders" who surrounded him. Stalin considered it unnecessary to hide the "shortage" of many millions of his slaves in a cunning way, therefore, without a shadow of embarrassment, he named the figure of 7 million who died in the war - about the same as in Germany. And deal with the end.

Khrushchev also did not prepare for the arrival of the "revision commission" (which unpreparedness ultimately led him to the October 1964 Plenum of the Central Committee ...), and he needed a sharp - three times at once - increase in the number of war victims for purely external use. In fact, Khrushchev was the first to start a normal foreign policy. Normal in form: he traveled abroad, the top leaders of other countries came to him; Moscow hosted the International Festival of Youth and Bourgeois Directors with bourgeois films. Normal in content: the environment "has ceased to be a hostile imperialist environment", and the word "peace" itself has ceased to be perceived as a designation for this or that period of preparation for a new war. In reality of international relations, Khrushchev needed a huge, staggering number of human losses in the USSR (20 million) as an "ideological

shoe, "with which he could hit the negotiating table at the right time.

To all the "uncomfortable" questions - from timid reminders of the need to return the equipment received under Lend-Lease to demands for freedom of choice for the countries of Eastern Europe - there was one deafening answer: "Twenty million human lives! What more money do you want? We saved the world! We paid with our blood..." I remember very well how in August 1968 the Soviet people seethed with sincere indignation: "We liberated them! We put so many people, but they want to kick us out?"

And then came the enchanting era of "perestroika and glasnost". Surveying his legacy, Gorbachev (or one of his advisers) could not fail to notice the "miracles" of Stalin's demographic statistics. Accordingly, in the general series of measures for "the renewal of socialism and the democratization of inner-party life," it was decided to bring some order to the accounting of people.

So, probably, the figure of 27 million appeared. In the "fire" of the Second World War, which does not raise any doubts about its reality, it was decided to burn down the "lack" of the All-Union Census of 1937, and the horrific increase in the death rate of the civilian population in the rear, and the mass repressions of the post-war years. In a word, **to blame Stalin's crimes on Hitler.**

An authoritative commission of trusted and party-minded docents and candidates was set up under the chairmanship of Yu. A. Polyakov, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. One of the leading employees of this commission, Doctor of Historical Sciences A. A. Shevyakov, published an interesting article ("Sociological Research", No. 12 / 1991), which described the work of the commission and its results. More precisely, about how the commission fought to obtain the result entrusted to it of 27 million. It turns out that there are some "data from the State Planning Commission and the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR", but they "have not yet been found". What does "failed" mean? What does "discover" mean? I understand why expeditions of enthusiasts have not yet managed to find fragments of the "Tunguska meteorite" in the wild deserted taiga. What does the verb "detect" mean in relation to the work of the State Commission with the documents of the State Planning Commission?

From Shevyakov's article it follows that the only documentary basis was and remains the acts and messages of the ChGK. From these reports it follows that **6,390 thousand people died in the occupied territories**. Since the commission (not the ChGK, but Polyakov's commission) already knew that the losses of the Armed Forces were determined at 8.7 million and the military department did not want to increase this figure, it had to gain 18.3 million to the directive-specified 27 million. Accordingly, the only relatively reliable source - the ChGK documents - is immediately accused of being "significantly underestimated" in the figures presented in it. As it should be for a doctor of sciences, Shevyakov not only states the fact of underestimation, but also gives an explanation for it. Three reasons have been named. One is better than the other. The first two sound like this: "intensive migration of the population" and "incomplete repatriation of Soviet citizens

from abroad." Strange. Both can lead to an overestimation, but certainly not an underestimation of the number of victims. For example, the punishers burned the Belarusian village and shot its inhabitants, the ChGK counted everyone among the dead. And someone survived, went to the partisans, was wounded, taken to a hospital on the Volga, after being cured, he got married and with his young wife left for the Far East on organizational recruitment. The person is alive in reality, but no one in Belarus knows about it. This is what "intense migration of the population" is and its impact on the reporting data of the ChGK. The "incomplete repatriation of Soviet citizens from abroad" led to the same effect, to an overestimation of the number of victims, in the first post-war months - a person is listed as dead, but in fact he was rounded up, was forcibly taken to

Germany and will soon return home. The most interesting, third reason for the mythical "understatement" of the death toll in ChGK reports is, according to Dr. Shevyakov, that ChGK employees "did not **have political intuition and methods for identifying fascist atrocities**." But with this I have to categorically disagree. Something, but the "political instinct" of the Soviet officials of the Stalin era was in abundance. Without unnecessary reminders, the ChGK attributed the execution to the Germans in Katyn, revealed "fascist atrocities" in the case of mass executions by the NKVD of prisoners in the prisons of Lvov and

Vinnitsa. And each ChGK report went through a multi-stage approval process "at the very top" before its publication. So if already in 1945 the task was set to "inflate" the number of victims to 18 million, then the ChGK employees would have perfectly "smelled" this. Otherwise, they themselves would have entered the general list of "victims of the German occupiers." But they did not know what kind of task would be assigned to Soviet historians at the end of the 1980s. And they had no idea about "socialism with a human face". But is this a reason for accusations of the loss of vigilance and intuition?

Speaking seriously, the figures obtained from the ChGK reports really inspire very, very big doubts. Shevyakov gives data for each republic of the USSR, indicating the percentage of those killed in relation to the pre-war population (for the RSFSR, in relation to the number of inhabitants who fell under occupation, which number is determined at 28 million). In the pivot table it looks like this:

	тыс. человек	%%
Латвия	313,8	16,5
Литва	436,5	15,1
Белоруссия	1 547,0	15,0
Украина	3 256,2	8,1
Эстония	61,3	6,1
РСФСР	706,0	2,5
Молдавия	61,2	2,4

Could this be true? Of course not. On the eve of the war, the population of Lithuania was 2.9 million people, Latvia - 1.95 million people. And the number of civilian casualties in these two republics turned out to be higher in absolute numbers than in Russia? And the percentage of those killed in Latvia is greater than in any other republic, including Belarus (the zone of the most active partisan actions)? What does it mean? And what is the "victims of the occupiers" in relation to Latvia? There was no mass partisan movement there, moreover, Latvia was an "exporter" of punitive police battalions that committed atrocities on the territory of neighboring Belarus and Russia. There was no other "terror of the fascist invaders", except for the genocide of Jews, in Latvia, but on the eve of the war there were not 314 thousand Jews, but only 90 thousand (in

neighboring Lithuania - 250 thousand). The ratio of the number of casualties in Ukraine and in the occupied territories of the RSFSR also looks very strange. Even taking into account the fact that about 1.5 million Jews died in Ukraine, it is

strange ... It is sad that one has to guess in such a matter, but, most likely, the clue to the absurd figures lies in the fact that in the reports of the ChGK (at least in many published) the total figures of the dead local residents and prisoners of war are given, and Shevyakov interprets them as the number of dead civilians, excluding prisoners of war. With this assumption, everything immediately falls into place: the Baltic was a region where both prisoners of war and "Ostarbeiters" were driven to concentration camps. Yes, it sounds a little strange, but the "Soviet" Baltic was the recipient (!!!) of forced labor. According to the Office of Repatriation Affairs in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, at the end of the war, 227,044 civilians and 56,363 prisoners of war were taken into account, who were taken there for forced labor from other regions of the occupied territory of the USSR. Huge camps for prisoners of war were also created in Ukraine, where, moreover, the very number of prisoners of war captured by the Wehrmacht was huge (more than 1.1 million in only five "boilers": Uman, Kiev, Melitopol, Kerch and Kharkov). It remains to be assumed that due to the erroneous (if not deliberate) summation with the number

of dead prisoners of war (which we took into account in the total number of dead military personnel), even the number of 6,390 thousand civilians killed is overestimated. Shevyakov's further arguments that the Nazis deliberately spread deadly epidemic diseases to the occupied territories (i.e., in the rear of their own troops), that many "Ostarbeiters" returned to their homeland with incurable diseases, which included syphilis and gonorrhea, that the invaders secretly irradiated men with X-rays in order to reduce the birth rate, they are only interesting because a serious academic journal did not hesitate to publish such ...

What do we have as a result of discussing this extremely sad topic? The tragedy experienced by the Soviet people is terrible and has no analogues in the history of the civilized world.

11 million military dead. 5-6 million civilians
killed and tortured by the fascist invaders. More than 1 million civilians
who died in the blockade

Leningrad and Stalingrad destroyed to the ground.

Unknown exactly, but a huge (about 6-9 million) number of victims of
Stalinist repressions. And a
boundless sea of lies.

They say that now this lie will be resolutely fought. They talk on the
radio. Today, April 16, 2008, Colonel General Skvortsov, Deputy Chief of
the General Staff of the Russian Army, made a public statement. ***“The fight
against falsifications of military national history has ceased to be the
task of only the Ministry of Defense ... It is necessary to support the
initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to create an interdepartmental
working group on history under the government of the Russian
Federation in the interests of countering attempts to falsify history to
the detriment of Russia's interests ...”*** Wow ! I did not even know that
the list of tasks assigned to the military department of a great nuclear power
includes a literary polemic with the former Deputy Chief of the General
Staff, Academician M.A. Gareev and the pupils of his scientific school. In
any case, it's nice to know that I've written a very timely book. If you, dear
reader, managed to buy and read it before the interdepartmental commission
under the government of the Russian Federation had time to seriously take
up the fight against "falsifications", then I wasted my time and yours not in
vain.